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Title: The Proof of Emptiness – Bhāviveka’s *Jewel in the Hand*

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Abstract: This study seeks to examine the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka proof of emptiness in Bhāviveka’s *Jewel in the Hand* (**Karatalaratna*, KR). The proof comprises two inferences, the first of which is to the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things and the other to the ultimate unreality of unconditioned things. However, emptiness and logical reasoning are seemingly mutually-exclusive, in that emptiness is non-conceptual and ineffable while logical reasoning is conceptual and verbal. How can Bhāviveka prove emptiness by logical reasoning? The thesis addresses this theoretical tension in two parts: Part I – an introduction to the proof, and Part II – a commentary with the translation of the objections raised by the opponents and Bhāviveka’s responses related to the first inference.

Chapter 1 in Part I explains the formation of the two inferences. Chapter 2 clarifies Bhāviveka’s notions of the two truths in relation to the proof. The theoretical tension is solvable as the ultimate emptiness is understood as the expressible (*pariyāya*) ultimate truth, which is conceptual. The proof is further considered as the true (*tathya*) conventional truth, through which the realisation of the inexpressible (*apariyāya*) ultimate truth is facilitated. Chapter 3 examines the two inferences in terms of inferences for others. Although they are considered the summary of the conclusions of all individual inferences regarding the ultimate emptiness of different things, they are unestablished as standalone inferences because their reasons (*hetu*) are fallacious. Thus, they fail to prove the expressible ultimate truth. Chapter 4 suggests that the proof might be defensible referring to later developments in Buddhist logic.

Part II analyses the objections to Bhāviveka’s first inference and his notion of self-emptiness and Bhāviveka’s defences, based on the translation of the relevant part in KR. These objections are refuted by logical reasoning, although not obviously with satisfactory results.

THE PROOF OF EMPTINESS – BHĀVIVEKA’S
JEWEL IN THE HAND

by

Lai Yan Fong

A thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of
the University of Durham
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Philosophy

2015

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ABBREVIATIONS

CBETA	CBETA Chinese Electronic Tripiṭaka Collection (V5.2), distributed by the Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Association, May 2014.
DDB	Digital Dictionary of Buddhism < http://www.buddhism-dict.net/ddb/ >
GN	<i>Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa</i> by Jang-gya in “Translation of the Svātantrika chapter of Jang-gya’s <i>Presentation of Tenets</i> ” in Lopaz 1987, pp. 245-386.
HJIBS	<i>Hokkaido Journal of Indological and Buddhist Studies</i> (印度哲学仏教学)
HUSFL	<i>The Hiroshima University Studies, Faculty of Letters</i> (広島大学文学部紀要)
IJJ	<i>Indo-Iranian Journal</i>
JIBS	<i>Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies</i> (印度学仏教学研究)
JIP	<i>Journal of Indian Philosophy</i>
KDBR-KT	<i>Kanazawa daigaku bungakubu ronshū</i> (金沢大学文学部論集), Kōdōkagaku tetsugaku hen (行動科学・哲学篇)
KR	* <i>Karatala-ratna</i> by Bhāviveka. Translated into Chinese as <i>Da cheng zhang zhen lun</i> (大乘掌珍論) by Xuanzang (玄奘). CBETA, T30, no. 1578.
LRCM	<i>Lam rim chen mo</i> by Tsong-kha-pa in <i>The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment</i> , vol. 3, trans. The Lamrin Chenmo Translation Committee, eds. Joshua W. C. Cutler and Guy Newland. Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications, 2002.
MHK	<i>Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā</i> by Bhāviveka; verses 1-136 with TJ of Chapter 3 in Iida 1980, pp. 52-242; chapter 5 with TJ in Eckel 2008, pp. 213-298; chapter 6 with TJ in HE 2011, pp. 257-303.
MMK	<i>Mūlamadhyamakakārikā</i> by Nāgārjuna in Siderits and Katsura 2013.
MN	<i>Majjhima Nikāya</i>
MW	<i>A Sanskrit-English Dictionary: Etymologically and Philologically Arranged, with Special Reference to Cognate Indo-European</i>

	<i>Languages</i> , by Monier Monier-Williams. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1899. Reprinted in 1964.
NM	<i>Nyāyamukha</i> by Dignāga in Katsura 1977, 1978, 1981, 1982. See also Tucci 1930.
NP	<i>Nyāya-praveśa</i> by Śaṃkarasvāmin. Translated into Chinese as <i>Yin ming ru zheng li lun</i> (因明入正理論) by Xuanzang. CBETA, T32, no. 1630. See also Tachikawa 1971.
PEW	<i>Philosophy East and West</i>
PP	* <i>Prajñāpradīpa-mūlamadhyamaka-vṛtti</i> by Bhāviveka. Translated into Chinese as <i>Bo re deng lun shi</i> (般若燈論釋) by Prabhākaramitra. CBETA, T30, no. 1566.
PS	<i>Pramāṇasamuccaya</i> by Dignāga; chapter 1 in Hattori 1968, pp. 21-172; chapters 2 and 5 in Hayes 1988, pp. 231-308; verses 1-2 of chapter 3 in Tillemans 2000; chapters 3, 4 and 6 in Kitagawa 1965, pp. 126-351.
PSP	<i>Prasannapadā</i> of Candrakīrti; chapter 1 in Scherbatsky 1977, pp. 87-192; chapters 18 and 24 in Sprung et al. 1979, pp. 165-186, 223-246.
PSV	The <i>Vṛtti</i> of PS by Dignāga; see PS.
PTS	Pali Text Society
PV	<i>Pramāṇavārttika</i> by Dharmakīrti in “ <i>Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā</i> (Sanskrit and Tibetan),” ed. Yūsho Miyasaka, <i>インド古典研究 (Acta Indologica)</i> , 2 (1971/72): 1-219.
SA	<i>Satyābhisamaya: A Buddhist Studies Quarterly</i> (正觀雜誌)
SAT	The SAT Daizōkyō Text Database < http://21dzk.l.u-tokyo.ac.jp/SAT/ddb-bdk-sat2.php >
SGZKN	<i>Suzuki Gakujutsu Zaidan kenkyū nenpō</i> (鈴木学術財団研究年報)
SK	<i>Sāṃkhya-kārikā</i> by Īśvarakṛṣṇa in Mainkar 2004.
SN	<i>Samyutta Nikāya</i>
SNS	<i>Samdhi-nirmocana-sūtra</i> . Translated into Chinese as <i>Jie shen mi jing</i> (解深密經) by Xuanzang. CBETA, T16, no. 676.
SS	<i>Suvarṇa-saptati</i> . Translated into Chinese as <i>Jing qi shi lun</i> (金七十論) by Paramārtha. CBETA, T54, no. 2137.
T	<i>Taishō Tripiṭaka</i>

- TJ *Tarkajvālā* by Bhāviveka. See MHK.
- TS/P *Tattvasaṃgraha* by Śāntarakṣita in *The Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntarakṣita: with the Commentary of Kamalashīla*, 2 vols., trans. Ganganatha Jha. First printed in 1937 as G. O. S. No. Lxxx in Baroda. Reprinted in Delhi by Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1986.
- VV *Vigrahavyāvartanī* by Nāgārjuna in Westerhoff 2010, pp. 19-41.
- XYSJL *Xian yang sheng jiao lun* (顯揚聖教論) by Asaṅga. Translated into Chinese by Xuanzang. CBETA, T31, no. 1602.
- YB *Yogācāra-bhūmi-śāstra* by Asaṅga. Translated into Chinese as *Yu jia shi di lun* (瑜伽師地論) by Xuanzang. CBETA, T30, no. 1579.
- YMRZLLS *Yin ming ru zheng li lun shu* (因明入正理論疏) by Kuiji (窺基). CBETA, T44, No. 1840.
- WSFLJ *Wei shi fen liang jue* (唯識分量決) by Zenju (善珠). SAT, T2321, no. 71.
- Zangyao *Zangyao* (藏要), vol. 22, ed. 歐陽竟無 (Ouyang Jingwu). Taipei: 新文豐 (Xin wen feng), 1988.
- ZZLS *Zhang zhen lun shu* (掌珍論疏). CBETA, X46, no. 788.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to the ERC project Śāstravid and the Thousand Buddha Temple, under the scholarships of which I finished my PhD study. I would like to express my greatest gratitude to my supervisors Dr. Jan Westerhoff and Dr. Simon James. My research and writing have benefited a lot from their helpful advice and suggestions. I am also deeply indebted to Prof. Zhihua Yao, who kindly comments on my translation. Thanks also to Edward and Jacquelyn for their personal support and encouragement.

DEDICATION

To Plato, Valentin and all sentient beings

PART I – INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1: Preliminaries

This thesis is an examination of Bhāviveka's¹ proof of emptiness, which consists of two inferences (*anumāna*) respectively regarding the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things and of unconditioned things, in his *Jewel in the Hand* (大乘掌珍論 [*Dacheng Zhangzhen Lun*]),² **Karatalaratna*, hereafter as KR). It seeks to address some basic yet overlooked questions: can the ultimate emptiness (*śūnyatā*) of all things be proved by means of logical reasoning? If so, how is this achieved in KR? If not, what is the deficiency of the proof?

Bhāviveka is generally considered to be the first to have used the phrase *Madhyamaka*, the school of the Middle Way. His criticism of the methodology of Buddhapālita and the subsequent criticism of him by Candrakīrti contributed to the demarcation of Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka and Svātantrika-Madhyamaka by later commentators.³ It may also be considered that Bhāviveka's criticism of Yogācāra's notion of emptiness and the three natures marks the rift between Madhyamaka and Yogācāra.⁴

Bhāviveka's work, KR, was translated into Chinese by Xuanzang in the seventh century; the Sanskrit source is lost and no Tibetan translation has been found. The title *Jewel in the Hand* is translated from Chinese by Poussin in 1933 as *Joyau dans la Main* and is reconstructed into Sanskrit by Sastri in 1949 as **Karatalaratna*. To be exact, the title of this text should be translated as *The Treatise of the Jewel in the Hand of the Great Vehicle* (**Mahāyāna-Karatalaratna-Śāstra*).

Regarding the title of KR, jewels (*ratna*) represent things that are precious and excellent. In Buddhism, jewels are associated with the Buddha and his teachings, as

¹ There are other translations for the name Bhāviveka (清辯 / 清辨) (c. 490-570), e.g. Bhāvaviveka, Bhavya; see discussions in Ejima 1990, and also Iida 1980, pp. 5-6, Hsu 2013, pp. 10-12, HE and Van der Kuijp 2014a, pp. 338-341. The translation of Bhāviveka will be used throughout this thesis.

² CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 268c6-269a12 and 273b28-c20.

³ See the background of the two schools in Ruegg 2006.

⁴ See Hanson 1998, pp. 283-287. For further information on Bhāviveka's background, works and reception, see Iida 1980, pp. 5-26, Eckel 2008, pp. 9-17, Hsu 2013, pp. 10-43, Moro 2004a and 2004b.; see also HE and Van der Kuijp 2014a, Saito 2005 on the discussions on the chronology of his works.

in the case of the three jewels (i.e. the Buddha, the Dharma and the Saṃgha) in which practitioners take refuge, that illuminate the gateways and practices leading to enlightenment. Jewels in this context thus refer to the skilful means with their radiance inspiring practitioners to attain the ultimate truth. This can also be understood from the Bodhisattvas, whose statues are always adorned with jewels. They vow to save all sentient beings from the cycle of death and rebirth by their practices in the conventional world. KR is composed due to such a Bodhisattva's vow, therefore it can be considered to be one of the skilful means.⁵ Hands have a special significance in Buddhism. The palm (*karatala*) is related to the notion of quintessence. As depicted in the SN, after the Buddha achieved enlightenment, among many things he realised, he told his disciples that the most important things he had to teach are like the leaves in his hand, which represent liberation, wisdom and enlightenment and the path to *nirvāṇa*.⁶ Hence, the treatise with the title “*Jewel in the Hand*” can be understood as a quintessential means in the hands of the Bodhisattvas to facilitate others' attainment of the ultimate truth that is the ultimate emptiness of all things, in the Mādhyamika context.⁷

1.1 Dharma, satya, śūnyatā, svabhāva

First of all, I would like to define the usage of the terms in the notion “the emptiness of all things in the ultimate truth”, which is frequently mentioned in the discussion:

Dharma (法 [fa]): “*Dharmas*” will be generally translated as “things” in this thesis. While there are several meanings of *dharma*, including thing, teaching, property, etc.,⁸ *dharma* will be translated throughout this thesis in the meaning particular to the context.

⁵ See CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 268a29-b20.

⁶ Hsu 2013, pp. 44-45, and note 126; *Simsapa Sutta*, SN 56.31 [PTS: S v 437].

⁷ As Bhāviveka may be familiar with Dignāga's work *Balled Hand Treatise* (**Hastavālaprakaraṇa*, 掌中論 in CBETA, T31, no. 1621) and as he holds a critical position towards the latter's works, HE and Van der Kuijp argue that the Sanskrit title of *Jewel in the Hand* should instead be **Mahāyāna-Hastaratna-Śāstra*, so as to continue the metaphor. It is to signify one opens one's hand and discovers the jewel that is the Mādhyamika point of view, instead of making a fist and holding the Yogācāra point of view. (HE and Van der Kuijp 2014a, pp. 301-302)

A discussion on the appropriate Sanskrit title of *Jewel in the Hand* is not in the scope of this thesis. To my knowledge, the Sanskrit manuscript or any Tibetan commentaries of KR are yet to be discovered so that the original Sanskrit title of KR or its exact Tibetan translation remains unknown. For this reason, I will refer to the title **Karatalaratna* (KR) in the following.

⁸ See MW, p. 510, 3 and p. 1329, 2.

In Abhidharma, *dharma*s are the building blocks of the universe; they refer to categories of things that remain after all other gross objects are analysed to their limit. Hence to the Ābhidharmikas, *dharma*s are the ultimate existents in the universe.⁹ However, the ultimate existence of all things is denied in Madhyamaka.¹⁰ To avoid the implication of ultimate existence, *dharma*s translated as “things” in this thesis only refer to things in general. These things are divided into two categories, namely conditioned things (*saṃskṛta-dharma*) and unconditioned things (*asaṃskṛta-dharma*). The former refers to things that are produced through causes and conditions. The latter refers to things that are not produced. Their ultimate existence is to be refuted by Bhāviveka’s proof of emptiness.

When *dharma* is translated as “property”, it is employed as a logical term. It refers to the property (*dharma*) of a certain thing, with this thing being the locus (*dharmin*) of this property. This property is to be inferred (as *sādhya-dharma*) or functions to infer (as *sādhana-dharma*) in an inference. See further discussion in Section 1.3.

The notion of *dharma* as “property” is related to the notion of *svalakṣaṇa* (自相 [zi xiang]), which refers to the “peculiar characteristic or property”¹¹ of things, which is the specific characteristic that identifies a thing as such or distinguishes this thing from the others in common conception. In this thesis, *svalakṣaṇa* in this sense is translated as “distinctive characteristic”. While having a distinctive characteristic in certain doctrines may imply having a *svabhāva*, this thesis does not commit to this view. Also, *svalakṣaṇa* in Dignaga’s epistemological system is considered the object of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), which is the ineffable particularity.¹² In this case, it is translated as “particular”.

Truth and reality (*satya*): Unlike Western philosophy, Indian philosophy does not distinguish the notion of truth from that of reality or existence. To be true means to be real or existent, and vice versa. This can be understood from the Sanskrit word

⁹ See the list of *dharma*s in Lusthaus 2002, pp. 546-548.

¹⁰ See MMK 13.8.

¹¹ See MW, p. 1276, 3.

¹² See PSV of PS 1.2c2-1.2d1. (Hattori 1968, p. 24)

“*sat*”, which can mean true, real and existing.¹³ The same can also be understood from “*satya*”, which is a noun developed from “*sat*”, meaning truth and reality.¹⁴

The distinction of the two truths started in Abhidharma.¹⁵ *Dharmas* (as the building blocks of the universe) are considered the ultimate truths (*paramārtha-satya*), while concepts and gross objects are conventional truths (*saṃvṛti-satya*). Due to Madhyamaka’s understanding of the middle way (*madhyamā-pratipad*) and dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*), nothing is admitted to exist or be true in terms of the ultimate truth. Although the ultimate truth is the emptiness of all things to Madhyamaka, this ultimate truth is not taken to be true or to exist ultimately; things which are caused are conventional, otherwise they are non-existent or false even conventionally. Thus, the ultimate reality of *dharmas* in Abhidharma is denied. The same applies to other Buddhist and non-Buddhist realities.

Emptiness (*śūnyatā*) or empty (*śūnya*): This thesis involves the discussion of different notions of emptiness in Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools, which are to be refuted. E.g. Yogācāra takes emptiness as an ineffable reality and understands it as the absence of false concepts in the consciousness, while the consciousness is not empty of its own ultimate reality. The non-Buddhist realists equate emptiness with absolute non-existence. Other notions of emptiness will be specified when they are discussed.

The notion of emptiness that is discussed in relation to all Mādhyamikas, including Bhāviveka, in this thesis is clarified here: emptiness is not an ineffable reality. Things that have arisen from causes and conditions are considered to be empty, as they have to depend on, i.e. be conditioned by, other things’ existence, arising, changing and ceasing to exist conventionally.¹⁶ As these things are ever-changing and impermanent (*anitya*), they are said to be without inherent existence or inherent nature (*niḥsvabhāva*). They are only mistaken to be the ultimate existents in common conception. Further, emptiness, as ineffable and non-conceptual or conceptualised to

¹³ MW, p. 1134, 2.

¹⁴ MW, p. 1135, 3. In Newland’s words, “conventional truths are not just propositions or facts about tables, chairs, and so on; they are also those things themselves. Tables, chairs...are all conventional truths. As such, they do exist.” (Newland 2011, p. 57)

¹⁵ See further discussion in Karunadasa 2010, pp. 59-67.

¹⁶ *Assutavā Sutta*: Uninstructed (1). (SN 12.61; PTS: S ii 94)

be effable, is only a concept that is designated dependently (*prajñapti*),¹⁷ i.e. it is also conditioned and empty. It is not a reality that is true or exists in the ultimate sense. Thus, the Mādhyamika thesis, “all things are empty”, is not ultimately true either.¹⁸ Based on this clarification, this thesis does not in any way mean to imply that emptiness is an ineffable or ultimate reality in Madhyamaka.

***Svabhāva* (自性 [zì xíng]):** Madhyamaka considers things as “having a *svabhāva*” when they have a permanent, substantial existence, or independent, spontaneous existence; or when they have an unchanging, inherent nature or identity, an essence; and vice versa. These things would be ultimate truths, ultimate realities, or objects of determinate cognitions in the Mādhyamika understanding.¹⁹ In this thesis, *svabhāva* is translated as “inherent existence” or “inherent nature” to convey its general meaning, with its specific implications explained in the discussion if necessary.

Madhyamaka, as has already been clarified, considers all things as empty of *svabhāva*, i.e. being without inherent existence or inherent nature, or ultimate reality. As other Buddhist or non-Buddhist schools may have different understandings of *svabhāva*, this term will also be translated to convey other meanings specific to the context of discussion.

1.2 The tension between logical reasoning and emptiness

This section proceeds to explain the background and central question of this thesis. The tension between emptiness and a logical proof of it is fundamental, if not readily noticeable. While emptiness is considered the ultimate truth in Madhyamaka, logical reasoning always pertains to the conventional world. Their natures are generally considered mutually exclusive; with emptiness being non-conceptual and ineffable, and logical reasoning conceptual and verbal.

To Madhyamaka, what is expressed by speech or thought, as generated due to conceptual proliferations (*prapañca*), is generally considered erroneous views about things. To realise emptiness and attain the ultimate truth is to eliminate all these

¹⁷ MMK 24.18.

¹⁸ See VV 29.

¹⁹ Cf. definitions in MW, p. 1276, 1. For a discussion on the ontological and cognitive aspects of *svabhāva*, see Westerhoff 2007.

views and stop discrimination (*vikalpa*) upon things. Nāgārjuna holds that when things are realized to be neither arising nor ceasing independently in the ultimate truth, one no longer cognizes based upon the domain of her consciousness; when emptiness is attained, both conceptualization and language cease to function,²⁰ and no speech or thought will arise. Inference and logical reasoning, which deal with conceptual objects, therefore cannot function to know the ultimate truth or emptiness, as the latter is by definition not knowable by any conceptual means of knowledge.²¹

Nāgārjuna teaches that one has to rely on the conventional truth to attain the ultimate truth.²² This thus involves a change in horizon from one state which is conceptual and verbal to another which is non-conceptual and ineffable. The different attitudes towards the role of the conventional truth have given rise to the Prāsaṅgika-Svātantrika dispute. On the one hand, Candrakīrti holds that the ultimate emptiness, which is non-conceptual and ineffable, is achieved after refuting all erroneous views that arise from the conceptualization on conventional realities.²³ To do this, one should only show the contradictory consequences of the erroneous views by *reductio ad absurdum* (*prasaṅga*), instead of committing to any view.²⁴ Bhāviveka, on the other hand, accepts the reality of the conventional truth, and holds that one can attain the ultimate truth by means of it. In order to explicate the Mādhyamika thesis, “all things are empty”, to both Buddhists and non-Buddhists, he admits the legitimacy of logical reasoning and treats it as a conceptual tool to inspire one to achieve the ultimate emptiness that is non-conceptual and ineffable. This is the motive for Bhāviveka’s proof of the Mādhyamika thesis by inferences²⁵ and defence of it by logical reasoning in KR.

²⁰ See MMK 18.7.

²¹ Cf. the refutation of the ultimate reality of the various means of knowledge in VV 5-6, 30-51.

²² MMK 24.10.

²³ In his commentary of MMK 24.8 in PSP, Candrakīrti defines the worldly conventional truth (*loka-samvṛti-satya*) as concealment, and considers it in relation to social conventions that operate through language and are in dual-terms. This worldly conventional truth does not exist in the ultimate truth because there will be nothing for language to refer to, when there is no object of cognition. (PSP in Sprung et al. 1979, pp. 230-231)

²⁴ See PSP in Stcherbatsky 1977, pp. 123-124, 143-144, 147.

²⁵ There are mainly four means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) in Indian philosophy, namely direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference, analogy (*upamāṇa*) and testimony (*śabda*). Buddhist logicians generally accept direct perception and inference, and consider the rest reducible to these two. Bhāviveka is considered as accepting the conventional reality of both direct perception and inference. It is pointed out in Iida 1966, pp. 80-85 that Bhāviveka sees the Buddhist scriptures (*āgama*) (i.e. the above-mentioned testimony) as the initial and final authority, and he treats logical reasoning as a verifier of the authority of and an indispensable means to the correct understanding of these scriptures; see also Ejima 1969 and Tamura 2014.

To Candrakīrti, however, Bhāviveka's acceptance of the conventional reality and inference signals his commitment to erroneous views. His position then leads to a problem, which is seemingly not faced by the Prāsaṅgikas – how something non-conceptual (the ultimate emptiness) can be proved by something conceptual (logical reasoning). That is, how the ultimate can be proved by the conventional, which is associated with erroneous views. Candrakīrti has in fact criticized Bhāviveka for establishing a proof that is based on conventional existents, because according to the Mādhyamika thesis, Bhāviveka will have to refute their existence in the ultimate sense.²⁶ The same criticism is applicable to the conceptual emptiness, which is understood in terms of speech and thought, to be inferred by the proof. The proof only leads to a detour to the realisation of the ultimate emptiness. It is also futile to explicate emptiness to non-Buddhists and ordinary people because they only understand things in terms of either ultimate existence or absolute non-existence.²⁷ In Candrakīrti's opinion, proving emptiness is infeasible.

This thesis has no intention of taking sides with either Candrakīrti or Bhāviveka regarding the issue of whether it is appropriate to prove emptiness, since this is outside its focus. Yet parts of their dispute, which concerned the legitimacy and effectiveness of inference in Madhyamaka, represent an important phase in the development of the school. The mentioned theoretical tension and the effectiveness of the proof of emptiness, which possibly are the bases of Candrakīrti's criticisms above, are both tackled in KR. This therefore sufficiently justifies the need for a study of the proof. While Candrakīrti's criticisms are mainly mentioned in footnotes, the issue of whether or not they are justified will be evaluated on other occasions.

In this thesis, I do not want to make the claim that Madhyamaka in general has a problem in proving emptiness, as Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti have clearly denied the

²⁶ See PSP in Stcherbatsky 1977, pp. 113, 117, 119. In Candrakīrti's comments, it is a fallacy to take an unreal thing as the subject of an inference, based on Dignāga's system of logic; cf. Objection 2 in Commentary. And as Bhāviveka does not admit the ultimate reality of the reason, Candrakīrti comments that no reason should be legitimate to Bhāviveka and logical demonstration should be impossible; this issue will be discussed in Section 3.2.

²⁷ When arguing against Bhāviveka's introduction of the modifier "in terms of the ultimate truth" (see discussion below), Candrakīrti in his PSP explains that the non-Buddhists do not understand the difference between the two truths, and the ordinary people do not understand what dependent origination is. Hence, conventional realities should be refuted on both the ultimate and conventional levels. (PSP in Stcherbatsky 1977, p. 112)

ultimate reality of and the use of inference. However, it should be noted that although Bhāviveka is the sole person in Madhyamaka in his time to attempt to prove it, his influence on the common use of logical reasoning in later Madhyamaka should not be overlooked. Thus, the problem in proving emptiness is relevant at least to those Mādhyamikas who engage in such a pursuit. To contribute to the discussion of this problem, this thesis situates its study on Bhāviveka's proof of emptiness in KR. This thesis will investigate the nature of this proof and the proof's effectiveness in achieving its aim to prove the Mādhyamika thesis, under Bhāviveka's understanding of the Mādhyamika doctrine.

In this thesis, I would rather claim that while Bhāviveka never tries to prove a non-conceptual emptiness (as he holds that it is realized through meditation), he fails to prove the conceptualized emptiness. I will argue that this is because his inferences to prove this conceptualized emptiness, as evaluated in relation to Dignāga's logical system, cannot take all conditioned and unconditioned things as their subjects; while the Mādhyamika thesis is exactly about the emptiness of *all things*. In other words, "all things are empty", as a universal claim, is not provable by inference in Dignāga's logical system. Thus, neither the non-conceptual nor the conceptual emptiness is proved in KR. Although, as just noted, this thesis does not participate in the dispute between Candrakīrti and Bhāviveka, its conclusion indeed supports Candrakīrti's view that proving emptiness is infeasible, although through a different charge. And as this thesis is a contextualized study of the proof of emptiness, "emptiness is not provable in all cases" is therefore not my claim; I would only claim that Bhāviveka fails to prove the Mādhyamika thesis by inference in KR.

1.3 The formation of the two inferences in the proof

The use of inference, as a means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*), developed as a part of the culture of debate in India. The rules and practices of inference and debate evolved over time due to constant disputes among doctrines. Notably the *Nyāya Sūtra* has recorded a five-membered inferential pattern,²⁸ lists of fallacies in

²⁸ This pattern is still observed in Objection 4 in Part II. Apart from the thesis (*pratijñā*), the reason (*hetu*) and the example (*dṛṣṭānta*) (see discussion below), the opponents also include in their inference two more members (*avayava*), namely (1) application (*upanaya*), i.e. to apply the positive concomitance (*anvaya*) of the property that infers (*sādhana-dharma*) with the property to be inferred (*sādhya-dharma*) exemplified by the positive example (*sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta*) to the subject (*pakṣa*) of the inference, being also a locus (*dharmin*) of the property that infers, and (2) conclusion (*nigamana*),

inferences and faults in debates, which are considered as the generally-accepted practice of its time. Before Dignāga, the use of logical reasoning has already been observed in, for example, Nāgārjuna's **Upāyahṛdaya* and Vasubandhu's *Vādaśāstra*. In Dignāga's time, the pattern of an inference has changed to become three-membered. His logico-epistemological system (*pramāṇavāda*) has systematized again the use of inference and the related fallacies.²⁹ It can be sure that disputes among doctrines did not stop in Bhāviveka's time, thus lending support to his use of inference and logical reasoning to demonstrate his views.

Bhāviveka lived in the period between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. He has no extant works specifically on his standpoint of or innovation in logic. HE 2012 demonstrated that the logical terms in KR display a strong continuity to Dignāga's system of logic. Although Bhāviveka's proof of emptiness and explanation in KR can also be evaluated by later Buddhist logical systems or logical systems from other doctrines, to take a historical and doctrinal point of reference, they will be understood in relation to Dignāga's system of logic here. Dignāga's PS and NM are the main references. As Śāṅkarasvāmin's NP is a manual of inference for others (*parārthanumāna*) and generally considered an accurate introduction to Dignāga's system, it will also be referred to.³⁰ Thus, a standard to analyze KR is set and its limitation can be shown. This allows us to pinpoint the differences in Bhāviveka's proof and views in KR from Dignāga's system.³¹ While the process of comparing and contrasting on a textual basis to locate these differences has already been done by Ejima 1980 and HE 2012, this thesis will only discuss these differences to the extent that is relevant to the establishment of the proof (see Chapter 3).

i.e. to affirm that the subject is also the locus of the property to be inferred. Referring to the example in the discussion below, the application will be "Jars are also man-made" and the conclusion will be "Therefore, jars are impermanent."

²⁹ See further discussions on the development of Indian logic in Matilal 2001, Vidyabhusana 1971 and Tucci 1981, pp. ix-xxx.

³⁰ The same approach is also employed in Eckel 1980, pp. 365-370, Hsu 2013, pp. 111-132.

³¹ While Bhāviveka's use and understanding of inference and logical terms in KR largely conform to Dignāga's system of logic, it can also be observed that he has adapted components in his inferences to the doctrine of emptiness. Dr. Eric Greene suggested in conversation that Bhāviveka's proof might be operating under a different logical system, or that Bhāviveka did not employ any fixed system at all. I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Greene for his suggestions, but I think these suggestions require verification by further textual evidences, which are either not yet discovered or outside the scope of the present study. Further, if Bhāviveka really did not employ any particular logical system in KR, there would be the question on on what basis he regards his inference and defence established but his opponents' fallacious. If this basis is a conventional one, then it also raises the question as to what this conventional basis is; whether or not it is a set of logical and debating rules, or even a system, commonly practised in that period of time or in that particular doctrine.

There are six chapters in PS: (1) direct perception, (2) inference for oneself (*svārthanumāna*), (3) inference for others, (4) example and the fallacies of example (*dr̥ṣṭānta-dr̥ṣṭāntābhāsa*), (5) exclusion (*apoha*) of others as the meaning of a word, (6) futile rejoinder (*jāti*), respectively with similar passages found in NM. Below, Dignāga's system of logic will only be introduced in relation to inference for oneself (chapter [2]) and inference for others (covering chapters [3], [4]), and with a focus on the latter, to provide the guidelines to understand Bhāviveka's proof of emptiness. Although the discussion of inference for others also includes chapter (6), materials from chapters (1), (5), (6) will be discussed only when it is appropriate. It should be noted that, as the proof is concerned with proving the ultimate emptiness of all things to the practitioners and Bhāviveka's opponents, it will be understood in relation to Dignāga's notion of inference for others.

1.3.1 Dignāga's logical system

There are two types of objects of knowledge (*prameya*), i.e. particulars and universals (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*), in Dignāga's system. Particulars are ultimately real in the system and are cognized by direct perception of the five senses, which is free from conceptual construction (i.e. not being associated with names [*nāman*], genres [*jāti*], etc.) and inexpressible. Universals, which are concepts constructed by the mind from repeated cognitions and generalization of the particulars, are only conventionally real. They are cognized by inference, speech and thought.³² Direct perception and inference are two valid means of knowledge. Inference, which cannot cognize ultimate existents, is still recognised as such because the formation of universals is based on the existence of particulars. The speech and thought that operate in terms of universals are effective in achieving our daily activities, thus demonstrating a connection of the universals (i.e. the conventional) with the particulars (i.e. the ultimate).³³

³² See PS/V 1.2-1.5 (Hattori 1968, pp. 24-27) and note 1.14 (*ibid.*, pp. 79-80); Katsura 2007, Chu 2006 (2008). In the process of conceptual construction, universals are formed by exclusions of others (*anyāpoha*). For example, certain things are designated as "jars" by excluding all individual non-jars. Thus, the formation of the universal "jars" is based on the things that are not jars. This universal itself is not a real existent. It is only a concept expressing "not non-jar", which does not correspond to any real jars. See Chapter 5 of PS/V.

³³ Dignāga himself did not give a clear explanation on the connection between particulars and universals. How such a connection should be understood, however, is outside the scope of this thesis; see discussion in Hayes 1988, pp. 185-204.

Dignāga holds that there are two types of inference, i.e. the inference for oneself and the inference for others. Inference for oneself refers to one's own inferential process and knowledge of an object, based on the examination of this object in accordance with the three characteristics of a reason (*trairūpya*).³⁴ Inference for others is one's communication of one's knowledge obtained from the inference for oneself to others. To help others to generate the same inferential knowledge regarding the same object, one expresses one's knowledge as an inference also in accordance with the three characteristics of a reason.³⁵ Inference for others thus serves as a proof (*sādhana*).

Inference for oneself

In PS/V 4.6, differences in the process of inference for oneself and inference for others are described; regarding inference for oneself, Katsura explains,

- “(1) First we ascertain the presence of an inferential mark (*liṅga*, e.g. smoke) in the object to be inferred (*anumeya*, e.g., the top of a mountain); this is the confirmation of the first of the three characteristics (*trirūpa*) of a valid inferential mark, i.e., *pakṣadharmatva*.
- (2) Next we recall that we previously experienced elsewhere the presence of the inferential mark in what is similar to the object to be inferred (*tattulya*, e.g., a kitchen) and its absence in the absence of the property to be inferred (*asat*, e.g. a lake); this is the confirmation of the second and the third characteristics, viz., *anvaya* (a positive concomitance) and *vyatireka* (a negative concomitance).
- (3) Then we can have an ascertainment (*niścaya*) that the property to be inferred exists in the object to be inferred, as, e.g., that there must be, even though it is imperceptible, a fire at the top of the mountain.”³⁶

Central to the inferential process are the three characteristics of an inferential mark or of a reason: 1. *pakṣadharmatva*, 2. *tattulye sadbhāva*, 3. *asati nāstitā*, which are discussed in PS/V 2.5cd-2.7.³⁷ Hayes formulates the three characteristics as below:

- “1. The inferential [mark] must be a property of the subject of the inference [= object to be inferred in Katsura's explanation]. That is, there exists in the subject of

³⁴ See PS 2.1. (Hayes 1988, p. 231)

³⁵ See PS/V 3.1ab (Tillemans 2000, pp. 3-4).

³⁶ Katsura 2004, pp. 136-137 and PS of PSV 4.6 quoted in notes 4 (*ibid.*); Kitagawa 1965, p. 267. See also “*svārthānumāna*” in Nakamura 1983, pp. 193-194.

³⁷ Hayes 1988, pp. 239-242.

inference [such] a property, which is different from [the property to be inferred] and which is furthermore evident to the person drawing the inference....

2. The inferential [mark] must be known to occur in at least one locus, other than the subject of inference, in which [the property to be inferred] occurs.

3. The inferential [mark] must not be known to occur in *any* other loci in which [the property to be inferred] is absent.”³⁸

Inferential mark refers to the property that infers (*sādhana-dharma*), which is a property of the the subject of the inference that functions as an evidence to prove that this subject is also the locus of the property to be inferred (*sādhya-dharma*).³⁹ To achieve this, it must possess the three characteristics of a reason, which are also understood in terms of relations of pervasion (*vyāpti*) discussed in PS/V 2.20-2.25.⁴⁰

For the first characteristic, the subject should be pervaded by the property that infers, but not vice versa. Thus, the property that infers applies to a wider class of things than the subject does; all individual members of the subject possess the property that infers.

For the second characteristic, the property that infers should be present in some or all things, except the subject, that possess the property to be inferred (*sādhya-dharma*). Things having the property to be inferred are similar (*samāna*) to the subject, i.e. similar instances (*sapakṣa*), as the subject will be inferred to also possess such a property.⁴¹ Regarding the second characteristic, the property to be inferred pervades the property that infers, i.e. the property that infers is a member of the property to be inferred, but not of any property that is not the property to be inferred. Thus, all things that have the property that infers also have the property to be inferred. These two properties may pervade each other, but the pervasion between them is not reversible. This relationship is called *anvaya*, i.e. positive concomitance.

For the third characteristic, the property that infers is absent in all things that do not possess the property to be inferred. Things lacking the property to be inferred are

³⁸ Hayes 1988, pp. 153-154; cf. NP, where the second and the third characteristics are rendered as “*sapakṣe sattvam*” (“同品定有性”) and “*vipakṣe ’asattvam*” (“異品遍無性”) (CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 11b7; Tachikawa 1971, p. 140, Section 2.2).

³⁹ See also “*linga*” in Nakamura 1983, pp. 101-102.

⁴⁰ Hayes 1988, pp. 247-249.

⁴¹ PS/V 3.18. (Kitagawa 1965, pp. 177-178; see also Potter 2003, p. 345)

dissimilar to the subject, i.e. dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*),⁴² as the subject will be inferred to possess such a property. Regarding the third characteristic, the absence of the property to be inferred is pervaded by the absence of the property that infers, so that all things that do not possess the property to be inferred also lack the property that infers. The absences of the two properties may pervade each other, but the pervasion between them is again not reversible. This relationship is called *vyatireka*, i.e. negative concomitance.⁴³

One will then reach the ascertainment of “jars are impermanent,” i.e. jars are the loci of “impermanent”, through this inferential process: first, one ascertains that an inferential mark, “man-made”, is present in all members of the subject of inference, i.e. all jars (the first characteristic of a reason). Then one recalls that this property is also present in some or all similar instances, i.e. things that are impermanent, e.g. cloths (the second characteristic), and it is absent in all dissimilar instances, i.e. things that are not “impermanent”, e.g. space (the third characteristic). As jars are “man-made”, by analogy, one thus ascertains that jars are also “impermanent”. In this inference for oneself, “jars” is pervaded by “man-made”. “Man-made” is pervaded by the property to be inferred “impermanent”. The absence of “impermanent” is pervaded by the absence of “man-made”.

⁴² In order to reach the inferential knowledge correctly, a dissimilar instance is defined as that which is the absence (*nāstitā*) of the similar instances, and devised with the same purpose as an actual negative example to demonstrate the third characteristic of a reason (see **Inference for others**). A dissimilar instance is not (1) that which is other than (*anya*) the similar instances nor (2) that which is contradictory (*viruddha*) to them. (PS/V 3.19-3.20abc in Kitagawa 1965, pp. 179-181; see also Potter 2003, p. 345, Katsura 2003, pp. 26-30) For example, in an inference for the impermanence of jars, with the reason that they are man-made; while cloths are taken as the similar instances, in terms of (1), things other than cloths, e.g. pots, would be taken to be dissimilar instances. This is problematic because pots are indeed impermanent and man-made. Further, the third characteristic of a reason would be missing. In terms of (2), things that possess the property opposite to the property to be inferred would be taken to be the dissimilar instances. Referring to Dignāga’s example, in the inference for the presence of heat in this place, with the reason of the presence of fire, a snowy mountain (which is both cold and without fire) would be a dissimilar instance that could fulfill the third characteristic of a reason. This is still problematic because the possibility that fire is found in places which are neither hot nor cold has not been excluded, thus failing to secure the second characteristic of a reason.

⁴³ Katsura suggested that Dignāga takes the second and the third characteristics as logically equivalent (Katsura 1983, p. 19), with the positive concomitance understood as “if p, then q” and the negative concomitance as “if ~q, then ~p”, or as “whatever is p is q” and “whatever is not q is not p” (p = the property that infers; q = the property to be inferred). Due to the subject, which also possesses the property that infers, is required to be excluded from the domain of similar instances in Dignāga’s inference, this view of Katsura or Dignāga is shown to be untenable; see detailed discussion in Tillemans 1999, pp. 114-115, notes 41 and 42. For this reason, the positive concomitance and negative concomitance will not be treated as logically equivalent in this thesis.

Inference for others

Inference for others also operates based on the three characteristics of a reason and the relations of pervasion explained in relation to inference for oneself. Referring to PS/V 4.6 again, Katsura translates:

“...with a desire to produce for others the same ascertainment (*niścaya*) as we ourselves have obtained, we refer to (1) [a reason’s (*hetu*)] being a property of the topic (*pakṣa*) of a proposition (*pakṣadharmatva*), (2) [its inseparable] relation (*sambandha*) [with that which is to be proved] and (3) the [proposition] to be proved (*sādhya*). Other items should be excluded [from the members of a proof].”⁴⁴

“(1) The statement of a proposition (*pakṣa-vacana*) is made in order to indicate the state of affairs to be inferred (*anumeya*).

(2) The statement of a reason (*hetu-vacana*) is made in order to indicate that the reason is a property of the topic under discussion (*pakṣadharmatva*).”

(3) The statement of an example (*drṣṭānta-vacana*) is made in order to indicate that the reason is inseparably related (*avinābhāva*) to the property to be inferred (*anumeya*).”⁴⁵

In order to produce the same ascertainment that one has obtained from inference for oneself for others, three members (*avayava*): the statement of a proposition or a thesis (= *pratijñā*), the statement of a reason and the statement of an example, are devised in an inference for others:

The thesis consists of the topic of the proposition, i.e. the subject of an inference, and the property to be inferred in relation to the subject.⁴⁶ It does not prove anything, but only to serve to indicate the state of affairs to be inferred,⁴⁷ i.e. that the subject being the locus (*dharmin*) of the property to be inferred.

⁴⁴PS 4.6: *svaniścayavad anyeṣāṃ niścayotpādanecchayā | pakṣadharmatvasambandhasādhyokter anyavarjanam ||*. (Katsura 2004, p. 137 and note 6 = Kitagawa 1965, p. 268, note 576) Cf. NM in Section 5.5 of Katsura 1981, pp. 73-76; Tucci 1930, pp. 44-45. See also “*parārthānumāna*” in Nakamura 1983, pp. 118-120.

⁴⁵ PSV of PS 4.6: *gañ gi phyir phyogs kyi chos ñid bstan pa’i don du gtan tshigs brjod pa dan | yan de’i rjes su dpag par bya ba dan med na mi ’byun ba’i don du dpe brjod pa dan | rjes su dpag par bya ba yin pa’i don du phyogs brjod pa ste rjes su dpag pa’i yan lag gžan yod pa ma yin no || de’i phyir gžan dag ni šes pa la sogs pa rnams dan ñe bar sbyor ba dan mjug bsdu ba dag ’dir spañs pa yin no ||*. (Katsura 2004, pp. 138-139 and note 7 = Kitagawa 1965, pp. 521-522)

⁴⁶ PS/V 3.10. (Kitagawa 1965, pp. 151-152; see also Potter 2003, p. 344)

⁴⁷ PS/V 3.1cd. (Tillemans 2000, p. 4)

The statement of a reason consists of the subject of the inference and the property that infers, which is a property that is known to be present in the subject either by perception or inference.⁴⁸ This refers to the first characteristic of a reason, and the reason-statement serves to indicate this. The property that infers here should be recognised by both the proponent of the inference and her opponents. The subject should also be admitted to be real by both parties.⁴⁹

The statement of an example, according to PS 4.1, serves to present the second and the third characteristics of a reason (i.e. the inseparable relation, being the positive or negative concomitance, between the property that infers and the property to be inferred), as the reason-statement only presents the first characteristic.⁵⁰ As the second and the third characteristics should also be recognised by both parties in the debate,⁵¹ the examples should exemplify them and also be mutually recognized to be legitimate. An example statement consists of a statement expressing the positive or the negative concomitance and an actual example in our experience.⁵² There are two kinds of example-statement, positive (*sādharmya*) and negative (*vaidharmya*). The former presents the positive concomitance and an actual positive example, while the latter presents the negative concomitance and an actual negative example.⁵³ An actual positive example is selected from the domain of similar instances, i.e. things that possess the property to be inferred; it is a similar instance that at the same time possesses the property that infers, demonstrating the said positive concomitance. An actual negative example is selected from the domain of dissimilar instances, i.e. things that do not possess the property to be inferred; as it also lacks the property

⁴⁸ See PSV of PS 2.5cd. (Hayes 1968, pp. 239-240)

⁴⁹ PS 3.11-3.12. (Kitagawa 1965, pp. 153-156; see also Potter 2003, p. 344)

⁵⁰ Katsura 2004, p. 140 and PS 4.1 quoted in note 1: *trirūpo hetur ity uktam pakṣadharme tu saṁsthitaḥ | rūḍhe rūpadvayaṁ śeṣaṁ dṛṣṭāntena pradarśyate ||*. (*Ibid.* = Kitagawa 1965, p. 239) Cf. NM in Section 5.6 of Katsura 1981, pp. 76-78; Tucci 1930, pp. 45-46.

⁵¹ NM in Section 2.2 in Katsura 1977, pp. 122-123; Tucci 1930, p. 13.

⁵² Dignāga insists that a statement expressing the positive or the negative concomitance, in the form of, e.g., whatever is man-made is impermanent, or whatever is not impermanent is not man-made, should be included in an example-statement. According to Katsura, including such a statement in the example-statement amounts to meaning that the universal relation which it expresses is observed (*dṛṣṭa*, cf. the word *dṛṣṭānta* [i.e. the example]), thus suggesting that this statement “does not necessarily imply a universal law but rather assumes a general law derived from our observations or experiences.” (Katsura 2004, p. 145 and note 18) In this respect, PS 4.11 holds that this statement is required, in addition to an actual example, in an example-statement because further examples and hence an infinite regress, will result if a general law of pervasion were not stated. (Kitagawa 1965, p. 273; see also Potter 2003, p. 349) According to Katsura’s analysis, to Dignāga the purpose of giving actual examples is therefore “to indicate some positive support in the external reality”. (Katsura 2004, p. 155 and note 28)

⁵³ PS 4.2. (Katsura 2004, p. 141 and note 11; Kitagawa 1965, p. 240)

that infers, it demonstrates the said negative concomitance.⁵⁴ The actual positive example functions to affirm that there are some experiential things, which possess the property that infers, also possessing the property to be inferred, while negating that they possess the opposite of the property to be inferred. The actual negative example only functions to exclude any other things that lack the property to be inferred from having the property that infers.⁵⁵ Dignāga holds that both positive and negative example-statements are required to form an inference for others; except when one of the examples is already well-known to the opponents, it is sufficient to state only the other, or when both examples are well-known to the opponents, it is sufficient to state only one of them.⁵⁶

The inferential process of an inference for others is similar to that of an inference for oneself. In order to produce the same inferential knowledge one has obtained in

⁵⁴ Dunne 2004, p. 30.

⁵⁵ NM: 前是遮詮，後唯止濫。(CBETA, T32, no. 1628, 2c8-c9; Section 5.1 in Katsura 1981, pp. 63-65); Tucci 1930, p. 37 translates: The first example is negative and affirmative, the second is merely exclusive.

⁵⁶ PSV of PS 4.5 (Katsura 2004, pp. 167-168 and note 51 in *ibid.*, pp. 168-169; Kitagawa 1965, pp. 266); Cf. NM in Section 5.4 in Katsura 1981, pp. 71-72; see also Tucci 1930, pp. 42-44.

On the other hand, a question arises as to whether actual examples are indeed irrelevant in proving a thesis. On the basis of Katsura's view that Dignāga takes the second and the third characteristics of a reason as logically equivalent, the positive concomitance and the negative concomitance can further be understood as premises of a deductive argument, and only one of them is required. With the first characteristic also understood as a premise, an inference for others can be interpreted as:

(Second characteristic:)	Whatever is man-made is impermanent.
(First characteristic:)	Jars are man-made.
(Thesis:)	Jars are impermanent.

As the conclusion, i.e. the thesis, can be deduced by merely considering the logical relationship between the terms, actual examples have become irrelevant in the inferential process.

However, this view is not taken in this thesis. First, based on the discussion of examples and fallacious examples in chapter 4 of PS/V and in NM (see Katsura 1981), Dignāga does hold that the positive concomitance and the negative concomitance have to be exemplified by actual examples (see footnote 50) to convince the opponents. Also, it should be noted that the second and the third characteristics are not logically equivalent, no matter whether or not Dignāga intends them to be so (see footnote 43). Inference indeed involves inductive reasoning and analogy. For example (the second characteristic:) whatever is man-made is impermanent. The concept of "man-made" does not originally imply the concept of "impermanent" (as seen in the situation where the opponents disputing the positive concomitance). The general relation of the two concepts is rather established by referring to the experiential objects, i.e. the domains of similar instances and dissimilar instances, from which this relation is derived. The thesis of an inference is proved analogically with reference to the positive concomitance and the negative concomitance exemplified by the actual examples selected from the domains of similar instances and dissimilar instances. Thus, I share the view that inference in the Buddhist logico-epistemological school is not intended to be deductive argument or formal logic (see also Hayes 1988, p. 154, Tillemans 1999, p. 100 and p. 114 note 40, Sidierits 2003, p. 317, Dunne 2004, p. 31, note 41). While interpreting inference as deductive argument may also yield fruitful results (with the difference between inference and deductive argument noted), as this is outside the scope of this study, I will leave this approach to my future research.

others, instead of inferring in one's own mind, the inferential process is now demonstrated by an inference consisting of a thesis, a reason-statement and example-statement(s). As mentioned, one (the proponent of the inference) should state a reason, in which the reality of the subject and its property (i.e. the property that infers) are also recognised by others (the opponents). The proponent then demonstrates to the opponents the positive and the negative concomitances between the property that infers and the property to be inferred by the actual positive and negative examples. In this way, the opponents engage in an inferential process similar to that of the proponent's inference for herself. Except that they may dispute the three characteristics of a reason and various components of the inference (see **Fallacies**), and therefore the proponent has to defend her inference (see the objections and responses in Part II.) If the opponents also accept the thesis, being the conclusion of the inferential process of an inference for others, which is the same as the conclusion of the inferential process of an inference for oneself, the thesis is considered proved.

Before further discussion, the translation and usage of the aforementioned logical terms in this thesis are clarified as follow:

1. *Pakṣa* sometimes refers to the object to be inferred (*anumeya*) or topic (*pakṣa*) of the proposition, while sometimes referring to the statement of the proposition or the thesis (*pakṣa-vacana*).⁵⁷ Below, *pakṣa* is restricted to mean the object to be inferred, i.e. “the subject” of an inference; the proposition-statement will be referred to as “the thesis”.
2. “Reason” (*hetu*) sometimes refers to the statement of reason (*hetu-vacana*), which is a member in an inference, while sometimes referring to the inferential mark (*liṅga*), which is the property that infers (*sādhana-dharma*).⁵⁸ Below, “reason” is restricted to mean the reason-statement. The inferential mark will be referred to as “the property that infers”.
3. *Trirūpa* will still be referred to as “the three characteristics of a reason” as it is commonly used. The second characteristic of a reason and the positive concomitance of the property that infers with the property to be inferred will be used

⁵⁷ See Staal 2001, pp. 158-159.

⁵⁸ See Katsura's comment in Potter 2003, p. 347.

interchangeably, with the former emphasizing the characteristic that a reason should have to be qualified as legitimate, and the latter emphasizing the relation of pervasion between the two properties. The same applies to the third characteristic and the negative concomitance of the two properties, and similarly to the first characteristic.

4. “Example” (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) sometimes refers to the statement of example (*dr̥ṣṭānta-vacana*), which is a member of an inference, while sometimes referring to the actual example, which is a component of the example-statement.⁵⁹ Below, “example” is restricted to mean the actual example. It will be specified when it refers to the example-statement.

5. A “similar instance” (*sapakṣa*) is similar to the subject because it possesses the property to be inferred, while sometimes it also designates the actual positive example. However, a similar instance is not necessarily a positive example. As explained, it can be one only when it also possesses the property that infers. Below, “similar instances” are restricted to only mean instances that possess the property to be inferred. “Positive examples” are restricted to mean similar instances that possess both the property to be inferred and the property that infers, and that are used to exemplify the said positive concomitance.⁶⁰ The same applies to negative examples and dissimilar instances.

6. As inference is different from deductive argument in Western logic; it will not be described as “valid” or “sound” in the following discussion. When the opponents accept the proponent’s thesis, or after the proponent has successfully defended the inference from attribution of fallacies by her opponents, the inference is considered “established” (*siddha*) or its thesis proved. Otherwise, it is unestablished (*asiddha*). When components in an inference are found to be fallacious, they are also called unestablished in KR.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ See Katsura 2003, p. 31. Further, the difference between a similar instance and a positive example can be clarified with reference to some positive examples, which are fallacious because they do not possess the property that infers, although being similar instances, i.e. having the property to be inferred. These examples may present the type of reason which is considered indeterminate (*anaikāntika*) and fallacious (see below). Taking similar instances to be the same as positive examples would mean that all similar instances possess the property that infers, and therefore the mentioned fallacious example and reason would be impossible. Although dissimilar instances are devised with the same purpose as negative examples (see also footnote 42), due to the fact that there are fallacious negative examples that do not possess the property to be inferred but possessing the property that infers, dissimilar instances are also distinguished from negative examples here.

Previously, a person has obtained the inferential knowledge regarding “jars are impermanent” through an inference for oneself. Now this person attempts to convince others (her opponents) to accept the same inferential knowledge in a debate, she therefore proposes a three-membered inference:

Thesis: Jars are impermanent,

Reason: because jars are man-made,

Positive Example: whatever is man-made is impermanent, like cloths, etc.;

Negative Example: whatever is not impermanent is not man-made, like space.

“Jars are impermanent”, which is the conclusion of the proponent’s inference for herself, is taken up as the thesis in her inference for others. In order to prove that jars are the loci of the property to be inferred (“impermanent”), the proponent first states the reason, “because jars are man-made”, in which the reality of jars is recognised by both herself and her opponents. They also agree that the property that infers, i.e. “man-made”, is the property of all jars. Thus, the reason possesses the first characteristic of a reason. Then, the proponent states the positive example, “cloths”, to exemplify the positive concomitance of “man-made” with “impermanent”, and the negative example, “space”, to exemplify the negative concomitance of the two properties. Thus, the reason also possesses the second and the third characteristics. As “cloths, etc.” which are “man-made” are also “impermanent”, so should “jars”. “Space” is both “permanent” and “not man-made”, lacking the properties of “cloths”. While “jars” are “man-made”, “jars” should not be “permanent”. In this way, the proponent attempts to convince her opponents to accept the thesis “jars are impermanent”.

Fallacies

There are fallacies which may be found in various components in an inference. The opponents can refute the inference by pointing out any one of them. A list of these fallacies in Dignāga’s logical system was discussed in NP.⁶¹

A thesis is fallacious in the following situations:

⁶¹ Similar discussions are found in PS/V 3.2cd (Tillemans 2000, pp. 5-6), 3.21-3.22 (Kitagawa 1965, pp. 185-192; Potter 2003, pp. 345-346; see also Dignāga’s *Hetucakra* in HE and Van der Kuijp 2014b), 4.13-4.14 (Kitagawa 1965, pp. 277-281; Potter 2003, p. 349).

- (1) the thesis or the property to be inferred in relation to the subject is contradicted by perception, inference, scriptures, common knowledge, or be self-contradictory;
- (2) the existence of the subject, the property to be inferred, or both are not admitted by the opponents;
- (3) the thesis, i.e. the subject being the locus of the property to be inferred, is well-established so that a proof for this is not needed.⁶²

As the subject and its properties are often experiential, their relation may be disputed by the opponents. While it is impossible for the proponent to cite all examples to the opponents to establish necessary relations between the property that infers and the property to be inferred, opponents may also give counter-examples to such relations. This will demonstrate the fallacies either in the reason or the example, or both.

Regarding the reason, NP lists three kinds of fallacies; (1) is related to the first characteristic of a reason, while (2) and (3) are related to the second and the third characteristics:

- (1) the property that infers is not recognised (*asiddha*) (a) by either the proponent, the opponents, or both; (b) because its existence is in doubt; (c) because the existence of its locus is not admitted.
- (2) the property that infers is indeterminate (*anaikāntika*) when (a) it occurs in some or all of both similar instances and dissimilar instances; (b) it occurs in neither similar instances nor dissimilar instances; (c) a contradictory thesis can be established by another legitimate reason.
- (3) the property that infers is contradictory (*viruddha*) when (a) it infers the opposite of the distinctive characteristic (*svarūpa*) or the implied characteristic (*viśeṣa*) of the property to be inferred; (b) it infers the opposite of the distinctive characteristic or the implied characteristic of the subject.⁶³

⁶² CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 11b24-11c9; Tachikawa 1971, pp. 122-123.

⁶³ CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 11c9-12a28; Tachikawa 1971, pp. 123-126.

Regarding the positive example-statement or the positive example, NP lists the following fallacies:

- (1) the property that infers, the property to be inferred, or both do not occur in the positive example.
- (2) the statement expressing the positive concomitance is missing in the example-statement, or the pervasion of the property that infers by the property to be inferred is expressed in reversed order.⁶⁴

Fallacies in the negative example-statement or the negative example are committed under similar situations.

Sometimes, these fallacies are wrongly attributed to the proponent's inference and should be rejected.⁶⁵ There are also faults that the proponent or her opponents may commit in their debate, thus resulting in the loss of either party. They are called the points of defeat (*nigrahassthāna*).⁶⁶ As not all these fallacies or points of defeat are found in KR, they will be discussed in detail in Part II when they occur.

1.3.2 Bhāviveka's proof

The two inferences in the proof of emptiness in KR⁶⁷ are understood in terms of the inference for others discussed above:

First inference

Thesis: In terms of the ultimate truth, conditioned things are empty,

Reason: because they arise from conditions,

Positive Example: like illusions.

⁶⁴ CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 12a29-12b25; Tachikawa 1971, pp. 126-128.

⁶⁵ See Chapter 6 of PS/V. (Kitagawa 1965, pp. 282-351; see also Potter 2003, pp. 360-362)

⁶⁶ See Vidyabhusana 1971, pp. 84-90.

⁶⁷ KR 1: 真性有為空，如幻，緣生故。| 無為無有實，不起，似空華。|| (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 268b21-b22) Poussin has reconstructed the Sanskrit of the two inferences as follows: *tattvataḥ saṃskṛtāḥ śūnyā māyāvat pratyayodbhavāḥ | asaṃskṛtās tv asadbhūtā anutpādāt khaṇḍapavāt ||*. (Poussin 1933, p. 70, note 1) The below introduction on their formation is based on Bhāviveka's explanation in KR in CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 268c6-269a12 and 273c2-c20; see also HE 2012, pp. 6-12, Hsu 2013, pp. 125-128.

Second inference

Thesis: In terms of the ultimate truth, unconditioned things have no reality,

Reason: because they do not arise,

Positive Example: like a sky-flower.

It is observed that in the example-statements of both inferences, Bhāviveka did not provide the statement that expresses the positive concomitance, but considered it implicit. This can be understood from Bhāviveka's explanations of why illusions and a sky-flower are employed as the positive examples in KR; these show that he formed the third member of his inferences with the second characteristic of a reason in mind (see below). Although this shortened form of the third member (with an actual example only) constitutes a fallacy in the example-statement in Dignāga's logical system, it is employed in debates in which the proponent and the opponents both understand the positive concomitance that is implied by the actual example, and is not objected to. Indeed, this shortened form of the third member is not disputed by Bhāviveka's Buddhist and non-Buddhist opponents in KR. It is also used throughout the text of KR (see Part II). For this reason, this shortened form will not be evaluated as a formal fallacy here.⁶⁸

Terms used in both inferences are defined below:

In the first inference, to be "arisen from conditions" means to be jointly produced by the cause (*hetu*), i.e. the direct cause, and other conditions (*pratyaya*), i.e. the auxiliary causes, as stated by Bhāviveka.⁶⁹ Such an assemblage of cause and conditions is generally referred to as "conditions". "Arisen from conditions" therefore refers to all possible circumstances of causation where a thing has arisen dependently, and thus also including "arisen by virtue of conditions" and "being

⁶⁸ See Dunne 2004, pp. 34-35 and note 45 for a similar approach.

⁶⁹ In Abhidharma, there are the doctrines of the six causes and the four conditions. Here, it is possible that Bhāviveka is considering the doctrine of four conditions of Abhidharma, namely the condition qua cause (*hetu-pratyaya*) which is the direct cause, the immediately preceding condition (*samanantara-pratyaya*) which is the condition of arising of the immediately succeeding result, the object as condition (*ālambana-pratyaya*) for the cognition, and the dominant condition (*adhipati-pratyaya*) which is the efficient cause that directly contributes to the arising of the result or indirectly contributes by not hindering it. The six types of causes include the efficient cause (*kāraṇa-hetu*), the homogeneous cause (*sabhāga-hetu*), the universal cause (*sarvatraga-hetu*), the retribution cause (*vipāka-hetu*), the co-existent cause (*sahabhū-hetu*) and the conjoined cause (*saṃprayuktaka-hetu*). Since the two doctrines are not significant to the present discussion, I will not explain them further. For details, see Chapters 6 and 7 in Dhammajoti 2009, pp. 143-185.

manifested by conditions”. Its opposite is “not arising from any cause or condition”, which is meant by “not arising” in the second inference.

In relation to whether or not to arise from conditions, there are two categories of objects of cognition in the conventional world, namely “conditioned things” and “unconditioned things”. In KR, conditioned things are those which are produced by the assemblage of conditions, i.e. “arisen from conditions”. They include the twelve *āyatana*s, i.e. the six sense organs (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind) and their respective objects (colour and form, sound, smell, taste, touch, mental object),⁷⁰ but exclude part of the *dharma-āyatana* which are the four mental objects, i.e. space (*ākāśa*), cessation through deliberation (*pratisamkhyā-nirodha*), cessation independent of deliberation (*apratisamkhyā-nirodha*) and suchness (*tathatā*). These four objects are considered by some as unconditioned things, i.e. the opposite of conditioned things, as they are not produced by conditions, i.e. “not arising”.⁷¹ A thing can only be “conditioned” (“arisen from conditions”) or “unconditioned” (“not arising”), not both nor neither.

Regarding the “ultimate truth” (**tattvata*) that modifies both theses, Bhāviveka explains that it refers to the ultimate truth itself (see Section 2.3).⁷² This modifier (**viśeṣaṇa*) functions to avoid the contradiction that emptiness may have with what is accepted by Bhāviveka himself, i.e. the existence of conventional things, which are also the causes and conditions for the arising of ordinary perception, and with the

⁷⁰ There are eighteen *dhatū* in Buddhist philosophy. They are the twelve *āyatana*s plus the six respective consciousnesses, i.e. the visual consciousness, aural consciousness, olfactory consciousness, gustatory consciousness, tactile consciousness and mental consciousness. As the six consciousnesses also arise from conditions, it is unclear why Bhāviveka did not include them among the conditioned things. As the emptiness of the non-discriminating knowledge is discussed in KR after that of the conditioned and unconditioned things, it is possible that he intends to establish the emptiness of consciousness in general after that of the twelve *āyatana*s. If this is true, it may be assumed that KR is presenting a gradual teaching in relation to the Mādhyamika thesis regarding the emptiness of all things; first on the conditioned and unconditioned things as the twelve *āyatana*s (as the objects) and then the consciousnesses (as the subjects of cognition). A similar approach can be found in TS/P.

As a Mādhyamika, Bhāviveka does not hold the view that anything, including consciousness, should be real in the ultimate sense. For the sake of illustration, I have included the six consciousnesses into the discussion of conditioned things, and thus the scope of application of the proof of emptiness, unless there are further sources to indicate otherwise.

⁷¹ The first three are the three unconditioned things in the Sarvāstivādin doctrine, while the last is held by Yogācāra in relation to their doctrine of the three natures; see Section 2.4 for a discussion on these objects.

⁷² It should be noted that Bhāviveka denies the ultimate reality of this ultimate truth or of the ultimate emptiness of things that he takes to be established by his proof (see Section 1.1).

common knowledge that conditioned things have an inherent existence. Therefore, conditioned things are to be inferred to be empty only in the ultimate sense but not in the conventional sense.⁷³ In terms of the ultimate truth, the “emptiness” of conditioned things is synonymous to “the lack of an inherent existence”; with both emptiness and the lack of an inherent existence of the character of a false appearance or an illusion.⁷⁴ In terms of the same, the “emptiness” of unconditioned things is synonymous to “unreality”⁷⁵ because these things do not arise even on a conventional level and are therefore non-existent on the same level.

There are three members, i.e. a thesis, a reason and a positive example in each inference. In the first inference, the thesis, “in terms of the ultimate truth, all conditioned things are empty”, is the conclusion to be proved by the inference. Bhāviveka attempts to infer the subject “conditioned things” as possessing the property “empty”, which is not initially agreed by other parties in the debate, from the property that infers, i.e. “arisen from conditions”, which has been commonly agreed as being possessed by the conditioned things. The positive example “illusions” are the similar instances (being “empty”) that at the same time possess the property that infers (“arisen from conditions”), exemplifying the positive concomitance of “arisen from conditions” with “empty”. A negative example is absent.⁷⁶ The second inference is understood in a similar way.

Regarding the first characteristic of a reason, the property “arisen from conditions” occurs in all members of “conditioned things”, while “not arising” in all “unconditioned things”. As “conditioned things” are defined as those which are “arisen from conditions”, “conditioned things” and “arisen from conditions” apply to the same class of things; the same is true of “unconditioned things” and “not arising”.

Regarding the second characteristic, the property that infers (“arisen from conditions”) occurs in some similar instances that possess the property to be inferred (“empty”), while “not arising” in some similar instances that possess “unreal” (synonymous to “empty”). The positive concomitance of the property that infers

⁷³ KR: 就勝義諦立有為空，非就世俗。

⁷⁴ KR: 「空」與「無性」虛妄顯現門之差別。(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 268c19)

⁷⁵ KR in CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 273c4, c9, c10.

⁷⁶ KR in CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 268c29, 273c13.

with the property to be inferred is demonstrated by a positive example in both inferences. As “illusions” are commonly recognised as “arisen from conditions” and as false appearances that lack an inherent existence but appear as such, i.e. “empty”, they are taken as the positive example in the first inference. A “sky-flower” means a flower of the sky.⁷⁷ Since a flower does not arise in the sky, a sky-flower is an unconditioned thing and is commonly recognised by ordinary people as not existent even conventionally. As it is both “not arising” and “unreal”, it is taken as the positive example in the second inference. As “empty” pervades both “arisen from conditions” and “not arising”, things that are “arisen from conditions” and “not arisen”, i.e. all (conditioned and unconditioned) things, are therefore “empty”.

As there are no dissimilar instances or negative examples in either inference, the third characteristic is considered absent (see Section 3.3.2).

Although conditioned things are arisen from conditions, and thus do not have an inherent existence in terms of the ultimate truth, they are conceptualised to have one. In order to prove this to be an erroneous view, conditioned things are stated as “empty in terms of the ultimate truth”, which is supported by the reason “because they arise from conditions” and the positive example “illusions”.⁷⁸ As illusions have demonstrated a general observation that things arisen from conditions are also empty in the ultimate sense, so should conditioned things, having arisen from conditions, be empty in the same sense. And although unconditioned things do not arise at all, and thus do not exist at all, they are still conceptualized to be real in terms of the ultimate truth. For the same reason, they are stated as “unreal in terms of the ultimate truth”, with the reason “because they do not arise” and the positive example “a sky-flower” in the second inference. As a sky-flower has demonstrated a general observation that things which do not arise are also unreal in the ultimate sense, so should unconditioned things, which do not arise, be unreal in the same sense.

⁷⁷ According to KR, “sky-flower” (*kha-puṣpa*) is understood in terms of the sixth type, i.e. the genitive type of *tatpuruṣa*, meaning that the first member “sky” (*kha*) is in the genitive case (MW, p. 1110, 1); hence, flower of the sky (see CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 274a13).

⁷⁸ It is noted in KR that the positive concomitance of the property that infers and the property to be inferred in the subject, which is to be established by a positive example, does not require the subject possessing all the properties identical with those of the positive example; see KR in CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 268c22-c25.

It can be noticed that similar inferences can be found particularly in Chapter 3 of MHK/TJ, in which individual conditioned things and unconditioned things are established to be empty by separate inferences.⁷⁹ As Bhāviveka composes KR to help practitioners easily realise the true emptiness and quickly penetrate into the nature of things,⁸⁰ the proof of emptiness in KR is different in the way that it seeks to establish the Mādhyamika thesis at one time; it sets out to deal with the whole categories of conditioned things and unconditioned things, attempting to establish each category as a whole as empty. Individual things are discussed only when it is appropriate to cite concrete instance for the discussion to proceed, which ultimately serves to establish the two inferences regarding the ultimate emptiness of all things. Thus, the proof of emptiness in KR can be understood as establishing the overall conclusion of Chapter 3 of MHK.

Further, referring to the fallacies discussed in Section 1.3.1, two basic criteria to establish an inference for others are summarized here: (1) only terms whose concepts are commonly agreed upon can be used; (2) the reason should be commonly agreed as possessing the three characteristics. Due to the emphasis on the mutual agreement between the proponent and the opponents on (1) and (2), later Chinese commentators, such as Kuiji, consider this type of inference an inference for both oneself (i.e. the proponent) and others (i.e. the opponents), i.e. a common inference.⁸¹ Inferences in KR are considered as inferences of this type.⁸² Although Bhāviveka did not mention the two criteria in KR, as shown in his response, he does often try to refute the accusations of his opponents about the fallacies resulting from his alleged violation of these criteria. This is done not by denying these criteria, but by clarifying that these criteria are not violated or by explaining away the fallacies concerned (see Part II).

Also, it should be noted that Bhāviveka's opponents do not conceive of the truth or existence of things in terms of whether they are conventional or ultimate, unlike Dignāga and Madhyamaka. To these opponents, everything in their experience or

⁷⁹ See Iida 1980, pp. 53-54 for the list of these conditioned things and unconditioned things.

⁸⁰ See CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 268b20.

⁸¹ The term "common inference" translates the Chinese term "共比量".

⁸² See YMRZLLS in CBETA, T44, no. 1840, 115c2-c3 and 116b18-b20; WSFLJ in SAT, T2321, no. 71, 449b17-b18.

whatever is knowable and expressible is true and real in the ultimate sense (in Mādhyamika terminology); otherwise these things are false and non-existent in the absolute sense. To them, inference, as a valid means to knowledge, is considered to generate knowledge (i.e. the thesis) that is ultimately true. Things which are known through inference (i.e. the subject and its properties) are also real ultimately. The inference, as a knowable thing, is also a real existent. In this way, the inference is considered as established in the ultimate sense, in the Mādhyamika understanding. By contrast, inference is conceptual to Dignāga and Bhāviveka. Therefore, it can only generate conventionally true knowledge. The inference itself and the things it refers to are also conventional existents. In the context of the two truths, an inference is considered established to the extent that its thesis is true only conventionally, with the subject and its properties only conventionally real (i.e. the inference itself and the inferential knowledge are neither true nor real ultimately). In this sense, an inference is considered established conventionally. The problems from the conventional and ultimate establishment of an inference will be further addressed in this thesis.

Finally, from the introduction above, features in Bhāviveka's inferences, which are different from a standard inference by Dignāga, can be observed, namely the use of a modifier in the thesis and the lack of negative examples. Together with another feature, i.e. the use of non-implicative negation (which will be introduced in Chapter 3),⁸³ these features will be discussed in relation to the establishment of the proof of emptiness in Chapter 3.

1.4 Previous Research

Bhāviveka's proof as a conceptual tool in inspiring one to attain the ultimate emptiness that is non-conceptual and ineffable raises the questions as to whether the Mādhyamika thesis can be proved by the two inferences and under what circumstance, if any. The formation and establishment of the proof in turn determine the proof's legitimacy and effectiveness in achieving its aim. However, these issues are not sufficiently dealt with, particularly in the first two groups of research literature as outlined below.

⁸³ See also Ejima 1980, pp. 102-137 and HE 2012. Kajiyama also includes the negation of the *prasaṅga-vākya* (the unique method of the *Prāsaṅgikas*) into the list. (Kajiyama 1957, p. 305)

The first group is concerned with the discussions on the Prāsaṅgika-Svātantrika dispute.⁸⁴ While standpoints from both sides are described and sometimes compared, based on Candrakīrti's PSP and *Madhyamakāvatāra*, and Bhāviveka's MHK and PP, discussions usually only focus on one side. Bhāviveka's standpoint in KR and his proof of emptiness are seldom examined.

The second group is concerned with the textual studies of Bhāviveka's MHK, PP and KR,⁸⁵ which are translated and some chapters critically-edited. Arguments are summarised in footnotes. Sources of quotations and parallel passages in other texts are provided. Other discussions focus on the features of Bhāviveka's arguments,⁸⁶ whose background and functions are explained, drawing textual resources from Bhāviveka's works and their commentaries. This group of literature provides important references to the clarification of Bhāviveka's notion of emptiness, his system of the two truths and the formation of the proof of emptiness in KR. Poussin's translation and Ejima's discussion have especially facilitated the understanding of KR. However, these literatures are mainly philological or descriptive. As Bhāviveka's proof of emptiness in KR cannot be understood by merely presenting the text itself or its background, a more thorough analysis has become necessary.

The third group is concerned with specific studies on KR. HE 2012 explains the formation of the two inferences and summarises the objections and responses in KR. This paper aims to show the continuity of Dignāga's system in KR, but not an in-depth analysis of the proof. While it requires another occasion to fully evaluate HE's paper, when appropriate I have referred to some of her points.

Hoornaert 1993 argues that emptiness is not proven because the use of non-implicative negation has violated the law of identity, the law of non-contradiction

⁸⁴ See, for examples, Nozawa 1956, Mizukawa 1964, Ozumi 1973, Iida 1980, pp. 281-298, Yotsuya 1999.

⁸⁵ For examples, see Ejima 1980 for a translation of Chapter 3 of MHK, and Iida 1980 for a partial translation and edition of MHK/TJ for the same chapter; Eckel 2008, Hoornaert 1999, 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2002, 2003 for a translation and edition of Chapter 5 of MHK/TJ, and Yamaguchi's study in Yamaguchi 1964; HE 2011 for the translation and edition of Chapter 6 of MHK/TJ; see Ames 1993, 1994 for the translation of Chapter 1 of PP; see Poussin 1933, Hatani 1976 and Hsu 2013 for a translation of KR; Sastri 1949 for the Sanskrit reconstruction of KR.

⁸⁶ See a detailed discussion in Ejima 1980, especially pp. 91-144, Kajiyama 1957; see also Chu 2009.

and the law of the excluded middle, which he considers as the foundation of coherent conventional speech, and made the proof problematic.⁸⁷ Although I agree with Hoornaert that the proof is unestablished, I have given a different reason to this.

Hsu 2013 provides the historical background and a translation of KR; and like HE 2012, explains the formation of the two inferences and summarises the objections and responses. This dissertation introduces the proof of emptiness, with Bhāviveka responses to the objections, as the initial step to bridge the conventional truth and the ultimate truth, because they can help practitioners acquire the wisdom from hearing,⁸⁸ which in turn facilitates the acquisition of the wisdoms of reflection and meditation. Our views differ in the understanding of individual categories in Bhāviveka's system of the two truths; a more detailed investigation in term of the two truths is also required to show the soteriological role of logical reasoning. While Hsu has brought in MHK's discussion on universals in explaining the formation of the inferences,⁸⁹ in my thesis I have presented some different understandings on the role and significance of universals in Bhāviveka's system. Our differences in view and in the translation of the text, if relevant to the discussion, are also marked in footnotes.

1.5 Overview

To sufficiently address the questions regarding (1) the circumstance where the Mādhyamika thesis, i.e. the emptiness of all things, is proved and (2) whether the proof of emptiness in KR can be established, this thesis is structured in two parts. Part I, consisting of four chapters, is an introduction to examine these questions mainly based on KR, particularly on resources from Part II. Part II provides a translation of and a detailed commentary on each objection and response regarding the first inference on the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things.

Part I – Introduction

After the explanation of preliminaries in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 deals with question (1) to demonstrate that the proof only applies to prove the expressible ultimate truth through the true and false conventional truths. As these three categories of truths are

⁸⁷ Hoornaert 1993, p. 11-13.

⁸⁸ Hsu 2013, pp. 145-146.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 117-120.

all conceptual, Bhāviveka has successfully addressed the tension between the ultimate and the conventional, i.e. the conceptual and non-conceptual. The proof, as logical reasoning, is further shown to be an indispensable part in all practitioners' realisation of the inexpressible truth.

This chapter begins by clarifying Bhāvivaka's notion of ultimate emptiness to set the background for the demarcation of the four categories of truth in his system of the two truths. Bhāvivaka holds that a wise person's realisation of emptiness is a tranquil state of mind, which does not hold onto any object, and is therefore free from conceptual proliferations. This state of mind is ineffable and non-conceptual and is referred to as the non-discriminating wisdom which is beyond the world. The pure worldly knowledge that is attained after this wisdom then conceptualizes and designates the arising of objects as dependent origination, realizing emptiness as the non-discriminating knowledge and emptiness as the object of this knowledge. This ultimate emptiness or state of mind, however, is also conditioned and empty ultimately.

This chapter then shows how the proof of emptiness functions as the bridge between the understanding of the ultimate truth and the conventional truth, each divided into two categories. The inexpressible ultimate truth refers to the above-mentioned ultimate emptiness that is to be realised through meditation. Although both the expressible truth and the two conventional truths are conceptual, the former is clarified to be the wise person's non-discriminating knowledge and emptiness as its object. It also refers to the wise person's teachings on emptiness and the practitioners' wisdom resulting from hearing and reflecting on these teachings, both presented by the thesis of the proof of emptiness that is specified by the modifier "in terms of the ultimate truth". The true conventional truth is considered the skilful means, which include the wise person's act of teaching emptiness according to the ultimate truth through conventional speech, as the proof of emptiness in KR. It represents the correct discernment of things and is therefore a process or an instrument, through which the practitioners ascend to attain the ultimate truth. The false conventional truth refers to conditioned things, whose conventional existence is mistaken by ordinary people and Bhāviveka's opponents to be ultimate existence. Things which do not arise even conventionally, i.e. the unconditioned things and the opponents'

realities, are non-existent to the ordinary people and are merely false conventionalities to be refuted by the proof. As the proof is set up under the expressible ultimate truth and the two conventional truths, it aims only to establish a conceptual emptiness that refers to the non-conceptual emptiness.

On this basis, this chapter further explores the soteriological role of logical reasoning. Practitioners investigate the false conventional truth by means of the proof. Some gradually eliminate the merely false conventionalities and transform their horizon from the conventional to the ultimate. Others discern the ultimate emptiness of all things and reflect on it to strengthen their understanding. The functions of such a proof, as logical reasoning, and of meditation are therefore complementary in a practitioner's spiritual progress. While the proof is employed both by practitioners who have realised the inexpressible ultimate truth and by practitioners who have not, it enables the upward-downward directions of spiritual practice along the two truths.

Chapter 3 goes on to deal with question (2) to analyse the two inferences of the proof as inferences for others in Dignāga's system of logic, or as common inferences (involving Bhāviveka and his opponents), in terms of the two basic criteria that qualify them as such (Section 1.3). It demonstrates that they are established [1] as the general result of the whole inferential process consisting of individual inferences for the ultimate emptiness of different conditioned and unconditioned things, with their formation adapted under the doctrine of emptiness. However, they are unestablished [2] as standalone inferences due to their fallacious reasons.

The first criterion requires that only terms, whose concepts are commonly agreed upon, can be used (applicable to both [1] and [2]). Bhāviveka requires the generality of these terms, which are already universals, be determined by the common agreement among all parties involved in the debate. These terms are therefore general enough to cover all particular meanings in both Bhāviveka's and his opponents' doctrines. For the merely false conventionalities that do not exist even conventionally cannot be the loci of universals; as long as they are being thought of by all parties involved, they can still be designated, discussed and eventually refuted on the conventional level. Thus, common agreement among all parties involved is

shown to be a more fundamental criterion than being a universal for a term to be used in an inference.

The second criterion requires that an inference for others should be commonly agreed to possess the three characteristics of a reason. Under [1], this chapter instead demonstrates that the two inferences in the proof are established without the third characteristic. Along the inferential process to prove the ultimate emptiness of all things, the dissimilar instances of the two resultant inferences have all been eliminated gradually by individual inferences regarding different conditioned and unconditioned things. This elimination is achieved by non-implicative negation, which negates without implying the affirmation of the opposite of what is negated. As there is no locus for the properties “not empty” and “real” to occur in, the second characteristic is secured while the third characteristic has become impossible. To avoid the misunderstanding of establishing the unreality of things conventionally from Bhāviveka’s opponents, the thesis of both resultant inferences is eventually specified by the modifier, “in terms of the ultimate truth”, to satisfy the conventions of all parties involved.

However, in terms of the second criterion, the two inferences are unestablished under [2]. This is because inference in Dignāga’s logical system cannot take “all things” as its subject, which is required to be excluded from the domain of similar instances. To be applicable to all parties involved, their subjects have included all conditioned things and all unconditioned things. As they are defined as “arisen from conditions” and “not arising” respectively, the subject and the property that infers in either inference actually apply to the same class of things. No conditioned thing or unconditioned thing, including illusions and a sky-flower, can exemplify the second characteristic of a reason. The two inferences have committed the fallacy of the reason being too specific. While they already lack the third characteristic, they cannot establish with only the first characteristic. The Mādhyamika thesis regarding the emptiness of all things, which is the expressible ultimate truth, is not proved. This shows the problem in Bhāviveka’s attempt to combine the doctrine of emptiness with inference.

Chapter 4 summarises the discussions in Part I. It reconsiders the proof as only a teaching and an instrument for reflection that is presented in the form of two inferences, but not established as proper inferences *per se*. It suggests that the proof is worth defending as it only summarises the conclusions of all individual inferences, which are established with the same reasons and positive examples. The two inferences might further be defensible in consideration of later systems of Buddhist logic.

Part II – Translation and Commentary

Having discussed the formation and establishment of the proof of emptiness in Part I, Part II is devoted to a detailed analysis of how the proof is actually criticized and subsequently defended by Bhāviveka to prove his thesis. This part consists of a translation of the objections and responses regarding the first inference.⁹⁰

Commentary is provided below the translation of objections and responses in order to examine the arguments of both sides.

This thesis does not aim at producing a critical edition of the text, but only a readable translation to enable the understanding and discussion of the text. The translation is based on the Chinese text available electronically in CBETA Chinese Electronic Tripiṭaka Collection (V5.2) because of its accessibility. Only the corrected version of the text will be referred to. Variants of text from other ancient printed editions of the Chinese canon, which are found in the footnotes of the CBETA Chinese Electronic Tripiṭaka Collection, will not be footnoted again in this thesis. There are occasions where further editing of the text is required; such occasions will be explained in the footnotes. Poussin's translation and Zangyao⁹¹ are the main references for this translation; translations by Hsu and Hatani and the Sanskrit reconstruction by Sastri

⁹⁰ CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269a13-273a5.

⁹¹ Some may consider Zangyao as merely a modern reproduction of the Chinese canon. However, Zangyao also contains punctuations, indication of quotations, division of sections, objections and responses, which are either missing or insufficient in CBETA. While using the corrected text on CBETA is sufficient to serve the present purpose to produce a readable translation, the information in Zangyao, similar to Poussin and others' translations, is nevertheless an important reference for translation and understanding.

There are some variants of the text found in Zangyao and other translations but are not footnoted in CBETA. (It is duly noted that this may be due to the differences in earlier versions of the CBETA Chinese Electronic Tripiṭaka Collection, which are not available to me.) There are also occasions when it is necessary to follow Zangyao and/or other translations to edit certain characters in the CBETA text back to those from earlier editions. In such cases, I will footnote these variants found in Zangyao and/or other translations and explain whether or not further edition of the CBETA text is needed.

are taken into consideration when punctuation or meaning of the text cannot be determined based on the two. Sanskrit equivalents of the Chinese terms are given in brackets when it is necessary.⁹² The Chinese text is then placed in the footnote after each section of the translation.

As for the commentary, only the first inference, its objections and responses are under examination. As only the conventional existence of conditioned things is admitted by Madhyamaka, unconditioned things which do not arise and are taken to have an ultimate existence are considered non-existent.⁹³ Hence, the first inference regarding the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things actually presents the rationale of the Mādhyamika doctrine and attempts to establish it directly. This is also because the objections and responses of the first inference are arranged thematically to display the step by step establishment of its thesis. Those regarding the second inference are concerned with the refutation of individual unconditioned things or realities of different opponents. Further, in their objections Bhāviveka's opponents try to refute the first inference with logical fallacies, and argue against his notion of emptiness. These objections, being the criticisms that Bhāviveka faced in inferring the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things, showcase the challenges of his attempt to combine the doctrine of emptiness with logical reasoning. Bhāviveka is therefore obliged to defend his inference by demonstrating how it is exempt from these criticisms.

Part II is arranged into fifteen objections and responses with reference to the Zangyao, and then into three sections according to their central ideas.⁹⁴ Discussions in the Commentary are outlined as below:

⁹² I provide Sanskrit equivalents for various Chinese terms: (1) for the logical terms, (2) for doctrinal terminologies, (3) for those that are suggested by Poussin. In case of (1), the Sanskrit equivalents are provided with reference to the Sanskrit text of NP in Tachikawa 1971, pp. 140-144 and to Vidyabhusana 1971. In case of (2), they are provided with reference to the relevant doctrinal texts or relevant secondary literature. In case of (3), they are provided with reference to Poussin 1933. Sanskrit equivalents provided under cases (1) to (3) are footnoted, indicating the page numbers of the references where they are derived from.

Sometimes the same Sanskrit word (e.g. *rūpa*) can be translated into different Chinese (e.g. 色, 相) or English (e.g. colour, matter) terms, and vice versa. Sanskrit equivalents of these terms, which are cross-checked with Hirakawa et al. 1977, are also given. They will not be further footnoted if they are not under cases (1) to (3).

⁹³ Cf. MMK 24.

⁹⁴ There are alternative arrangements, e.g. Hsu 2013 divides the objections and responses into three sections, namely "Response to the critiques of nihilism" (corresponding to Sections A-B.3 in the Commentary of this thesis; see outline below), "The critiques on *paratantra* in Yogācāra School" (to

A. Proving the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things does not present any problem to the thesis or the reason in the inference

- A.1 The thesis regarding the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things does not contradict direct perception, common knowledge, or Bhāviveka's own doctrine, nor is it self-contradictory
- A.2 Although conditioned things are empty of an inherent existence ultimately, it is not fallacious for them to be taken up as the subject of an inference
- A.3 The property that infers, i.e. "arisen from conditions" does not contradict the property to be inferred, i.e. "empty"
 - A.3.1 It cannot be established logically that whatever is causally efficacious has inherent existence
 - A.3.2 The inference can be established even it is a conditioned thing and empty due to the reflexivity of its thesis
 - A.3.2.1 The inference is not deficient, although the reason and the example are also conditioned things and included in the subject
 - A.3.2.2 The reason is not illegitimate, although it is included in the subject and proved to be empty, should the thesis be established
 - A.3.2.3 It is fallacious to take the reason, which is empty of an inherent existence, to be absolutely non-existent
 - A.3.2.4 The thesis regarding the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things is reflexive but not fallacious
 - A.3.2.5 Establishing conditioned things as empty of inherent existence is not a nihilistic view
 - A.4 The general quality, instead the particularities, of the subject should be taken up as the property that infers

B. Conditioned things themselves are originally empty of an inherent existence

Section B.4) and "Response to others" (to Sections B.5-C and passages that are not included in C); Poussin 1933 arranges the objections and responses into "Critique de la proposition [thesis]" (broadly corresponding to Sections A.1-A.3.1, A.3.2.4-A.3.2.5 in the Commentary of this thesis), "Critique de l'argument [reason]" (to Sections A.3.2.1-A.3.2.3, A.4), "Critique de l'exemple" (to Sections B.1-B.2), "Objection du Sāmkhya" (to Section B.3), "Objection des Yogācāras" (to Section B.4), "Validité de la réfutation Madhyamaka" (to Section B.5) and "Conclusion" (to Section C and passages that are not included in C).

- B.1 The view that an illusion is not empty of an inherent existence, but empty of the nature of a real thing is erroneous
 - B.2 The view that an illusion is not empty of a substantial existence, but empty in contrast with a real thing is erroneous
 - B.3 The view that everything is not empty of the existence of everything is erroneous
 - B.4 The view that emptiness is the non-existence of the imagined nature in the existent dependent nature is erroneous
 - B.5 The view that the inherent existence of conditioned things is emptied by the reasonings that refute it is erroneous
- C. Conclusion

Chapter 2: Bhāviveka's Understanding of the Two Truths

2.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to contextualise the discussion on Bhāviveka's proof of emptiness in KR in relation to his system of the two truths. The discussion below suggests his system as a solution to the theoretical tension between emptiness and a logical proof of it outlined in Section 1.2. I will show that the proof itself pertains to the real conventional truth and it only applies to prove the expressible ultimate truth under his system, which is conceptual. While the logical aspect of the proof will be discussed in the next chapter, this chapter rather aims to discuss the role of the proof of emptiness, as logical reasoning, to show that it forms an indispensable part in a practitioner's spiritual progress, through which the inexpressible ultimate truth is realised.

There are two sections in this chapter. Section 2.2 discusses Bhāviveka's notion of the ultimate emptiness of all things in KR. Taking this as background, Section 2.3 clarifies the four categories of truth in his system of the two truths in relation to the proof of emptiness. In terms of the two truths, the role of the proof together with spiritual practices will be explored, taking the realisation of this ultimate emptiness as their goal.

2.2 What is emptiness in the ultimate sense?

2.2.1 The ultimate emptiness as described by Bhāviveka

Bhāviveka's understanding of the relationship of dependent origination, emptiness, designation and the middle way basically follows Nāgārjuna's (Section 1.3),⁹⁵ but his discussions on the ultimate truth and the practice to realise emptiness in KR are richer than that in MMK.⁹⁶ In this section, I would like to first discuss his notion of the ultimate truth, the realisation of which is the ultimate goal of the Mādhyamika practice, as the background for the discussion in the next sections.

⁹⁵ See his commentary to MMK 24.18 in PP in CBETA, T30, no. 1566, 126a29-b17.

⁹⁶ This may be due to the influence of early Yogācāra philosophy, which is out of the scope of this discussion.

In KR, one's realisation of emptiness is described as a static state of mind, which is calm and tranquil, and is also compared to space (*ākāśa*), which does not arise and is without characteristics. As the calm mind does not intend to know anything by virtue of discrimination and conceptualisation, i.e. by movements, neither does it attend to or grasp any objects of cognition. Due to the absence of discrimination, that which is realised is non-dual, undistinguished and inconceivable. Because it neither arises nor ceases and is therefore without an image or a sign, it is not seen in terms of ordinary perception. Thus, that which is realised is inexpressible in the sense that it is beyond the sphere of application of one's speech or thought. Only in this way is the real state of things known, and this type of knowledge refers to the direct realisation (*abhisamaya*) of things that is designated as the real seeing, which itself is not a movement nor is it discriminative.⁹⁷

Bhāviveka explains the real seeing in relation to the attainment of the non-discriminating wisdom (*nirvikalpa jñāna*) and realisation of the suchness (*tathatā*), i.e. the ultimate state of things, emptiness. In KR verse 2, Bhāviveka states that

[Regardless of] the appearance (*ābhāsa*) of the objects (*viśaya*) of the mind (*citta*) and of the wisdom (*prajñā*),⁹⁸ as the wise person does not grasp it, her wisdom practices (*carati*) [in a] non-discriminative [manner], and it practices without anything to practice.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ KR in CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 278a3-a10.

⁹⁸ According to Saito's analysis of Chapter 5 of MHK, Bhāviveka discusses the perception of objects on the conventional level. Bhāviveka considers the aggregation of atoms the objective support (*ālambana*), actual object (*gochara*), or cause (*hetu*) of perception, while the object in perception is actually the appearance or representation of this aggregation. See further discussion in Saito 2006.

⁹⁹ KR 2: 諸心、慧境現，智者由不取，| 慧行無分別，無所行而行。|| (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 277b12-b13); cf. Sanskrit reconstruction in Sastri 1949, p. 93: *cittadhīviśayābhāsān sarvān prājñā 'parigrahāt | prajñācārī nirvikalpamacarivā caratyayam* || and note 153 in *ibid.* See also MHK/TJ 3.10-3.11.

The translation of the verb *carati* (√car) in the second half of the verse into English is difficult. In the Chinese text, *carati* is rendered as “行” and is explained as “to roam about” (“遊履”); its opposite is explained as “without cognition or understanding” (“無行解”) and “without arising” (“無生起”), which are literally not related to walking, but can only be metaphorically understood as the discriminative form of cognition, as the movement of roaming about in its object sphere (see KR in CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 277c28-c29). According to MW, this verb can also mean to practice, to perform, to move, to turn, etc. (MW, p. 389, 1-2) However, whichever meaning the translation takes will fail to express the static state of mind, which one attains when directly realising emptiness. It is because, as discussed, this direct realisation itself is not a movement; whereas a verb always indicates movement. This is exactly the paradoxical sense of what it means to attain the ultimate truth that

With the appearance of the objects of cognition, the discriminative mind and wisdom hold onto it and generate conceptual knowledge due to discrimination. However, the wise person does not: with the non-discriminating wisdom, she does not generate any thought, but realises suchness directly. As things no longer appear as any objects to the wise person, their arising only means dependent origination and conventional existence to her intellect (*buddhi*), which is the pure worldly knowledge she has attained after the realisation of emptiness. Here, mind refers to the collective of thoughts. Its object spheres include all conditioned and unconditioned things such as the sense faculties, the five aggregates, the various fruitions along the path to liberation or enlightenment, the extraordinary qualities of a Buddha, omniscience, etc., which are known through discrimination. Wisdom refers to that which is excellent. Its object sphere is the emptiness of the conditioned and unconditioned things, i.e. the emptiness of the above examples. The wise person does not generate any attachment or view as she does not grasp the appearance of any of these objects. When there is no more discrimination by the mind concerning the inherent existence or the characteristic of that which appears to it, the wisdom of the wise person stops practicing. This is the non-discriminating wisdom.¹⁰⁰

The direct realisation of suchness by the non-discriminating wisdom of the wise person refers to the real seeing discussed above. As the real seeing is static and non-discriminative, it does not refer to that which sees in the conventional world, nor does it refer to seeing something that is not seen. For suchness is realised by the non-discriminating wisdom, it should also be free from discrimination and conceptualisation, and therefore not something which is seen by the real seeing. Otherwise, this seeing would involve the subject-object duality, and both suchness and the real seeing would cease to be qualified as such. It is in this sense that the non-discriminating wisdom or the real seeing actually means non-cognising or non-seeing; it does not cognise or see any object, and neither is it a subject. The same

Bhaviveka intends to convey: only through not seeing anything, i.e. not seeing things conventionally as objects whose existence is constructed by discrimination and conceptualisation, can one really see, i.e. directly realise the ultimate state of things; the same understanding can be drawn from expressions such as “knowing without anything to know” and “cognising without anything to cognise”. Since the non-discriminating wisdom can be understood solely in terms of its cognitive aspect as well as in general in relation to various practical aspects, here I understand *carati* in a general sense and have translated it as “to practice”.

¹⁰⁰ KR in CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 277b14-c1.

applies to the direct realisation which is said to realise suchness. In this way, cognition, seeing and direct realisation by the non-discriminating wisdom are only designations.¹⁰¹

To express her understanding of what the real seeing is like, the wise person designates her non-discriminating wisdom in terms of conventional speech to be a knowledge that is non-discriminating, i.e. the non-discriminating knowledge that directly realises its object, suchness. While this wisdom in fact refers to the mind-stream of the wise person, it is called non-discriminating also by means of designation, like others' discriminating wisdom is called discriminating.¹⁰² Hence, what is known as the non-discriminating knowledge in conventional speech in fact refers to the mind-stream of the wise person which does not know as a subject in the ultimate sense; neither can it be known as an object in the same sense.

From the above discussion, it can be seen that there is a demarcation of the knowledge which takes emptiness or suchness as its object and of the wisdom which is completely non-discriminative, i.e. does not take any object at all. In the next section, the former will be understood as the expressible ultimate truth, and the latter as the inexpressible ultimate truth. For Madhyamaka holds that ultimate existence is not possible; the former being a discriminative knowledge of emptiness, both itself and its object are also refuted as real ultimately. As for the latter, Bhaviveka also denies its ultimate existence. This view on the latter can be confirmed when he refutes the Yogācāra opponents in KR, who hold that the consciousness, i.e. the discussed non-discriminating wisdom or the mind-stream of the wise, and suchness are ultimately real.

Under the discussion on emptiness in Objection 14 in Part II, the Yogācāras have quoted the Buddha's teaching on emptiness in YB – "[this] is empty of that, because that does not exist; [this] is empty, because this does exist"¹⁰³ – to argue for the ultimate reality of things that are dependently-arisen and of their dependent nature, and hence the ultimate reality of consciousness. Consciousness is dependently-arisen

¹⁰¹ KR in CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 277c8-278a2.

¹⁰² KR in CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 277c2-c7.

¹⁰³ From the *Tattvārtha* Section of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* in YB: *yena hi śūnyam tadasadbhāvāt yac ca śūnyam tatsadbhāvāc chūnyatā yuyjeta* || (Takahashi 2005, p. 101); see footnote 376.

and is in a dependent nature (*paratantra-svabhāva*). It has attained a perfected nature or realised suchness when it has become non-discriminative due to it is empty of false concepts or the imagined nature. Bhaviveka refutes this understanding and clarifies that conditioned things are empty of an inherent existence because inherent existence does not exist when they arise. They are empty as they only exist conventionally. Consequently, consciousness, which is dependently-arisen, is also empty of an inherent existence and only existent conventionally to Bhaviveka.¹⁰⁴

Later on Bhaviveka has also refuted the ultimate reality of an ineffable suchness, as taken by the Yogācāras as an unconditioned thing, and as the object of the non-discriminating wisdom which is beyond the world and of the pure worldly knowledge which is attained after the realisation of emptiness. In Bhaviveka's comparison of emptiness with space, the latter is only a concept designating the mere absence of resistant bodies. Since space itself, i.e. the mere absence of resistant bodies, does not arise, as an unconditioned thing it does not exist even conventionally.¹⁰⁵ Likewise, suchness or emptiness is also a concept, which is not real ultimately. For this reason, Bhaviveka points out the Buddha has taught that that which is called the seeing of the truth actually means there is nothing to be seen,¹⁰⁶ neither conditioned things, i.e. perceptual objects, nor unconditioned things like suchness, are seen in the ultimate truth. If the non-discriminating wisdom or knowledge mentioned by the Yogācāras could cognise or directly realise suchness, it would cease to be non-discriminating because it would have an object of cognition, which always involves discrimination, and would have become conditioned, like other conventional knowledge.¹⁰⁷

As discussed above, both the non-discriminating wisdom, which actually refers to the mind-stream of the wise, and the non-discriminating knowledge, which is designated according to this, are conditioned and not existent ultimately. The suchness they are said to realise is also a designation by the wise person as an understanding of what the ultimate truth is like. Hence, Bhaviveka concludes that “in

¹⁰⁴ See Commentary for details.

¹⁰⁵ KR in CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 273c7-c13, 273c23-c29.

¹⁰⁶ KR in T30, no. 1578, 274c11. Poussin 1933, p. 113, note 6 suggests referring to *Āryadhyāyitaṃsūtra*, which is quoted in Tsongkhapa's commentary to MMK 24.40 in Ngawang Samten and Garfield 2006, pp. 512-513.

¹⁰⁷ KR in CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 274b28-c14; see also 276c17-277a4.

terms of the ultimate truth, this non-discriminating knowledge which is beyond the world is not a real existent either, because it arises from conditions, like an illusory man.”¹⁰⁸

2.2.2 The epistemological interpretation of emptiness

There have been different interpretations of the emptiness explicated by Madhyamaka. The ontological interpretation concerns whether anything exists ultimately if all things are empty of an inherent existence. In Abhidharma, as the various categories of *dharma*s refer to the building blocks of the universe, to hold that the *dharma*s are also empty amounts to saying that they do not exist ultimately and hence no longer qualify as the building blocks. For this reason, the nihilistic interpretation of emptiness is that ultimately, nothing whatsoever exists. By contrast, the absolutist interpretation understands emptiness itself as the sole ultimate reality. While Madhyamaka is against both ultimate existence and absolute non-existence, some interpret emptiness as merely anti-realist and reject both nihilistic and absolutist interpretations. According to the non-conceptual interpretation, the ultimate state in which the conventional existents exist is ineffable. The semantic interpretation of emptiness, on the other hand, does not consider the ontological implications of emptiness, but only concerns the semantic implication of things being empty of an inherent existence in the ultimate sense. This interpretation generally holds that the truth and falsity of things, which is known in terms of their inherent nature, can only be coherently talked about conventionally instead of ultimately. Since to be liberated is to realise this, the ultimate truth, as expressed conventionally, is therefore that there is no ultimate truth.¹⁰⁹

Bhāviveka’s understanding of emptiness as discussed above does not support the nihilistic or the absolutist interpretation, while being more in line with the anti-realist interpretation. This is because it admits dependent origination and the conventional existence of things while it denies the ultimate reality of suchness. It also holds the

¹⁰⁸ KR: 就勝義諦，如是出世無分別智亦非實有，從緣生故，猶如幻士。(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 277a2)

¹⁰⁹ For details, see discussions in Ferraro 2013, 2014, and Siderits and Garfield 2013. With a similar conclusion, Priest and Garfield considers Nāgārjuna’s attempt to express the inexpressible ultimate truth, emptiness or the natureless reality shows a paradox of expressibility, and such a paradox is nevertheless grounded in the contradictory nature of reality; see discussion in Priest and Garfield 2002.

ineffability of the ultimate truth. Although Bhāviveka would agree with the semantic implication of the emptiness of inherent existence of things, he does not stop at merely delimiting the scope of application of speech and thought. This can be understood from his discussion on meditation and spiritual practices after the establishment of the proof of emptiness in KR.¹¹⁰

Apart from these interpretations, it should be noted that KR also presents an epistemological understanding of emptiness, which is concerned with how things and emptiness are known, along one's spiritual progress.¹¹¹ The different ways of knowing, such as direct perception, logical reasoning, meditation and direct realisation, take objects in different manners. On the conventional level, emptiness is not known to people who know things as if these things were ultimate existents, in terms of common knowledge and direct perception. The conceptualisation and discrimination of things are compared to eye disease, which generates false perceptual objects. As people proceed to discern the nature of things, they take the same conventional things as the objects of logical and meditative investigations, in which emptiness is understood conceptually. Ultimately, when they no longer cognise, neither is there anything for them to cognise. Emptiness or the suchness of the conventional things also ceases to be an object, until it is designated conceptually again for the sake of teaching and understanding.

When the same objects are cognised in decreasingly discriminative manners, changes in a practitioner's horizon occur. When a practitioner progresses from the conceptualisation of conventional things to the realisation of emptiness, she changes from seeing a definite object to seeing no object, i.e. not seeing at all. This is shown in the proof of emptiness, conditioned things which are perceived conventionally are shown to be empty like illusions that cannot be perceived ultimately; unconditioned things which cannot be perceived even conventionally are shown to be unreal like a sky-flower that does not exist at all, and hence cannot be known in any way. It is parallel with meditation in which a practitioner starts from the seeing of a

¹¹⁰ See CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 276a5ff.

¹¹¹ Cf. Westerhoff 2007, pp. 34-38, where Westerhoff points out the cognitive dimension of the *svabhāva* in the understanding of emptiness. He holds that the ultimate aim of the Madhyamaka project is to achieve a cognitive shift which consists of the elimination of the *svabhāva* as a substance, which the mind naturally superimposes onto things when it conceptualises the world, in our cognition through specific practices.

conceptualised object to seeing only a sign (*nimitta*) and eventually seeing nothing. This can also be understood from what it means to attain the real seeing as discussed above. In KR, an epistemological understanding of emptiness is emphasized in relation to logical reasoning and different natures of perception. Logical reasoning and perception are indeed the two fundamental means to knowledge in the conventional world. Along a practitioner's spiritual progress, the change in the natures of perception – from direct perception to abstract perception in meditation, and eventually to no perception – is complemented by logical reasoning. While logical reasoning and perception are interdependent in their roles in realising emptiness, the importance of the former is stressed by Bhāviveka.

With the above clarification, this thesis concentrates on the discussion on emptiness as a conceptualised object, i.e. on how the ultimate truth is understood by the wise person and on how the notion “all things are empty of an inherent existence” is inferred by logical reasoning, which is what concerns the proof of emptiness in KR, in terms of concepts and conventional speech.

2.3 Bhāviveka's system of the two truths

Although KR itself is a treatise on emptiness, the system of the two truths is not discussed systematically by Bhāviveka in KR, unlike in PP or MHK. As KR aims to provide guidance to practitioners, instead of ordinary people, to their spiritual progress,¹¹² Bhāviveka may have assumed that his readers already have some

¹¹² KR's aim to provide guidance to practitioners along their spiritual progress can be seen in its introduction, where Bhāviveka declares his mission to help practitioners easily realise the true emptiness and quickly penetrate into the nature of things so he composes KR. There are two types of practitioners to whom the KR provides guidance. Practitioners of the first type have already known about the doctrine of emptiness based on teachings and instructions. They have been practicing diligently according to this doctrine and have attained certain progress along the path to enlightenment. However, they have become exhausted due to their doubts in understanding or difficulties in practicing. Practitioners of the second type have not yet understood the emptiness of all things. However, they have sharp faculties so they can correctly discern and understand the doctrine of emptiness easily, thus attaining enlightenment. (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 268b17-b20) Under this circumstance, both types of practitioners require some succinct and pertinent guidance to help them correctly understand and realise the genuine emptiness. The fact that the treatise is called *The Jewel in the Hand* is because it aims to be the essence of the teachings and instructions on emptiness, like a manual, to solve the various problems which a practitioner encounters during her spiritual progress; once she has obtained this jewel in her hand, she has understood the essence of the teachings and instructions on emptiness. Hence, it can be understood that the targeted readers of KR are not ordinary people or in Bhāviveka's words, the dull-witted, in the conventional world. In the discussion below, I will further show that the discernment and the practice of the doctrine of emptiness by the practitioners mentioned here are to be understood in terms of, what Bhāviveka calls, the true conventional truth, in contrast to the false conventional truth as related to the ordinary people.

knowledge about this system. Here, I consider the understanding of this system an important background to the understanding of Bhāviveka's proof of emptiness to the extent that he has established the proof based on this system. Having indicated this, this section aims to define the four categories of truths in this system, namely the inexpressible (*aparyāya*) and the expressible (*paryāya*) ultimate truths, and the true (*tathya*) and the false (*mithyā*) conventional truths and to discuss their interrelationship in spiritual practice, in order to set the scope of application of the proof of emptiness, for the clarity of later discussion.¹¹³

2.3.1 Nāgārjuna's explication of the two truths

The Madhyamaka understanding of the two truths is explicated by Nāgārjuna in MMK 24.8-24.10:

The teaching of the Buddha is based on two truths, i.e. the conventional truth and the ultimate truth. [24.8]

Those who do not understand the difference between the two truths do not understand the reality in accordance with the profound teachings of the Buddha. [24.9]

The ultimate truth is not taught independently of customs and conventions. Not having attained the ultimate truth, nirvana is not attained. [24.10]¹¹⁴

In MMK 24.8-24.9, Nāgārjuna states that the Buddha's teachings are based on two truths, and that practitioners have to understand the conventional truth in order to

¹¹³ This section is not going to inspect the historical background of Bhāviveka's system of the two truths but only attempts to define the four categories of truth in this system. This system has already been discussed extensively in earlier works, such as in Iida 1973 and 1980, Katz 1976, Lopez 1987, Tsau 1996 and 2000; also in Ejima 1980, pp. 102-105, Nasu 1999, Hsu 2011, pp. 66-72, Kumagai 2011. However, it seems that explanations given in these works differ when they try to give a definition of each category. The obvious reason is that Bhāviveka himself did not define it systematically in his works, so that the understanding of the categories of truth has to refer to later commentators' works. It is not my aim to evaluate how one definition develops into another in a historical or philological context. It is, however, my concern to work out a clear conceptual demarcation of each category; the linguistic aspect of the definitions will be discussed only when it is necessary. While some other texts such as Jñānagarbha's *Commentary on the Distinction Between the Two Truths* (*Bden gnyis rnam 'byed 'grel pa*), Kamalaśīla's *Illumination of the Middle Way* (*Madhyamakāloka*) and Jang-gya's *Presentation of Tenets* (*Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa*, GN) have also discussed Bhāviveka's system of the two truths, due to limited space, below I will only discuss passages, which are mainly from Bhāviveka's MHK/TJ and from GN, that are directly related to the definition of the categories of truths.

¹¹⁴ MMK 24.8-24.10: *dve satye samupāśritya buddhānām dharmadeśanā | lokasaṃvṛtisatyam ca satyam ca paramārthataḥ || ye 'nāyor na vijānanti vibhāgam satyayor dvayoḥ | te tattvaṃ na vijānanti gambhīre buddhaśāsane || vyavahāram anāśritya paramārtho na deśyate | paramārtham anāgamya nirvāṇam nādhigamyate ||* (Ye 2011, p. 420). A similar verse is found in MHK 5.110.

understand the ultimate truth. The conventional truth refers to things which are considered ultimately existent, while they actually exist dependently. They are customs and conventions in the world and are objects of conceptual knowledge by means of speech and thought. The ultimate truth refers to the realisation regarding the empty nature of these dependently existent things. It is free from conceptual proliferations and is ineffable.

In MMK 24.10, Nāgārjuna further states that the two truths are interdependent in the way that one has to realise the ultimate truth by means of the conventional truth. As the ultimate truth is free from conceptual proliferation, it is beyond speech and thought. However without speech or thought, the ultimate truth can never be taught, not to mention be realised; neither can nirvana be attained. According to Nāgārjuna, emptiness is taught conventionally along one's spiritual progress by means of speech and thought, through which they are led to eliminate their conceptual proliferation on things. As conceptual proliferation is eliminated, one is inspired to realise the ultimate truth and eventually attains nirvana. The function of the conventional truth, like a ladder for one to reach the top, is also fulfilled.¹¹⁵

Despite these differences between the two truths, the boundary between what should be taken as conventional and as ultimate is not clear. The conventional truth is supposed to encompass everything that we know through speech and thought, such as a jar and a sky-flower, as well as their cessation. However, by common sense, we know that there are degrees of reality regarding these things. For example, conventionally, while we take a jar as existent ultimately, we take a sky-flower as non-existent absolutely. If something is non-existent absolutely, it is nonsensical to take it as a conventional truth. And by comparison, the knowledge that a jar will cease to exist seems to be truer than that of the jar which is mistaken as permanently existent. A similar situation occurs with respect to the ultimate truth. While we hold that it is non-conceptual and ineffable, we do not immediately take the Buddha's teachings about it as merely conventional. This is because they are more a presentation of the ultimate reality than of the worldly knowledge, although being taught or known by means of speech and thought. Thus, degrees of conventionality

¹¹⁵ See also commentary of MMK 24.8-24.10 in Siderits and Katsura 2013, pp. 272-274 and Garfield 1995, pp. 296-299.

can also be distinguished regarding whether the ultimate truth is expressed conventionally, and whether the content of what is expressed is about the ultimate truth or only an uninterpreted (*neyārtha*) teaching. This shows an ambiguity as to whether they should be treated as conventional as other worldly knowledge or as ultimate as the emptiness of things.

Bhāviveka's system of the two truths developed Nāgārjuna's explication of the two truths in two aspects. First, in relation to MMK 24.8-24.9 where the difference between the two truths is concerned, he has divided each of the two truths into two in order to clarify the ambiguity discussed above. Second, in relation to MMK 24.10, where spiritual progress by means of the two truths is discussed, and the four categories of truth, he has given more importance to the role of general spiritual practices that lead practitioners to the realisation of emptiness. The two aspects are discussed below.

2.3.2 Bhāviveka's four categories of truth

Bhāviveka's system distinguishes the two truths respectively into two categories – the inexpressible ultimate truth, the expressible ultimate truth, the true conventional truth and the false conventional truth – to clarify the mentioned ambiguity in the difference between the two truths in MMK 24.8-24.9. The mentioned tension between emptiness itself, i.e. the ultimate truth, being non-conceptual and ineffable, and Bhāviveka's proof of emptiness, i.e. the conventional truth, consisting of conventional speech and concepts, that can be understood from Nāgārjuna's explication can also be solved through clarifying this ambiguity. I will define each category of truth in the following.

The inexpressible and expressible ultimate truths

Bhāviveka explains the ultimate truth in the TJ of MHK 3.26:

...the ultimate truth is of two kinds. In this regard, the first kind is without volitional action (*anabhisamkāra*), beyond the world (*lokottara*), without outflows (*anāsrava*) and free from conceptual proliferation (*aprapañca*). The second kind engages in volitional action. It is in accordance with the accumulation of merit and wisdom (*punya-jñāna-sambhāra*); it refers to the pure worldly

knowledge (*viśuddha-laukika-jñāna*) and is accompanied by conceptual proliferation. In this case, [i.e. in terms of the second kind of ultimate truth,] we have no fault in holding such a specification of our thesis (*pratijñā*).¹¹⁶

In the first kind of ultimate truth, “without volitional action” means that the one who has realised this kind of truth, i.e. an *ārya*,¹¹⁷ which is also referred to as the wise person in the last section, does not apply herself or intend any action. “Beyond the world” means that this kind of truth is not worldly and is transcendent. “Without outflow” means the *ārya* is uncontaminated in the sense that she is no longer motivated by her desire, the action due to which will lead to further rebirth. Free from conceptual proliferation means the absence of conceptualisation, i.e. the opposite of the multiplication of conceptualisations on the inherent existence of things. In Buddhist philosophy, actions are always driven by desire due to one’s ignorance. Bodily, verbal and mental actions, whether good or bad, have a karmic significance that leads to rebirth. One who has already realised the ultimate truth has eliminated her desire so that she does not act physically or mentally in terms of her desire, and in such a sense she will not be reborn after she has received the consequences from her previous actions. Such a pure and static state of this kind of ultimate truth, which is without action and without conceptualisation, corresponds to the nature of things, i.e. emptiness, which is explicated by Nāgārjuna and Bhāviveka in previous discussions. As it is opposite to the activities in the conventional world, it is considered beyond the world. And as it is free from conceptual proliferation, this kind of ultimate truth is non-conceptual and cannot be expressed through speech which operates in terms of concepts. Hence, this is the inexpressible ultimate truth. It corresponds to the ultimate truth in Nāgārjuna’s explication.

The second kind of ultimate truth refers to the expressible ultimate truth, i.e. the inexpressible ultimate truth that is known in terms of conventional speech and

¹¹⁶ TJ of MHK 3.26: ...*don dam pa ni rnam pa gnyis te / de la gcig ni mngon par 'du byed pa med par 'jug pa 'jig rten las 'das pa zag pa med pa spros pa med pa'o / gnyis pa ni mngon par 'du byed pa dang bcas par 'jug pa bsod nams dang ye shes kyi tshogs kyi rjes su mthun pa dag pa 'jig rten pa'i ye shes zhes bya ba spros pa dang bcas pa ste / 'dir de dam bcas pa'i khyad par nyid bzung bas nyes pa med do.* (Iida 1980, pp. 86-87)

¹¹⁷ An *ārya* refers to a practitioner who has realised emptiness, i.e. who has entered the path of seeing (*darśana-mārga*) on the Bodhisattva Path, or attained the *śrāvaka* equivalent, the seeing of the truth (*satya-darśana*), both of which are defined as not seeing any object. An *ārya* is understood in relation to *prthagjana*, i.e. a practitioner who has not yet entered the path of seeing.

conceptions by an *ārya* who has already realised it. It is not considered a conventional truth because it is correct knowledge of the inexpressible ultimate truth. However, it constitutes various volitional actions because the originally ineffable ultimate truth is now taken as an object which is understood and elaborated conceptually by means of speech and thought. In this sense, the expressible ultimate truth is the conceptual knowledge of the emptiness of all things, while also being a pure worldly knowledge. It is so considered also because such a conceptual knowledge of the inexpressible ultimate truth is in accordance with the accumulation of the two good qualities, i.e. merit and wisdom, which are necessary for one to attain the Buddhahood.¹¹⁸ In terms of the expressible ultimate truth, merit is accumulated by teaching on the inexpressible ultimate truth and practicing that benefit other sentient beings. In terms of the same, wisdom is accumulated by investigating and meditating on the ultimate truth that enhances one's conviction to the understanding of the emptiness of things.

In an early passage in the TJ of MHK 3.26,¹¹⁹ Bhāviveka explains the expressible ultimate truth in linguistic terms; “*parama*” refers to “the most excellent”, while “*artha*” refers to the object to be known (*jñatavya*) and therefore to be investigated (*parīkṣanīya*) and understood (*pratipādyā*). Accordingly, there are three interpretations of the ultimate truth, which is understood as:

1. “the most excellent object”¹²⁰ because it is an object as well as the most excellent;
2. “the object of the most excellent”¹²¹ because it is the object of the most excellent non-discriminating knowledge (*parama-nirvikalpa-jñāna*) as discussed in the previous section. A similar passage in PP adds that this knowledge does not have any other things as its object, apart from the ultimate truth.¹²²

¹¹⁸ Merit refers to the merits and good actions it derives; it corresponds to the first five perfections (*pāramitā*). Wisdom refers to the acuity of the mind that sees things in their true nature, and is free from delusion and harmful habituation; it corresponds to the sixth perfection; for details, see the entries of “二資糧”, “福德” and “智慧” in DDB. See also the list of the six perfections discussed in KR in CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 278a25-b5.

¹¹⁹ Iida 1980, pp. 82-83.

¹²⁰ This is understood as a *karma-dhāraya* compound, in which each member stands in the same case; see MW, p. 259, 1.

¹²¹ This is understood as a *tat-puruṣa* compound, in which the last member is qualified by the first without losing its grammatical independence; see MW, p. 433, 2.

¹²² See the PP of MMK 24.8 in CBETA, T30, 1566, 125a10-a12.

3. something which is “in accordance with the ultimate truth”,¹²³ referring to the conceptualised knowledge of the ultimate truth (*kalpanā-anulomika-paramārtha-jñāna*). PP explains that this includes the teachings on non-arising etc. that are said to negate those views regarding the arising of things, etc. This also includes the three kinds of wisdom that is attained from hearing (*śrutamayī*) and from reflecting on (*cintāmayī*) the Buddha’s teachings, and from meditation (*bhāvanāmayī*).¹²⁴ According to this interpretation, the expressible ultimate truth therefore includes the Buddha’s teachings and the wisdom attained in relation to these teachings.¹²⁵

On the basis of the distinctions of the two categories of ultimate truth, it can be understood that the inexpressible ultimate truth, i.e. “the emptiness of all things”, is taken as an object to be discerned in the proof of emptiness, corresponding to the expressible ultimate truth in the first interpretation, and subsequently being realised

¹²³ This is understood as a *bahu-vrīhi* compound, i.e. an adjective compound, in which both members together qualify a noun; see MW, p. 726, 1.

¹²⁴ The PP of MMK 24.8: 為遮彼起等隨順所說無起等及聞、思、修慧，皆是第一義。(CBETA, T30, no. 1566, 125a12-a13)

¹²⁵ In GN, the inexpressible ultimate truth is analyzed as the actual ultimate while the expressible ultimate truth as the concordant ultimate. Each of them is then analyzed as an object and as a subject. As an object, the ultimate truth itself is free from the conceptual elaborations of dualistic appearance and ultimate existence. When it is an object of a reasoning consciousness, it is free from the conceptual elaboration of ultimate existence but not that of dualistic appearance. The former case is the actual ultimate while the latter is the concordant ultimate. As a subject, the non-discriminating wisdom which has realised the emptiness of things is free from both conceptual elaborations of dualistic appearance and ultimate existence. As a reasoning consciousness, it takes the ultimate truth as an object and therefore not free from the conceptual elaboration of dualistic appearance. The former case is the actual ultimate while the latter is the concordant ultimate. The teachings on the ultimate truth are the concordant ultimate because it conforms to the ultimate truth. (Lopez 1987, pp. 326-327) In Jang-gya’s analysis, there are both possibilities of being actual (inexpressible) and concordant (expressible) for the ultimate truth when it is taken as the object and the subject. Although he did not mention the quotation from TJ discussed above, it can be understood that he also has the three interpretations in mind and understands the first interpretation as the objective aspect of the ultimate truth and the second interpretation as the subjective aspect.

While TJ has stated that *paramārtha* is considered the most excellent object which should be investigated and understood, in this context I take all three interpretations as pertaining to the expressible ultimate truth because they all involve conceptual elaborations on the ultimate truth as an object. This does not mean that I disagree that the ultimate truth itself, i.e. that which is referred to by and analyzed in terms of “the most excellent” “object”, is inexpressible.

This view and Jang-gya’s view are different from other understandings on the inexpressible and expressible truths, in relation to the three interpretations. For example, Ejima takes the first and second interpretations as pertaining to the inexpressible ultimate truth while the third to the expressible ultimate truth (Ejima 1980, p. 105); Kumagai considers the distinction of being inexpressible and expressible as only found in the third interpretation (Kumagai 2011, pp. 1187-1188). Since they all agree that the teachings on the ultimate truth pertain to the expressible ultimate truth, for the sake of simplicity of the discussion, I will not further investigate these differences. I would only note that the difference in understanding of the first and second interpretations contributes to the distinction of Bhāviveka’s view on emptiness from the Yogācāra’s; the latter holds that both emptiness (as an object) and the non-discriminating knowledge (as the subject) pertain to the inexpressible ultimate truth.

by the non-discriminating knowledge, corresponding to the expressible ultimate truth in the second interpretation. Further, the commentary in TJ following the second passage quoted above states that the modifier “in terms of the ultimate truth” in the theses of the two inferences in the proof should be understood in terms of the third interpretation.¹²⁶ The emptiness of all things is therefore the wisdom or the correct knowledge of the inexpressible truth that is conceptualised by an *ārya* after she has realised such truth; and it is in terms of the expressible ultimate truth understood by this wisdom that she teaches the emptiness of all things to the *prthagjana*, i.e. those who have not yet realised it. Also, according to the first passage quoted from the TJ of MHK 3.26, the theses “in terms of the ultimate truth, conditioned things are empty of inherent existence” and “in terms of the ultimate truth, unconditioned things do not have a reality” in the proof are stated in terms of the expressible ultimate truth. Due to the fact that the two theses are the conclusions of the inferences in the proof, the emptiness of all things is also understood as the resultant wisdom that one has attained from hearing, reflecting or meditating on “the emptiness of all things” as an object.

The true conventional truth

The various aspects of the true conventional truth explained in the TJ of MHK 3.8 and 3.9 are mainly concerned with a Bodhisattva’s training for the attainment of the Buddhahood. They include the fulfilment of the six perfections (*pāramitā*)¹²⁷ and the accumulation of wisdom and merit. The accumulation of wisdom is concerned with the discernments (*vibhāga*) of causation and of the objects of cognition. The former refers to the relationship between cause (*hetu*) and effect (*phala*). The latter deals with objects such as the universal characteristics (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*, or universals) that are cognised by inference and the particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*) that are cognised by direct perception, as well as other conventional symbols (*saṃketa*), concepts (*prajñapti*), marks (*nimitta*), etc. The accumulation of merit is concerned with the

¹²⁶ Iida 1980, p. 83.

¹²⁷ The six perfections include the perfection of giving (*dāna-pāramitā*), the perfection of precepts (*śīla-pāramitā*), the perfection of forbearance (*kṣānti-pāramitā*), the perfection of vigour (*vīrya-pāramitā*), the perfection of meditation (*dhyāna-pāramitā*) and the perfection of wisdom (*prajñā-pāramitā*); see also KR in CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 278a25-b5. They are the main aspects of the Buddha’s practice before he attains the Buddhahood.

knowing of the four unlimited (*apramāṇa*) virtues and the four means of conversion (*saṃgraha-vastu*).¹²⁸

It should be noted that both the expressible ultimate truth and the true conventional truth are pure worldly knowledge. They differ since the former is conceptual knowledge of the inexpressible ultimate truth and is in accordance with the accumulation of merit and wisdom, while the latter refers to the actual acts of accumulating merit and wisdom, as outlined above, based on the former.¹²⁹ In other words, the true conventional truth is about how an *ārya* who has realised the inexpressible ultimate truth practices in the conventional world.¹³⁰ This is also confirmed by the TJ of MHK 3.13 where it is pointed out that the true conventional truth is the sphere (*gocara*) of investigation of the pure worldly knowledge which is attained after one has realised the inexpressible ultimate truth,¹³¹ i.e. of the expressible ultimate truth.

Various components in the proof of emptiness are considered in relation to the accumulation of wisdom. In terms of objects of cognition, terms such as “conditioned things”, “empty”, “arising from conditions” and “illusions” in the first inference are universals, which are concepts constructed based on the direct perceptions of the particulars; likewise, “unconditioned things”, “unreality”, “not arising” and “sky-flowers” in the second inference.¹³² They form the thesis, reason and the example in the inferences. Their logical relation is then discerned in the two inferences. The speech and concepts that constitute the proof are conventional designations. In terms of causation, the proof itself is a conditioned thing that arises from conditions. It is also to discern the emptiness of conditioned and unconditioned things in relation to causation, i.e. to prove in terms of the ultimate truth that conditioned things, which exist through dependent origination, are empty of an

¹²⁸ The four unlimited virtues include friendliness (*maitrī*), compassion (*karuṇā*), sympathetic joy (*muditā*) and even-mindedness (*upekṣā*); the four means of conversion include giving (*dāna*), kind words (*priya-vāditā*), helpfulness (*artha-caryā*) and consistency between words and deeds (*samāna-arthatā*); see Iida 1973, pp. 69-70; see also MHK/TJ 3.8-3.9 in Iida 1980, pp. 62-65. I only listed four out of the five points that are explained in Iida 1973. This is because point 5 is not an aspect of the true conventional truth to my understanding. It is concerned with some conventional knowledge, which will be explained as the false conventional truth below.

¹²⁹ As the true ultimate truth and the expressible ultimate truth complement each other, Kajiyama 1957 pp. 302-303 considers the two as the same.

¹³⁰ See also Iida's comment quoted in Katz 1976, p. 257.

¹³¹ Iida 1980, pp. 68-69.

¹³² See a list of universal characteristics and particulars in the TJ of MHK 3.13 in *ibid*.

inherent existence; unconditioned things, which are not caused, are unreal. These show that while the conceptual knowledge of the inexpressible truth is the expressible ultimate truth, the discernment of this knowledge in terms of conventional speech and conceptions is considered the true conventional truth. The former is the resultant wisdom, i.e. the fruit of the proof when it is established, and the latter is the instrument or the action, which is the inference itself that consists of a thesis, reason and example, and the whole process of logical reasoning, to attain the former.

The false conventional truth

Bhāviveka himself did not offer a definition of the false conventional truth. Like MMK 24.10, MHK/TJ 3.12 and 3.13 explains that the true conventional truth is like a staircase. One has to ascend it to reach the top, i.e. the ultimate truth, and this ascension takes seven infinite *kalpas*, i.e. an infinitely long period of practice. For this reason a practitioner should discern “the conventional truth”, understood as the false conventional truth in this discussion, by intelligence first, before she proceeds to investigate thoroughly the particulars and the universals of things,¹³³ being aspects of the true conventional truth. Although Bhāviveka did not mention the false conventional truth in MHK/TJ 3.12 and 3.13, it shows that he has two levels of conventional truth in mind. “The conventional truth” concerned, which is considered as different from and at a lower level than the true conventional truth, is then considered as false comparatively.¹³⁴

According to the TJ of MHK 3.13, the “*saṃvṛti*” in “conventional truth” (*saṃvṛti-satya*) refers to the discernment of all things in the world. It is a genuinely mundane activity, in contrast to the true conventional truth, which is a pure worldly knowledge. It is a truth, “*satya*”, because it is a valid means of knowledge that establishes all things in the conventional world.¹³⁵ The conventional truth includes the thorough

¹³³ Iida 1980, pp. 67-68.

¹³⁴ A similar rationale can be understood from MMK 18.8, which states that the Buddha presents different teachings to people with different capacities. While teachings which are closer to the ultimate truth are taught to people who have attained a higher capacity, the more conventional teachings which they previously received are refuted.

¹³⁵ Cf. Candrakīrti who particularly understands “*saṃvṛti*” as “covered up” or “concealed”, in addition to the common understandings of “that which is dependently-originated” and “custom and convention”. He then understands “*saṃvṛti-satya*” as the worldly concealed truth (*loka-saṃvṛti-satya*). See PSP of MMK 24.8 in Sprung et al. 1979, pp. 230-231.

study of well-known subjects in the conventional world, e.g. grammar and medical science.¹³⁶ PP states that the conventional truth refers to what is expressed by speech in the conventional world,¹³⁷ and also to things that are empty of an inherent existence but mistakenly taken to be existent ultimately.¹³⁸ With this understanding, Bhāviveka states that these things which are commonly accepted as existent in the world are also admitted by him as conventional existence.¹³⁹ This conventional existence is not disputed by his proof.¹⁴⁰

The distinction between the true conventional truth and the false conventional truth is discussed in GN in a clearer manner. Jang-gya states that what distinguishes the true from the false conventional truth is that the former refers to those objects which can perform a function in accordance with how they appear to a conventional valid cogniser who perceives them, while the latter refers to those which cannot.¹⁴¹ In this

¹³⁶ Iida 1980, pp. 68-69, i.e. point 5 in Iida 1973, p. 70.

¹³⁷ See the PP of MMK 24.8 in CBETA, T30, no. 1566, 125a5-a8.

¹³⁸ See the PP of MMK 24.10 in CBETA, T30, no. 1566, 125b8-b9.

¹³⁹ KR: 此中世間同許有者，自亦許為世俗有故。(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 268c8) Although also taking whatever is agreed upon by the world as existent conventionally (PSP of MMK 18.8 in Sprung et al. 1979, p. 181), Candrakīrti considers all conventional existents erroneous, and the ultimate truth is realised by eliminating them. As he thinks the world has no idea of the two truths (PSP of MMK 1.1 in Stcherbatsky 1977, p. 112), he may therefore find Bhāviveka's demarcation of the conventional truth as true and false problematic; the same also applies to the latter's demarcation of the ultimate truth. While some conventional truths are indeed better than the others, Tillemans criticizes Candrakīrti's treatment of the conventional truth that takes all things as thoroughly erroneous, and comments that such a truth would become a "dumbed-down truth". He points out the level of sophistication of the world's epistemic procedures, and suggests understanding the two truths as a rung on a ladder to reach to know better a unitary world; see discussion in Tillemans 2011. Newland points out that Tsongkhapa follows Candrakīrti's distinction between conventions that are real to the world, i.e. cognised by unimpaired sense faculties, and those that are unreal, i.e. cognised by impaired faculties, and holds that conventional truths are taken as true because their existence cannot be falsified by the former. In his analysis, the conventional consciousness is the bridge between the two truths as it provides reliable information to understand the argument against the reality of inherent existence. Conventional claims about things are thus falsified through a process of elimination; see discussion in Newland 2011. Tsongkhapa's treatment of conventional truth is similar to Bhāviveka's. However, there is also ambiguity in Bhāviveka's treatment of the false conventional truth; see discussion below.

¹⁴⁰ KR: 世俗有故，無容違害。(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269a29)

¹⁴¹ Lopez 1987, pp. 333-334. Although a clear distinction between the true conventional truth and the false conventional truth is explained in GN, it should be noted that Jang-gya's understanding of it is in part based on Jñānagarbha and Kamalaśīla, who are in turn influenced by Dharmakīrti, who is known to define ultimate existents as causally efficacious (see PV II 3: *arthakriyāsamarthaṃ yat tad atra paramārthasat*, in Miyasaka 1971/72, p. 42). The criterion, "causal efficacy" is found in *Madhyamaka-artha-saṃgraha*, but this work is not commonly recognised as Bhāviveka's own (see Potter 2003, pp. 442-443). Iida has quoted a passage from PP's commentary of MMK 18.8 to explain causal function as the criterion to distinguish the true conventional truth, e.g. the drinkable water, from the false conventional truth, e.g. the water of a mirage. He translates this passage as follows, "the sense organs like the eye, etc., and their objects, like *rūpa*, exist without contradicting conventional truth. Therefore, it is declared, 'Everything is real.' [However], from the ultimate point of view, their own-beings cannot be established like a mirage which arises dependently on [other

sense, for example, a jar taken as ultimately real would be a false conventional truth to this cogniser, but a true conventional truth if it is understood as a conventional object that arises dependently. Although a jar in general is known by conventional speech, with reference to Jang-gya's definition a jar as an ultimate reality is a false conventional truth because this so-called ultimately existent jar in fact does not have an all-pervading existence as it is mistaken to have, and therefore it cannot fulfill its function to contain water in all places and in all times;¹⁴² a jar as a dependently-arisen conventional existent is a true conventional truth because it can contain water as long as it appears as a jar. The same applies to illusions, the example in the first inference of the proof of emptiness; an illusory man, taken as a real man, is a false conventional truth because it cannot function like a real man. However, this illusory man is a true conventional truth when he is taken as a dependently-arisen thing because it can fulfill its function, in this context, as an object exemplifying the positive concomitance of the properties "arisen from conditions" and "empty" in conditioned things. Likewise, the illusory monks, who were conjured by the Buddha as a skilful means (*upāya*) to inspire other monks to follow the Buddhist practice.¹⁴³ From this, it can be understood that there is no clear boundary between a jar, a concrete object, and an illusion to the Mādhyamikas, as these things all arise dependently. Their truth or falsity in the conventional sense is determined by whether they can fulfill their functions, which are largely determined by the cogniser's interest or desire, in terms of their being ultimate existents or conventional existents. Therefore, it should be noted that it is only the inherent existence of illusion and other conditioned things to be refuted in the proof of emptiness, but not the conditioned things *per se*.

entities]. Thus, since it does not exist as it appears, when we consider it from the point of view of two truths, 'Everything is both real and unreal.'" (Iida 1973, p. 68; see also CBETA, T30, no. 1566, 108a8-a11) However, it should be noted that the concern of this passage is not to distinguish the two conventional truths but to distinguish the ultimate truth from the conventional truth. This passage means that things, which are regarded as existent in the conventional world, are not existent in the ultimate sense because the existence of these things, like that of a mirage, is dependent on other things. Although it does mention that conventional things do not exist as it appears, it does not explain this in terms of their lack of causal function; see also the TJ of MHK 3.7, where the true conventional truth is only explained as in accordance with the discernment of the real objects (*bhūta-artha*). (Iida 1980, pp. 61-62) Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that the criterion of causal efficacy is merely an interpretation, although a feasible one, to clarify Bhāviveka's thought by later commentators.

¹⁴² This can also be understood in general terms with the jar as an object of perception. As an object of perception, the jar should be able to cause perception to a valid cogniser. If it is ultimately existent, then it should be perceivable to this cogniser in all places and all times. However, it is not. As this so-called ultimately existent jar in fact cannot fulfill its function as an object of perception, the understanding of it as an ultimate existent is a false conventional truth.

¹⁴³ *Mahāratnakūṭa-sūtra* in CBETA, T11, no. 310, 637b14-c26.

As for the example “sky-flower” in the second inference, it is commonly recognised as non-existent even conventionally. Although it is also known through conventional speech, it is not reasonable for it to be taken as either true or false conventional truth. Bhāviveka did not offer any explanation on the status of objects like sky-flower in his system of the two truths. In GN, these objects are identified as merely false conventionalities, outside the two conventional truths. They are not taken as a truth because they are not a valid basis for cognition, meaning that they cannot be cognised at all in the conventional world.¹⁴⁴ Therefore, there is no way to determine whether they can fulfill their function as they appear. They include objects like

- (1) double moon, hair and other objects, which appear due to the deficiencies or illnesses in one’s perceptual or cognitive system, and
- (2) a permanent Self, *prakṛti*, the inherent existence of things and other realities in Bhāviveka’s opponents’ doctrines.

Likewise, these objects also include

- (3) logically impossible objects, such as a circular square, as they can neither be cognised by perception nor established by inference.

¹⁴⁴ Lopez 1987, pp. 333-334; see also *ibid.*, pp. 207-209. In GN, false conventionalities cover both false conventional truths and those which are not existent even conventionally as bases of cognition, such as double moon, the self of persons (*pudgalātman*), the self of things (*dharmātman*), etc.; the latter are merely false conventionalities but not false conventional truths. The distinction of false conventionality is not used by Bhāviveka in KR. In *Madhyamaka-artha-saṃgraha*, a work that has yet to be proved as Bhāviveka’s own, the merely false conventionalities as understood in GN seem to be included in the false conventional truth, under the categories of the false conventional truth with conceptualisation and false conventional truth without conceptualisation (Potter 2003, p. 443; see also Katz 1976, p. 259). Thus, double moon, etc. are categorized under the false conventional truth without conceptualisation, while taking a rope for a snake, etc. are under the false conventional truth with conceptualisation, together with the conventional things that are mistaken as ultimate existents. The idea may be that the double moon, etc. are not cognised due to conceptualisation, but deficiencies; a rope for a snake, etc. and the ultimately existent conventional things are cognised due to conceptualisation. However, this distinction is problematic in the sense that no matter whether double moon and others are cognised due to conceptualisation or not, they do not arise in the conventional sense and therefore do not exist even conventionally; hence, they cannot be regarded as a conventional truth to be further discerned as either true or false. Also, it is clear that Bhāviveka treats conventional existents differently from the false conventionalities, as he does not deny the conventional existents that are commonly recognised by common people, but he refutes the merely false conventionalities in the conventional sense. This shows that it is untenable to lump all these objects together into the category of false conventional truth.

In other words, these merely false conventionalities, which cannot be cognised through conventional knowledge, include things that are falsely perceived, i.e. (1), and things that are unperceivable and are erroneous concepts, i.e. (2) and (3). Although all these things, as represented by thoughts or concepts, arise mentally and to a certain extent physically, they never arise as the things as such that would be commonly recognised as existent in the conventional world. In this sense, they are categorized as merely false conventionalities.

In KR, the unreal perceptual objects in (1) are excluded from the scope of the proof because these objects are not produced due to one's conceptual proliferation but deficiencies or illnesses that one cannot control; they can only be dispelled by medicine instead of reasoning. Bhaviveka categorizes the unperceivable things and erroneous concepts in (2) and (3), which cannot be perceived or validly conceptualised, as unconditioned things that do not arise, in relation to the second inference of his proof. He has generally taken the conventional approach discussed above therefore all these unconditioned things are to be refuted as merely false conventionalities and not existent even conventionally.

However, GN's interpretation is not completely true to KR. It is because Bhaviveka did not refute the conventional existence of inherent existence, which he considers non-arisen from conditions and should therefore be non-existent even conventionally, unlike his treatment of other merely false conventionalities. The false conventional truth is false because conditioned things, which are empty of inherent existence, are now mistaken as having such existence. By not refuting these things which are commonly accepted as existent in the world, Bhāviveka has also accepted the conventional reality of inherent existence; if he had refuted the conventional reality of inherent existence, then conditioned things would also be stated as empty, without such inherent existence, in terms of the true conventional truth.¹⁴⁵ However, this is not what Bhaviveka himself has stated in the theses of his proof (Section 1.3.2). In order to prove these things as empty only in terms of the ultimate truth (see also Section 3.4), these theses are indeed specified by the modifier “in terms of the ultimate truth”. Thus, it can be understood that Bhāviveka treats the inherent

¹⁴⁵ This might be another reason why some scholars consider the expressible ultimate truth the same as the true conventional truth (cf. footnote 129), but this has not yet been discussed in any literature to my knowledge.

existence of things differently from other merely false conventionalities. It may be that they are deliberately kept in the false conventional truth first due to the need of discussion. Still, they are different from other false conventional truths as they do not arise. A similar explanation is however given by Bhāviveka for his inclusion of the other merely false conventionalities in his discussion: they are explained to be provisionally-established as concepts or inferential objects in order to be refuted later by his second inference regarding unconditioned things.¹⁴⁶ This shows that perhaps Bhāviveka allows degrees of flexibility about what is included in the false conventional truth, and this probably depends on the need of teaching or reflection.

The discussions above have clarified the four categories of truth in Bhāviveka's system of the two truths. The inexpressible ultimate truth is a non-conceptual and ineffable state which is the ultimate goal in the system. The expressible ultimate truth is the conceptual knowledge of the inexpressible ultimate truth, i.e. the wisdom that all things are empty. It is also the wisdom resulting from the correct discernment of false conventional truth in terms of the true conventional truth i.e. from the proof of emptiness in the present context. The true conventional truth is the correct discernment of the false conventional truth, in which the merely false conventionalities and the mistaken ultimate existence of things are refuted by the proof of emptiness. The false conventional truth is the truth established by conventional knowledge which takes conditioned things as having an inherent existence, i.e. as either ultimately existent or absolutely non-existent. The merely false conventionalities refer to the unconditioned things, including the ultimate existents in the opponents' doctrines and absolute non-existents that cannot be established conventionally by direct perception or by inference. The four categories of truth are summarized as below:

The two truths	The ultimate truth	The inexpressible ultimate truth	Emptiness itself
		The expressible ultimate truth	Emptiness as an object realised by the non-discriminating knowledge
			Teachings on emptiness and the resultant wisdoms

¹⁴⁶ See also discussion in Section 3.2.2.

	The conventional truth	The true conventional truth	- The conclusion of the proof of emptiness
			The acts of teaching, reflecting, meditating, practicing, etc. in terms of the emptiness of all things
		The false conventional truth	- The proof of emptiness
			Conditioned things that are taken as having an inherent existence
			Unconditioned things, i.e. the merely false conventionalities(?), including the opponents' ultimate realities and things that are absolutely non-existent

In KR, cognisable objects are divided into either conditioned things or unconditioned things, which include all realities of Bhāviveka opponents. Things that are commonly recognised as existent are those that arise in a conventional sense, i.e. the conditioned things. Things that are not commonly recognised as existent are those that do not arise even conventionally, i.e. the unconditioned things. Bhāviveka's opponents either take the latter to be absolutely non-existent or as their ultimate realities, both of which are merely false conventionalities to be refuted by the proof of emptiness. If these so-called unconditioned things are indeed conditioned but only mistaken as unconditioned, according to their conditioned nature, they are considered as existent in terms of conventional knowledge and as false conventional truths. On this basis, the inherent existence of the conventional existents is to be refuted in terms of the expressible ultimate truth. Unconditioned things are established as ultimately unreal in terms of the same. In this way, Bhāviveka has established that no unconditioned things exist, and whatever exists is arisen from conditions, i.e. conventional.

2.3.3 Spiritual practice in terms of the two truths

Bhāviveka has developed Nāgārjuna's explication of the two truths: secondly, by giving more importance to the role of practice in general in a practitioner's spiritual progress, which can be seen from his establishment of the expressible ultimate truth and the true conventional truth.¹⁴⁷ Katz comments that the Prāsaṅgikas concentrate

¹⁴⁷ It is generally agreed that Bhāviveka puts more emphasis on or leaves more room for teaching, logical reasoning, meditation and practice in his system of two truths; see for example in Katz 1976, p. 257, Tsau 2000, pp. 42-43, Hsu 2011, pp. 72-73.

on MMK 24.8-24.9, i.e. the difference between the two truths, in the sense that they negate the conventional in order to attain the ultimate, while the Svātantrikas, represented by Bhāviveka, concentrate on MMK 24.10, i.e. the equal importance of the two truths in spiritual progress.¹⁴⁸ However, discussions above and this section show that Bhāviveka gives equal emphasis to both; he clarifies the ambiguity of the two truths in order to show their differences, and he emphasises the role of Buddhist practices in general, and logical reasoning in particular, for one to attain the ultimate truth. This is based on the understanding that the two truths are interdependent and that although they are different, they can relate to each other. In this light, it is more accurate to consider that the Prāsaṅgikas have overlooked the importance in the role of conventional truth in spiritual progress. This can be seen in the Prāsaṅgika representative, Candrakīrti's negative attitude towards inference, which aims at directly establishing emptiness, while he only accepts the use *reductio ad absurdum* (*prasaṅga*).

Spiritual progress along the two truths

In KR, Bhāviveka holds that the erroneous views regarding the inherent existence of things are necessarily to be refuted by the discernment of emptiness, which includes logical reasoning and meditation; just like the unreal perceptual objects which appear due to eye disease can only be dispelled by medicine.¹⁴⁹ Bhāviveka compares the illness of the eyes with one's conceptual proliferation, the eye medication with the unperturbed discernment of emptiness, false perceptual objects with objects cognised as having an inherent existence, i.e. the erroneous views. The analogy works like this: Supposing that a person did not know that she had eye disease, she took all objects that appeared due to this illness as real. After someone pointed out her illness to her, she knew that those objects were false and she applied the eye medication. While she kept applying the medication, her eyes became better gradually and the false perceptual objects appeared less often. Eventually, her eyes are cured completely. She can see things clearly, and according to reality, she no longer sees the false objects. The same for a person who had erroneous views and believed in the inherent existence of things; after she heard the wisdom concerning the emptiness all things,

¹⁴⁸ Katz 1976, pp. 256-257.

¹⁴⁹ Cf. MHK/TJ 3.1-3.4, where Bhāviveka states that the eye that penetrates into the reality of things is only possessed by the person who has knowledge, but not the person who only has flesh eyes. Therefore, the wise person should pursue this eye of wisdom, i.e. the knowledge of the ultimate reality.

she then actively practiced the unperturbed discernment of emptiness, and eliminated the erroneous views gradually. At last, she has attained the non-discriminating wisdom that realises the emptiness of things.¹⁵⁰

Here, what distinguishes a person with eye disease from another person with healthy eyes is the fact that the latter can see according to the reality; a person who knows that she has eye disease is also different from another person who does not in the sense that the former treats the false perceptual objects she sees as false, while the latter takes them as real. Similarly, what distinguishes an ordinary person, who has no knowledge about the ultimate truth, from an *ārya*, who has already realised it, is that the former only has a conventional conception of things as either ultimately existent or absolutely non-existent; the latter no longer takes them as either ultimately existent or absolutely non-existent after she has realised the inexpressible ultimate truth. Although she can still see these things conventionally, she has a correct understanding on the inexpressible ultimate truth and therefore a right view on the conventional things; she only treats them as empty and existent dependently.¹⁵¹

The in-between situation of the person who is taking medication to cure her eye disease can be compared to that of a *prthagjana*, a practitioner who has not yet realised the inexpressible ultimate truth. While the latter understands that things are empty of inherent existence, she still takes some as ultimately existent or absolutely non-existent. The things that are empty and non-empty can be different to different practitioners. This shows a scale of levels of spiritual progress. As Bhāviveka stated, the true conventional truth is like a staircase ascending to the ultimate truth, where a practitioner accumulates wisdom and merit. It therefore can be understood that one's

¹⁵⁰ KR: 然證出世無分別智，要須積習能壞一切邪見眼瞶、無倒觀空安膳那藥。如是積習無倒觀空安膳那藥，要藉能遣一切所緣自性聞慧。(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 268b14-b16); cf. MHK 3.251-3.252.

¹⁵¹ A similar analogy is found in KR, where an ignorant painter is compared to a fool. The fool does not correctly understand the reasoning regarding the ultimate truth therefore she attaches herself to the false inherent natures and differences of things due to conceptual proliferation. This painter takes the horrible images she has painted as real and becomes afraid of them. By contrast, a painter with wisdom is compared to one who can correctly understand the reasoning regarding the ultimate truth. Also facing the images she has painted, this painter knows that they are not real therefore she does not conceptualise on them and generate fear. (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 268b26-c5) In other versions of this analogy, the painter with wisdom is replaced by a magician who produces illusions. Not only does this magician know the false nature of the illusions that she has produced, she also uses them to achieve certain purposes. This magician can be compared to as an *ārya* in the present context.

ascent of this staircase is taken as a truth because it presents one's correct pursuit of the ultimate reality, in terms of the emptiness of all things. In this light, the true conventional truth is considered a process; through a long period of time, a practitioner investigates the false conventional truth and refutes the merely false conventionalities. This marks the gradual transformation of one's horizon from conventional to the ultimate, which is discussed in the following.

While the merely false conventionalities are distinguished from the false conventional truth, Bhāviveka holds that one should study thoroughly the latter by intelligence before proceeding to discern the true conventional truth. One can discern correctly the characteristics of things only if one has a thorough knowledge of them. Although the false conventional truth concerns mere conventional knowledge, it is the object or the basis of investigation for one who proceeds to discern the particulars and the universals of conventional things in terms of the true conventional truth. Through the correct discernment of these things, and with the help from the wisdom attained from hearing the Buddhist teachings and instructions, one by one the conventional things are found to be dependently-arisen and not existent ultimately; one by one the merely false conventionalities, such as a permanent Self and the inherent existence of things, are refuted. This method of elimination is reflected in the non-implicative negation (*prasajya-pratiṣedha*) Bhāviveka employs in KR; in terms of the expressible ultimate truth, the ultimate existence, the absolute non-existence, both, and eventually all objects of cognition are negated without implying the affirmation of the opposite of what is negated.¹⁵² The same rationale is also reflected in analytical meditation (*vicāra-bhāvanā*) through which a practitioner systematically investigates individual objects under the topics of, for example, impermanence, and subsequently resolves that the permanent existence of none of these objects is attainable. In this sense, the practices regarding logical reasoning and meditation complement each other.¹⁵³

¹⁵² CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c16-c19. The non-implicative negation is understood in relation to the implicative negation (*pariyudāsa-pratiṣedha*), which implies the opposite of what is negated. For details, see discussion in Section 3.3.3 and Commentary on Objection 9 in Part II.

¹⁵³ Iida considers logical reasoning as playing a major role in facilitating the wisdom attained from reflection, instead of the wisdom attained from hearing the Buddhist teachings (Iida 1966, pp. 93-95). Based on his analysis of the alogicality of Bhāviveka's proof of emptiness, Hoornaert instead regards the proof as only applicable in the translogical stage of meditation. (Hoornaert 1993, p. 23) Nevertheless, in the present discussion based on KR, it seems that Bhāviveka does not give a clear-cut

After one has refuted the inherent existence of all things through logical reasoning, in other words, after one has ascended the staircase of the true conventional truth, one attains the pure worldly knowledge of the expressible ultimate truth, i.e. the resultant wisdom that all things are empty. In KR, Bhāviveka holds that after one has attained this wisdom, which is the understanding of the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things and the ultimate unreality of all unconditioned things, through logical reasoning, one should also meditate to completely eliminate all conceptual proliferation.¹⁵⁴ With the help from analytical meditation and the wisdom from reflection that all things are empty, he advises the practitioners of the concentration of mind (*samādhi*) on the practice of insight meditation (*vipaśyanā*). Through this meditation, they eliminate all the dualities such as subject and object, existence and non-existence in their mind. Eventually when all objects, including emptiness itself, are eliminated, they realise the inexpressible truth, which is a moment of insight. This is Bhāviveka's understanding of the meaning of MMK 24.10, which states that one cannot attain the ultimate truth without relying on the conventional truth.

From the above analysis, there are two directions of spiritual practice, upward and downward, which can be understood in relation to the proof of emptiness, based on the system of the two truths. The upward direction is concerned with the *prthagjanas*. As discussed above, with the thorough knowledge of the false conventional truth they investigate the dependent origination and emptiness of conventional things in terms of the true conventional truth. With the reflection of the conventional things in terms of the true conventional truth, they attain the expressible ultimate truth, which is the emptiness of all things. Hence, the establishment of the proof of emptiness, to the *prthagjanas*, presents an upward direction of spiritual progress from the false conventional truth to the more transcendent expressible ultimate truth. The downward direction is concerned with the *āryas*. After they have realised the inexpressible ultimate truth, they develop a conceptual knowledge of it, i.e. the wisdom that all things are empty, in terms of the expressible ultimate truth. They further teach and reflect on this knowledge, by means of the proof of emptiness, in terms of conventional speech and conceptions pertaining to the true conventional

division of labour between logical reasoning, or particularly the proof of emptiness, and meditation in relation to the three kinds of wisdom.

¹⁵⁴ CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 273a22-a24, 276a5-a8.

truth. On the one hand, they strengthen their understanding of the emptiness of all things, which in turn enhances their meditation and practices. On the other hand, the proof of emptiness, as a teaching, causes the wisdoms attained from hearing and from reflection for the *prthagjanas* to further investigate the nature of conventional things; in other words, it is the cause of their later realisation of the emptiness of all things.

Hence, in Bhāviveka's system of the two truths, the expressible ultimate truth and the true conventional truth play an important role in one's spiritual progress. While the expressible ultimate truth, i.e. all things are empty, is the conceptual knowledge of the inexpressible ultimate truth, it is taught by the *āryas* to the *prthagjanas* based on the true conventional truth; at the same time the *prthagjanas* refine their knowledge on the nature of conventional things also based on the true conventional truth. In this respect, all practitioners, regardless of whether they have already realised the ultimate truth, reflect on the nature of conventional things in terms of the true conventional truth, by means of the proof of emptiness. Through the proof of emptiness, the expressible ultimate truth is therefore the resultant wisdom of all practitioners. This also involves a change in the practitioners' horizon progressing from the knowledge of the conventional truth, which is conceptual, to the attainment of the inexpressible ultimate truth, which is non-conceptual. As shown in the above discussion, a gradual change is possible through continuous practices that are in terms of the true conventional truth, taking the inexpressible ultimate truth as their goal. The proof of emptiness, which is one of the practices in the true conventional truth, is the instrument for one to attain the resultant wisdom of the emptiness of all things. Thus, the categories of the true conventional truth and the expressible ultimate truth, both being conceptual, in Bhāviveka's system of the two truths act as the mediator, or the bridge, between the mere worldly knowledge and the realisation of the inexpressible ultimate truth.¹⁵⁵

In the beginning of the chapter, I mentioned the tension between the non-conceptual emptiness and the attempt to prove it conceptually by logical reasoning. In my opinion, Bhāviveka attempts to solve this tension by dividing the two truths into four categories. Thus, emptiness itself, which is non-conceptual, remains as the

¹⁵⁵ Kajiyama 1957, pp. 301-303, Tsau 2000, pp. 40-41, Hsu 2011, pp. 86-87.

inexpressible ultimate truth that can only be attained through meditation. The scope of the application of the proof of emptiness is now confined in the other three categories, i.e. the expressible ultimate truth, the true conventional truth and the false conventional truth, all of which are understood to be conceptual. This has successfully addressed the tension in the sense that emptiness is taken up as a conceptualised object that can be talked or thought about; the underlying purpose to teach and reflect upon it is therefore fulfilled. In Bhāviveka's system of the two truths, the proof of emptiness therefore serves as a skilful means to facilitate one's spiritual progress to the realisation of the inexpressible ultimate truth.

Chapter 3: The Establishment of the Proof

3.1 Introduction

In Chapter 2, the proof of emptiness was interpreted as the true conventional truth. Bhāviveka believes that it represents the wise person's attempt to convey her conceptual knowledge of the inexpressible ultimate truth to other practitioners as well as to the Buddhist and non-Buddhist opponents. Thus, the proof is expected to be applicable universally among these groups of people. Bhāviveka holds that he has succeeded in proving that all things are empty in general, instead of being empty only to some people.

This chapter is concerned with the adaptations in the formation of the two inferences in the proof of emptiness as inference for others, or as common inference for these groups of people, under the influence of Bhāviveka's position on emptiness. These adaptations will be evaluated in terms of the two basic criteria for establishing an inference for others (Section 1.3.2): first, only terms whose concepts are commonly agreed upon can be used; second, the reason should be commonly agreed as possessing the three characteristics. Based on this, the two inferences are considered under Bhāviveka's claim that they are established either [1] as the general result of the whole inferential process regarding the emptiness of all things, or [2] as standalone inferences. I will show that [2] is untenable due to their universal nature, i.e. to prove the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things and all unconditioned things, constituting a fallacy in Dignaga's logical system.

There are five sections in this chapter. Section 3.2 considers how Bhāviveka fulfills the first criterion in both [1] and [2]. Section 3.3 and 3.4 then evaluate how the second criterion is addressed in [1]. Issues regarding the proof being established without the third characteristic of a reason, with the use of non-implicative negation, and the employment of the modifier as the final step to establish the proof as common inferences will be discussed. Section 3.5 argues that Bhāviveka has nevertheless failed to fulfill the second criterion in [2]. The fallacious reason resulting from the universal nature of the inferences is investigated. Section 3.6 concludes that the expressible ultimate truth is not proved in KR.

3.2 On the common agreement on the concept of a term

The first criterion for the establishment of an inference for others requires that only terms whose concepts are commonly agreed upon can be used (applying to both [1] and [2]).

In Objection 10 regarding the first inference in the proof, the opponents objected to “arisen from conditions” as the property that infers in the reason because it can mean something different to Bhāviveka than to other parties.¹⁵⁶ It can mean, for example, that things are produced by some substances, thus implying that they are ultimately real, or that they are produced by other dependently-originated things, thus implying that they are empty of an inherent existence. As a result, a certain party in the debate may be favoured when a particular meaning is taken into account. For different parties derive different understandings from “arisen from conditions”; if the reason were to be understood in terms of some of its various meanings, an inference for others (or a common inference) would be impossible.¹⁵⁷ This problem does not only apply to the reason. It can also apply to “conditioned things”, as in cases where they imply ultimate existence to the opponents,¹⁵⁸ and to “illusion”, as in cases where its illusory inherent nature is implied.¹⁵⁹ For this reason, Bhāviveka generally holds that the terms used in inferences should be understood in terms of their general quality.

3.2.1 Terms as general qualities

In response to the objection above, Bhāviveka states that the property that infers (“arisen from conditions”) should be understood as a general quality (*sāmānya*) that is accepted by both parties in the debate, including all particular instances possessing this quality. It should not be understood in terms of any of its particularities or implications (*viśeṣa*). Such a property is generally accepted by the logicians as the reason.¹⁶⁰ As long as all parties agree on the general sense of the reason, the reason

¹⁵⁶ CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c28-c29.

¹⁵⁷ A similar debate between Bhāviveka and his opponents on this issue is recorded in PSP, where Bhāviveka’s explanation, as also discussed below, is rejected by Candrakīrti (Stcherbatsky 1977, pp. 115-117); see also footnote 319 in Part II.

¹⁵⁸ See, for example, Objections 1 and 3 in Part II.

¹⁵⁹ See Objections 11 and 12.

¹⁶⁰ KR: 二宗共許，不顯差別，總相法門明正理者許為因... (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c29-271a1)

is sufficient to be established. This position applies to all other terms in both inferences.

A general quality may be conceived of as a universal. This is discussed by Bhāviveka in MHK 5.61, where he states that the referent of a word is an entity (*vastu*) possessing a universal (*sāmānya*), because this entity causes the cognition of the image of itself. This entity exists, therefore it can be referred to by a word.¹⁶¹ The TJ of MHK 5.59 explains that this entity is the form-and-colour that exists conventionally, and its image is the sense object that appears in direct perception and is inexpressible.¹⁶² These form-and-colours are particulars that arise from conditions and are conventional existents. One may not attempt to grasp them, as in the case in the realisation of the inexpressible ultimate truth; but when one does, one has already conceptualised these originally inexpressible sense objects and formed a concept about them. Hence, when these particulars are referred to by words, they are already conceived of as gross objects, in terms of the concept of themselves. This concept is a universal.¹⁶³ Alternatively put, words always refer to the universals of the particulars. Therefore, MHK 5.63 states that the universal is necessarily cognised together with any particular entity that is its locus.¹⁶⁴ Due to continuous conceptualising activities, various universals are formed and are possessed by common loci, so that the conceptual knowledge of, for example a “blue” “lotus” and a “blue” “pot”, is possible.¹⁶⁵ In this light, the terms in the two inferences in the proof of emptiness are considered universals. For example, the particulars that have arisen from conditions can be generally referred to by and subsequently discussed in terms of the universals “conditioned things”, “arisen from conditions”, “illusion” and “empty”.

¹⁶¹ Eckel 2008, p. 266; see also Saito 2004, p. 25 and Hoornaert 2001b, pp. 30-31.

¹⁶² Eckel 2008, pp. 264-265; see also Saito 2004, p. 28 and Hoornaert 2001b, pp. 29-30.

¹⁶³ See Hsu 2013, pp. 111-120 for the discussion on the relation between direct perception, inference and the formation of universal.

¹⁶⁴ Eckel 2008, p. 268; see also Saito 2004, p. 25 and Hoornaert 2001b, p. 32. Bhāviveka’s understanding of universal should be contrasted with Dignāga’s. Bhāviveka holds that universals are formed by the cogniser’s conceptualisation on the particulars as entities. They are possessed by these entities and necessarily cognised together with them. Dignāga’s universals are understood by virtue of exclusion of others (*anyāpoha*). A property of a thing is established by negating anything that possesses the opposite property of this property ($\sim p$). Thus, this thing, which possesses this property, is understood as having the property “ $\sim p$ ” (Hayes 1988, pp. 183-184); see also Saito 2004.

¹⁶⁵ MHK 5.64 and 5.65. (Eckel 2008, pp. 269-270)

However, understanding a term as a universal is not sufficient to solve the problem described under Objection 10. This is due to different degrees of generality. For example, “arisen from conditions” is a universal. Opponents’ conception of “produced by substances” is another universal, although one that is more specific than the former. What determines a term in an inference to be understood in terms of the former, in a more general manner? Or, how is one to assess this degree of generality? Bhāviveka’s explanation on this point is not clear. Thus, to try to understand his view, I shall consider the nature of an inference for others. Different from an inference for oneself, which only aims to achieve inferential knowledge for oneself, an inference for others rather aims at convincing others to accept the same conclusion one has reached in one’s own inferential process. For this reason, no common knowledge between two parties could be achieved if the inference was set up only based on the conceptions of the proponent or the party whom the proponent wishes to convince. Under this circumstance, the proponent has to look for a common ground. When deciding the terms to use in an inference, the proponent has to take up their general qualities, whose senses are general enough for both parties to accept. Thus, the inferential knowledge common to both parties is possible.

While the property that infers of an inference is the basis for both parties to infer the conclusion, it must be general enough to be commonly recognised by both parties. Only in this way can it act as the medium through which the common inferential knowledge can be established through the concomitance between the property that infers and the property to be inferred. This is why a reason is fallacious if it is not accepted by all parties in the debate.¹⁶⁶ In his response to Objection 10, Bhāviveka has taken a property which is commonly possessed by all particular instances of the subject of the inference to be the property that infers in the reason.¹⁶⁷ As already defined in Section 1.3.2, “conditioned things” include everything that is arisen from conditions; the property that infers, i.e. “arisen from conditions”, is possessed by all conditioned things. Being “arisen from conditions” means to be “jointly produced by conditions”, “arisen by virtue of conditions” or being “manifested by conditions”. This definition includes all particular causal activities whose results are caused by

¹⁶⁶ See, for example, Bhāviveka’s response to Objection 7 in Part II.

¹⁶⁷ See Commentary in Part II for the detailed discussion on Bhāviveka’s response.

the assemblage of causes and conditions. Thus, “production by substances”, which is the interpretation favoured by Bhāviveka’s opponents, is also included.

The same rationale also applies to other terms in an inference for others. In his response to Objection 12, Bhāviveka states that one should not object to an inference based on the particularities of the property that infers and of the property to be inferred. Take the inference “sound is impermanent, because it is produced” as an example. It should not be refuted based on the fact that the positive example “jar” is “produced by lumps of clay” or “destructible by a stick”, which is unlike the subject “sound”, as sound is produced and destroyed under different circumstances. This is because as long as both the jar and sound possess the general qualities, i.e. “impermanent” and “produced”, then the jar is sufficient to be a positive example to establish the impermanence of sound.¹⁶⁸

As terms understood in their general qualities are used to infer the knowledge applicable to all parties involved, they do not already imply the conclusion Bhāviveka favours. The principle of impartiality can be maintained. Neither do they imply the opposite of the conclusion that his opponents favour. This therefore has avoided the fallacy of establishing what has already been established to the opponents, as inferring what is not originally agreed upon by the opponents is one of the basic rules of conducting a debate.

3.2.2 The discussion of the merely false conventionalities

While universals are understood as general qualities, there may be a further problem regarding the nature of the terms used in the second inference. As universals are always cognised together with the loci, i.e. the conventional existents, unconditioned things that do not arise are to be proved by Bhāviveka to be merely false conventionalities, which are non-existent even conventionally. And as they do not exist, they cannot be the loci of the universals. Thus, there is a question as to how to conceive of “unconditioned things” such as “space”, “sky-flower”¹⁶⁹ and their “not

¹⁶⁸ See Commentary in Part II for detailed discussion.

¹⁶⁹ It should be noted that the ontological status of, e.g. sky-flower, is different from that of unconditioned things, such as space, etc. that are introduced in Section 1.3.2. The former is commonly considered as absolutely non-existent. However, space, cessation through deliberation and cessation independent of deliberation are regarded as ultimate realities in Vaibhāṣika; see KR in

arising” in the second inference. In KR, the logicians indeed have objected: since Bhāviveka himself holds that unconditioned things are non-existent absolutely, it is illegitimate for him to set up an inference to infer any property of these things.¹⁷⁰

Bhāviveka tries to explain away this problem in his response in KR.¹⁷¹ He argues that all parties involved in the debate do establish “space” based on the mere absence of resistant bodies, by virtue of the power of designation of our thought. Similarly, they establish “cessation through deliberation” based on the mere non-arising of defilements resulting from the discernment of our wisdom. They also establish “cessation independent of deliberation” based on the mere non-arising of things and “suchness” based on the mere absence of all attachments, both resulting from the absence of conditions. It is because of the power of designation of our thought that we are allowed to provisionally establish these unconditioned things.

Thus, unconditioned things are created by our mind as imaginary existents on a conventional level and therefore we are able to talk about them by conventional speech. From this, we are also able to form an inference about them. At this point, Bhāviveka would be able to respond to the problem of universals by saying that just as these unconditioned things can be established provisionally as concepts in our mind, so too can the relevant universals be established. Provisionally, they both take the mental organ that consists of form-and-colours as locus, while eventually being negated altogether. This seems to be the solution Bhāviveka takes.

Bhāviveka continues to explain that as the unconditioned things are established by the power of designation of our thought, they can be taken to be the subject of the thesis through the power of common agreement of the parties involved.¹⁷² While he regards them as merely false conventionalities and his opponents take them as ultimate existents, the implications of being unconditioned, i.e. as being absolutely

CBETA, T30, no. 1758, 273c21-c23, 274a17-a20 and 274b16-b17. Suchness is taken as ultimate reality by Yogācāra; see KR in CBETA, T30, no. 1758, 274b28-c3.

¹⁷⁰ See CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 274b4-b6. A similar criticism by Candrakīrti is found in Chapter 1 of PSP. (Stcherbatsky 1977, p. 117)

¹⁷¹ KR: 想施設力於唯無有有質礙物立為虛空；由慧簡擇，於唯無有煩惱生起立為擇滅；由闕眾緣，於唯無有諸法生起立非擇滅；於唯無有一切所執立為真如。想施設力許有假立虛空等故。(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 274b7-b11)

¹⁷² KR: 想施設力許有假立虛空等故，不顯差別，由共許力總立有法。(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 274b11)

non-existent or ultimately existent, are not taken into consideration when forming an inference. Although the existence of unconditioned things is conceived of differently by different parties, the point that they are thought of and are agreed upon as such by all parties involved is not deniable.¹⁷³ Therefore, even merely as concepts, they are sufficient to be taken up as the subject of the thesis. The same applies to individual unconditioned things, i.e. space, etc.; they can be taken as the subject of the inference as long as they are thought of and are agreed upon as such by all parties involved.

Nevertheless, the refutation or the proof of the implication that unconditioned things are ultimately existent is not commonly recognised. As long as the parties involved can conceive of such a dispute, “do not have reality” can be stated as the property to be inferred in relation to the subject. As the fact that unconditioned things do not arise is commonly recognised, “not arising” is stated as the property that infers. And although there is no such thing as “sky-flower” in reality, as an imaginary existent it is generally thought to have the properties “unconditioned”, “does not arise” and “unreal”.¹⁷⁴ Therefore, Bhāṇiveka can still set up his second inference for the ultimate unreality of unconditioned things.

Universals are employed in inference in Dignāga’s system of logic. The above, however, shows that in an inference for others, being a universal is not the fundamental criterion for a concept to be considered the term used in such an inference. In the discussion of conditioned things as conventional existents and unconditioned things as merely false conventionalities, the universals of the former are considered more real than those of the latter. If we had strictly adhered to the definition of “universal” given in MHK, the concepts or the universals of unconditioned things would be unacceptable because they do not have any conventionally existent locus. While they are considered to have been established taking the mind as their locus, the same can be said about the universals of conditioned things. The criterion that allows both types of universals to take the mind as their locus is in fact the power of designation of our thought and the power

¹⁷³ ZZLS: 不顯差別，由共許力總立為有法。謂因明立有法之法，不顯有法體相差別。謂總約彼此有義邊，立為有法。我以無為為世俗有，汝以無為為勝義有者，雖真俗不同，有義不異。(CBETA, X46, no. 788, 717b6-b9)

¹⁷⁴ See KR in CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 274b11-b15.

of common agreement by the parties involved in the debate. Through these powers, Bhāviveka can make sure that there is common agreement on both content and concept-generalities for the terms used in both inferences. Hence, no matter whether all or a particular conditioned thing or unconditioned thing is taken up as the subject, as long as its concept is commonly agreed upon, the inferences can qualify as inferences for others.¹⁷⁵

This discussion of the commonly-agreed nature of concepts can be further applied to our conception of an inherent nature, which should also be regarded as a merely false conventionality as it does not arise from conditions.¹⁷⁶ To Bhāviveka, a quality, as a universal, of a thing becomes an inherent nature because of our false conceptualisation. The fact that we can talk about a thing or “its inherent nature” as if it were ultimately real is also due to the powers of designation and common agreement. When one reflects on the false conventional existents in terms of the expressible ultimate truth, one then establishes them as empty. The inherent existence of these things, which was once established by these powers, is also negated.

3.3 The general result of the whole inferential process

The second criterion for the establishment of an inference for others requires that the reason be commonly recognised by all parties as possessing all three characteristics of a reason. This is evaluated in terms of [1] in this section.

In Objection 5, the opponents make the criticism that the act of inference is deficient in the first inference. In the first part of his response ([1]), Bhāviveka explains that the proof of emptiness presents the general result of the valid means of knowledge (i.e. inference)¹⁷⁷ and that individual conditioned things (in both Buddhist and non-

¹⁷⁵ Yao 2009, p. 392 points out that Tsongkhapa solves the problem from discussing empty subject terms, which are understood as the merely false conventionalities in the present context, by the use of non-implicative negation. This is because non-implicative negation does not imply the affirmation of anything while it negates the existence of these empty subject terms. Although Bhāviveka employs non-implicative negation, he did not offer any similar explanation in KR (see discussion below). Nevertheless, Tsongkhapa does refer to Bhāviveka’s works and is influenced by him in his use of non-implicative negation; see discussion in Chu 2009, Sections 3.1-4.4.

¹⁷⁶ Bhāviveka’s treatment of inherent existence is different from that of the merely false conventionalities; see discussion under “the false conventional truth” in Section 2.3.2.

¹⁷⁷ Cf. Hayes’s commentary on PS 2.1, in which inference is explained to be (1) the process of inferring, and (2) the resultant cognition from this process. (Hayes 1988, pp. 231-232)

Buddhist doctrines) are taken up as the subject during examination and in the formation of individual inferences. Hence, the proof did not commit the said problem.¹⁷⁸ In this section, I will consider how the theses of the two inferences in the proof are established as the general result of all individual inferences concerning conditioned and unconditioned things, i.e. as the conclusion of the whole inferential process concerning the ultimate emptiness and ultimate unreality of these things, i.e. the expressible ultimate truth. Below, the two inferences in the proof will be called the resultant inferences, in order to differentiate them from the individual inferences in the inferential process. Further, I will show that the former are established without the third characteristics of a reason,¹⁷⁹ with the use of non-implicative negation in this inferential process.

3.3.1 Inference as a process

The process of cognition generally involves a subject with an instrument. Through an action or a process, the subject acts on the object, to finally obtain the result, i.e. the knowledge on the object. Research on Bhaviveka's view on causation in relation to inference is rare. Referring to what has been discussed in Chapter 2, the proof of emptiness, as the true conventional truth, is like an ascending staircase. Through this staircase, one takes a long period of time to accumulate the wisdom and merit in order to attain the conceptual knowledge of the inexpressible ultimate truth. In this sense, the proof is considered the process or the instrument which one uses to understand the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things and the ultimate unreality of all unconditioned things.¹⁸⁰ This understanding matches the general notion that inference is both a valid means of knowledge and a causal process, like direct perception. During the inferential process embodied in the proof, the subjects who engage in the act of inference include the wise person, the practitioners, as well as the opponents. By means of this process or the instrument, various false conventional existents and merely false conventionalities, as inferential objects, are revealed to be either empty or unreal ultimately. Refer to the diagram below:¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁸ KR: 今此頌中總說量果。於觀察時及立量時，眼等一一別立為宗，故無此過。(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269c9-c11)

¹⁷⁹ On the first characteristic of a reason (i.e. conditioned things are arisen from conditions and unconditioned things do not arise) in both resultant inferences, see Section 1.3.2.

¹⁸⁰ See Section 2.3.3.

¹⁸¹ Cf. individual inferences for different conditioned and unconditioned things in Chapter 3 of MHK.

Inferences regarding conditioned things

Inferences regarding unconditioned things

T₁: In terms of the ultimate truth, jars are empty,
because they arise from conditions,
like illusions; unlike space.

T₂: In terms of the ultimate truth, space has no
reality,
because it does not arise,
like a sky-flower; unlike sound.

T₃: In terms of the ultimate truth, sound is empty,
because it arises from conditions,
like illusions; unlike cessation through
deliberation.

T₄: In terms of the ultimate truth, cessation
through deliberation has no reality,
because it does not arise,
like a sky-flower; unlike eyes.

T₅: In terms of the ultimate truth, eyes are empty,
because they arise from conditions,
like illusions; unlike cessation independent
of deliberation.

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T_n: In terms of the ultimate truth,
all conditioned things are empty.
because they arise from conditions,
like illusions.

T_n: In terms of the ultimate truth,
all unconditioned things have no reality,
because they do not arise,
like a sky-flower.

Suppose there are infinitely many moments on the timeline. Although there is an interval of time between each point (T), for demonstrative purpose they are designated in sequence as T₁ up to T_n.¹⁸² During a debate on the nature of

¹⁸² As discussed in Section 2.3.2, according to MHK/TJ 3.12-3.13, one has to ascend the staircase of the true conventional truth to attain the expressible ultimate truth, i.e. the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things and the ultimate unreality of all unconditioned things. This ascension will take seven infinite *kalpas*, i.e. an infinitely long period of practice (T_n) to complete. This leads to the questions on the possibility of attaining enlightenment and when. While the attempt to respond to these questions is out of the scope of this thesis, one of Bhāviveka's quotations in KR may be considered as a possible answer. This quotation is about Mañjuśrī's response to a Brahmin's question on what is called enlightenment to a Bodhisattva. Mañjuśrī's answer is that it is neither the past, future nor present; a Bodhisattva should therefore discern the purity of the three dimensions of time to attain the purity of the three realms in order to achieve enlightenment. (CBETA, T30, no, 1578, 273b12-b20)

conditioned things, all parties involved have decided to examine the existence of jars, a particular type of conditioned thing. Therefore, jars are taken up as the subject in the thesis of an inference. Based on the commonly agreed reason “they arise from conditions” and positive example “illusions”, and with a provisional negative example “space” that is considered “not arising” and “not empty”, they conclude that the jars are empty of inherent existence. Hence, at T_1 , the thesis “all jars are empty of an inherent existence”, which is the conclusion of the inference, is proved. On another occasion, say, T_2 , all parties involved have decided to examine the existence of space, a particular unconditioned thing. Therefore, space is taken up as the subject in the thesis of an inference. Based on the commonly agreed reason “it does not arise” and positive example “a sky-flower”, and with a provisional negative example “sound” that is considered “arisen” and “real”, they conclude that space is unreal. Hence, at T_2 , the thesis “space has no reality”, which is the conclusion of the inference, is proved. Subsequently, the inherent existence of sound is refuted at, say, T_3 , taking “illusions” as the positive example and “cessation through deliberation” as a provisional negative example. The reality of cessation through deliberation is then refuted at, say, T_4 , and so on.

Up to T_n , adding together all these individual conclusions of the inferences regarding conditioned things and unconditioned things, i.e. individual inferential processes as a whole, the general result is that all conditioned things are empty and all unconditioned things are unreal, as stated in the theses of the two resultant inferences in the proof of emptiness. This general result obtained through the proof of emptiness is the attainment of the expressible ultimate truth.

3.3.2 The absence of a negative example and the third characteristic of a reason

In the demonstration above, provisional dissimilar instances are present and provisional negative examples can be given to inferences regarding individual conditioned things and unconditioned things; and hence showing the third characteristic of a reason. When the general result of all the conclusions of these inferences is obtained, no negative example is given and the two resultant inferences in the proof of emptiness are established without the third characteristic.¹⁸³

¹⁸³ Cf. discussion in Ejima 1980, pp. 126-135.

The similar instances of the resultant inferences are objects which are empty and unreal in the ultimate sense, and they all qualify as positive examples. When the two resultant inferences are established, all conditioned things that are arisen from conditions are also proved to be empty and all unconditioned things that do not arise are also proved to be unreal. There would be no instances which arise from conditions but not empty, or which do not arise but are real. Any such instances (for example a dependently-arisen jar that has an inherent existence ultimately, the non-arisen suchness that is ultimately real – realities in the opponents’ doctrines) are refuted in individual inferences regarding different conditioned things and unconditioned things.

Further, the dissimilar instances of the individual inferences on conditioned things are objects which are not empty and do not arise, and those of the individual inferences on unconditioned things are objects which are real and arisen from conditions. “Unreality” in the second inference is synonymous to “emptiness” (Section 1.3.2); to be “real” means being “not empty”. Hence, these dissimilar instances are in fact the aforementioned realities in the opponents’ doctrines to be refuted by individual inferences. For example, “space”, which is the dissimilar instance of the inference regarding “jars” at T_1 , is taken up as the subject and its reality is to be refuted for the inference regarding unconditioned things at T_2 to be established. “Sound”, which is the dissimilar instance of the inference regarding “space” at T_2 , is in turn taken up as the subject and its inherent existence is to be refuted for the inference regarding the conditioned thing at T_3 to be established. This happens because individual inferences regarding unconditioned things are set up to negate the dissimilar instances of the individual inferences regarding conditioned things, and vice versa.

As both theses “all conditioned things are empty” and “all unconditioned things have no reality” in the proof are universal statements, for the proof to establish there should be no conditioned thing which is not empty or unconditioned thing which is real in the ultimate sense. Hence, when all individual inferences regarding conditioned and unconditioned things are established, realities in the opponents’ doctrines have already been eliminated. As a result, both inferences are established without a dissimilar instance or a negative example. For this reason, in KR,

Bhāviveka states that a negative example is only provided to negate the dissimilar instance. It is not fallacious to establish an inference with a provisionally-established negative example at the time of explanation. But when the purpose of negating dissimilar instances has already been achieved, there is no more dissimilar instance, and therefore there is no negative example.¹⁸⁴

To Dignāga, the purpose of negative examples are to indicate the dissimilar instances, which neither possess the property to be inferred in relation to the subject nor the property that infers, to exclude them from the domain of positive instances, which instead may possess the property that infers. Through this exclusion of the dissimilar instances, the subject is proved to possess the property to be inferred.¹⁸⁵ Having accepted the use of inference in his system, it can be assumed that Bhāviveka also agrees on the general function of the various components of an inference. However, it can be observed that the notion of the negating or excluding dissimilar instances has acquired some additional content in Bhāviveka's proof of emptiness. Referring to the inferential process discussed in Section 3.3.1, all dissimilar instances are also eliminated – there is no dissimilar instance for either resultant inference, after the general result of all the conclusions of individual inferences is obtained. In this sense, a negative example is no longer needed.

The circumstance in KR is therefore different from the explanation in PSV (Section 1.3.1), where the negative example is considered omissible when it is already well-established to all parties involved. This is possible also because the negative concomitance between the property to be inferred and the property that infers is presumed (*arthāpatti*) by the positive concomitance, which has already been established by the positive example.¹⁸⁶ The situation in KR is also different from the

¹⁸⁴ KR: 為遮異品，立異法喻。異品無故，遮義已成，是故不說。於辯釋時，假說異品，建立比量，亦無有過。(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 268c29-269a1); 不說遮止異品立為不同法喻，如前應知。(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 273c13)

¹⁸⁵ NM 5.1 and Katsura's explanatory note in Katsura 1981, pp. 63-65; Tucci 1930, p. 37. See also discussion on negative examples in relation to non-implicative negation in Chu 2009, Sections 1.1-1.3.

¹⁸⁶ NM in Section 5.4 in Katsura 1981, pp. 71-72; see also Tucci 1930, pp. 42-44. Apart from the suggestion that the second and the third characteristics of a reason in Dignāga's system of logic are logically equivalent (see footnote 43), the establishment of the second characteristic can presume the presence of the third characteristic may also be due to Dignāga's theory of the exclusion of others that is understood in relation to the positive and negative examples. The positive example, which possess the property to be inferred, is rather understood as that which does not possess the opposite of the property to be inferred ($\sim p$, i.e. as $\sim\sim p$). This exclusion of others is understood in terms of implicative negation, which does not imply the affirmation of what is negated (see also discussion in Section

explanation in NM, where the third characteristic is considered present in cases when dissimilar instances are absent. This is acceptable because, to Dignāga, dissimilar instances are to be excluded by negative examples, which are understood in terms of non-implicative negation (see Section 3.3.3); Dignāga does not commit to affirm the reality of any negative example or its property in the first place. Also, as the property that infers cannot occur in any dissimilar instance,¹⁸⁷ the reason of an inference which already possesses the second characteristic of a reason would not become illegitimate. On this basis, HE considers the third characteristic of a reason being guaranteed by the absence of a dissimilar instance as one of the justifications for the absence of negative examples in the two resultant inferences.¹⁸⁸

However, the discussion above shows that the two resultant inferences in the proof are established *without* the third characteristic of a reason. This is not because the presence of this characteristic is guaranteed by the presence of the second characteristic or the absence of dissimilar instances, but simply because the presence of this characteristic is impossible. This is true that dissimilar instances are absent, as the proof is the general result of the whole inferential process. But according to what has already been explained in Section 3.2.1, to Bhāviveka universals have to be cognised together with the entities that possess them. Without a dissimilar instance, the opposites of the property to be inferred in both resultant inferences, i.e. “not empty” and “real”, as universals, cannot occur in any locus. As they are not possessed by any entity, they cannot be cognised at all. The negative concomitance between the property that infers and the property to be inferred is therefore not exemplified by any object. As it is not argued, here, that the second and third characteristics of a reason are logically equivalent (see footnote 43), it is more reasonable to consider the third characteristic absent, instead of established under presumption.

3.3.3), thus implying the affirmation of the property “ $\sim p$ ” in relation to the subject of the inference. The negative example, which possesses the opposite of the property to be inferred ($\sim p$), is instead understood in terms of non-implicative negation. (See also discussion in Chu 2009, Sections 1.2-1.3.) Since the positive examples, which exemplify the second characteristic, is established dependently on the negative examples, which exemplify the third characteristic, the establishment of the second characteristic thereby presumes the presence of the third characteristic.

¹⁸⁷ See NM in Section 3.4 in Katsura 1978, pp. 128-130 and Section 5.1 in Katsura 1981, pp. 63-65; Tucci 1930, pp. 27, 37. It should be noted that Dignāga’s standpoints from PSV, and particularly from NM, just outlined here could be considered inconsistencies in his logical system, as he also holds that it is necessary to exemplify the third characteristic of a reason to prove a thesis (Section 1.3.1).

¹⁸⁸ HE 2012, pp. 10-11.

HE also gives other reasons for the absence of a negative example: (1) the theses are understood as universal statements, and “emptiness” is understood in terms of the non-implicative negation; (2) the theses are specified by the modifier, i.e. “in terms of the ultimate truth”.¹⁸⁹ The above discussion is compatible with (1) because the theses are understood as universal statements as they present the general result of the whole inferential process, which consists of individual inferences regarding conditioned and unconditioned things. Dissimilar instances are all eliminated in this process. Section 3.3.3 will show how this is achieved with the use of non-implicative negation. However, the absence of a negative example is not due to (2); Section 3.4 will show that the modifier functions in a different way.

3.3.3 Non-implicative negation

The elimination of all dissimilar instances in KR is possible due to the use of non-implicative negation, and it is linked to the possession of the second characteristic by the reason. Bhāviveka holds that a thesis of an inference cannot be established by merely negating dissimilar instances,¹⁹⁰ i.e. by the presence of the third characteristic of a reason. As the possession of this characteristic is shown to be impossible if the resultant inferences are established, Bhāviveka has to establish the positive concomitance between the property that infers and the property to be inferred, i.e. the second characteristic, to establish his proof. For this purpose, Bhāviveka sets out to eliminate all the opponents’ realities, which would violate the said positive concomitance. Thus, non-implicative negation is employed in individual inferences regarding different conditioned and unconditioned things.

The Indian Grammarians consider that a negation can be construed in two ways to be what Bhāviveka calls an implicative negation (*paryudāsa-pratiṣedha*) or a non-implicative negation. An implicative negation is formed by adding a negative indicator “a(n)” to the descriptive (*karma-dhāraya*) or possessive (*bahu-vrīhi*) compound that follows, as in the case of “not-white” in English. Hence, with the sentence “The cloth is not-white”, the term “not-white” is implicitly affirmed in relation to the cloth, while the other properties that are “not-not-white” are negated.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁰ KR: 唯遮異品，所愛義成，不應道理。(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269c3-c4); see also discussion on Objection 4 in Commentary.

A non-implicative negation is formed by adding the negative particle “*na*” to the verbal phrase in a sentence, as in the case of “is not white”. Hence, with the sentence “The cloth is not white”, the verbal phrase “is white” is negated without implying an affirmation of any other property in relation to the cloth.¹⁹¹ In Bhāviveka’s words, after “the cloth is white” is negated, the negative sentence “the cloth is not white” has already fulfilled its function and it no longer has the efficacy to further express other meanings, such as “the cloth is black” or “the cloth is red”.¹⁹² For this reason, Bhāviveka considers that the function of affirmation is dominant in the implicative negation, while the function of negation is dominant in the non-implication negation.¹⁹³

Distinction between the two types of negation was already observed in Dignāga’s NM.¹⁹⁴ It was Bhāviveka who first discussed their difference and usage in Madhyamaka. Based on his analysis of the negative tetrallemmas (*catuṣkoṭi*) and the eight negations in the dedicatory verse in MMK, Ruegg points out that Nāgārjuna does not distinguish between the two types of negation, and negation, to Nāgārjuna, regardless of whether it is regarding a compound or a verbal phrase, is always meant to negate without implying the affirmation of the opposite; the same is also true to Candrakīrti.¹⁹⁵ This is, in Bhāviveka’s terms, non-implicative negation. Due to the doctrine of emptiness, Madhyamaka generally holds that everything is empty of inherent existence, and hence to affirm anything whatsoever of a certain thing would amount to admitting the inherent existence of this thing. Therefore, Bhāviveka states that all objects of cognition, which are taken as either ultimately existent or absolutely non-existent by the opponents, should be negated in terms of the ultimate truth until there is no attachment or discrimination remaining in our mind.¹⁹⁶ By non-implicative negation, these objects, as false conventional existents or merely false

¹⁹¹ This understanding of implicative negation and non-implicative negation is based on Ruegg 1977, p. 3 and Yao 2009, pp. 391-392; see further discussions in Ejima 1980, pp. 113-125, Chu 2009.

¹⁹² KR: 「非白絹」言唯遮「白絹」，功能斯盡，更無餘力詮表「黑絹」、「赤絹」、「黃絹」。(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c14-c15)

¹⁹³ KR: 汝執此言表彰為勝，我說此言遮止為勝。(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c11)

¹⁹⁴ NM: 前是遮詮，後唯止濫。(CBETA, T32, no. 1628, 2c8-c9; Section 5.1 in Katsura 1981, pp. 63-65; Tucci 1930, p. 37), with “遮詮” refers to implicative negation and “止濫” to non-implicative negation; see Yao 2009, p. 391 and note 18, Chu 2009, Sections 1.1-1.3.

¹⁹⁵ Ruegg 1977, pp. 4-5. Candrakīrti has admitted the use of non-implicative negation in PSP; see Stcherbatsky 1977, pp. 142-147.

¹⁹⁶ KR: 為避所餘妄執過失，乃至一切心之所行，悉皆遮止。所行若滅，心正隨滅。(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c18-c19)

conventionalities, are negated one by one and are inferred to be either empty or unreal ultimately.

The second characteristic of a reason is met by virtue of the use of non-implicative negation: firstly in the way that the opponents' realities are eliminated without remainder, and secondly since they are negated without further implying their opposites, which are some other inherent natures or ultimate realities. The positive concomitance between the property that infers and the property to be inferred of either resultant inference will fail to establish if there is at least one thing which possesses the property that infers but not at the same time possessing the property to be inferred. Referring to diagram in Section 3.3.1, for example, if the inherent existence of "sound", as a provisional dissimilar instance in an inference regarding unconditioned things, were not refuted, then there would be at least one conditioned thing, i.e. "sound", that is arisen from conditions but not empty. The thesis regarding the emptiness of all conditioned things would fail to establish. The thesis regarding the unreality of all unconditioned things would also fail to establish under a similar circumstance.

In terms of non-implicative negation, the negations "sound is empty" and "space has no reality" only negate the ultimate existence of sound and space. Their opposites, i.e. the natureless sound and the unreal space, as ultimate realities, are not thereby affirmed by implication. By contrast, in the case of implicative negation, sound, which is "arisen from conditions", would become not empty of "no-nature". Space that "does not arise" would become, in an ultimately real sense, "unreal".

Bhāviveka's position on non-implicative negation can be seen from Objection 12, where he denies the illusory nature of illusions in relation to the negation "illusory men are not real men".¹⁹⁷ This negation does not imply the affirmation of the "not-real-men", i.e. illusory as an inherent nature. He also denies the absolute non-existence of space, as another ultimate reality, when he negates the ultimate reality of space.¹⁹⁸ For the same reason, neither does he accept the existence of suchness in relation to the negation "all things are empty".

¹⁹⁷ See Commentary in Part II for detailed discussions.

¹⁹⁸ KR: 所立宗言「無為無實」，此言正遣執實有性，亦復傍遣執實無性。(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 274b22-b23)

Having eliminated all dissimilar instances, the reasons of both resultant inferences in the proof are agreed upon by all parties involved as also possessing the second characteristics. The resultant inferences in the proof of the emptiness of all conditioned and unconditioned things are now established with the first two characteristics of a reason.

3.4 The modifier “in terms of the ultimate truth”

Nāgārjuna states that whatever is arisen from cause and conditions is empty, including emptiness itself, and whatever is empty is also a designation. The middle way, which is understood in relation to dependent origination, emptiness and designation, involves the denial of both ultimate existence and absolute non-existence, and the acceptance of conventional existence as the bridge through which the practitioners attain the ultimate truths.¹⁹⁹ Under Bhāviveka’s interpretation, this middle way is understood as conditioned things being empty of an inherent existence only ultimately but not conventionally.

Although Bhāviveka understands the emptiness in his proof in terms of the expressible ultimate truth and the middle way that do not deny conventional existence, from the perspectives of ordinary people and his opponents, who did not understand the notion of emptiness, the emptiness of all conditioned things and the unreality of all unconditioned things indeed amount to the non-existence of all things even on the conventional level. This is in fact the basis of Objection 1 that: the thesis of the first resultant inference is considered as incompatible with the common knowledge of ordinary people, direct perception and Bhāviveka’s own doctrine of the middle way.

Further, inference in Dignāga’s system of logic is a valid means of knowledge for one to know the occurrence of a property in a locus, in which both the locus and its property are conceptualised based on ultimately existent particulars (Section 1.3.1). The point of Bhāviveka’s inference is rather to prove that all ultimate existents (including these particulars), as well as anything that is conceptualised upon them, are not knowable in terms of their inherent nature, i.e. not existent, in the ultimate sense under the doctrine of emptiness. In Dignāga’s system of logic, however, any

¹⁹⁹ Chapter 24 of MMK.

object that lacks a basis of existence, i.e. the real particulars in the present context, may be considered an empty term and so cannot unproblematically be taken as the subject of an inference.²⁰⁰ This is even more problematic when the subject is required to be existent ultimately in the opponents' realist doctrines. Thus, by combining the doctrine of emptiness with Dignāga's system of logic, Bhāviveka's use of inference seems to have contradicted the various established means of conventional knowledge, including inference.

For this reason, the modifier “in terms of the ultimate truth” is employed by Bhāviveka to specify the theses, which are the conclusions of all individual inferences and of the two resultant inferences.²⁰¹ These inferences are clarified to be only concerned with proving the emptiness of all things on the ultimate level. The emptiness that is understood in terms of the expressible ultimate truth is therefore distinguished from the non-existence that is understood in terms of the two conventional truths. By this modifier, Bhāviveka aims to avoid the misunderstanding of establishing the conventional unreality of things, hence solving the conflicts that his proof seems to have with conventional knowledge (i.e. common knowledge, direct perception and inference) and the middle way.²⁰² This employment of the

²⁰⁰ This is indeed the basis of several objections in Part II; see, for example, discussion under Objection 2. See further discussion on the methods to deal with the issue of empty terms in Buddhist logic in Yao 2009.

²⁰¹ Inferences regarding individual conditioned and unconditioned things in Chapter 3 of MHK are also specified by this modifier. The use of this modifier is certainly objected by Candrakīrti (Section 1.2). However, Tsongkhapa, being also a Prāsaṅgika, supports the use of it in his LRCM. He holds that it is impossible to distinguish the two truths without it. (LRCM, p. 219) If the object, which is conventionally posited by the Mādhyamikas, were not negated with this modifier, then the negation itself would become fallacious. (*Ibid.*, p. 216) Thus, in relation to the present discussion, “in terms of the ultimate truth” should be added to, e.g., “conditioned things do not exist”. For the same reason, Tsongkhapa points out that although Candrakīrti himself disapproves Bhāviveka's use of “in terms of the ultimate truth” in his PSP (see Stcherbatsky 1977, pp. 112-114), Candrakīrti does add “intrinsically” when he refutes the false production. (LRCM, pp. 218-219) As for the objects that are imaginary constructs proposed by the Buddhist or non-Buddhist essentialists, i.e. objects that are regarded by the Mādhyamikas as non-existent even conventionally, modifiers such as “essentially” or “intrinsically” are used only when these opponents' perspectives are taken into account. (*Ibid.*, p. 215) Therefore, Tsongkhapa clarifies that what distinguishes the Prāsaṅgikas from the Svātantrikas is not the use of modifiers, but that they refute ultimate existence conventionally. Thus, it is unnecessary for the Prāsaṅgikas to add a modifier to refute the ultimate existence of conditioned things. However, a modifier is needed by the Svātantrikas (*ibid.*, p. 220), and hence rendering the negation as “in terms of the ultimate truth, the ultimate existence of conditioned things does not exist.”

²⁰² See KR: 此中世間同許有者，自亦許為世俗有故；世俗現量生起因緣，亦許有故；眼等有為世俗諦攝，牧牛人等皆共了知眼等有為是實有故，勿違如自宗所許、現量、共知，故以「真性」簡別立宗...就勝義諦立「有為空」，非就世俗。(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 268c8-c13); 此中簡別立宗言詞，即上「真性」。須簡別意如前應知，就「真性」故立「無為空」，非就世俗。(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 273c3-c4); Cf. Kuiji's YMRZLLS: 若共比量等，以勝義言簡，無

modifier, “in terms of the ultimate truth”, thus satisfies the customs and conventions of all parties involved, and therefore marks the final step for Bhāviveka to establish his inferences as inferences for others, or as common inferences.²⁰³ In this way, the common knowledge, i.e. “whatever is arisen from cause and conditions is empty of an inherent existence in terms of the ultimate truth”, which is the wisdom accumulated through the practice of logical reasoning in relation to the proof, is obtained.

3.5 On taking all conditioned things or all unconditioned things as the subject

In the proof of emptiness, under [1], the two resultant inferences respectively take all conditioned things and all unconditioned things as their subjects as they present the general result of many inferences. Each of these inferences establishes the conclusion that a particular class of things is empty or unreal, in terms of the expressible ultimate truth. Eventually, all conditioned things and all unconditioned things have become the subjects of the resultant inferences, as the two theses have included the conclusions of all individual inferences.

Although these two resultant inferences fulfill the two criteria of being the inferences for others in [1], I would like to show, below, that they fail to fulfill the second criterion concerning the three characteristics of a reason in [2], i.e. when they are examined as standalone inferences. This is because, with reference to the formal requirement of an inference in Dignāga’s system of logic, this kind of subject (“all conditioned things” and “all unconditioned things”) leads to the fallacy of indeterminate reason and the lack of a positive example. For this reason, the two inferences are unestablished.

3.5.1 The fallacy of the reason being too specific (*asādhāranānaikāntika-hetu*)

違世間、自教等失。隨其所應，各有標簡。此比量中，有所簡別，故無諸過。有法言真，明依勝義，不依世俗，故無違於非學世間。(CBETA, T44, no. 1840, 115c2-6); 凡若宗標勝義，如掌珍言：「真性有為空，如幻，緣生故。無為無有實，不起，似空花。」亦無違自教、世間等過失。(CBETA, T44, no. 1840, 116b18-20). In the record of PSP, Bhāviveka explains that the modifier is introduced in consideration of the standpoints of the opponents. (Stcherbatsky 1977, p. 112)

²⁰³ Cf. discussion in Ejima 1980, pp. 55-60, 102-113.

In PS/V 3.21-3.22, there are nine possibilities regarding the full or partial presence and absence of the property that infers in the similar and dissimilar instances.²⁰⁴ The fifth one concerns an indeterminate reason, in which the property that infers is absent in both the similar and dissimilar instances. It is too specific in relation to the subject, resulting in no positive example can be provided. Thus, this reason cannot prove the property to be inferred in relation to the subject. Consider the following inference:

Thesis: Sound is permanent,
Reason: because it is audible.

Its reason is fallacious because audibility is the distinctive characteristic of sound, i.e. nothing else is audible apart from sound. Since audibility applies to the same class of things as sound, there are no other positive instances which can possess both “permanent” and “audible” at the same time. Hence, the proponent of this inference is unable to provide a positive example.

Although dissimilar instances or negative examples are available, they are in fact all things apart from sound. It might be considered that the negative concomitance between the property that infers and the property to be inferred, which is exemplified by these negative examples, is contrapositive to the positive concomitance of these two properties.²⁰⁵ However in Dignāga’s system of logic, the presence of negative concomitance does not presume the positive concomitance concerned.²⁰⁶ Bhāviveka also holds that negative examples alone are not sufficient to establish an inference, as they cannot exemplify the positive concomitance.²⁰⁷ Also, universals are necessarily cognised together with the entities that possess them (Section 3.2.1). Thus, although the dissimilar instances of the above inference possess the properties “impermanent” and “inaudible”, they cannot serve as the evidence for sound to be the locus of the opposite of “impermanent”, i.e. “permanent”. The property that infers neither occurs in the similar instances nor in the dissimilar instances in the

²⁰⁴ Kitagawa 1965, pp. 185-192; see also Potter 2003, pp. 345-346. See Dignāga’s *Hetucakra* in HE and Van der Kuip 2014b.

²⁰⁵ Cf. footnote 43.

²⁰⁶ See footnote 186.

²⁰⁷ See further discussion under Objection 4 in Part II.

inference above.²⁰⁸ The second characteristic of a reason not demonstrated and the inference is unestablished.

From this example of indeterminate reason, it is generally considered that Dignāga excludes the subject from the domain of positive instances because the property to be inferred has yet to be affirmed or denied in relation to it. Thus, the subject cannot become one of the positive examples. The problems at hand cannot simply be solved by taking a particular kind of sound, e.g. a person's voice, as the positive example, which would otherwise have been mentioned by Dignāga. This is perhaps because a person's voice has already been included in the subject, which refers to the whole class of sounds. Since the permanence of sound, in general, is currently under examination and has not been proved, a particular kind of sound, under the class of sounds, cannot serve as evidence to support the permanence of the whole class of sounds; even though this particular kind of sound is commonly recognised as permanent.²⁰⁹

3.5.2 With “arisen from conditions” as the distinctive characteristic of “all conditioned things”

The same problems can also be found in the two resultant inferences in the proof of emptiness. Take the first inference as an example:

Thesis: In terms of the ultimate truth, [all] conditioned things are empty,
Reason: because they arise from conditions,

²⁰⁸ NP: 言不共者，如說「聲常，所聞性故」，常、無常品皆離此因。(CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 11c22-c23). Tachikawa 1971 p. 124 translates: An instance of a mark uncommon [to both the *sapakṣa* and the *vipakṣa*] is: “[Sound is] permanent because it is audible”, for the mark [i.e. audibility] is a cause of doubt, because it is excluded from both permanent and impermanent things [other than sound]. See also Tillemans 1999, p. 90.

²⁰⁹ One cannot deny the situation in which a particular kind of sound is already known to be audible and permanent. This particular kind of sound might be a qualified positive example. The same may be applicable to the positive example “illusions” in the proof of emptiness. However, if the thesis about the whole class of things were to be established with just some of the members as examples, then this may result in the problem of over-generalization. It is also possible that some other members of the same class possess the property that infers “audible” and the opposite of the property to be inferred, i.e. “impermanent”, resulting in the fallacy of indeterminate reason.

Even if the whole class of things, i.e. the subject, were not required to be excluded from the domain of positive instances, neither would the proponent of the inference be able to cite all members of this class as examples; not to mention that this is virtually impossible. This may be the reason why Dignāga did not cite a particular member within the class of the subject as a positive example. It is not the problem in the example itself, but in taking the whole class of things as the subject, and in the reason that is too specific.

Positive Example: like illusions.

As has been discussed, “arisen from conditions” is the distinctive characteristic of “conditioned things”; nothing else would arise from conditions apart from conditioned things. Therefore, “conditioned things” and “arisen from conditions” apply to the same class of things. However, the subject, which in this case is the whole class of conditioned things, should be excluded from the domain of positive instances and thus cannot become one of the positive examples. Consequently, “illusions” cannot serve as a positive example because it has already been included in the class of conditioned things, whose emptiness has not been proved. Thus, no positive examples would be available. This problem might be solved if illusions were considered outside the class of conditioned things, but this would be unacceptable to Bhāviveka. As “arisen from conditions” is absent in both similar instances (i.e. in this case, no positive instance at all) and dissimilar instances (i.e. anything that is not empty), there is the fallacy of the reason being too specific.

From this, we may also interpret Objection 5, which is concerned with the deficient reasoning in the inference, as the lack of the act of inference. This is because what is referred to by the reason and what is referred to by the example have already been included in the subject of the thesis, i.e. “conditioned things”:

Thesis: In terms of the ultimate truth, [all] conditioned things are empty,

Reason: because they are conditioned things,

Positive Example: like some conditioned things.

In the second half of his response to Objection 5, Bhāviveka explains that there is no such fallacy even when all conditioned things are taken as the subject. I take that he means the inference is established even when it is examined as it is (i.e. as an inference), without taking its nature as the general result of individual inferences into consideration. According to Bhāviveka, the inference is established because “arisen from conditions”, which is mutually recognised, instead of “empty”, which is still disputed, is taken as the property that infers. It is also because illusions, instead of

the subject itself, are taken as the positive example.²¹⁰ Bhāviveka seems to understand the fallacy as circular reasoning, where a person supports her argument with something which should be proved by her argument in the first place.

With reference to what has just been discussed, however, Bhāviveka's response appears to have overlooked part of the thrust of the objection. His inference actually attempts to establish the emptiness of all conditioned things with the reason "because conditioned things are conditioned things". Although this reason possesses the first characteristic, it is shown to be fallacious under Dignāga's system of logic because it is too specific in relation to the subject. Hence, agreeing with the opponents' objection in this regard, the property that infers is indeed included in the subject, in the sense that they both are referring to the same class of things. As all possible positive examples, i.e. particular conditioned things, have already been included in the subject, which cannot be one of the similar instances, no positive examples are available. From this, both the reason and the example are indeed included in the subject. As both the second and the third characteristics of a reason are missing, inference cannot take place.

These problems are not addressed by Bhāviveka's claim that the reason is mutually recognised by all parties in the debate. As shown by the fallacy of the reason being indeterminate, this "mutually-recognised" reason cannot qualify as such. In the present inference, Bhāviveka intends the reason to be recognised universally, in order to be applicable to all conditioned things in all Buddhist and non-Buddhist doctrines. Therefore, he takes up the general sense of causation, i.e. "arisen from conditions", which is at the same the distinctive characteristic of "all conditioned things", to be the property that infers. This makes the "universally-recognised" reason nonetheless fallacious since the second and the third characteristics of a reason are not exemplified by any example. Neither can Bhāviveka explain the problem away by stating that he did not take "empty" as the property that infers, with his response to Objection 5. This is because the problem concerned is not about

²¹⁰ KR: 總立一切有為為宗，亦無此過。「緣生故」因二宗皆許，非不成故。若說「眼空，其性空故」，此所說因可有是過。亦非無喻，幻等有故。若立所說喻中幻等以為宗者，便有重立已成過故。(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269c11-c15)

circular reasoning, but about “arisen from conditions” being the distinctive characteristic of “all conditioned things”.

It could be argued that the inference for the emptiness of all conditioned things is different from that for the permanence of sound, because illusions, according to Bhāviveka, are indeed commonly recognised as arisen from conditions and empty of an inherent existence, but the permanence of a particular kind of sound, e.g. a person’s voice, is in fact not commonly recognised. However, even if “illusions” were accepted to be a legitimate example, and the emptiness of all conditioned things were hence concluded based on the evidence of the emptiness of one particular kind of conditioned thing, i.e. illusions, the inference would still be problematic. This is because it would have the problem of over-generalisation.

It might also be argued that the inference would be free from the aforementioned problems if the nature of its conclusion as the general result of the whole inferential process of individual inferences for the emptiness of different conditioned things, i.e. as the expressible ultimate truth, was taken into account.²¹¹ From this, the inference should take “all conditioned things” as the subject, to which the property that infers, i.e. “arisen from conditions”, applies. Besides, the thesis has already been specified by the modifier, i.e. “in terms of the ultimate truth”. However, as discussed in Section 3.4, this modifier only functions to avoid the misunderstanding from the opponents that things are proved to be non-existent even conventionally by the thesis. It only applies to the conclusion of the inference, but not to the reason or the examples that actually involve in inferring this conclusion. As Bhāviveka holds that this resultant inference is a standalone inference, whose establishment can be evaluated on its own, this inference has to follow the formal requirements of an inference. As traditional inference emphasises the experiential aspect of knowledge, it relies on analogical reasoning to establish the positive and negative concomitances between the property that infers and the property to be inferred, which are the second and the third characteristics of a reason. The minimum requirement for Bhāviveka to set up an inference is the presence of the thesis, the reason and an example. Since “all conditioned things” and “all unconditioned things” are taken as the subjects in

²¹¹ KR: 今此頌中總說量果。(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269c9)

the two inferences, both positive and negative examples are absent.²¹² Neither can the positive concomitance nor the negative concomitance be established. As these fundamental problems cannot be solved, the inference is considered unestablished. The same problems are also found in the second inference.

3.6 Is the expressible ultimate truth provable by inference?

The two inferences in the proof of emptiness are set up as inferences for others or common inferences, and so are thought to have force for both Buddhists and non-Buddhists. Bhāviveka claims that they can be understood [1] as the general result of the whole inferential process regarding the emptiness of all things, and [2] as standalone inferences, and that they are established either in terms of [1] or [2]. In the above discussion, I have argued that they are only established under [1], but not [2].

While Bhāviveka requires the terms used in these inferences be understood in their general qualities so that they are recognised by all parties involved, the theses have taken up all “conditioned things” and all “unconditioned things” as their subjects. These subjects apply to the same classes of things as the properties that infer, i.e. “arisen from conditions” and “not arising”, in the reasons. Due to the limitation of inference for others in Dignāga’s logical system, in which the property of the subject is inferred based on examples, from which the subject is excluded, there are no positive examples in these inferences. Bhāviveka is unable to demonstrate the second characteristic. Although the first characteristic is guaranteed, with also the lack of the third characteristic, his inferences are unestablished. The failure of his proof of emptiness is due to the fact that inference for others in Dignāga’s logical system cannot prove a type of thesis with its subject applying to the same class of things as the property that infers.²¹³

Bhāviveka cannot prove the Mādhyamika thesis, “all things are empty”, as a universal claim about all conditioned and unconditioned things, in terms of Dignāga’s logical system. For this reason, the expressible ultimate truth, i.e. the

²¹² See Section 3.3.2 for the discussion on the absence of a negative example.

²¹³ This can be understood in comparison with another type of thesis, e.g. “all jars are empty” which is also universal in nature, but provable with the same reason “because they arise from conditions”; the property that infers can occur in similar instances, e.g. cloths, to exemplify the second characteristic.

emptiness of all things, is beyond inferential knowledge with reference to Dignāga's system of logic. Bhāviveka has failed to combine inference, understood in relation to Dignāga's logical system, with his doctrine of emptiness.²¹⁴

²¹⁴ Cf. *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa*, where Nāgārjuna holds that the Mādhyamikas do not accept the sixteen logical categories, which are regarded as ultimate realities in Nyāya's theory of inference, because the Mādhyamikas do not hold onto anything, based on the doctrine of emptiness. (Tola and Dragonetti 1995, p. 57) These categories are then shown to be problematic logically as a result of their being established independently; see, for example, Sections XXXIII-XLIX. (*Ibid.*, pp. 74-81)

Chapter 4: Closing Remarks

Bhāviveka attempts to prove the theses that all conditioned things are empty and all unconditioned things are unreal through his proof of emptiness in KR. As he only aims to prove the lack of an inherent existence in all things in the ultimate sense, not denying their inherent existence affirmed in conventional knowledge, the two theses are specified by the modifier “in terms of the ultimate truth”. The reasons which serve to prove these theses are recognized by all parties in the debate as possessing the first characteristic of a reason (i.e. “conditioned things” being pervaded by “arisen from conditions”, and “unconditioned things” by “not arising”) and the second characteristic (i.e. “arisen from conditions” being positively concomitant with “empty”, and “not arising” with “unreal” in the ultimate sense). As there are no dissimilar instances, which are not empty and not arising or real and arisen, both the negative example and the third characteristic of a reason are not available in both inferences. Concerning the positive examples, “illusions” are commonly known as arisen from conditions and empty of an inherent existence, and “a sky-flower” as not arising and absolutely non-existent. Since the reasons and the positive examples are well-established, Bhāviveka considers both inferences, and therefore the proof of emptiness, established.

The central discussion

Since the objections to the first inference and Bhāviveka’s responses to them will be discussed in detail in my commentary in Part II, in Part I I have rather focused on investigating some fundamental issues regarding the formation of the inferences. The ultimate emptiness of things is generally considered ineffable and non-conceptual by Madhyamaka, while inference is in nature verbal and conceptual. Along this line, I asked the following question: is Bhāviveka’s proof of emptiness in KR, consisting of two inferences, established? I developed this inquiry in two ways:

In Chapter 2, I examined the circumstance, under which the proof of emptiness is established. To achieve this, I analysed Bhāviveka’s understanding of emptiness and the four categories of truths. I considered the demarcation of the two truths into four categories as the result of Bhāviveka’s equal emphasis on the knowledge of the

difference between the two truths, and the dependence on the conventional truth to attain the ultimate truth. The inexpressible ultimate truth refers to the ultimate emptiness, which is not an ineffable reality, but only a state of mind of the wise person that is without objects of cognition and beyond the application of speech or thought. The expressible ultimate truth is the wise person's conceptual elaboration of this inexpressible ultimate truth or emptiness to be an object, which is then referred to by the modifier "in terms of the ultimate truth" in the proof of emptiness. The proof, as an instrument or a process, belongs to the true conventional truth, which is the sphere of practice to accumulate merit and wisdom. Through it, the wise person teaches the expressible ultimate truth to practitioners who reflect upon it and eventually, attain it. The false conventional truth refers to things in conventional knowledge, in which they are accepted as having an inherent existence. The proof is therefore set up to only operate in terms of the expressible ultimate truth and the two conventional truths, which are also conceptual and expressed through speech. By refuting the things that do not arise even conventionally, such as the absolute non-existents and the permanent realities in the opponents' doctrines, and the ultimate existence of the conventional existents, the proof fulfills its function to assist practitioners to understand the expressible ultimate truth. As a skilful means, along with meditation and general practices, it facilitates one's spiritual progress to the realisation of the inexpressible ultimate truth.

This seems to have solved the theoretical tension between emptiness itself and a proof of it, but the two inferences in the proof should also be free from logical fallacies to be established. In Chapter 3, I analysed them in terms of inferences for others. [1] The two inferences are the general result of the whole inferential process, consisting of all individual inferences regarding the ultimate emptiness of different conditioned and unconditioned things in both Buddhist and non-Buddhist doctrines, representing the expressible ultimate truth. In this regard, Bhāviveka requires the content and generality of the terms they use to be determined by the power of common agreement by all parties involved in the debate. Hence, things whose reality is ultimately to be refuted can also be taken up as the subjects of inference as long as they are thought of. Further, due to the use of non-implicative negation, individual inferences for the ultimate emptiness of individual conditioned things and the ultimate unreality of individual unconditioned things eliminate each other's

dissimilar instances. The two inferences are established without negative example and the third characteristic of a reason, but only the first and the second characteristics. As conventional existence is not refuted in Bhāviveka's system of the two truths, the modifier "in terms of the ultimate truth" is employed to indicate both inferences as the general result of the whole inferential process. Therefore, the proof can be accepted even by his opponents.

However, I argue that [2] the two inferences are fallacious as standalone inferences and unable to prove the expressible ultimate truth due to the fallacy of the reason's being too specific. As they take *all things* as the subjects, the property that infers of either inference is also the distinctive characteristic of the subject so that they apply to the same class of things. Since Dignāga requires all members of the subject to be excluded from the domain of positive instances, no positive example can be provided in either inference. As they lack both positive and negative examples, the second and the third characteristics of a reason are missing. Inference cannot take place with only the first characteristic. Bhāviveka has failed to combine inference with his doctrine of emptiness.

The role of the proof reconsidered

Although Bhāviveka fails to establish his inferences as [2] standalone inferences, it is still tenable to consider these inferences in terms of [1], i.e. the general result of the whole inferential process (Sections 3.2 to 3.4). This gives us an opportunity to reconsider the role of Bhāviveka's proof of emptiness. As discussed in Chapter 2, the ultimate truth expressed in the theses of the two resultant inferences refers to the wise person's experience of the inexpressible ultimate truth. The reason for presenting the teaching in the form of two inferences is to inspire and enable practitioners to ascend the staircase of the true conventional truth, i.e. to attain the expressible ultimate truth, through logical reasoning. Refusing this expressible ultimate truth would mean the falsification of the teaching of the wise person, and even her experience, which is not intended by any Buddhist doctrine. Under [1], assuming that the individual inferences that add up to form the two resultant inferences in the proof are logically-established, the inferential process shown in Section 3.3.1 might nevertheless serve as an effective tool for the practitioners' reflection on the emptiness of all things. As they keep analyzing, they might

gradually come to understand the ultimate emptiness of all individual conditioned things and unconditioned things. Also in the course of defending his proof (see Part II of this thesis), Bhāviveka has (he thinks) refuted various erroneous views concerning the emptiness and non-emptiness of things, and clarified his notions of the ultimate emptiness and the ultimate truth. This might in turn assist to dispel the doubts and misunderstandings of the practitioners on their path of spiritual progress. In this aspect, the proof of emptiness could be useful pedagogically.²¹⁵

Further, a charitable understanding of the proof in terms of [1] can be offered. While emptiness itself is not provable, the proof only aims to prove a conceptualized ultimate emptiness. The idea is that when the practitioners reach the conclusion of the inferential process, they also come to understand that there is nothing which is not empty or is real ultimately. In this sense, the proof might therefore be able to fulfill its function as a staircase, which leads practitioners to the right knowledge of the reality, i.e. the ultimate emptiness of all things. When this ultimate emptiness is also revealed as not exemplifiable to the practitioners under the fallacy of the reason being too specific, the proof that affirms this ultimate emptiness can then be abandoned. To put this alternatively, while the ultimate emptiness of all things is understood through conventional speech and thought, ultimately even this emptiness is revealed to be an erroneous view. It is exactly in this paradoxical sense that one is said to realise emptiness.

Possible justifications for the proof

While the reasons in [2] are fallacious in Dignāga's system of logic, Bhāviveka's inferences could be defended as follows.

First, the theses of the two resultant inferences are respectively the summary of the conclusions of individually established inferences regarding the ultimate emptiness of different conditioned things and the ultimate unreality of different unconditioned things. As long as the conclusions of these individual inferences are admitted as established, it is reasonable to also take the theses of the resultant inferences as established. These resultant inferences, as discussed, fail to be established only due

²¹⁵ This takes us back to Candrakīrti's criticism (Section 1.3) that such a teaching or conceptual tool only leads to a detour to the realization of the ultimate emptiness, which cannot be further examined here.

to the limitations of inference under Dignāga's system – i.e. that the second and the third characteristic of a reason can only be established through examples.

If the terms of an inference could be evaluated solely in terms of their logical relationship and without any existential implications, even when there are no positive and negative examples, these inferences would still be deemed valid arguments. For example, when they are interpreted in terms of western logic as:

Premise 1: All conditioned things are arisen from conditions. (All p is q.)
Premise 2: All that are arisen from conditions are empty of an inherent existence.
(All q is r.)
Conclusion: All conditioned things are empty of an inherent existence. (All p is r.)

Or as:

Premise 1: If things are conditioned things, then things are arisen from conditions.
(If p, then q.)
Premise 2: If things are arisen from conditions, then things are empty of an
inherent existence. (If q, then r.)
Premise 3: Things are conditioned things. (p)
Conclusion: Things are empty of an inherent existence. (r)

While it is insufficient to claim that Bhāviveka's proof of emptiness is intended to be understood like these examples,²¹⁶ Bhāviveka's responses to the objections may be considered as maintaining the three characteristics of a reason interpreted as the logical relationships between the property that infers with the subject, the similar and dissimilar instances. In discussing Objection 13, he maintains that all conditioned things are arisen from conditions by refuting Sāṃkhya's doctrine that manifested things, which are conditioned things in his understanding, are pre-existent in their causes. Under several objections, he refutes the ultimate reality, i.e. non-emptiness, of particular conditioned things, e.g. eyes. By means of non-implicative negation, he

²¹⁶ Understanding inferences in terms of western logic, as inductive arguments or deductive arguments, is fairly common; see for example Vidyabhusana 1971, Chi 1984, Katsura 1983 and Hsu 2013, p 122ff. The details and the problems of which are outside the scope of this thesis; for discussions, see, for example, Siderits 2003.

also negates all dissimilar instances, which would otherwise show that some members that are “arisen from conditions” are not “empty”. This may lend support to establish the inferences even when they take all conditioned things or all unconditioned things as subject.

It may also be worth considering the developments Dharmakīrti. In his system of logic, the second characteristic of a reason is understood as the property that infers implying the property to be inferred. The relation of these two properties in the third characteristic is understood as contrapositive to that of the second characteristic.²¹⁷

The third characteristic, understood in relation to the proof of emptiness, i.e. “whatever is not empty of an inherent existence is not arisen from conditions”, is generally considered to be logically equivalent to the second characteristic, i.e. “whatever is arisen from conditions is empty of an inherent existence”. Also, it is not necessary to state the thesis. As it is the conclusion of an inference, it does not function to infer at all, and therefore can be excluded from the proof.²¹⁸ As long as the reason possesses the first characteristic and the second or the third characteristic, the conclusion, which was once stated as the thesis, will be eventually reached. Thus, the two inferences in the proof of emptiness may be re-formulated as follows:

First inference:

(Thesis: In terms of the ultimate truth, all conditioned things are empty of an inherent existence.)

Reason: Because all conditioned things are arisen from conditions;

Positive example: whatever is arisen from conditions is empty of an inherent existence, like illusions.

Second inference:

(Thesis: In terms of the ultimate truth, all unconditioned things are unreal.)

Reason: Because all unconditioned things do not arise;

Positive example: whatever is not arisen is unreal, like a sky-flower.

²¹⁷ See Dunne 2004, pp. 28-30. The logical equivalence between the second and the third characteristics is disputed in Tillemans 1999, pp. 114-115, notes 41 and 42; see Tillemans’ solution discussed in relation Gelug-pa’s view on *asādhāraṇānaikāntika-hetu* in *ibid.*, p. 115, note 42.

²¹⁸ See *ibid.*, pp. 71-77.

To ensure that the universal statements, which express the second or the third characteristic, are established, reasons such as *svabhāva-hetu* (lit. the essential property of the reason) are developed in Dharmakīrti's system. When an inference is established by means of *svabhāva-hetu*, the essential property of the property that infers is taken up to be the property to be inferred; as this essential property pervades the property that infers, whenever there is the presence of the latter, there is also the presence of the former.²¹⁹ In his later works, Dharmakīrti instead understands the property that infers as the essential property of the property to be inferred. This suggests that the property to be inferred and the property that infers may be commutable, as they are the essential property of each other in an inference.²²⁰ In *Madhyamaka*, emptiness is indeed a concept designated on things that are dependently-arisen. To *Bhāviveka*, being "arisen from conditions" is necessarily "empty of an inherent existence in the ultimate sense", and being "non-arising" is necessarily "unreal". His inferences may be established, with the reasons "because they arise from conditions" and "because they do not arise" being considered in terms of *svabhāva-hetu* under Dharmakīrti's system.²²¹

As for the problem regarding the reason being too specific, which is discussed in relation to the inference of sound-audibility-[im]permanence, Ratnākaraśānti argues that there is no such a fallacy.²²² The impermanence of sound is proved based on the

²¹⁹ See the explanation of *svabhāva-hetu* in the second verse of the *Svārthānumāna* chapter of PV: An entity (*bhāva*) is evidence (*hetu*) for an essential property (*svabhāva*) that is causally dependent upon only [the entity's] existence (*bhāvamātrānurodhini*). (Hayes 1987, p. 323) According to Hayes, this essential property is understood as the property to be inferred, while the entity is perhaps a property that determines a subclass of the class that is determined by the essential property. (*Ibid.*) See further discussions in Hayes 1987, Iwata 2003, Fukuda 2014.

²²⁰ This is perhaps due to Dharmakīrti's ontology that these two properties are arisen from the same cause; see discussion in Iwata 2003.

²²¹ This may be the reason why similar inferences are still employed in later Buddhist works; see, for example, verses 392-395 of TS, where all permanent things are inferred to be non-existent with the reason that they lack causal efficacy, which is understood in relation to momentariness below:

(Thesis: Permanent things are non-existent.)

Reason: Because permanent things cannot have any fruitful activity, either successively or simultaneously;

Positive example: whatever things are devoid of momentariness can never have an existence, like permanent things, e.g. space;

Negative example: whatever things are existent are all in a state of perpetual flux, like all created things.

²²² See Tillemans 1999, pp. 96-97. This is, however, rejected by the Gelug-pa. Although they also consider that there is no such a fallacy in the sound-audible-permanent inference, they hold that an example is necessary. While they do not exclude the subject from the similar instances, this inference is considered as a case, in which the property that infers being only present in the subject, which is the only similar instance. As the opponents of this inference cannot know this without a positive example,

internal concomitance (*antarvyāpti*) between audibility and impermanence, which is observed in the subject (“sound”) itself. Any example that is external to the subject is not needed. In an inference established by means of internal concomitance, the opponents’ view is taken up provisionally in one of the premises, while a conclusion that is undesirable to these opponents is derived. Therefore, such an inference can be considered as a form of *reductio ad absurdum*.²²³ This shows that, in establishing of an inference, the focus is rather put on the positive concomitance between the property that infers and the property to be inferred, but not on the role of examples that would relate to the issue of whether or not the subject is excluded from the similar instances. While the internal concomitance is usually employed in the proofs of momentariness (*kṣaṇabhāṅga*), further discussion of its application in relation to the proof of emptiness is required.

Although some of the above-mentioned issues concerning developments in logic after Dignāga are outside the scope of this thesis, they have provided possible justifications for the proof of emptiness, and may therefore support its establishment. These suggest that the proof may also be defensible in later logical systems.

the second characteristic of a reason is not established. Thus, there is instead the fallacy of the reason being indeterminate. (*Ibid.*, pp. 92-100)

²²³ See Kajiyama 1999, pp. 34-38.

PART II – TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY

The text of KR regarding the first inference for the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things²²⁴ is arranged into three sections, consisting of fifteen objections to this inference and Bhāviveka's responses. Objections 1 to 10 (Section A) is concerned with Bhāviveka's use of logical reasoning to prove the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things. He denies that his reasoning is fallacious because the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things is not incompatible with their conventional existence. The thesis and reason, as conditioned things, are nevertheless able to fulfill their functions conventionally. In his response to Objections 11 to 15 (Section B), Bhāviveka further refutes various notions of other-emptiness and non-emptiness, and clarifies that conditioned things are originally empty of inherent existence or inherent nature. The inference, which lacks an inherent existence, cannot destroy the inherent existence of conditioned things, but can only function to explicate the lack of inherent existence in these things in a conventional sense. Section C is the conclusion.

A. Proving the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things does not present any problem to the thesis or the reason in the inference

The inference to establish the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things immediately conflicts with the common conception of these things. To some, the ultimate existence of these things is directly confirmed by our sense faculties, such as matter is known when it is perceived by our eyes, sound is known when it is heard by our ears, and so on. Since the objects of cognition exist, eyes and other sense faculties that cognise these objects, as well as the perception and other kinds of cognition through which these objects are known, should also be existent. Therefore, objects of cognition, sense faculties and cognitions have to be taken to exist or be real ultimately so as to guarantee the validity of the everyday knowledge. In KR, Bhāviveka often refers to the holders of this commonsensical notion of the ultimate existence of things as ordinary people such as cowherds and fools.

The ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things also conflicts with the doctrines of other non-Buddhist opponents in KR, who take a realist stand for the ultimate existence of conditioned things. For example, the logicians generally hold that the

²²⁴ See Section 1.3 in Part I for the discussion on how the inference is considered an inference for others.

subject in an inference must be a real existent. In Nyāya, whatever is knowable or expressible is taken as existent ultimately, and vice versa; as the ultimate existents are known as determinate objects of cognition, the knowledge of them is also true ultimately. The Sāṃkhyas, who hold that things presently perceived and manifested are inhered in by the existence of all other things, and therefore nothing is empty. The opponents may further include the general Ābhidharmikas, who take categories of conditioned things as the building blocks of the universe. The Sarvāstivādins in particular hold that conditioned things have a substantial existence in the three dimensions of time.

In KR, Bhāviveka refers to the holders of the above commonsensical notion of existence and the Buddhist and non-Buddhist opponents collectively as the proponents of non-emptiness. To them, conditioned things must not be empty. To exist is to exist substantially or ultimately, and being empty amounts to being non-existent absolutely, like a sky-flower or a hare's horn. Their epistemology is therefore realist, with the subjects, objects, causes and results of cognitions being ultimately real.

In this Section, the proponents of non-emptiness attack Bhāviveka's inference by claiming that its thesis and reason are fallacious. They object on four grounds: first, the thesis is against conventional knowledge (Objection 1); second, conditioned things which do not exist ultimately should not be taken as the subject of the inference (Objection 2); third, conditioned things cannot be "arisen from conditions" while at the same time be "empty of an inherent existence" (Objections 3 to 9); fourth, the reason is not commonly recognised because the property that infers is understood differently in different doctrines (Objection 10).

A.1 The thesis regarding the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things does not contradict direct perception, common knowledge, or Bhāviveka's own doctrine, nor is it self-contradictory

The proponents of non-emptiness object as follows:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269a13-a18)

[Objection 1:] To this [inference], all proponents of non-emptiness make the objection, “if all conditioned things are established as empty, then there would be no matter (*rūpa*), etc. Just like it is unreasonable that the knowledge from direct perception could arise from cognising a hare’s horn, the direct perceptions of other objects of cognition similar to matter should not arise either. However, the reality of [matter and similar objects] is directly known by everyone. Therefore, [what is stated by] your thesis has violated the nature of things. Your thesis thus has committed the fallacies of contradicting our direct perception (*pratyakṣa-viruddha*)²²⁵ and of contradicting common knowledge (*loka-viruddha*).²²⁶ This is because it has denied the substantial existence of eyes, etc., which are generally recognised by the cowherds and others.”²²⁷

The proponents of non-emptiness hold that if conditioned things are empty of inherent existence, then they will be non-existent absolutely. The same applies to matter; the direct perception of it and other kinds of objects of perception will be impossible. This amounts to also denying the existence of eyes and other sense organs. But the ultimate existence of conditioned things is affirmed by direct perception and well-established in common knowledge. It is therefore absurd to the proponents of non-emptiness that these things are empty, like a hare’s horn which does not exist in reality, yet still known through perception. For this reason, they

²²⁵ The fallacy of contradicting direct perception (*pratyakṣa-viruddha*) is a fallacy committed by the thesis of an inference. It is committed when the property to be inferred, or what is implied by this property, in relation to the subject is not compatible with what is known by direct perception. NP gives the example “sound is inaudible” to illustrate this fallacy. (CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 11b28; Section 3.1 [1] in Tachikawa 1971, pp. 122, 141) It has contradicted direct perception because sound is audible with audio perception.

²²⁶ The fallacy of contradicting common knowledge (*loka-viruddha*) is a fallacy committed by the thesis of an inference. It is committed when the property to be inferred, or what is implied by this property, in relation to the subject is not compatible with what is known in common knowledge. NP gives the example of “a human skull is pure” (CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 11c1; Section 3.4 in Tachikawa 1971, pp. 122, 141). It contradicts common knowledge because a human skull is generally considered impure.

²²⁷ KR: 此中一切不空論者皆設難言：「若立一切有為皆空，便無色等。如緣兔角現量智生理不成就，似色等緣諸現量覺亦應不生。然彼實有各別內證。是故汝宗憎背法性，便有違害現量過失及有違害共知過失。撥無一切牧牛人等同所了知眼等體故。」

regard Bhāviveka's thesis "conditioned things are empty" as contradictory to the existent nature of things.

However, the inherent existence of conventional existents (including the subjects, objects, causes and results of any valid cognition) is admitted under the false conventional truth. Bhāviveka's inference only aims to prove the emptiness of them in terms of the expressible ultimate truth. Their inherent existence is the objects that the inference intends to refute, but not themselves *per se*, or the direct perception and common knowledge of them. Objects like a hare's horn are merely false conventionalities, which are non-existent even conventionally and only falsely perceived (see Section 2.3.2 in Part I).

The dispute at issue is the incompatibility between the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things and the conventional knowledge of them, which arises from the proponents of non-emptiness's misunderstandings of the implications of emptiness in relation to existence and non-existence.²²⁸ Bhāviveka's response to this objection is in twofold: [1] on direct perception and [2] on common knowledge. In the response below the incompatibility is analysed and clarified, in Bhāviveka's term, by the wisdom of the middle, understood as the middle way, in terms of his system of the two truths:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269a18-a29)

[Response:] The wise persons should now eliminate the poison, i.e. the attachment to one's own sect, and abide in the wisdom of the middle²²⁹. Together we should consider [1] whether the thesis I stated contradicts the direct perception

²²⁸ The issue of whether a conditioned thing, which is arisen from conditions, should necessarily be taken as an ultimate existent will be discussed in Objections 2 and 3. The issue of whether this conditioned thing, which is empty of inherent existence, is necessarily causally inefficacious will be discussed in Objection 4.

²²⁹ "Middle" ("中") (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269a19) is understood as "impartial", while it is translated to describe the wise person in Poussin 1933, p. 75. Taking Poussin's translation into consideration, apart from referring to "the wisdom of the middle way", "the wisdom of the middle" may also refer to "the wisdom of impartiality".

arisen from the mind-streams of ourselves (*sva-saṃtāna*) or of the others (*para-saṃtāna*)?²³⁰

Regarding [1], suppose that the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things is incompatible with perceptual knowledge. There are only three possibilities: [1a] it has contradicted one's own perception, [1b] it has contradicted others' perception and [1c] it has contradicted the perception of the fools (see below). In terms of the expressible ultimate truth, Bhāviveka denies [1a], and in terms of the false conventional truth, he denies [1b] and [1c]. Bhāviveka's denial of [1a] is as follows:

[1a] If it is said that [my thesis] contradicts the direct perception arisen from the mind-streams of ourselves; [we respond that] direct perceptions are all empty of inherent existence in terms of the ultimate truth, because they arise from conditions, just like the direct perceptions in dreams are not real direct perceptions. For this reason, my thesis does not even contradict the direct perception arisen from the mind-streams of ourselves.²³¹

Here, the direct perception of the proponents of the thesis, i.e. Bhāviveka, the wise persons and anyone who agree with his reasoning is referred to. In terms of the expressible ultimate truth, Bhāviveka denies that his thesis "in terms of the ultimate truth, conditioned things are empty" has contradicted his own perception. It is because he also perceives in terms of the same truth. His direct perception is consistent with what is stated in his thesis.

What does it mean for direct perception to be empty in the ultimate sense? As a determinate cognition, direct perception cognises conditioned things as independent existents as if they have a determinate inherent nature. But as their existence depends on conditions, e.g. the presence of a perceiver, ultimately, they lack the independent existence or determinate inherent nature which they seemed to have on the

²³⁰ KR: 諸有智者今當遣除朋黨執毒，住處中慧，應共思議我所立宗為當違害自相續中所生現量？為當違害他相續中所生現量？

²³¹ KR: 若言違害自相續中所生現量，諸現量覺就勝義諦自性皆空，眾緣生故，如睡夢中諸現量覺，非實現量，是故我宗且不違害自相續中所生現量。

conventional level. Such direct perception should therefore have nothing to cognise in the ultimate sense. It ceases to be a determinate perception. Thus, conditioned things perceived by direct perception on the conventional level are not perceived as such on the ultimate level; like an illusion that was produced due to causes and conditions and perceived as if it was a real existent is no longer perceived as such after it is realised to be illusory. As both direct perception and its objects belong to the classes of “conditioned things” and “arisen from conditions”, they are proved to be empty by Bhāviveka’s proof.

Bhāviveka gives an inference to illustrate the ultimate emptiness of direct perception:

Thesis: In terms of the ultimate truth, direct perceptions are all empty of
 inherent existence [i.e. not real],
Reason: because they arise from conditions,
Positive Example: like the direct perceptions in dreams.

Direct perceptions in dreams, which take past or imaginary events as objects, are arisen from conditions. Although we do perceive objects in dreams, it is commonly agreed that dream perceptions are not real perceptions even in the conventional sense. This is because objects perceived in dreams do not exist as such in reality, or will no longer be perceived after the dreamer has woken up. In this way, direct perceptions in dreams are empty, in the sense of being not real, in the ultimate sense. As the direct perception in the objection is also arisen from conditions, they should also be empty and not real in the ultimate sense.

To demonstrate that the ultimate emptiness of direct perception does not contradict people’s direct perception in their conventional experience, Bhāviveka moves on to deny [1b]:

[1b] If it is said that [my thesis] contradicts the direct perception arisen from the mind-streams of the others; [we respond that] it should be reasonable that the many unreal hairs, flies, moons, etc., which are seen by people with eye floaters (*taimirika*), and which are not manifested in people

with clear eyes, are false appearances that have contradicted the direct perception.²³² Therefore, neither does my thesis contradict the direct perception arisen from the mind-streams of the others.²³³

Here, the direct perception of people other than Bhāviveka and anyone who agrees with his reasoning is referred to. With clear, healthy eyes, these people perceive the conditioned things and take them to have an inherent existence. The unreal things falsely perceived by people with eye floaters are the merely false conventionalities; as they contradict the direct perceptions of the people with healthy eyes, they are not considered to be real even on the conventional level. To Bhāviveka, the everyday truth of the people with healthy eyes - namely, that conditioned things are real existents - is the false conventional truth in his system of the two truths. He therefore also denies the reality of the unreal things conventionally. Thus, both his thesis and others' direct perception deny the false perception of unreal things. In this way, he clarifies that his thesis on the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things does not contradict the direct perception of these people.²³⁴

²³² Hsu 2013, p. 179 understands this clause as “the extra appearances perceived by the one who has impure eyes, an unreal hair, fly, a moon perceived by the one who has a eye-disease...” (“非淨眼者顯彼眾多，眼瞽眩者所見不實髮、蠅、月等...”) (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269a25-a26), which may be deemed problematic. Notwithstanding the differences in punctuation, the translation of “眾多” to “extra appearances” is questionable because “眾多” is usually used as an adjective meaning “many”, but seldom as a pronoun referring to “appearances”.

²³³ KR: 若言違害他相續中所生現量，非淨眼者顯彼眾多眼瞽眩者所見不實髮、蠅、月等，是虛妄現，違害現量，應正道理，是故我宗亦不違害他相續中所生現量。

²³⁴ Alternatively, the text can be read as: “the unreal things, which are seen by people with eye floaters but not by people with clear eyes, are false appearances that have contradicted direct perception and should be corrected by reasoning.” The implication is that in terms of the expressible ultimate truth, Bhāviveka takes others' direct perception, which is believed to be able to see ultimate existents by ordinary people, to be like the false perception, which sees unreal things as real, and holds that they both should be corrected.

This can be understood with an analogy in KR, where Bhāviveka compares the perception of people having eye floaters with erroneous views, and eye medication with the unperturbed discernment of things that is facilitated by logical reasoning. (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 268b14-b16; see discussion under Section 2.3.3 in Part I) In this analogy, erroneous views are generated due to people not realising their false conceptions of things, regardless of whether they are based on false perception or direct perception. Hence, Bhāviveka likens the wise persons who understand the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things to people having clear eyes, and the ultimate existence of these things to the unreal things falsely perceived as real. Like the unreal things, the ultimate existence of these things is denied. Therefore, the direct perception that sees things as ultimate existents, just like the erroneous views and false perception, contradicts the direct perception that should only see things as dependently-arisen things. In terms of the expressible ultimate truth, the latter is the right nature of direct perception; the former is erroneous and should be corrected by reasoning, i.e. by Bhāviveka's inference.

Bhāviveka's denial of [1c] is as follows:

[1c] If it generally refers to the direct perceptions produced in the conventional [world] by the fools and others, then they are not negated here because they exist conventionally and must not be contradicted.²³⁵

Here, the perceptions of everyone, including those in [1a] and [1b], are referred to. This kind of perception, and the conditioned things it cognises, are recognised by everyone and are admitted by Bhāviveka under the false conventional truth. As Bhāviveka only argues for their emptiness in terms of the ultimate truth, he denies that his thesis has contradicted everyone's direct perception.

Bhāviveka continues to analyse the contradictions that the thesis “in terms of the ultimate truth, conditioned things are empty” may have with common knowledge in [2]. Supposing what is stated by this thesis is incompatible with common knowledge, there are only three possibilities: [2a] it has contradicted its proponents' own knowledge, [2b] it has contradicted others' common knowledge and [2c] it has contradicted the common knowledge of the cowherds. Bhāviveka denies all these charges.

The denial of [2a] is as follows:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269b1-b11)

[2] If it is said that [my thesis] has committed the fallacy of contradicting common knowledge, then this is not true either.

[2a] If it is said that [my thesis] contradicts the common knowledge of my own doctrine, then this is not reasonable because [this thesis] is allowed by our doctrine. Had our own doctrine been contradicted, then there would be the fallacy of

²³⁵ KR: 若總相說如愚夫等一切世俗所生現量，今此不遮，世俗有故，無容違害。

contradicting one's own thesis (*svapratijñā-virodha*)²³⁶ rather than the fallacy of contradicting common knowledge.²³⁷

Bhāviveka denies that what he has stated in the thesis has contradicted the common knowledge in his own doctrine because his thesis is stated in accordance with the Mādhyamika doctrine, i.e. this common knowledge.²³⁸ Thus, the question would rather be whether his thesis has (i.) committed the fallacy of contradicting his own doctrine (*āgama-viruddha*),²³⁹ or even (ii.) is self-contradictory.

To contradict one's own doctrine is to propose a thesis that affirms or implies something contradictory to what is held by this doctrine. If Bhāviveka had proposed a thesis which states that “in terms of the ultimate truth, some conditioned things are not empty of an inherent existence” or “conditioned things do not exist even conventionally”, then this thesis, which affirms the ultimate existence or absolute non-existence of conditioned things, would contradict his own doctrine. But he only states that all conditioned things are empty in terms of the ultimate truth, without denying their inherent existence in the conventional sense. As he considers this the middle way, i.e. the rationale of his doctrine (see Chapter 2), if his thesis had contradicted his doctrine, he takes that it would also have contradicted itself.

²³⁶ Poussin 1933, p. 76 suggests the Sanskrit equivalent “*svapratijñā-virodha*” for “違自宗” (“contradicting one's own thesis”). This fallacy is committed by the thesis of an inference when the property to be inferred, or what is implied by this property, is contradictory to the subject, or what is implied by the subject. Hence, the thesis is self-contradictory (*svavacana-viruddha*). NP gives the example “my mother is a barren woman” (CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 11c3; Section 3.1 [5] in Tachikawa 1971, pp. 122, 141) to illustrate this. If a woman is barren, then she would not be able to give birth and become a mother; if she is a mother, then she would not be barren.

²³⁷ KR: 言有違害共知過失，此亦不然。若言違害自論共知，不應道理，自論許故。設違自論，是違自宗，非是違害共知過失。

²³⁸ This may be disputed by Candrakīrti who holds that the ultimate truth is non-conceptual and ineffable. Emptiness, in order not to be mistaken as an inherent nature of things, should also ultimately be empty and ineffable. It is therefore erroneous, Candrakīrti might argue, for Bhāviveka to conceptualise on emptiness and affirm it in his thesis. Bhāviveka indeed considers his inference and what is stated in its thesis as conditioned things. They are also empty in the ultimate sense, and this is allowed by the Mādhyamika doctrine. See discussion in Objection 8 for the problem of reflexivity of the thesis. The dispute between Candrakīrti and Bhāviveka on the understanding of the two truths in Madhyamaka, however, is outside the scope of the present discussion.

²³⁹ The fallacy of contradicting one's own doctrine (*āgama-viruddha*) is a fallacy committed by the thesis of an inference. It is committed when the property to be inferred, or what is implied by this property, in relation to the subject is not compatible with what is stated or implied by the doctrine of the proponent of this thesis. NP gives the example of a Vaiśeṣika who has proposed a thesis “sound is permanent” (CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 11b29; Section 3.1 [3] in Tachikawa 1971, pp. 122, 141), as sound is impermanent in her doctrine.

Bhāviveka then goes on to deny [2b]:

[2b] If it is said that [my thesis] contradicts the common knowledge of other doctrines, then this is not reasonable because all doctrines are developed to refute what is commonly known by others.²⁴⁰

Bhāviveka denies that it is fallacies for his thesis to contradict the proponents of non-emptiness's doctrines. Different schools hold different doctrines on the ultimate reality of things; Bhāviveka holds that all conditioned things are empty in the ultimate sense, while his opponents – for example, the logicians – hold that these things are existent ultimately. In a debate, the parties involved are not allowed to propose a thesis which is mutually agreed; to begin with: they are required to debate on what they do not agree. If Bhāviveka had proposed a thesis in which the property to be inferred in relation to the subject was already agreed by the logicians, i.e. such a relation is already well-established (*prasiddha-saṃbandha*), he would have committed the fallacy of establishing what has already been established.²⁴¹ For this reason, Bhāviveka responds that he means to propose the thesis regarding the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things, which is allowed by his own doctrine, to refute other doctrines on the ultimate existence of these things, which is the common knowledge of his opponents. This should not lead to the fallacy of contradicting common knowledge in a debate.

Bhāviveka moves on to deny [2c]:

[2c] If it is said that [my thesis] contradicts the common knowledge of the cowherds and others, then this is not reasonable. The disciples of the Buddha hold that all compounded phenomena (*samskāra*) cease within a moment, all things have no self, and there are no sentient beings (*sattva*)

²⁴⁰ KR: 若言違害他論共知，亦不應理，一切論興皆為破遣他共知故。

²⁴¹ NP gives the example “sound is audible” (CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 11c7; Section 3.1 [9] in Tachikawa 1971, pp. 122-123, 141) to illustrate this fallacy because the fact that sound is audible is well-established so that it does not require further inference to establish it.

either.²⁴² The Vaiśeṣikas claim, “in reality, various [qualities such as] colour (*rūpa*) and others are possessed by various substances (*dravya*) and others.”²⁴³ The Sāṃkhyas claim, “the intellect (*buddhi*) itself is not the pure consciousness (*cetanā*),²⁴⁴ and things exist regardless of whether they have already destructed or are yet to exist.”²⁴⁵ These kinds [of proponents] explicate at length their own theses. All their reasonings should be explained to be contradicting common knowledge; however this is not accepted. For they examine things in terms of the ultimate truth with these reasonings, they are not concerned with the common knowledge of the cowherds or others.²⁴⁶

Bhāviveka does not dispute the conventional existence of what is known in common knowledge because it is recognised by ordinary people. His thesis, which is stated in terms of the ultimate truth, is only concerned with the ultimate state of conditioned things. If the proponents of non-emptiness claim that the ultimate emptiness of these things has contradicted their conventional existence known in common knowledge, then their claim is not applicable to Bhāviveka’s thesis.

²⁴² The textual source of this sentence about the doctrine of the disciples of the Buddha is not found at the moment. However, it seems probable that “all compounded phenomena cease within a moment,” “all things have no self” and “there are no sentient beings” can be respectively understood in relation to the three Dharma Seals, i.e. all things are impermanent, all things are no-self, and nirvana is tranquil.

²⁴³ The meaning and translation of this sentence “實異色等有異實等” in the text (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269b7) are uncertain. Poussin 1933, p. 76 translates it as “les *rūpas* etc., sont des espèces de *dravya*; les *dravyas*, etc., sont des espèces de *bhāva*.” Although substance (*dravya*), being inhered in by the universal “existence” (*bhāva*) might be understood as a species of it, colours (*rūpas*), as qualities possessed by substance, cannot be understood as a species of substance. Sastri 1949, p. 41 reconstructs it as “*dravyabhinno rūpādīḥ bhāvabhedo dravyādiriti*”. The present translation is with reference to Potter 1977, p. 86; cf. Hatani 1976, p. 104 and Hsu 2013, p. 180.

²⁴⁴ In Sāṃkhya, everything in the universe is transformed or manifested by two substances, namely *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. *Puruṣa* is the pure consciousness, while *prakṛti* is completely material. As *puruṣa* wishes to see the three constituents in *prakṛti*, *prakṛti* transforms into intellect and all other things in the universe under *puruṣa*’s desire. See further details under Objection 13.

²⁴⁵ This will be discussed in details in relation to the Sāṃkhya doctrine on the pre-existence of effects in their causes in Objection 13.

²⁴⁶ KR: 若言違害牧牛人等共所了知，亦不應理。諸佛弟子立一切行皆剎那滅，諸法無我，亦無有情。諸勝論者：「實異色等有異實等。」諸數論者：「覺體非思，已滅、未生皆是實有。」如是等類廣顯自宗，所有道理皆應說名違害共知，然不應許。以於此中就勝義諦觀察諸法，非關牧牛人等共知。

In comparison, if the Buddhist or non-Buddhist doctrines mentioned in Bhāviveka's response were established as conventional truths, then they would have also contradicted some aspects of common knowledge. For example, the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness would have contradicted the common knowledge that the same things can exist for a long period of time; the doctrine of no-self would have contradicted the common knowledge about sentient beings having a permanent soul; the doctrine of nirvana would have contradicted the common knowledge concerning the rebirth of sentient things. Vaiśeṣikas' doctrine of substance and quality would have contradicted the perception of ordinary people that can only affirm the existence of gross objects in terms of their qualities such as colour and others; the existence of substances, which constitutes the gross objects and possess these qualities, are not recognised in common knowledge. Sāṃkhyas' doctrine of the pure consciousness: that it causes *prakṛti* to transform into the intellect, but is completely different from this intellect, is inconceivable in common knowledge; their doctrine on effects already existing in their causes before they arise would have also contradicted the common knowledge that things are not existent before they arise.

On the other hand, if these Buddhist and non-Buddhist doctrines are also to deal with the ultimate reality, then they are actually standing on the same ground as Bhāviveka's Mādhyamika doctrine of emptiness. They are also describing conditioned things from the point of view of the ultimate truth. If the proponents of non-emptiness's criticism were legitimate, it would then be equally applicable to their own doctrines. Theses proposed under their doctrines would have also committed the fallacy of contradicting common knowledge. However, admitting that their doctrines are concerned with the conventional world is not a choice, because they would have to admit the contradictions their theses have with common knowledge, as pointed out above.

To conclude, Bhāviveka states that his thesis cannot have committed the fallacy of contradicting direct perception or common knowledge because of his employment of a modifier, "in terms of the ultimate truth":

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269b12)

And the thesis is stated with the application of the modifier
“[in terms of] the ultimate truth”. So there is absolutely no
way to attribute to it the said contradictions. For this reason,
neither has it committed the fallacy of contradicting one’s own
thesis.²⁴⁷

See discussion in Section 3.4 in Part I.

**A.2 Although conditioned things are empty of an inherent existence ultimately,
it is not fallacious for them to be taken up as the subject of an inference**

Under Objection 1, Bhāviveka has clarified the misunderstanding of the proponents of non-emptiness that the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things means the absolute non-existence of objects of cognition even in the conventional sense. In Objection 2, these proponents of non-emptiness aim further to establish that things which have arisen from conditions are necessarily ultimate existents. To do this, they attribute logical fallacies to the subject of Bhāviveka’s thesis, which will also be revealed to be empty should his inference be established.

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269b13-b14)

[Objection 2:] Again, the other [opponents] say, “[as] the
proponents of the emptiness of inherent existence [hold that]
the eye and other sense faculties are empty in terms of the
ultimate truth, their thesis has then committed the fallacy of its
subject being unestablished²⁴⁸ and their reason has committed
the fallacy of its support [i.e. the subject of the thesis] being
unestablished (*āśraya-asiddha*).^{249,250}

²⁴⁷ KR: 又立宗中以勝義諦簡別所立，故定無容如說違害，由此亦無違自宗過。

²⁴⁸ The fallacy of its subject being unestablished is committed in the thesis when the subject of an inference is not admitted to exist by either party in the debate. NP calls this fallacy “that which is qualified being unestablished” (“所別不極成” [*aprasiddha-viśeṣya*]) and gives the example of “a Sāṃkhya telling a Buddhist that *puruṣa* is the pure consciousness” (CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 11c4-c5; Section 3.1 [7] in Tachikawa 1971, pp. 122, 141) because Buddhists generally do not admit the existence of *puruṣa*.

²⁴⁹ The fallacy of the support being unestablished (*āśraya-asiddha*) is committed in the reason when the locus of the property that infers, i.e. the subject of the inference, is not admitted to exist. NP gives the example of “a person giving the reason ‘because space is a substratum of qualities’ to prove the reality of space to another person who denies the reality of space.” (CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 11c16; Section 3.2.1 [4] in Tachikawa 1971, pp. 123, 141-142) The fallacy is committed because space is not

As conditioned things, such as eyes and other sense faculties, are empty in the ultimate sense, the subject “conditioned things” of the inference, as a universal that is conceptualised based on the direct perception of conditioned things, should also be empty in the same sense. To be empty means to be non-existent absolutely therefore the proponents of non-emptiness, Bhāviveka’s opponents, counter-argue that this subject should become non-existent even conventionally and unestablished. The property that infers, i.e. “arisen from conditions”, which takes this subject as locus therefore loses its support and also becomes unestablished. Hence, if all conditioned things were proved to be empty ultimately, the subject would be non-existent absolutely, with both the thesis and the reason unestablished.

The opponents go further in this objection in the sense that they hold that the subject of an inference should be established and real in an ultimate sense for the thesis to be provable. If it is empty and thus unestablished in this sense, then the inference cannot have the ability to establish the thesis that it is supposed to have. While Bhāviveka can otherwise accept the ultimate reality of the subject for his thesis to be proved, his thesis for the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things would then be contradicted. This is because the subject, which is a conditioned thing, is not empty ultimately.²⁵¹ Bhāviveka’s inference is unestablished, regardless of whether the subject is empty in the ultimate sense or not.

The dilemma here leads one to question (1) whether the subject of a thesis, or even all terms in an inference, must necessarily be an ultimate existent for an inference to be established; (2) if not, whether such an inference, which consists of merely conventionally-established terms, i.e. terms that are empty of an inherent existence in the ultimate sense, can function like an inference, which consists of all ultimately real terms that the opponents have in mind. In other words, the dilemma raises the

admitted to exist by the other person, and thus cannot be the locus for the property that infers, i.e. “a substratum of qualities”.

²⁵⁰ KR: 有餘復言：「性空論者，就勝義諦眼等處空，便有有法不成宗過，亦有所依不成因過。」

²⁵¹ This can also be understood to be an epistemological issue: if sense faculties are empty in the ultimate sense, then, to these opponents, there would be no way to know whether they are empty in the same sense. But if these sense faculties are excluded from the subject, then at least they are not empty in the same sense. This then contradicts the thesis which states that all conditioned things are empty in this sense.

question of whether such a conventionally-established inference also has the efficacy to prove the ultimate emptiness of things; further, whether an inference, which is empty in the ultimate sense, can prove the ultimate emptiness of itself. Bhāviveka did not give a straightforward answer to question (2). However, the problem regarding the compatibility between the efficacy of an inference and conventional existence is indeed discussed in Objection 4, and the reflexivity of the inference in Objection 8. Regarding question (1), Bhāviveka responds as follows:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269b15-b17)

[Response:] This is not reasonable. The well-established eyes, etc. in general, which are commonly recognised by the cowherds and others, are taken as the subject of our thesis; that is to say, our reason is stated in regards to those [well-established eyes, etc.] Therefore, this [case merely] appears to have the fallacies of the subject being unestablished in the thesis and of the support being unestablished in the reason.²⁵²

Bhāviveka holds that an inference can also be set up with merely conventionally-established terms. This is because eyes and other sense faculties, which are taken as the subject of the thesis and the support of the reason, are well-established in common knowledge. This can be understood from the requirement for the setting up of an inference for others: it is not about whether the terms or the referents of the terms are ultimately real, but whether all parties in the debate agree upon the same concept of the terms used in the thesis, reason and example of an inference (see Section 3.2 in Part I). For this reason, Bhāviveka's inference is set up on a conventional level, where conventional existence is not disputed. To Bhāviveka, sense faculties are conditioned things, which are arisen from conditions and also have an inherent existence according to direct perception and common knowledge. As long as this is recognised by the opponents, Bhāviveka's thesis and reason are neither fallacious nor unestablished. As the opponents do not merely require conditioned things to be existent conventionally, but also existent ultimately, the property to be inferred in relation to the sense faculties in Bhāviveka's inference, i.e.

²⁵² KR: 此不應理。牧牛人等共所了知極成眼等總為宗故，即說彼法以為因故，此似有法不成宗過，亦似所依不成因過。

“empty”, is not well-established. The issue of whether all conditioned things are empty in the ultimate sense has then become the issue to debate.

A.3 The property that infers, i.e. “arisen from conditions” does not contradict the property to be inferred, i.e. “empty”

Bhāviveka’s response to Objection 2 thus anticipates Objection 3 in which the opponents, being the logicians this time, reveal the underlying reason why they consider conditioned things to be ultimately existent. They object as follows:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269b18-269b21)

[Objection 3:] There are some unskilful logicians who make the following objection, “if [you say that] ‘in terms of the ultimate truth, eyes, etc. are all empty, because they arise from conditions’; since eyes, etc. are ‘empty’, why are they said to be ‘arisen from conditions’? If they have ‘arisen from conditions’, then why are they said to be ‘empty of substantial existence’? As there is also a contradiction between the thesis and the reason, [the reason] therefore has the fault of contradicting the thesis (*pratijñā-virodha*).^{253,254}

The logicians hold that a thing being arisen from conditions, i.e. being conditioned, entails that it is also existent ultimately, i.e. not empty. As the property that infers (“arisen from conditions”) should instead prove the non-emptiness of things, it has contradicted the property to be inferred (“empty”). Thus, Bhāviveka fails to prove his thesis.

²⁵³ The reason being contradictory to the thesis (*pratijñā-virodha*) is a point of defeat (*nigrahassthāna*) in Nyāya. (Vidyabhusana 1971, p. 85) Any party in the debate which has committed to a point of defeat is considered having lost the debate. (*Ibid.*, p. 84) It is concerned with the fallacy regarding contradictory reasons (*viruddha-hetu*) in NP, in which it is called the fallacy of inferring the opposite of the property to be inferred (*dharma-svarūpa-viparīta-sadhāna*). NP gives the example of “proving ‘sound is permanent’ with the reason ‘because it is produced’” to illustrate this. The property that infers, i.e. “produced”, is only possessed by the dissimilar instances, i.e. things that are impermanent, but not by any similar instances, i.e. things that are permanent. The reason is fallacious because it has instead proved the impermanence of sound. (CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 12a17-a19; Section 3.2.3 [1] in Tachikawa 1971, pp. 125, 142)

²⁵⁴ KR: 有諸不善正理論者作是難言：「若『就真性，眼等皆空，眾緣生故』，眼等既『空』，云何『緣生』？若『緣生』者，云何『體空』？如是宗、因更相違故，便成與宗相違過失。」

With this objection, it is worth further considering, based on the definition of a conditioned thing as “that which has arisen from causes and conditions”, whether the concept of a “conditioned thing” also entails that any such thing is empty ultimately, existent ultimately, or non-existent absolutely. First, being a conditioned thing does not entail that it is empty ultimately. All parties in the debate agree that “emptiness” is the property to be inferred, while Bhāviveka’s opponents usually take conditioned things as either existent ultimately or non-existent absolutely. Then, although these opponents seem to affirm the ultimate existence of conditioned things, they do grant some exceptions, for example an illusion. From this, it follows that there must be a more basic criterion for them to determine whether a conditioned thing is ultimately existent or not, such as whether it has causal efficacy, whether it is inhered in by certain substances or universals, etc., which is not addressed in their objection. Thus, being conditioned does not entail ultimate existence either. And while these opponents generally do not consider conditioned things as non-existent absolutely, it is also questionable as to whether they will take conditioned things such as illusions as absolutely non-existent in a straightforward manner, without considering other criteria such as those in the case of ultimate existence. In this light, the opponents’ association of a conditioned thing with either ultimate existence or absolute existence shows that they have surreptitiously introduced additional concepts to the terms or additional premises into the argument in their objection. This may indeed constitute a point of defeat called shifting the reason (*hetvantara*) in classical Indian logic: when the property that infers, i.e. “arisen from conditions”, has failed to establish the ultimate existence or absolute non-existence of the conditioned things, the opponents add a specific character to this property, such as “being causally efficacious or not”, “being inhered by certain substances or universals or not” – and thereby lose the debate.²⁵⁵ This remains a recurring issue in the following objections.

In his response to Objection 3, Bhāviveka does not directly deny the accusation of the logicians. But by explaining his own understanding of the circumstance that constitutes the illegitimacy of a reason, he clarifies that he did not commit the said fault. Since both the reason and the example are well-established, his inference is established. His response is as follows:

²⁵⁵ See Vidyabhusana 1971, p. 86.

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269b21-b27)

[Response:] [Although] this [objection] seems to arrogate faults to the thesis we stated, [the following] example shows that the fallacy of the reason being without any positive example or being unestablished [is what actually constitutes the fallacy of contradicting the thesis]. For example it is said that “sound is permanent, because all things are impermanent”; as this example shows [that “sound”] is not [included in] “all things”, this unintelligible reason has committed the fallacy of being unestablished because “sound” is [in fact] included in “all things”. [This reason] also lacks a positive example, for how could [there be anything] “permanent” while not [included in] “all things”? [Therefore,] this [inference] is not reasonable. [In our inference,] the reason “because they arise from conditions” and the example “like illusions” are both commonly recognised. Hence, both the reason and the example are established. For this reason, your objection eventually fails to satisfy the wise persons.²⁵⁶

Due to their ontological commitments, the logicians think that the property that infers (“arisen from conditions”) contradicts the property to be inferred (“empty of substantial existence”) in Bhāviveka’s inference. As Bhāviveka distinguishes the ultimate truth from the conventional truth, the logicians’ standpoint should not present a real contradiction to him.

Such a contradiction would occur rather when the proponent of an inference cannot give a positive example in relation to the reason one has given, and when this reason has become unestablished. To illustrate this, he examines an inference:

Thesis: Sound is permanent,
Reason: because all things are impermanent.

²⁵⁶ KR: 此若矯舉立宗過失，方便顯因無同法喻或不成過，如說「聲是常，一切無常故」，此方便顯非「一切」故，不明了因，有不成過，以「聲」攝在「一切」中故。亦無同喻，如何是「常」，而非「一切」？此不應理。「緣生故」因及「如幻」喻皆共知，故因、喻並成，是故汝難終不能令智者意悅。

The property that infers, i.e. “impermanent” indeed contradicts the property to be inferred, i.e. “permanent”. This is true as the subject of the reason is “all things”, which refers to everything including “sound”, being the subject in the thesis; the same would also be true even if it was only “sound” being taken up as the subject in the reason. The proponents of the permanence of sound intend to prove the permanence of sound by excluding it from all things, which are impermanent; but sound is indeed some “thing” therefore it cannot be both permanent and impermanent at the same time.²⁵⁷ The fallacy of a contradictory reason is further illustrated by a lack of a positive example as there is no similar instance which can be both permanent and impermanent at the same time, meaning that anything in the category of “all things” that is both “impermanent” and “permanent” is impossible. This would be the case unless there were something which was “permanent” but not included in “all things”, but this possibility has already been excluded by the subject “all things”, as it indeed includes everything. Thus, this inference demonstrates a contradiction between a thesis and a reason.

In short, if there is a contradiction between a reason and a thesis, it must show itself in the reason, where a property possessed by the subject would infer the opposite of this property to be possessed by the whole class of things that the subject represents; it would also show itself by a lack of positive example because the property that infers is absent in all similar instances. However, Bhāviveka can give a positive example of illusions, being similar instances – and all parties in the debate agree that illusions are both arisen from conditions and empty of inherent existence. The reason “because conditioned things arise from conditions” is also accepted by the logicians. Hence, his reason and example are both well-established. He does not commit the fallacy of having a contradictory reason, and therefore his thesis is not unestablished.

This objection can also be analysed in terms of the difference in understandings between the logicians and Bhāviveka regarding the cause to the contradiction

²⁵⁷ The proponents of the permanence of sound may in fact want to say that sound is permanent, because all other things are impermanent. However, this does not help to establish the inference because the subject of the inference is changed and the impermanence of non-sound does not entail the permanence of sound, just as all things other than a chair in this room are not white does not entail that this chair should be white; it could be white, as well as any colour which is non-white.

concerned.²⁵⁸ To the logicians, this fallacy is committed when the thesis, which is the conclusion of an inference, has contradicted the reason, as the reason is established before the thesis is. This shows the purpose of an inference to the logicians, i.e. as an instrument to infer the unknown from the known phenomena. In this sense, the reason, which functions as the inferential mark, is always a commonly-recognised phenomenon. The thesis, which states what was originally unknown to them, is the conclusion of an inference supported by the evidence that is the reason. Hence, whenever there is a contradiction between a thesis and a reason, the problem always lies in the thesis; for it is fallacious to infer a contradictory thesis based on a well-established reason. That is why Bhāviveka thinks that the logicians try to refute his thesis by attributing the fallacy of a contradictory reason to it. To Bhāviveka, the inference's purpose, as an inference for others, is to demonstrate the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things. Therefore, the thesis, the reason and the example seems to be taken altogether as an argument. While the thesis, which is what he intends to argue for, is already established to him, what is required, then, is to give an appropriate reason and example to support this thesis. Hence, if there is contradiction between the thesis and the reason, the fallacy is in the reason.

The thesis is always something to be proved, and it is understandable that a different conclusion, i.e. thesis, can be drawn, therefore debates are always required to start from a common ground, i.e. a mutually agreed reason. In consideration of this, Bhāviveka in fact did not give a satisfactory response by merely explaining his understanding of the fallacy concerned. In the present context, the logicians do not agree on the conclusion, even though they recognise the reason and the example. As an inference for others, although Bhāviveka's inference can reach a conclusion acceptable to himself, it cannot achieve the purpose of reaching a common conclusion.

Hence, it should be asked: having accepted the same reason "because they arise from conditions", why Bhāviveka would reach a conclusion (i.e. all conditioned things are empty ultimately) that is opposite to the logicians' (i.e. all conditioned things are

²⁵⁸ HE points out that before Dignāga, the logicians understand the fallacy of contradicting the thesis as being committed by the thesis of an inference. Since Dignāga, this fallacy has been understood as being committed by the reason. Bhāviveka's understanding follows Dignāga's. He uses the same example "sound is permanent, because all things are impermanent" in his response, as in NM, to illustrate this. (HE 2012, p. 18; see also CBETA, T32, no. 1628, 1a25-a29, Tucci 1930, p. 8)

existent ultimately). This then leads us back to the discussion on whether being arisen from conditions entails empty or existent ultimately. The answer to this question, however, is shown to be that: it is unreasonable for the logicians to presuppose ultimate emptiness as contradictory to being arisen from conditions. Thus, the logicians' objection is unfounded.

In Bhāviveka's responses to the objections below, he further shows the compatibility of the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things with them being arisen from conditions, and the problems in understanding these things as either existent ultimately or non-existent absolutely. Objection 4 examines these in relation to the causal efficacy of conditioned things, while Objections 5 to 9 in relation to the reflexivity of Bhāviveka's inference, particularly on how its own emptiness and coherence are understood.

A.3.1 It cannot be established logically that whatever is causally efficacious has inherent existence

In his response to Objection 3, Bhāviveka has already clarified that a conditioned thing is empty ultimately does not contradict the fact that it is arisen from conditions. In this objection, the proponents of inherent existence, the opponents, argue in terms of causal efficacy – which is one of the criteria that marks a thing out as existent – to prove that conditioned things are causally efficacious only if they have inherent existence. In other words, they intend to show that the ultimate emptiness of these things is not compatible with their possession of causal efficacy. Their objection is as follows:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269b27-269c1)

[Objection 4:] Again, the proponents of inherent existence say, “you should be convinced that the visual organ (*cakṣur-indriya*) has an inherent existence, because it can produce an effect. Those which do not have an inherent existence cannot produce any effect, like the son of a barren woman. Eyes can produce an effect, that is, they can produce the visual consciousness (*cakṣur-vijñāna*). According to the said reason,

because [eyes] have causal efficacy,²⁵⁹ therefore eyes must have an inherent existence.”²⁶⁰

This implies the following inference:²⁶¹

Thesis:	Eyes have an inherent existence,
Reason:	because they can produce an effect,
Negative Example:	unlike the son of a barren woman;
Application:	as eyes can produce the visual consciousness, [which is an effect,]
Conclusion:	they should have an inherent existence.

The opponents wish to prove that eyes have an inherent existence, with the support of a negative example, “the son of a barren woman”, demonstrating the negative concomitance between “having an inherent existence” and “able to produce an effect”. They consider their inference established with the first characteristic of a reason (i.e. “eyes” being pervaded by “able to produce an effect”) and the third characteristic (i.e. the above negative concomitance). Applying this conclusion to all other conditioned things, the implication is that whatever can produce an effect should have an inherent existence; anything that does not have an inherent existence is unable to produce an effect. Hence, only ultimate existents can have causal efficacy, and the conventional existents in Bhaviveka’s understanding are all non-existent absolutely and inefficacious like the son of a barren woman.

The issue of whether or not objects of cognition should be ultimate existents has been discussed under Objections 2 and 3. The epistemological issue that occurs since Objection 1, which is regarding the contradiction between the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things and direct perception, continues here with a focus on the ultimate emptiness of the instrumental aspect of cognition. The sense organs, which are

²⁵⁹ Poussin 1933, p. 78 gives the translation “Cet argument est irrésistible” for “如所說因有勢用故” (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269b29). However “勢用” here should be understood in relation to the reason (“如所說因”), i.e. “because it can produce an effect” (“有所作故”), and thus be translated as “causal efficacy”.

²⁶⁰ KR: 有性論者復作是言：「汝應信受眼根有性，有所作故。諸無性者，非有所作，如石女兒。眼有所作，謂生眼識。如所說因，有勢用故，眼定有性。」

²⁶¹ See footnote 25.

empty ultimately, is criticised for lacking the efficacy to produce consciousness in a conventional sense. In the same manner, Bhāviveka's inference, which is a conditioned thing and empty ultimately, is criticised for lacking the efficacy to establish the inferential knowledge which is the result of this inference, i.e. the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things, in a conventional sense.

Bhāviveka points out four fallacies which the opponents have committed in their inference:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269c1-c7)

[Response:] If this [i.e. the visual organ] were like that [i.e. having an inherent existence in the ultimate sense], [then the knowledge of this] is not attained from [careful] study. [1] The inherent existence that is known by the intellect of the cowherds and others is in terms of conventional speech. [If the opponents were to] establish eyes and other conditioned things as having an inherent existence [in terms of the conventional truth], they are [merely] establishing what has already been established. [2] If [eyes, etc. were established as having an inherent existence] in terms of the ultimate [truth], then the opponents would be unable to give a positive example. [3] It is unreasonable that [the opponents] establish the thesis²⁶² they prefer by merely excluding the dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa-pratiṣedha*)²⁶³. Just like the proponents of permanence, who conceptualise on sound and say, “sound is permanent, because of its nature of audibility. Jars, etc. are impermanent and in the nature of inaudibility. As sound is heard, its nature is therefore permanent.” [4] Also, based on the positive examples that are commonly known by the world, [your reason] “because it can produce an effect” has become a contradictory reason; for “eyes and other [sense organs]” that

²⁶² While “*artha*” (“義”) can mean purpose, object or meaning (MW, p. 90, 3), it refers to the object “thesis” and therefore translated as such in the present context (“所愛義成” in CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269c3). *Artha* will be translated throughout this thesis in the meaning particular to the context.

²⁶³ Poussin 1933, p. 78 suggests the Sanskrit equivalent “*vipakṣa-pratiṣedha*” for “遮異品”.

it [i.e. the reason] can establish are included in the conventional speech and have an inherent existence.²⁶⁴

In terms of [1], Bhāviveka clarifies that he also admits the inherent existence of eyes, visual consciousness and other conditioned things, as the conventional truths are not disputed. This has already been discussed under previous objections. Hence, if the opponents were to prove the inherent existence of these things based on the reason that these things can produce an effect in the conventional sense that is commonly recognised by everyone, then the opponents would have committed the fallacy of establishing what has already been established.

However, the opponents are in fact arguing for the ultimate existence of conditioned things, in addition to their conventional existence; things must be ultimately existent in order to be able to produce an effect. On the contrary, Bhāviveka considers conditioned things, which are empty in the ultimate sense, to be causally efficacious conventionally.²⁶⁵ He demonstrates by [2] and [3] that the ultimate existence of conditioned things that has causal efficacy cannot be established ultimately. While by [4], he points out that the reason given by the opponent actually leads to the same conclusion as his standpoint, i.e. that conditioned things that are not existent ultimately are also causally efficacious.

As Bhāviveka holds that conditioned things no longer exist as determinate objects of cognition in the ultimate sense, [2] he states that no positive example could be provided by the opponents if their inference were to establish the inherent existence of conditioned things in the ultimate sense. But as ultimate emptiness has yet to be proved, Bhāviveka's criticism would be unfounded if it was merely based on his doctrine. Thus, we may try to understand his criticism by considering some possible responses from the opponents:

²⁶⁴ KR: 此若就彼，非學所成。牧牛等慧所知自性，依世俗說。成立眼等有為有性，便立已成。若就勝義，無同法喻。唯遮異品，所愛義成，不應道理。如計音聲，常住論者說「聲是常，所聞性故。瓶等無常，非所聞性。聲既所聞，是故性常。」又依世間共知同喻，「有所作故」成相違因，能立「眼等」皆是世俗言說所攝，自性有故。

²⁶⁵ See discussion regarding the false conventional truth in Section 2.3.2 in Part I.

Facing [1], the charge of the fallacy of establishing what has already been established, the opponents may respond that Bhāviveka's conventional truth is indeed their ultimate truth, meaning there is no other truth above and beyond the conventional existence of conditioned things. In this case, then, these opponents and Bhāviveka are actually not debating on the same ground, i.e. the emptiness or non-emptiness of things "in terms of an ultimate truth". Unless the opponents have already proved that there is no such ultimate truth, their argument is not applicable to Bhāviveka's inference for emptiness in terms of the ultimate truth.

An alternative strategy for the opponents would be to contend that they and Bhāviveka are arguing on the same ground, i.e. in terms of an ultimate truth, and that the conditioned things established in the conventional sense also have an inherent existence ultimately. In this case, however, the subject, "eyes", of their inference and the possible positive examples, such as jars, etc., they can give are established conventionally, as they are established in terms of conventional speech that constitutes their knowledge. As the ultimate existence of conditioned things, i.e. having an inherent existence, is still something to be proved, these opponents cannot claim that things existent in a conventional sense can in any way exemplify anything existent in the ultimate sense. In this way, they are not able to give a positive example to exemplify the ultimate existence of eyes. The ultimate existence of conditioned things cannot be established.

The problem of [2] is also found in [3], where Bhāviveka further argues that the opponents cannot establish an inference by merely negating the dissimilar instances. He illustrates this by an inference similar to the opponents':

Thesis:	Sound is permanent,
Reason:	because it is audible,
Negative Example:	unlike jars, etc.;
Application:	as sound is audible,
Conclusion:	sound is therefore permanent.

In order to prove the permanence of sound, the proponent of this inference makes "audible", which is the distinctive characteristic of sound and shares the same class

of things, the property that infers. As a result, there is no similar instance that can possess “permanent” or “audible” to serve as a positive example to exemplify the positive concomitance between the two properties. All things other than sound have been made dissimilar instances, i.e. being “impermanent”, and are “inaudible”. As all dissimilar instances (i.e. things that are impermanent) are inaudible, sound, which is audible, should be permanent. But because the property that infers does not occur in any similar or negative instance, the reason has become too specific (*asādhāraṇānaikāntika-hetu*) and indeterminate, and is therefore unable to prove that sound is permanent.²⁶⁶

The opponents’ inference has similar flaws. If they had taken causal efficacy as the distinctive characteristic of conditioned things, then a positive example would be impossible, their reason would be too specific and indeterminate, and their thesis would be unestablished. If they have not, they still cannot prove their thesis because [2] they cannot exemplify the positive concomitance between the properties “having an inherent existence” and “able to produce an effect” due to the lack of a positive example. The negative example, “the son of a barren woman”, alone cannot establish the inherent existence of eyes, etc. This is because the fact that the son of a barren woman is absolutely non-existent and causally inefficacious does not entail that eyes, etc., as non-absolute non-existents, are causally efficacious and therefore not empty of an inherent existence. In addition to this, these opponents are under the circumstance that they have to at least admit the conventional existence of eyes, etc. as discussed above.

While the opponents might actually take causal efficacy as the distinctive characteristic of conditioned things, they might give jars and other conditioned things as positive examples to support their thesis. However, their inference is still unestablished. This is because, while the ultimate existence of conditioned things, i.e. their possession of an inherent existence ultimately, has not yet been proved (due to the fallacies discussed above), these opponents have to at least admit that their subject and their positive examples, which are established in common knowledge, as conventional. Thus, [4] their reason regarding causal efficacy can only infer the

²⁶⁶ NP provides the same example to illustrate the fallacy concerned. (CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 11c21-c24; Section 3.2.2 [2] in Tachikawa 1971, p. 124, 142) This fallacy is further discussed in relation to Bhāviveka’s response to Objection 5 in defense of his proof of emptiness in Section 3.5 in Part I.

property that is conventionally possessed by eyes, etc. This means that, under the opponents' inference, the reason "because they can produce an effect" has inferred that eyes, etc. have an inherent existence conventionally. This amounts to saying that these things are proved to be only existent conventionally. Thus, the opponents' thesis should become "eyes have an inherent existence [conventionally]" or "eyes[, as conventional existents,] have an inherent existence", which is consistent with Bhāviveka's understanding of the conventional truth of the ordinary people. This still commits the fallacy of establishing what has already been established. In their original inference, the opponents actually intended to prove that "eyes[, as ultimate existents,] have an inherent existence" or "eyes have an inherent existence ultimately", with the reason "because they can produce an effect". However, the property that infers, i.e. "able to produce an effect", is not possessed by the similar instances of the subject "the ultimately existent eyes", such as "the ultimately existent jars, etc.", but by the dissimilar instances, such as "the non-ultimately existent jars, etc." In this light, Bhāviveka criticises that the opponents' reason ("because they can produce an effect") has proved the contrary of their thesis.²⁶⁷

The opponents' inference has failed to prove the ultimate existence of conditioned things due to the fallacies concerned. Since the opponents will not deny the causal efficacy of conditioned things even on the conventional level, Bhāviveka has demonstrated that it is not necessary to be ultimately existent to possess causal efficacy. The ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things does not contradict the possession of causal efficacy by these things conventionally.

A.3.2 The inference can be established even it is a conditioned thing and empty due to the reflexivity of its thesis

²⁶⁷ In addition to Bhāviveka's response, the reason regarding causal efficacy is also contradictory in the sense that it proves the emptiness of things in the ultimate sense according to Bhāviveka's understanding of emptiness. Conditioned things with causal efficacy pass their conditions to their effects through causation. If they were unconditioned, i.e., if they were ultimately existent or absolutely non-existent, then they would not be able to limit their effects spatio-temporally. Hence, if things were unconditioned, things as causes or effects that have an inherent existence could not be produced. For these reasons, unconditioned things do not have causal efficacy. While conventional existents are causally efficacious, they are subject to destruction, in this sense they are empty of an inherent existence. Therefore, causal efficacy is compatible with emptiness but not with ultimate existence.

Objection 4 shows that common knowledge based on direct perception and inference is attainable, as both sense organs – from eyes to the mind – and objects of cognitions are efficacious to generate consciousness, even though they are empty of an inherent existence in the ultimate sense. This implies that even though Bhāviveka's thesis is, like all conditioned things, empty of inherent existence in the ultimate sense, it is nonetheless able to express its meaning, i.e. "all conditioned things are empty in the ultimate sense" by conventional speech. Even though the other components in the inference, the reason and the example, are empty in the ultimate sense, they can still function to prove what they are supposed to prove, i.e. what is stated by the thesis. Hence, it shows that whether or not an inference is established is not related to its ultimate emptiness.

To this, the opponents may counter-argue that this inference is only causally efficacious in the conventional sense: although it is meant to establish the ultimate emptiness of these things, the inference itself is not established ultimately. That is to say, the opponents could argue that, ultimately, this inference cannot establish the inferential knowledge of ultimate emptiness. Hence, the opponents may insist that, granted that all other conditioned things are empty, Bhāviveka's inference itself, which is also a conditioned thing, cannot be empty. But this would lead to a fallacy in his thesis for being self-contradictory, because his thesis indeed states that all conditioned things are empty ultimately. The obvious response expected from Bhāviveka is admitting that his thesis is reflexive, i.e. it also applies to the inference itself; the thesis, reason and example are empty of inherent existence and the said fallacy is avoided. To the opponents, Bhāviveka's inference will have committed other fallacies should the reflexive thesis regarding the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things be established.

A.3.2.1 The inference is not deficient, although the reason and the example are also conditioned things and included in the subject

In this objection, the opponents argue that Bhāviveka's inference is deficient in its reasoning. They contend that as Bhāviveka also has a problematic reason and example in his inference, he is not better off than the opponents he criticised in his response to Objection 4. Their objection is as follows:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269c8-269c9)

[Objection 5:] Others object again, “both the reason and the example are included in [the thesis] “conditioned things are empty”. As [the reason and the example] are of the same class [of things], there is the fault of deficient inference (*anumāna-nyūnatā*).^{268,269}

Bhāviveka intends to prove the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things in his inference. The subject “conditioned things” is a universal that refers to everything that is arisen from causes and conditions. Thus, Bhāviveka’s inference and its components – such as the thesis, the reason, the example, etc. – and the objects they refer to are all included as members of “conditioned things”.

It is, however, not clear how the above involves the fault of deficient inference. From Bhāviveka’s following response, it can be reckoned that these opponents may be criticizing the reason and the example on the basis that as they both are “conditioned things”, they cannot prove the ultimate emptiness of the whole class of conditioned things, including themselves. Hence, there are the problems of over-generalization and reflexivity. As the reason and the example cannot function to prove the thesis as they were expected to, in this sense they both are considered missing. Therefore, we have an instance of the fault of deficient inference.

Bhāviveka interprets this as a problem similar to circular reasoning in his response. In the response below, he only deals with the problems of over-generalization and circular reasoning:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269c9-c15)

[Response:] The result of valid knowledge is generally explained in this verse. When we examine and set up our inference, eyes, etc. are taken up to be the subject one by one.

²⁶⁸ Poussin 1933, p. 79 suggests the Sanskrit equivalent “*anumāna-nyūnatā*” for “闕比量過”. The fault of deficient inference (*anumāna-nyūnatā*) may refer to a point of defeat called saying too little (*nyūnatā*). It is committed when any member (e.g. the thesis, the reason, or an example) in an inference is missing. (Vidyabhusana 1971, p. 88) As a result, the act of inferring is deficient or not able to take place.

²⁶⁹ KR: 餘復難言：「『有為空』者，若因若喻皆攝在中。種類同故，闕比量過。」

Therefore, the inference did not commit this fault. Neither will it commit this fault even if all conditioned things are taken up as the subject. It is because the reason “because they arise from conditions” is recognised by both parties [in the debate]; it is not unestablished. If [the inference] had stated that “eyes are empty, because they are empty of inherent existence”, then the reason it has given would indeed be fallacious. Neither does [the inference] lack an example, as there are illusions, etc. [as examples]; for if we had taken illusions, etc. in the said examples as the subject, then we would have committed the fallacy of establishing what has already been established.²⁷⁰

Bhāviveka denies the problem of over-generalization because the inference in fact presents the result of valid knowledge, i.e. the conclusion of the whole inferential process, which consists of all individually established inferences; see discussion in Section 3.3.1.

Bhāviveka further holds that his inference is established even if all conditioned things are taken up as the subject, without considering this thesis as such a summary. It is true that both his reason and example are conditioned things, but a conditioned thing does have different properties. His inference is only concerned with the relations of pervasion among “arisen from conditions”, “conditioned things” and “empty”, to decide whether or not the conditioned things, apart from being “conditioned” and “arisen from conditions”, also possess another property, i.e. “empty”. According to Bhāviveka, all parties involved recognise his reason (i.e. that conditioned things are arisen from conditions) and example (i.e. illusions, which are arisen from conditions, are also empty). Thus, his inference is not an example of circular reasoning; unlike the example he has given:

Thesis: Eyes are empty,
Reason: because they are empty of inherent existence.

²⁷⁰ KR: 今此頌中總說量果。於觀察時及立量時，眼等一一別立為宗，故無此過。總立一切有為為宗，亦無此過。「緣生故」因二宗皆許，非不成故。若說「眼空，其性空故」，此所說因可有是過。亦非無喻，幻等有故。若立所說喻中幻等以為宗者，便有重立已成過故。

This example literally means “a thing is empty because it is empty”, where the property that infers is identical with the property to be inferred. As the reason is the same as the thesis, there is no inference at all for this reason to reach such a self-same conclusion. But this is not true of Bhāviveka’s inference as it is not recognised by all parties in the debate that “arisen from conditions” is identical with “empty”. The positive concomitance between these two properties in relation to conditioned things is under dispute therefore his reason is not missing. See another example:

Thesis: Illusions are empty,
Reason: because they arise from conditions,
Positive example: like illusions.

While the subject “illusions”, which are arisen from conditions, are proved to be empty of an inherent existence with the example “illusions”, this example is illegitimate and can be considered missing. This also amounts to saying that illusions are arisen from conditions and empty because they are empty and arisen from conditions. The reasoning is indeed circular. Further, the emptiness of illusions is well-established that does not require further proving. Bhāviveka considers that these are not true of his inference as it aims to prove the emptiness of conditioned things instead.

Bhāviveka’s response, however, cannot completely explain away the fault of deficient inference; see discussion in Section 3.5. He goes on to deal with the problem of reflexivity in his response to the following objections.

A.3.2.2 The reason is not illegitimate, although it is included in the subject and proved to be empty, should the thesis be established

In his response to the last objection, Bhāviveka clarified that his inference is not deficient even though his reason and example are conditioned things. As his thesis is reflexive, if the inference is established, the inference itself and all its components, as conditioned things, will also be empty. Opponents in Objection 6 further argue that the reason, which is empty in the ultimate sense, is illegitimate. They object as follows:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269c15-c16)

[Objection 6:] There are some dull-witted people who make this objection, “if you establish [the thesis] ‘all conditioned things are empty of an inherent existence’; as your reason is also conditioned, its nature is also empty. This reason then has the fault of being unestablished.”²⁷¹²⁷²

The assumption here may be that components in an inference, including the reason, should be existent ultimately for the inference to be established; or it may be that only ultimate existents have the efficacy to produce an effect, which is to establish the thesis regarding the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things in the present context. The former has already been refuted in relation to Objection 2 and the latter in relation to Objection 4 (and will be further discussed in Objection 7). Also, following the logic of Objection 5, opponents may also wish to claim that Bhāviveka’s inference has the problem of circular reasoning. As this has already been refuted in Bhāviveka’s response to the last objection, his response below directly addresses the issue of reflexivity:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269c17-c26)

[Response:] This [reason merely] appears to be unestablished, it is not really unestablished. For example, the disciples of the Buddha hold that “all compounded phenomena do not have a self, because they have causes.” Some object that “as this reason is included among the compounded phenomena, neither does it have a self, and therefore it has committed the fault of being unestablished.” And the Sāṃkhya hold that “the manifested things (*vyakta*) take suffering (*duḥkha*), pleasure (*sukha*) and confusion (*moha*) as their inherent

²⁷¹ KR: 有少智者作是難言：「若立『一切有為性空』，因有為故，其性亦空，是則此因有不成過。」

²⁷² The unestablished reason here should be distinguished from the fallacious reasons that are called unestablished reasons. These fallacious reasons are unestablished because (1) their properties to infer are either not recognised by the proponent of the inference, the opponents, or both; (2) the existence of that which they refer to is in doubt; or (3) the support of the property that infers, i.e. the subject, is not admitted to exist. The reason unestablished here is rather due to it being empty of an inherent existence ultimately; that is to say, the existence of the reason itself is in doubt.

natures,²⁷³ because they are different from the pure consciousness.” Some object that “as this reason is included among the manifested things, it also takes pleasure, etc. as its inherent natures, and therefore has committed the fault of being unestablished.” And the Vaiśeṣikas hold that “sound is impermanent, because it has the nature of being produced.” Some object that “as this reason[, which is uttered,] is itself sound, it is also impermanent, and therefore has committed the fault of being unestablished.” Although these kinds of opponents go to great lengths to find faults in the proponents, the reasonings they have said can never overturn others’ [i.e. the proponents’] doctrines. If there were such reasonings [that could overturn others’ doctrines], who and where could anyone establish any inference to overturn the reasoning (*yukti*) that I preferred or said?²⁷⁴

Bhāviveka gives some examples of inferences to show that the reflexivity of a thesis should not contribute to the unestablishment of these inferences. The reason to prove the absence of a self in compounded phenomena is itself a compounded phenomenon and therefore should also be no-self; the reason to prove the inherent natures of pleasure, etc. of manifested things is itself a manifested thing and therefore should also have the inherent natures of pleasure, etc.; the reason to prove the impermanence of sound is itself sound as it is uttered and therefore should also be impermanent. All these examples are common in the way that the reason will also possess the property to be inferred, should the thesis be established. From this, opponents of these inferences criticise that these reasons are all unestablished.

On the contrary, Bhāviveka considers these inferences obviously established (assuming that legitimate examples are provided), therefore he did not even explain why they are so. Apart from the second and the third characteristics of a reason (i.e.

²⁷³ SS in CBETA, T54, no. 2137, 1247c15-c19; see further discussion under Objection 13.

²⁷⁴ KR: 此似不成非真不成。如佛弟子立「一切行皆無有我，由有因故」。有難「此因諸行中攝，亦無我故，有不成過」。又數論者立「諸顯事以苦、樂、癡為其自性，與思別故」。有難「此因顯事中攝，亦以樂等為其性故，有不成過」。又勝論者立「聲無常，所作性故」。有難「此因用聲為體，亦無常故，有不成過」。如是等類諸敵論者雖廣勤求立論者過，如所說理畢竟無能破壞他論。若有此理，何處、誰能建立比量壞我所樂、所說道理？

the positive and the negative concomitances between the property that infers and the property to be inferred) which should be exemplified respectively by the positive and negative examples (not mentioned here), it can be observed that these inferences all possess the first characteristic – i.e., the subject being pervaded by the property that infers – which is a basic requirement for a reason to qualify as legitimate. Under this circumstance, even the reason itself is a member of the class of things that the subject refers to; it is legitimate as long as it is also pervaded by the property that infers. After all, the purpose of an inference is to convince other parties of the debate that the subject of an inference also possesses the property to be inferred, on the basis of the subject's possession of the property that infers.

If the reason were not pervaded by the property that infers, it would be indeterminate. There would be at least one member (i.e. the reason itself) of the “conditioned things” that is not pervaded by “arisen from conditions”. Granted that the second characteristic is present; as the subject were not wholly pervaded by the property that infers, the positive concomitance between the property that infers and the property to be inferred would be not applicable to this subject. It cannot be determined whether or not the members which do not possess the property that infers, including the reason itself, also possess the property to be inferred. Such a reason therefore cannot infer the property to be inferred in relation to the subject.

In the objection from the Vaiśeṣikas' opponents, the Vaiśeṣikas' reason (“because it has the nature of being produced”) for the impermanence of sound is criticised for being unestablished because it itself is also sound and will be proved to be impermanent. The above discussion shows that this reason would have committed the fallacy of being indeterminate, if it were not “having the nature of being produced”. While it does possess the property that infers, however, no fallacy is being committed, provided that the concepts of the terms used are agreed upon and the second characteristic of a reason is also present. Further, the argument of the Vaiśeṣikas' opponents will lead to an absurd consequence: that the property of sound can never be openly examined because such examinations all involve the production of sound. While these opponents may object only due to the underlying reason that sound is not impermanent in their doctrine, following their logic, however, their objection should also be refuted because it is also produced sound.

Applying this discussion to Bhāviveka's inference, it can be seen that its reason ("because they arise from conditions"), which is also "arisen from conditions", does not commit any fallacy. But if this reason were not also "arisen from conditions", it would be an indeterminate reason. Bhāviveka's opponents may object due to their doctrine that the reason in an inference cannot be empty of inherent existence (should Bhāviveka's inference be established). Discussion of this issue will continue under the next objections. The consequence, i.e. their objection refuting itself, will be further discussed under Objection 15.

Bhāviveka has shown that the reasonings of his opponents and of the opponents of the Buddhists, the Sāṃkhyas and the Vaiśeṣikas in his examples are problematic, and therefore unable to refute the inferences they object. Thus, Bhāviveka ends his response by commenting that if these problematic reasonings were accepted and able to refute any inferences at all, then his reasoning, which is actually free from faults, should be uncontestable. This means that although his inference is objected to by his opponents' reasonings, the latter can in no way harm his inference.

A.3.2.3 It is fallacious to take the reason, which is empty of an inherent existence, to be absolutely non-existent

On the basis of the negative concomitance between the properties "able to produce an effect" and "having an inherent existence" in things that are non-existent absolutely in Objection 4, the opponents cannot establish that conditioned things have to be existent ultimately to be causally efficacious. They cannot provide a positive example and their reason have become fallacious for being contradictory. This objection echoes Objection 4 as it also claims that the reason in Bhāviveka's inference cannot establish the thesis because it is empty of inherent existence. It seems that another group of opponents are attempting to prove the failure of Bhāviveka's reason in establishing the thesis, based on the positive concomitance between the properties "being not able to produce an effect" and "not having an inherent existence". They exemplify this positive concomitance by taking an absolute non-existent as the positive example. The objection is as follows:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269c27-c28)

[Objection 7:] Again, some object, “after all, the reason ‘because they arise from conditions’ cannot establish [the thesis] that it should establish, because [the reason] is empty of an inherent existence, like the voice emitted by the son of a barren woman.”²⁷⁵

This is in form of an inference:

Thesis: The reason “because they arise from conditions” cannot establish the thesis that it should establish,

Reason: because this reason is empty of an inherent existence,

Positive Example: like the voice emitted by the son of a barren woman.

As has already been discussed under Objection 4, the son of a barren woman is absolutely non-existent in reality. As this voice is emitted by something absolutely non-existent, it itself is also non-existent absolutely and cannot achieve anything. To the opponents, the reason of Bhāviveka’s inference is empty because it is a conditioned thing. Like the voice of the son of a barren woman which is absolutely non-existent, it does not have efficacy to prove the thesis.

Following this logic, Bhāviveka’s thesis, being a conditioned thing, is also empty in the sense of absolutely non-existent. Hence, it cannot state what it intends to state; and neither can it be proved. This will be discussed in Objection 8.

Equating the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things with the lack of causal efficacy in the conventional sense and with absolute non-existence, however, is the common underlying reason for the opponents’ objections. Unlike Objection 4, Bhāviveka directly refutes this underlying reason in his response to this objection. He points out that the reason in the opponents’ inference is unestablished either to themselves or to others:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269c29-270a12)

²⁷⁵ KR: 復有難言：「『緣生故』因終不能立所應立義，以性空故，如石女兒所發音聲。」

[Response:] This reason [given by the opponents] has committed the fallacy of being unestablished to [the opponents] themselves. Neither is it reasonable if their reason is said to be accepted by the other doctrines;²⁷⁶ for the meaning of [their reason] “because [the reason in Bhāviveka’s inference] is empty of an inherent existence” is unclear (*avijñāta-artha*)²⁷⁷ if it is said to the other doctrines. If [“empty”] means “not existent”; according to this meaning of the reason, this reason is unestablished because it does not mean “non-existent” [in my doctrine]. If [“empty”] means “existing [in the form of] a false appearance”; according to this meaning of the reason, the example “the voice emitted by the son of a barren woman” would be unable to establish anything because it is non-existent absolutely. Also, referring to [the example of] produced voice, [the reason] has committed the fallacy of being indeterminate (*anaikāntika*)²⁷⁸ because that [i.e. the voice produced by the Buddha] is able to benefit and give joy to infinite sentient beings.²⁷⁹

²⁷⁶ If the opponents’ reason were not recognized by both the opponents themselves and other doctrines, this reason would then commit the fallacy of being unestablished to both parties in the debate (*ubhaya-asiddha*). NP gives the example of “a person proving the impermanent of sound with the reason ‘because it is visible’”. (CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 11c13; Section 3.2.1 [1] in Tachikawa 1971, pp. 123, 141) This reason is fallacious because visibility is not related to sound, and thus neither the proponents nor the opponents of this inference would accept taking it as the property that infers.

²⁷⁷ Poussin 1933, p. 81 suggests the Sanskrit equivalent “*avijñāta-artha*” (i.e. “the intelligible”) for “其義未了”. It is a point of defeat committed by a person, who can no longer defend herself in a debate, tries to hide her inability by ambiguous words, or words that are not in ordinary use or uttered very quickly. Although the person has repeated three times, her words cannot be understood by her opponents or audience. (Vidhyabhusana 1971, p. 87)

²⁷⁸ According to NP, the fallacy of being indeterminate (*anaikāntika*) is committed when the property that infers in the reason is present in (1) all similar and dissimilar instances, (2) some similar instances and all dissimilar instances, (3) vice versa, and (4) some similar and dissimilar instances. The example of the Buddha’s voice seems to show this fallacy in the opponents’ reason, because the voice of the Buddha is causally efficacious and is also “empty of an inherent existence”. At least one dissimilar instance possesses the property that infers. See also discussion in NP in CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 11c17-c22, 11c25-12a12; Section 3.2.2 in Tachikawa 1971, pp. 124-125, 142.

²⁷⁹ KR: 此因於自有不成過。若說他宗所許為因，亦不應理。以就他宗說『性空故』，其義未了。若『非有』義，是因義者，此因不成，非『非有』故。若是『虛妄顯現有』義，是因義者，『石女兒聲』畢竟無故，此喻則無能立之法。又由化聲有不定過，彼能成辦無量有情利樂事故。

In his response, Bhāviveka first objects that it is unclear whether the opponents take “empty of inherent existence” to mean “being non-existent” in an absolute sense or “existing in form of a false appearance”. Bhāviveka does not recognise their reason in the former case. As they provide the positive example “the voice emitted by the son of a barren woman” to support their thesis, this shows that they have presupposed that “empty ultimately” means “absolutely non-existent”. However, being empty of an inherent existence, to Bhāviveka, is like an illusion or a false appearance, which is neither ultimately existent nor absolutely non-existent, but existent conventionally and able to fulfill its functions. Hence, the opponents’ reason “because Bhāviveka’s reason is empty of an inherent existence” is not recognised by the other party in the debate, i.e. Bhāviveka himself. It has committed the fallacy of being unestablished to either party in the debate (*anyatara-asiddha*).²⁸⁰

In case of the latter – i.e. if “empty of an inherent existence” means “existing in the form of a false appearance” to the opponents – then the opponents’ reason has become indeterminate. This is because the property “empty of an inherent existence” can also infer the opposite of “not being able to establish the thesis it should establish” (or generally as “not being able to fulfill its function” or “being causally inefficacious”). This is like the Buddha’s voice, which is empty of an inherent existence, but can achieve the salvation, etc. of the sentient beings. As the property that infers (“empty of an inherent existence”) also occurs in the dissimilar instances – i.e. things that are “causally efficacious” – the opponents’ reason can also prove the contrary of their thesis and has failed to be a legitimate reason. Further, the opponents’ example “the voice emitted by the son of a barren woman” has also become illegitimate because it is non-existent absolutely; it is not “empty” in the sense of “existing in the form of a false appearance”. However, the opponents actually take “empty” to mean “absolutely non-existent”. If they did take “empty” to mean “existing in the form of a false appearance”, their reason would have also committed the fallacy of being unestablished to either party (i.e. their own party) in the debate.

²⁸⁰ NP gives the example of “a person proving the impermanence of sound with the reason ‘because it is produced’ to another person who only admits the manifestation of sound”. (CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 11c14; Section 3.2.1 [2] in Tachikawa 1971, pp. 123, 141) The other person does not recognise the reason because she holds that sound is eternal and is only manifested to become heard under certain conditions.

Bhāviveka goes on to refute the opponents' inference because it is not established based on a commonly recognised reason:

Neither is it the case that a reason being accepted only by the other party can establish what it is supposed to establish, because [a reason that is only accepted by] one party [in the debate] is unestablished, like a reason which is unestablished to the other party; because it can be repudiated by another inference [that has a] contradictory [thesis]; because it is followed by great errors (*atiprasaṅga*).²⁸¹ For example, it is stated that “understanding (*prajñā*), etc. are not associated with thought (*citta-saṃprayukta*), because they are included in the aggregate of volition (*saṃskāra-skandha*), like the word-group (*nāma-kāya*),²⁸² etc.”; that “space, etc. are all impermanent, because they are the locus of qualities (*guṇa*), like earth, etc.”; that “*puruṣa* is not the pure consciousness, because it is not a manifested thing, like the first cause (*pradhāna*)”;²⁸³ these kinds [of reasons] destroy all theses and they are followed by faults. Therefore, it should be admitted that the reason is so called only when it is accepted by both

²⁸¹ In the translations of Hatani and of Hsu, Bhāviveka's response only starts after this sentence; see Hatani 1976, p. 106-107 and Hsu 2013, pp. 187-189. My translation does not agree with their understanding because it seems to me that Bhāviveka's response, starting with the discussion on the fallacy in the opponents' reason being unestablished both to themselves and others, is criticizing the inference proposed by his opponents; see Commentary below.

“Great errors” is a literal translation for “太過失” (*atiprasaṅga*), which was not a technical term in Indian logic. Later, it was employed by Dignāga in his critique of Nyāya in Chapter 1 of PS. In general, this term refers to the property that infers being also present in dissimilar instances or being inefficacious. (Harada 1988) However, it cannot be certain whether Bhāviveka used it here with the technical meaning in mind.

²⁸² Poussin 1933, p. 81 renders the term as “名身” (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270a9) as “*nāmarūpa*”, which means “name and form”. However, “factors that are not associated with thought” is a Sarvāstivādin terminology. Thus, “名身” should instead be rendered as “*nāma-kāya*” (“word-group”) under the Sarvāstivādin context. “Name and form”, as the fourth of the twelve limbs of dependent origination, refer to the psycho-physical complex of a sentient being. “Name” includes the first four aggregates, namely matter, sensation, conception, and volition, while “form” includes the last aggregate, namely consciousness. Hence, “name and form” includes both factors associated and not associated with thought. “Name and form” cannot be a positive example because it is not entirely “included in the aggregate of volition”, and hence it cannot establish the positive concomitance between “included in the aggregate of volition” and “not associated with thought”.

²⁸³ See Objection 13.

parties. From this reasoning, we cannot have committed the said faults.²⁸⁴

His refutation is in the form of an inference:

Thesis: A reason which is only accepted by the other party cannot establish what it is supposed to establish,

Reason: because a reason that is only accepted by one party in the debate is unestablished,

Positive Example: like a reason which is unestablished to the other party.

The opponents also understand that a reason of an inference is required to be recognised by all parties in the debate for the thesis to be proved. Therefore, the reason “because [a reason that is only accepted by one party in the debate is unestablished]” in Bhāviveka’s inference above is not contested. And Bhāviveka’s inference is established.

Bhāviveka holds that a reason which is only accepted by the other party in the debate cannot establish what it is supposed to establish further because such a reason can be repudiated by another inference that has a contradictory thesis. This is also because an inference with such a reason is followed by great errors, e.g. the fallacies of the reason being indeterminate or contradictory and of the example being illegitimate. These can be understood from the examples he has given in his response:

If the thesis “understanding is not associated with thought” were said to the Sarvāstivādins, then the reason “because it is included in the aggregate of volition” would be denied as it is contradictory. This is because the Sarvāstivādins consider whatever is “included in the aggregate of volition” to be “associated with thought”, and this includes “understanding”. Although the Sarvāstivādins agree that the example “word-group” is not associated with thought, it seems that they do not have common consensus as to whether word-group should be included in the aggregate of

²⁸⁴ KR: 又非他宗獨所許因能立所立，一不成故，猶如他宗所不成因；相違比量所損害故、有太過失所隨逐故。如立「慧等非心相應，行蘊攝故，如名身等」、立「虛空等皆非是常，德所依故，猶如地等」、立「我非思，非顯事故，猶如最勝」。如是等類壞一切宗，過失隨逐。故定應信二宗共許，方名為因。由此道理，如所說過，無容得有。

volition, the aggregate of matter, or both.²⁸⁵ If the thesis were said to the Sarvāstivādins who consider word-group as not included in the aggregate of volition, then it would not be a legitimate example. The positive concomitance of the properties “being included in the aggregate of volition” and “being not associated with thought” would be unestablished. The thesis would be unestablished.

If the thesis “space, as one of the elements, is impermanent” were said to the Vaiśeṣikas, then the reason “because it is the locus of qualities” would be denied as it is indeterminate. This is because the Vaiśeṣikas consider space to be impermanent, but a locus of qualities can either be permanent or impermanent. Although the example “earth” is the locus of solidity, it is considered permanent to the Vaiśeṣikas. Therefore, it would not be a legitimate example. As a result, the positive concomitance of the properties “being the locus of qualities” and “impermanent” would be unestablished. The thesis would also be unestablished.

If the thesis “*puruṣa* is not the pure consciousness” were said to the Sāṃkhya, then the reason “because it is not a manifested thing” would be denied as it is indeterminate. Sāṃkhya holds that *puruṣa* (purely conscious) and “the first cause” (purely material) are the only two substances that are responsible for things manifested in the universe. While they are both unmanifested, the manifested things are purely material. Although the example “the first cause” is neither a manifested thing nor the pure consciousness, the Sāṃkhyas disagree that whatever is not a manifested thing is not the pure consciousness. They also disagree that whatever is the pure consciousness is a manifested thing. As a result, the positive and negative concomitances between the properties “not a manifested thing” and “not the pure consciousness” are not commonly recognised. The thesis is also unestablished.

Thus, Bhāviveka’s opponents have failed to establish the positive concomitance of the properties “being not able to produce an effect” and “not having an inherent existence” because it is not commonly recognised. They have failed to prove that Bhāviveka’s reason cannot establish the thesis it should establish. The underlying reason for the opponents’ objection – i.e. that the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things amounts to their absolute non-existence – is refuted.

²⁸⁵ See Dhammajoti 2009, p. 309-310.

A.3.2.4 The thesis regarding the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things is reflexive but not fallacious

In Objection 7, the opponents claim that because Bhāviveka's reason is empty of an inherent existence in the ultimate sense, it cannot establish the thesis. Following the same logic, the logicians in this objection also claim that the property that infers "arisen from conditions" in the reason and the property to be inferred "empty" in the thesis are both included in "conditioned things", which is the subject of the inference, and empty in the ultimate sense. Therefore, the property that infers cannot establish the property to be inferred; neither does the latter exist for the former to establish. Their objection is as follows:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270a13-a17)

[Objection 8:] Some other unskilful logicians want to show the fallacies of our thesis by saying again, "if [conditioned things are] empty of an inherent existence, then that which is to be inferred and that which infers are both unestablished, like the voice emitted by the son of a barren woman. [This is because] that which infers is included in the 'conditioned things', therefore it is the same as that which is to be inferred by them [i.e. Bhāviveka, etc.], and its nature is also empty. As they are both empty, neither that which is to be inferred nor that which infers are established. They refute the existence of the property to be inferred and of the property that infers. This amounts to refuting the subject itself, [and hence] they shows the fault in establishing their thesis."²⁸⁶

This objection is in the form of an inference,

Thesis: That which is inferred and that which infers are both unestablished,
Reason: because they are empty of an inherent existence,

²⁸⁶ KR: 有餘不善正理論者為顯宗過，復作是言：「若自性空，所立、能立皆不成就，如石女兒所發音聲。能立攝在有為中，故同彼所立，其性亦空。以俱空故，所立、能立並不成就。彼遣所立、能立法體，即是遣於有法自相，顯立宗過。」

Positive example: like the voice emitted by the son of a barren woman.

As in Objection 7, the logicians here regard the property that infers and the property to be inferred in Bhāviveka's inference (which are empty) as absolutely non-existent like the son of a barren woman, and therefore causally inefficacious like the son's voice. Thus, they cannot establish anything and cannot be established.

Further, the logicians claim that Bhāviveka has committed the fault of refuting the subject of their own inference. Refuting the property that infers, which is a property generally possessed by all members of the class that the subject refers to, can be considered as refuting the distinctive characteristic of the subject (*dharmi-svarūpa*). Refuting the property to be inferred in relation to the subject, which is established based on the positive concomitance between it and the property that infers, can be considered as refuting the implication of the subject (*dharmi-viśeṣa*). In the case of Bhāviveka's inference, although conditioned things are defined as "arisen from conditions", they no longer qualify as such as this property does not exist. For the property to be inferred ("empty") is already non-existent absolutely; if the inference could be established at all, the subject would be proved to be "absolutely non-existent", being unable to possess any property.²⁸⁷ Thus, the subject is devoid of all characteristics, with its distinctive characteristic and implied characteristic refuted, and the subject itself will also be refuted. The inference, which was set up regarding this subject, has now failed to be established in relation to this subject and has become unestablished.²⁸⁸

Bhāviveka thus responds:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270a18-a20)

²⁸⁷ Cf. the discussion in Objection 2 about the fallacy of the thesis with its subject being unestablished and the fallacy of the reason with its support being unestablished. The difference between Objections 2 and 8 is that the opponents in Objection 2 object to the subject of the inference, while the logicians here object to the property that infers and the property to be inferred, which are related to the second characteristic of the reason. To the opponents in Objection 2, the subject of the inference is fallacious because it is empty and hence absolutely non-existent. As a result, the property that infers has lost its support, i.e. the subject. To the logicians in this objection, the inference is fallacious because it proves the emptiness and hence absolute non-existence of its components, including the subject, the property that infers and the property to be inferred; the inference thus has refuted itself.

²⁸⁸ The logicians will have the same problem in their inference, since the ultimate existence of conditioned things has already been refuted and they still insist on understanding emptiness as absolute non-existence; see Bhāviveka's response to Objection 15.

[Response:] As their reason is neither established to themselves nor to others, as it is indeterminate, and as their example is fallacious in itself; with reference to what has been just discussed, neither is this objection reasonable.²⁸⁹ Although the opponents have set up a different objection²⁹⁰ [to show the fallacy committed in our inference], eventually they cannot conceal the fallacies committed in their own thesis.²⁹¹

As the logicians' reason is not mutually agreed by both parties in the debate, they have committed the same fallacies as the opponents did in Objection 7. (1) Their reason is unestablished to the other party, i.e. to Bhāviveka, in the debate, as they understand "empty" as "absolutely non-existent". Bhāviveka's notion of "being empty of an inherent existence" is like an illusion or a false appearance, which is existent conventionally instead and able to produce an effect. (2) Their reason is indeterminate because according to Bhāviveka's understanding, empty things can also be causally efficacious. Thus, the property that infers ("empty") also occurs in dissimilar instances, i.e. things that are established. (3) Their example, "the voice emitted by the son of a barren woman", becomes illegitimate because its property "empty" understood in the sense of "absolutely non-existent" is disputed, thus failing to exemplify the positive concomitance between "empty" and "unestablished". As conditioned things which are empty are existent conventionally in Bhāviveka's understanding, he does not deny the existence of the property that infers and the property to be inferred. Therefore, the fault of refuting the subject is not committed in his inference.

The above objection is about inference-reflexivity – whether, that is, the proponents of an inference can accept the conclusion of their own inference to be applied to their

²⁸⁹ Hatani 1976, p. 107 understands the first part of this sentence – "As their reason...fallacious in itself" – as part of the objection, but this translation considers the three fallacies mentioned there as the reasons why the present objection should be refuted. The three fallacies have already been discussed by Bhāviveka under Objection 7. In his response, he is referring his readers to that objection to help them to understand that what is objected here is also unfounded.

²⁹⁰ "Different objection" translates the term "異端" (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270a20), the meaning of which is not clear. I have compared Poussin's suggestion "tentatives ingénieuses" (Poussin 1933, p.82), and rendered this translation; cf. Hsu 2013, p. 190, where it is rendered as "accusations".

²⁹¹ KR: 彼因自他互不成故，不決定故，喻有過故，如次前說，亦不應理。雖設異端，終不能掩自宗過失。

own inference. Below, the logicians in turn question Bhāviveka on his notion of emptiness and his thesis, if what is expressed by his thesis is also empty:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270a20-a28)

[Objection 8 cont.:] Again, other [unskilful logicians] set up another reasoning to conceal the fallacies [they have committed] in their own thesis. They say, “that which is stated by the thesis, which says that ‘in terms of the ultimate truth, the conditioned things are empty’ is unclear. [1] If ‘in terms of the ultimate truth, all conditioned things have no reality’ is the meaning stated by the thesis, this which is said [in the thesis] is also included in the conditioned things, therefore it is the same as the conditioned things and should also be unreal. [Alternatively,] if what is said [in the thesis] is not unreal, neither should all conditioned things be unreal. As this, which is said [in the thesis], refutes the very meaning it has established, it is called the self-contradiction in one’s own speech, which is a fallacy committed in the thesis, like when it is established that everything [that is expressed in] speech is false. [2] If ‘in terms of the ultimate truth, all conditioned things do not exist at all’ is the meaning stated by the thesis, then the thesis is denying the existence of everything. If this is what is established [by your thesis], then you have fallen into the erroneous view.”²⁹²

The logicians counter-argue that the meaning of Bhāviveka’s thesis “in terms of the ultimate truth, conditioned things are empty” is not clear. There are two possible meanings of the property to be inferred, “empty”, understood in terms of “a false appearance”; either it means [1] “unreal” or [2] “absolutely non-existent”.

²⁹² KR: 有餘復設別異方便掩自宗過，作如是言：「所說『真性有為空』者，此立宗言其義未了。若『就真性，一切有為皆無有實』是立宗義，此所說言亦復攝在有為中，故同諸有為，亦應無實。若所說言非無實者，有為亦應皆非無實。此言破自所立義故，名違自言立宗過失，如立一切言說皆妄。若『就真性，一切有為都無所有』是立宗義，即謗一切皆無所有。如是所立，便墮邪見。」

In terms of [1], “in terms of the ultimate truth, all conditioned things have no reality” will be the meaning of the thesis. “The ultimate unreality of all conditioned things,” which is meant by the thesis, is also a conditioned thing. Therefore, this will also be unreal in the ultimate sense. If Bhāviveka holds that what is stated in his thesis is exempt from the reflexivity of itself, and is real, then he will have refuted what he aimed to prove in his thesis. This is similar to a person, who says that, “I am telling a lie”. The content of the lie itself is of course false to the reality. But if this person is really telling a lie, her statement that “I am telling a lie” is then true. And if this statement is true, then this person is not telling a lie at all. Thus, this person has denied what she has affirmed at the same time – her statement and what is expressed by her statement cannot be true at the same time. In other words, her speech is self-contradictory. Hence, if Bhāviveka’s thesis can be proved, then it should be reflexive and be applicable to itself, proving the unreality of what it aims to establish.

In the translation of “if what is said by the thesis is not unreal, neither should all conditioned things be unreal,” it should be noted that there can be two readings of the second clause: (1) as “皆非無實” (*jie fei wu shi*),²⁹³ which means “all [conditioned things] are not unreal”, and (2) as “非皆無實” (*fei jie wu shi*), which means “[conditioned things] are not all unreal”. Indeed, (2) is sufficient for the logicians to establish their criticism. If there are some conditioned things (i.e. that which is expressed in Bhāviveka’s thesis) that are not unreal, then his thesis, which claims that “all conditioned things are unreal”, will become false.

For [2], if “empty” means “absolutely non-existent”, then the thesis will actually mean “all conditioned things are absolutely non-existent”. It has then committed the fault of nihilism, which should be avoided by all Mādhyamikas. In this way, the logicians argue, Bhāviveka has also contradicted his own doctrine of the middle way. Bhāviveka understands the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things as their lack of inherent existence, with both ultimate emptiness and lack of inherent existence being likened to a false appearance or an illusion.²⁹⁴ Hence, what is stated by his thesis is not established in terms of [2].

²⁹³ CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270a24.

²⁹⁴ KR: 「空」與「無性」虛妄顯現門之差別，是名立宗。(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 268c19-c20)

Regarding [1], in his response Bhāviveka denies that his inference is unestablished even though what is stated in his thesis is reflexive. He also discusses the circumstances where the reflexivity of the thesis will lead to self-contradiction in one's own speech. Regarding [2], he denies that the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things means their absolute non-existence. He also restates his notion of emptiness.

Bhāviveka's response regarding [1] is in two parts. In [1a], he clarifies that the reflexivity of his thesis will not generate problems for his inference because the inference is established in terms of the ultimate truth:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270a28-b3)

[Response:] [1a] Here, as it says, "one is the protector of oneself. Who says that there is another protector? The wise persons are skilful in taming their Selves, therefore they obtain the happiness of the deities."²⁹⁵ In terms of the conventional truth, they say that the mind is the Self; while in terms of the ultimate truth, they establish that it is no-self. [Therefore,] they did not commit the fallacy of self-contradiction in one's own speech in their thesis. The same applies to [our thesis] here. It is said, in terms of the conventional nature, that there are eyes, etc.; in terms of the ultimate truth, these things are all established as empty. Therefore, no fallacy is being committed.²⁹⁶

In Bhāviveka's understanding, the reflexivity of his thesis is problematic to the logicians because they have mistakenly supposed that the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things is stated in the thesis in terms of the conventional truth, i.e. the level of truth where Bhāviveka admits these things as having an inherent existence. Only on this same level of conventional truth would it be self-contradictory for

²⁹⁵ *Dhammapada* XII, no. 160. It is also quoted by Candrakīrti in his PSP for MMK 18.5cd (Sprung et al. 1979, p. 174) for the same purpose as Bhāviveka.

²⁹⁶ KR: 此中如說：「我定依於我，誰言他是依？智者我善調，故得昇天樂。」彼就世俗說心為我，就勝義諦立為非我，無違自言立宗過失。此亦如是。此是就世俗性說有眼等，就勝義諦立彼皆空，故無過失。

Bhāviveka's thesis to affirm the emptiness of conditioned things, given that the subject "conditioned things" of this thesis includes the thesis itself, and the property "empty" is opposite to the property "having an inherent existence". Since what is stated in the thesis is intended to be established in terms of a different level of truth, i.e. the ultimate truth, what is stated in the thesis will not be self-contradictory even if it has an opposite property in another level of truth, i.e. the conventional truth. Hence, the contradiction of conditioned things having mutually-exclusive properties is avoided in Bhāviveka's system of the two truths.

Although what is stated in the thesis "in terms of the ultimate truth, conditioned things are empty" is established by virtue of conventional speech, it is describing the ultimate state of these things. This is also specified by the modifier "in terms of the ultimate truth". In other words, it is established conventionally in order to convey the meaning that concerns the ultimate truth of things. This is indeed the way that the Buddha teaches the Self to ordinary people, although he does not admit its existence in the ultimate sense. As there is a Self, these people would be guided to act morally in order to have a better rebirth. But after they have understood the dependent nature of all things, the notion of Self will be discarded as well and no-self will be taught. The same is also true of the existence of conditioned things, eyes, etc. in Bhāviveka's thesis. They are provisionally established with an inherent existence in terms of the conventional truth so that the inferential knowledge on their emptiness in the ultimate sense can be conveyed.

Thus, what is stated in Bhāviveka's thesis is a conditioned thing, but it is not established to be unreal or false in the conventional sense. This is because Bhāviveka admits conditioned things as having an inherent existence on the conventional level. Their inherent existence is denied only on the ultimate level, and they are only established as empty, unreal or false on this level. Under the system of the two truths, there is no contradiction between the emptiness and the non-emptiness of inherent existence in conditioned things in relation to what is stated in Bhāviveka's thesis.

In [1b], Bhāviveka further explains the circumstances where a reflexive thesis actually leads to the fallacy of self-contradiction and how this fallacy is not committed by his thesis under the system of the two truths:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270b3-b25)

[1b] Again, there is a saying that, “all things that have arisen are eventually to die.”²⁹⁷ [As] that which is said by Muni [i.e. the Buddha] must not be false, the Buddha himself, being arisen, must die eventually, because he is not apart from [the things that have arisen]. Although the thesis which is established by him can prove that he will die eventually, this is accepted [by his own thesis]; therefore there is no fallacy of self-contradiction in one’s own speech [committed in his thesis]. The same applies to [our thesis] here. It is said, in terms of the ultimate truth, that all conditioned things are empty, because they arise from numerous conditions. Since the saying itself, which is established by the thesis, also arises from numerous conditions, it should also be empty of an inherent existence because it is not apart from [the conditioned things]. Although this saying, which is established by the thesis, can prove that what it says is empty of inherent existence, as this is accepted [by this thesis itself], [this thesis] does not have the fault of refuting the very meaning which it itself has established.

Just as a Brahmin says, “The Blessed One, I do not forbear anything.” The Buddha says, “Brahmin, do you not forbear this very thing?” The Brahmin of course forbears this very thing [that she does not forbear anything], while saying “I do not forbear anything.”²⁹⁸ As what she has just said contradicts what she admits, she has indeed committed the fallacy of contradicting what she said herself, [albeit] such a fallacy is not found everywhere.

²⁹⁷ The source of this quotation has not yet been identified. I followed Poussin 1933, p. 83 and Hatani 1976, p. 108 to end the quotation here, but not Zangyao, p. 5, which ends it after “...must not be false.” Hsu 2013, pp. 192-193 translates the phrase “不相離故” (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270b5) as “life and death are not separated”, instead of “he is not apart from [the things that have arisen]” in the present translation, and ends the quotation there.

²⁹⁸ See *Dīghanakha Sutta* in MN 74 (PTS: M i 497).

Elsewhere, the Blessed One says, “all compounded phenomena are without a self.” Again, he says somewhere else, “the compounded phenomena are impermanent [as] they are subject to arising and ceasing.” If it is not like [what has just been explained], having said the compounded phenomena are no-self and impermanent, the Buddha should have also committed the said fallacy [of self-contradiction]. However, it is not the case. This is because, just like when [his theses] negate the inherent existence and permanence of compounded phenomena, what is said in his theses are also allowed to be no-self and impermanent like the others.²⁹⁹ The same applies to [our thesis] here. [Our thesis] says that “conditioned things are empty”; this which is stated by our thesis is also allowed to be empty of an inherent existence. [Such a thesis] then follows and establishes the meaning that is admitted by itself. This is why the reason “because this [thesis] refutes the very meaning that it has established” given by you is not established.

Also taking the Sāṃkhyas as example; they regard pleasure, etc. as the natures of the manifested things. Although there is the objection that, “if manifested things take pleasure, etc. as natures, then that which is stated by their thesis should also take pleasure, etc. as its natures. If that which is stated by their thesis is not of these natures, neither should the manifested things take these as their natures.” However, this stated thesis did not commit this fallacy [of self-contradiction]. If conditioned things are established as impermanent and no-self,

²⁹⁹ In Hsu 2013, pp. 193-194, the second clause of this sentence is translated as “The thesis intends [the principle] of ‘no-self’ to be permanent” (“此立宗言，亦許同彼「無我」常故”) (see CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270b17). Although Hsu’s translation also explains why the Buddha does not commit the fallacy of self-contradiction in his sayings, the understanding of the basic teaching of no-self as permanent seems untenable. If it means that “except the teaching of no-self, all other compounded phenomena are no-self or impermanent,” then this means not all compounded phenomena are no-self or impermanent, and this is exactly what constitutes the fallacy concerned.

neither will the thesis commit the fallacy as attributed by those [opponents]. The same applies to [our thesis] here. It did not commit the fallacy attributed [by the opponents] because we intend it [to be empty ultimately].³⁰⁰

Recalling the example of “I am telling a lie”, it would be helpful to begin by examining whether or not the fallacy of self-contradiction can be solved. This statement is self-contradictory because the person who says this statement cannot be telling a lie and not telling a lie at the same time. Either this person is telling the truth that she is telling a lie, or she is telling a lie that she is telling a lie, meaning that she is telling the truth. This problem may be solved through distinguishing two orders of the sense of the statement. On a lower order, the statement “I am telling a lie” is affirmed, while on a higher order, this statement may be affirmed as in “it is true that ‘I am telling a lie’”, or denied as in “it is false that ‘I am telling a lie’”. Thus, the truth value of the statement “I am telling a lie” is determined on a higher order instead of the same order. Hence, it will not be self-contradictory even one affirms a statement which one eventually denies. This is similar to Bhāviveka’s reasoning, for he admits the inherent existence of conditioned things on the conventional level but denies it on the ultimate level.

However, regardless of whether the person who says that “I am telling a lie” would affirm that that statement is true on a higher order, this person is still telling the truth on this higher order, unless there is another higher order. If what the person really meant to convey is “I always lie”, meaning that she is lying in all places and all times, then what she really intended to establish is the meaning of her statement

³⁰⁰ KR: 復如有說：「一切生法，皆歸於死。」牟尼所言，定無虛妄，自身既生，亦應歸死，不相離故。彼所立宗雖能證自亦歸於死，是所許故，無違自言立宗過失。此亦如是。說就真性有為皆空，眾緣生故，所立宗言既眾緣生，亦應性空，不相離故。此立宗言雖能證自言說性空，是所許故，無有自破所立義失。

如梵志言：「世尊，一切我皆不忍。」佛言：「梵志，忍此事不？」此中梵志固忍此事，而言『一切我皆不忍』，彼言違自所許事故，可有違害自所言過。非一切處皆有此失。

世尊餘處說：「一切行皆無有我。」又餘處說：「諸行無常，有生滅法。」若不爾者，既說諸行無我、無常，佛亦應有如所說過，然無彼失。如遮諸行我性、常性，此立宗言亦許同彼無我、常故。此亦如是。說「有為空」，所立宗言亦許性空。此則順成自所許義。是故汝說「此言破自所立義故」，此因不成。

又如數論立諸顯事樂等為性，雖有難言：「顯事若以樂等為性，所立宗言亦應用彼樂等為性。所立宗言若非彼性，顯事亦應非彼為性。」然所立宗無如是過。如立有為無常、無我，亦無如彼所說宗失。此亦如是，無所說過，意所許故。

instead of the statement itself. In this case, it would seem more reasonable to admit that the meaning of the statement “I always lie” applies to the statement itself even on a higher order. Then it will result an infinite regress of levels of truth, which should be an acceptable consequence to her.

In his response to the objection, Bhāviveka gives an example of a Brahmin to illustrate what constitutes the fallacy of self-contradiction due to a reflexive thesis. The Brahmin says that she does not forbear anything. In terms of two orders of sense of the statement, just like Bhāviveka’s two levels of truth, it may be said that on a lower order the Brahmin does not forbear anything. Applying the same statement on a higher order, this Brahmin should also not forbear anything. But then, she would be not forbearing that “she does not forbear anything”, in which case she would have falsified her own statement. Or if she forbears that “she does not forbear anything”, then she would at least forbear this very statement and have also falsified her own statement. She would therefore have contradicted herself. This Brahmin might as well accept an infinite regress of levels of truth of her statement; however, infinite regress is undesirable in Indian philosophy. By contrast, this problem does not happen in other examples, such as the Buddha’s saying that “all things that have arisen are eventually to die” and his teachings on impermanence and no-self. Such claims would be self-contradictory if they denied the permanence of all things, including themselves, but established themselves in the ultimate sense to be absolute truths. To fulfill the meaning of the Buddha’s saying and teachings, their meanings are affirmed in terms of the conventional truth, while all things, including themselves, are also said to die or disappear in terms of the ultimate truth. This is consistent with the meaning of the Buddha’s saying and teachings and is exactly what they aim to achieve. The same applies to the example regarding the Sāṃkhyas. Their opponents claim that the Sāṃkhyas’ thesis, which states that all manifested things have the natures of pleasure, etc., itself should also be a manifested thing and have the same natures. It would also be fallacious if the Sāṃkhyas denied that their thesis is a manifested thing and have such natures. However, the fact that the Sāṃkhyas’ thesis is a manifested thing and has such natures does not contradict what is stated in it.

The same is also true of Bhāviveka's inference. The thesis "in terms of the ultimate truth, conditioned things are empty" is a conventional description of the state of the conditioned things in the expressible ultimate truth.³⁰¹ In order to convey the meaning of the thesis regarding their ultimate emptiness, conditioned things, including the thesis itself, are first established in terms of the false conventional truth with an inherent existence, i.e. not empty, and then established as "empty" in terms of the expressible ultimate truth. After the inference has conveyed the meaning in terms of the expressible ultimate truth, its nature of emptiness is also to be discarded, so that they are also empty ultimately.

Although Bhāviveka seeks to establish the emptiness of all things, there is no infinite regress of emptiness in his system, unlike the case of "I always lie". This is because this emptiness, which is established in terms of the expressible ultimate truth,³⁰² is further realised to be empty, not by inference, but through meditation. To be empty in terms of the inexpressible ultimate truth is not to affirm anything as empty, but rather to eliminate all conceptual distinctions, including true or false, real or unreal and empty or non-empty. Therefore, the issue of reflexivity no longer applies. As emptiness is not established as the absolute truth, Bhāviveka need not postulate another emptiness over and above the ultimate emptiness of all things, in the form of "this ultimate emptiness itself is also empty", and so on.

Based on Bhāviveka's response in the above, the logicians accuse Bhāviveka's thesis of committing the same fallacy of self-contradiction as themselves:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270b25-b27)

[Objection 8 cont.:] Again, those logicians do not seek to save what they have established. They instead respond with another

³⁰¹ While "empty" is established to be the property of conditioned things, this may be compared to the conclusion of the semantic interpretation of emptiness, which states that the ultimate truth, as expressed conventionally, is that there is no ultimate truth (Siderits 2007, pp. 200-204); or in other words that, the emptiness of an inherent nature in all things, as expressed conventionally, is the inherent nature of these things. (Priest and Garfield 2002, pp. 269-270) It considers that ultimately there are contradictions in the truth and falsity of these things, and their ultimate truth is established exactly based on these contradictions. Bhāviveka, however, considers that such contradictions do not exist ultimately as they are eventually eliminated by meditative practices; see also discussion in Section 2.2.2 in Part I.

³⁰² This will be criticised in Objection 9, where the opponents claim that Bhāviveka is establishing his thesis as an absolute truth, by affirming the emptiness or non-existence of things in the ultimate sense.

objection, “if ‘in terms of the ultimate truth, [all] conditioned things have no reality,’ then neither should this which is stated [in this thesis] ‘[in terms of the ultimate truth, all] conditioned things have no reality’ be real.”³⁰³

As Bhāvivēka’s original thesis states that “in terms of the ultimate truth, conditioned things are empty”, it means that these things are not real in the ultimate sense. The logicians thus claim that according to his thesis all conditioned things are not real ultimately – that what is stated in his thesis, as a conditioned thing, should also be unreal ultimately. Thus, Bhāvivēka’s thesis is unestablished ultimately. However, if Bhāvivēka’s thesis is not unreal ultimately, then what is stated in it – “all conditioned things are unreal ultimately” – will become unestablished. To this, Bhāvivēka responds:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270b27-c1)

[Response:] This objection cannot exempt [the logicians] from the fallacies they have committed in their own thesis.³⁰⁴ They falsely claim that others’ theses have committed the same faults as they have. Just like a foolish thief in the world, who has got caught but is not able to prove his innocence, establishes a reasoning by accusing others, “you are also thieves.” This is not said with close examination [of the issue concerned].³⁰⁵

As already discussed, Bhāvivēka’s reflexive thesis does not lead to the fallacy of self-contradiction. The logicians’ objections are unfounded. While they attempt to attribute the same fault to Bhāvivēka, this only leads to a point of defeat called admission of an opinion (*matānujñā*) in Indian logic.³⁰⁶ Therefore, they have lost the debate.

³⁰³ KR: 又彼論者不救所立，而返難言：「若『就真性有為無實』，所說『有為無實』之言，亦應無實。」

³⁰⁴ Refer to Bhāvivēka’s first response to Objection 8.

³⁰⁵ KR: 此難不能免自宗過。妄說他宗同彼有失，如世癡賊既被推徵不能自雪，而立道理誣譎他言：「汝亦是賊。」此非審察所出言詞。

³⁰⁶ Vidyabhusana 1971, p. 89.

Lastly, Bhāviveka refutes the logicians' claim that [2] his notion of “empty” means “absolutely non-existent”, and is a nihilistic view:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c1-c5)

[2] And as what is said by them, “if ‘in terms of the ultimate truth, all conditioned things do not exist at all’ is the meaning stated by the thesis, then the thesis is denying the existence of everything. If this is what is established by this [your thesis], then [you] have fallen into the erroneous view”,³⁰⁷ here the meaning of this thesis, as explained at length before, is to state that “empty” and “without inherent existence” are of the character of a false appearance instead of claiming the non-existence of all kinds [of conditioned things]. Therefore, you should not make such an objection [against us].³⁰⁸

Bhāviveka points out again that the logicians have mistaken what is stated in the thesis – i.e. the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things in the ultimate sense – as absolute non-existence. This is due to their misunderstanding of emptiness and the system of the two truths. As has already been explained, this ultimate emptiness of conditioned things only means their lack of inherent existence, where both ultimate emptiness and the lack of inherent existence are likened to a false appearance. False appearances are mistaken as existent with an inherent existence, and commonly recognised as without an inherent existence, i.e. empty, ultimately. The conventional existence of false appearances and other conditioned things is not denied as they have indeed arisen. For this reason, to say that conditioned things are empty in the ultimate sense does not mean that they are empty in the sense of being non-existent even conventionally. Thus, Bhāviveka's inference does not constitute a nihilistic view, and therefore it does not commit the fallacy of contradicting his own doctrine of the middle way; [2] is also unfounded.

³⁰⁷ Unlike Hsu 2013, p. 195, this translation does not consider this quotation to be a new objection from the opponents, but understands it as Bhāviveka's quoting of the opponents' objection from the first part of Objection 8 to be the basis of his following response.

³⁰⁸ KR: 又彼所言：「若『就真性，一切有為都無所有』是立宗義，即謗一切皆無所有，如是所立墮邪見」者，此中宗義，如前廣說，謂『空』、『無性』虛妄顯現門之差別，非一切種皆謗為無。故汝不應作如是難。

A.3.2.5 Establishing conditioned things as empty of inherent existence is not a nihilistic view

In Objection 8, Bhāviveka has explained away the fallacy of self-contradiction leading from his reflexive thesis by clarifying that what is stated in this thesis is also allowed to be empty in terms of the ultimate truth. As the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things is proved in his thesis, opponents in this objection consider these things, which should have an inherent existence, to be non-existent in the absolute sense. Thus, they criticise Bhāviveka for affirming the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things or reifying the non-existence of these things with his reflexive thesis. They object as follows:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c6-c8)

[Objection 9:] Again, there are other opponents, who are arrogant about their intelligence and make the following objection, “if the conditioned things are, in terms of the ultimate truth, like illusions, etc., which are empty and without an inherent existence, then they are non-existent. As [you] attach to [the notion that these things are] non-existent, [your view is] the view of non-existence.”³⁰⁹

The characteristic of illusions is that they are taken as real as long as people do not realise that they are merely false appearances; but after people have realised this, they will no longer be taken as real. In Bhāviveka’s inference, conditioned things are likened to illusions. Although they are determinate objects of cognition conventionally, after being realised to be empty, they are no longer cognised as they were to be the objects of our conceptual knowledge. In other words, as determinate objects of cognition, conditioned things are non-existent in the ultimate sense. “In terms of the ultimate truth, conditioned things, as determinate objects of cognition, are non-existent” is therefore exactly what is stated by Bhāviveka’s thesis.

To the opponents, Bhāviveka is too eager to refute the ultimate existence of thing. Consequently, he has affirmed the non-existence of things in the absolute sense. In

³⁰⁹ KR: 復有餘師懷聰叡慢，作是難言：「若諸有為就勝義諦猶如幻等，空無自性，即是非有。執非有故，便為無見。」

Bhāviveka's terms, this means that he has falsely attached himself to the notion of absolute non-existence, and hence the nihilistic view which is one of the extremes his doctrine of middle way is meant to avoid. This would mean that he has contradicted his own doctrine. Bhāviveka denies this in his response:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c8-c23)

[Response:] They [the opponents] want to conceal the faults of their own thesis by slandering us deliberately. They would rather see both sides committing faults than letting the inference of the proponents of emptiness be established, because [they think that] it would deny the ultimate truth, which is a great fault. [However,] this which is stated [in my thesis] regarding “non-existent” is [only] to express the meaning of negation. You insist that this saying is mainly for affirmation [but] I would say that it is mainly for negation. This which is stated [in my thesis] regarding “non-existent” is only to negate “existence” (*sattā*). Then its capacity is exhausted and no longer has the efficacy to further express other meanings. Like when it is said in a worldly convention that “it is not a white silk cloth”, one cannot thereby assert that this saying is expressing “[the silk cloth is] black” and attribute the fallacy in establishing the thesis to the speaker. The saying of “it is not a white silk cloth” is only to negate “a white silk cloth”. Then its capacity is exhausted and no longer has the efficacy to further express that “it is a black silk cloth”, “it is a red silk cloth”, or “it is a yellow silk cloth”.

In this treatise, in terms of the ultimate truth, [in order to] avoid the extreme view of eternalism in the sphere of cognition (*gocara*) of the conditioned things, “existence” is even negated. Thus, in remaining places, [in order to] avoid the extreme view of nihilism, “non-existence” (*asattā*) is negated. [In order to] avoid the two extremes [of eternalism and of nihilism], “existence” and “non-existence” are negated.

In order to avoid all remaining faults resulting from the false attachments, [we go as far as] to negate everything that our mind may cognise. As these objects of cognition cease, our [discriminative] mind follows them and ceases.

And elsewhere, [the Buddha] says, “Ānanda, if one attaches oneself to existence, one then falls into the extreme of eternalism. If one attaches oneself to non-existence, one then falls into the extreme of nihilism.”³¹⁰ Similarly, in another place, he says, “Kāśyapa, existence is one extreme, non-existence is another.”³¹¹

Due to these scriptures (*āgama*) and due to the reasonings we have explained, the thesis established by us is not anywhere near the dung-like fault [that is] the view of non-existence.³¹²

In his response, Bhāviveka quotes the sayings of the Buddha on the doctrine of the middle way, i.e., to avoid both extremes of eternalism and nihilism. The extreme of eternalism refers to the erroneous view concerning the ultimate existence of conditioned things, while the extreme of nihilism refers to the erroneous view concerning the absolute non-existence of these things. According to the Buddha, one should take the middle way by holding onto neither view. Bhāviveka sees the achievement of this middle way as the realisation of the ultimate emptiness of all things. It is to eliminate the conceptual proliferation of our discriminating mind, i.e. to stop cognising and discriminating things based on their false permanent, inherent

³¹⁰ See SN 44.10 (PTS: S iv 400); SN, vol. 34, no. 961 in CBETA, T2, no. 99, 245b18-b24. See also MMK 15.10-15.11.

³¹¹ Staël-Holstein 1926, p. 90; see also Poussin 1933, p. 86, note 2.

³¹² KR: 彼欲覆障自宗過難，矯設謗言。寧俱有過，勿空論者所立量成，謗勝義諦過失大故。此「非有」言，是遮詮義。汝執此言表彰為勝，我說此言遮止為勝。此「非有」言唯遮「有性」，功能斯盡，無有勢力更詮餘義。如世間說「非白絹」言，不可即執此言詮「黑」，與能說者作立宗過。「非白絹」言唯遮「白絹」，功能斯盡，更無餘力詮表「黑絹」、「赤絹」、「黃絹」。

今此論中，就勝義諦於有為境避常見邊，且遮「有性」。如是餘處，避斷見邊，遮於「無性」。雙避二邊，遮「有、無性」。為避所餘妄執過失，乃至一切心之所行，悉皆遮止。所行若滅，心正隨滅。

又於餘處說：「阿難陀，若執有性，即墮常邊。若執無性，即墮斷邊。」如是餘處說：「迦葉波，有是一邊，無是第二。」

由如是等阿笈摩故，及當所說諸道理故，我所立宗無觸如冀無見過失。

natures.³¹³ This applies to all dualistic terms including object and subject, non-existence and existence, impermanence and permanence, non-emptiness and emptiness, etc. They are all to be refuted.

To Bhāviveka's opponents, if a thing is not ultimately existent, then it is absolutely non-existent; if it is not empty, then it is non-empty. To avoid affirming any of these dualistic terms, Bhāviveka clarifies that his negations are always non-implicative, i.e. they are supposed to negate the ultimate existence of conditioned things without implying the affirmation of the opposite of what is negated, i.e. their absolute non-existence; see discussion in Section 3.3.3 in Part I. After all inherent natures of conditioned things are negated without remainder (i.e. after existence and non-existence,³¹⁴ non-emptiness and emptiness are also negated), the ultimate emptiness which is the middle way is achieved.

Thus, Bhāviveka's understanding of the ultimate emptiness is not a nihilistic view. His opponents take their own ultimate realities as absolute. They did not expect that Bhāviveka could go so far to admit the emptiness of the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things, hence accusing him of the said fault. Through this clarification, Bhāviveka has demonstrated that these problems are not applicable to his reasoning, but only to the opponents'.

To this, the opponents counter-argue:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c25-c27)

[Objection 9 cont.:] Some cannot bear to see the faults and objections accumulated towards the reasoning of their own thesis. In order to hide [their faults], again, they say, "although the proponents of emptiness of inherent existence always delight in pursuing the non-discriminating wisdom, they often distinguish the emptiness of all conditioned things and unconditioned things. Thus, they have developed false discriminations, which are attachments generated from

³¹³ MMK 18.7-18.9.

³¹⁴ By the same token, the inherent natures of both existence and non-existence and of neither existence nor non-existence of things are to be negated as well; the same applies to other concepts.

pervasive conceptualisations (*parikalpita*)³¹⁵, and [thereby] abandoned the thesis they delight in.”³¹⁶

The opponents claim that the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things is indeed discriminative in nature. This is because to establish his thesis, Bhāviveka has to distinguish conditioned and unconditioned things, emptiness and non-emptiness, which are precisely the kinds of conceptual proliferation his Mādhyamika doctrine aims to eliminate. In other words, the opponents argue that Bhāviveka has participated in the very conceptualisation of things that he himself claims to have eliminated. He has contradicted himself and given up his own doctrine. Thus, he cannot attain the non-discriminating wisdom.

Here, Bhāviveka simply replies that he did not commit this fault:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c27)

[Response:] We also negate these, therefore we do not commit this fault.³¹⁷

While he did not give any explanation of *what* are also negated, from the discussion above it can be understood that he means the negation of all inherent existence or natures, including those related to conditioned and unconditioned things, emptiness and non-emptiness, etc. When all inherent existence or natures are negated without remainder, the conceptualisation of them has also ceased. Thus, the non-discriminating wisdom is achieved.

A.4 The general quality, instead the particularities, of the subject should be taken up as the property that infers

In the above objections, Bhāviveka has already refuted the opponents’ notion that things that are arisen are ultimately existent, and things that are empty of an inherent existence ultimately are absolutely non-existent. He has already demonstrated that

³¹⁵ Poussin 1933, p. 87 suggests “*parikalpita*” for “遍計所執”, which is a Yogācāra terminology; see objection 14.

³¹⁶ KR: 有不忍見自宗道理過難所集，為欲隱映，復作是言：「性空論者雖常欣求無分別慧，而恒分別一切有為、無為空性，即是成立遍計所執虛妄分別，失自樂宗。」

³¹⁷ KR: 如是亦遮，故無此過。

the subject of his inference, the reason, the example and what is stated in the thesis can also be empty. Also, the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things is compatible with the conventional existence of these things. As the related objections have already been refuted, the opponents turn to object Bhāviveka's reason, "because they arise from conditions". They object as below:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c28-c29)

[Objection 10:] Again, some other [opponents] say, "as to the reason for emptiness as given [by you], regardless of whether it is in the conventional sense or in the ultimate sense, [and whether] it is regarding oneself [i.e. your doctrine] or the others [i.e. your opponents' doctrines], what is meant by this reason is not established."³¹⁸

The opponents have mentioned two circumstances where that which is meant by Bhāviveka's reason is unestablished. First, it is unestablished either conventionally or ultimately. Second, it is unestablished either in terms of one's own doctrine or of other doctrines. The reason has therefore committed the fallacy of being unestablished to either one or both parties in the debate.

Regarding the first circumstance, Bhāviveka's opponents may consider the property that infers "arisen from conditions" unestablished ultimately because it is empty of an inherent existence in the ultimate sense. Thus, it is no longer real and able to function to prove the thesis. As already discussed, Bhāviveka does not aim to establish anything as absolute truth. Components in his inference are allowed to be empty in the ultimate sense. Therefore, the fact that what is stated by the reason is not established ultimately does not present a problem for Bhāviveka's inference. As to whether Bhāviveka's reason is unestablished conventionally, then this is related to the second circumstance, i.e. whether or not what is stated by this reason, which is by virtue of conventional speech, is commonly recognized.³¹⁹

³¹⁸ KR: 有餘復言：「所說空因，若就世俗，或就勝義，於自、於他，因義不成。」

³¹⁹ The source of this objection has not yet been identified. Nevertheless, in the record of Chapter 1 of PSP, similar criticism in relation to the first circumstance and similar response from Bhāviveka which understands the criticism in terms of the second circumstance (see following discussion), are found; see also Poussin 1933, p. 87, note 2. In PSP, Bhāviveka also holds that only the relation of the

The opponents did not explain the second circumstance in their objection, and it is unclear why Bhāviveka's reason is thought to be unestablished due to the said fallacy. I shall refer to Bhāviveka's response to understand this objection:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c29-271a9)

[Response:] [As long as] the general quality [of the subject] is admitted by both parties [in the debate], the particularity (*viśeṣa*) [of this property that is understood differently in individual parties] is not specified; as this is clearly accepted by the logicians as the reason, in the objection that you have raised, [our reason] only appears to have committed the fallacy of being unestablished instead of really being unestablished. For example, the Vaiśeṣikas hold that “sound is impermanent, because it has the nature of being produced.”³²⁰

The proponents of the permanence of sound point out their faults by saying, “their reason can have different meanings”³²¹ [as it can mean that] sound is produced by the throat, etc. or [that] sound is produced by a stick, etc.³²² [Due to] this

property that infers to its locus, in general terms, should be taken into account. (Stcherbatsky 1977, p. 114-115)

Candrakīrti, however, thinks that there is no such a problem in different understandings of the meaning of the reason by different parties in the debate (i.e. the second circumstance). There is rather the problem in different understandings of what the subject in general is, i.e. whether it is existent or not conventionally and ultimately, in different doctrines (i.e. the first circumstance). (*Ibid.*, pp. 115-117) In PSP, he criticises [1] Bhāviveka's use of logical reasoning, which is facilitated by his admittance of things' inherent existence conventionally, in proving the ultimate emptiness of things. As Nāgārjuna has taught that one should not attempt to explain everyday ideas metaphysically, and the fact that the opponents and ordinary people do not understand dependent origination of the two truths, the ultimate reality or the inherent existence of things should be refuted both conventionally and ultimately. (*Ibid.*, p. 112) Hence, “arisen from conditions”, being the property of conditioned things, should be unestablished both conventionally and ultimately. [2] As conditioned things do not exist in the ultimate sense, it is logically fallacious for Bhāviveka to take non-existent things as the subject – i.e. the locus of the property to be inferred and property that infers – in an inference. His reason is also unreal ultimately (*ibid.*, pp. 113, 117, 119); cf. Bhāviveka's discussion of the merely false conventionalities as inferential objects in Section 3.2.2 in Part I.

³²⁰ *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*, Book II, Chapter 2, 21-32. (Radhakrishnan and Moore 1989, pp. 390-391)

³²¹ Unlike the present translation, Poussin 1933, p. 87 does not understand “their reason can have different meanings” as part of the objection by the opponents of the Vaiśeṣikas'. The present translation rather agrees with the understanding in Hatani 1976, p. 110.

³²² The translation in Hsu 2013, p. 199 gives: [They] discriminate the reasoning [for their thesis] by asserting that [sounds] are produced by a throat or sticks, etc., for the sentence “分別因義，咽喉等作，或杖等作” in the text (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271a3-a4). As the speakers here are the opponents of the Vaiśeṣikas' who support the permanence of sound, according to Hsu's translation,

difference³²³ [in the meanings of the reason], what is meant by [the Vaiśeṣikas'] reason is not established.” [And] for example, the Sāṃkhyas hold that “the five sense organs, including ears and others, are not derived matter (*upādāya-rūpa*), because they have the nature of the organs, like the mental organ (*mana-indriya*).”³²⁴ Proponents of the five sense organs, including eyes and others, as derived matter point out their faults by saying, “the reason ‘because they have the nature of the organs’ [has different meanings as it can mean that the organs] have the nature of being produced by the elements or [that] they take pleasure, etc. as their natures;³²⁵ [and whether] it is regarding oneself [i.e. the Sāṃkhyas’ doctrine] or the others [i.e. the doctrines of the Sāṃkhyas’ opponents], [due to] this difference [in the meanings of the reason], what is meant by [the Sāṃkhyas’] reason is not established.” [The reasons] in those two inferences [by the Vaiśeṣikas and by the Sāṃkhyas] appear to have committed the fallacy of being unestablished, but they are not really unestablished. Therefore, [the objections against them] are not reasonable. The same applies to [the opponents’ objection against us] here.³²⁶

these opponents are attributing the fault of differentiating the particularities of the reason to the Vaiśeṣikas. However, the present translation instead attributes this fault to the Vaiśeṣikas’ opponents. This is because Bhāviveka states in his response that these particularities should not be specified and that all parties involved should agree on recognising a reason which is understood in terms of the general quality of the subject; and hence, the Vaiśeṣikas’ inference is not fallacious. See Commentary.³²³ “[Due to] this difference” is employed to translate the phrase “如是分別” (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271a4) in the present translation due to the reason explained in footnote 322 above; unlike Poussin 1933, p. 87 which understands it as “ainsi analysé”, and Hsu 2013, p. 199 as “thus”.

³²⁴ In the Sāṃkhya doctrine of transformation, sense organs manifest before the elements, and the derived matter here is manifested after the elements; see also footnote 341 under Objection 13.

³²⁵ Hsu 2013, p. 200 gives: The reason that those faculties can be the reason is because they are basic faculties like the five great elements or *sattva*, etc., for the sentence “根性故因，若大造性，或樂等性” in the text (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271a6-a7). This seems to be a mistranslation; see Commentary.

³²⁶ KR: 二宗共許，不顯差別。總相法門明正理者許為因故，汝所立難，似不成過，非真不成。如勝論者立「聲無常，所作性故。」聲常論者說彼過言：「分別因義，咽喉等作，或杖等作，如是分別，因義不成。」如數論者立「能聞等五有情根非所造色，是根性故，猶如意根。」眼等五根造色論者說彼過言：「根性故因，若大造性，或樂等性，於自、於他，如是分別，因義不成。」彼二種說，似不成過，非真不成，故不應理。此亦如是。

From Bhāviveka's response, it can be understood that the opponents are objecting in terms of the generality of the property that infers, which is one of the properties of the subject of the inference. The opponents think that as the parties involved have individual understandings of the concept of this property, it is not legitimate to take up this property to be the reason. Yet, Bhāviveka holds that as long as all parties in the debate agree on the general quality of the subject and this quality is taken up as the property that infers, then this reason is legitimate; see discussion under Section 3.2.1 in Part I. Bhāviveka also gives the examples of the inferences by the Sāṃkhyas and the Vaiśeṣikas to illustrate this:

The Sāṃkhyas intend to establish the thesis “the five sense organs, including ears and others, are not derived matter” with the reason “because they have the natures of the organs”. Their opponents criticise the property that infers in their reason for having different meanings, as it can mean “having the nature of being produced by the elements” and the sense organs “taking pleasure, etc. as their natures”. If this property is understood in the sense of “having the nature of being produced by the elements”, then it is unestablished to the Sāṃkhyas, i.e. the proponents' own doctrine, because they hold that elements are transformed from the organs. But if the reason is understood in the sense of “the organs taking pleasure, etc. as their natures”, then it is unestablished to the Sāṃkhyas' opponents, i.e. other doctrines. This is because these opponents, who hold that the sense organs are derived matter, probably consider these organs as being produced from the elements, instead of being manifested from *prakṛti* to have the natures of pleasure, etc. Thus, the Sāṃkhyas' reason is unestablished to their opponents because it has committed the fallacy of being unestablished to either oneself or the others.

However, Bhāviveka considers the objection by the Sāṃkhyas' opponents unfounded. Different doctrines have different understandings of the subject of an inference, and they attach particular meanings to it. Although the sense organs are “having the natures of the organs” to the Sāṃkhyas, some take this means the sense organs “having the nature of being produced by the elements” and others take this means the sense organs “taking pleasure, etc. as their natures”. These particular meanings, however, should not be taken up as the property that infers in the reason. This is because the purpose of an inference is to achieve common knowledge

between the proponents and the opponents of this inference. To facilitate this, all parties involved must recognise a property that infers, whose concept is common to them, to be the common ground for the inference to proceed. Hence, “having the natures of the organs” should remain as the property that infers, as long as all parties involved agree that the sense organs in their doctrines also possess this property.

It is similar in the example of the Vaiśeṣikas, who intend to establish the thesis “sound is impermanent” with the reason “because it has the nature of being produced”. Their opponents criticise the property that infers in their reason for having different meanings, as it can mean “being produced by the throat, etc.” and “being produced by a stick, etc.” Thus, the Vaiśeṣikas’ inference is unestablished to the opponents. However, this objection is unfounded to Bhāviveka. This is because if all parties involved agree that sound in their doctrines possess the property “having the nature of being produced”, then this property is general enough to be taken up in the reason for an inference to take place. Hence, Bhāviveka holds that his reason only appears as unestablished, but in fact it is not.

B. Conditioned things themselves are originally empty of an inherent existence

Having solved the possible problems in the thesis and reason due to his proving of the emptiness of all conditioned things, in this section Bhāviveka starts to discuss different notions of emptiness and non-emptiness. Through the dispute on the nature of Bhāviveka’s example “illusions”, the following objections show that his opponents consider conditioned things as empty or not empty of something other than themselves. In Objection 11, they hold that these things are empty of the nature of other real things but not empty of an inherent existence. Similarly in Objection 12, they further hold that illusions are empty only in contrast to real things, but not empty of a substantial existence. In Objection 13, the Sāṃkhyas hold that nothing is empty because everything possesses the existence of everything. In Objection 14, the Yogācāras hold that things are empty when there is the existence of the dependent nature and the non-existence of the imagined nature in these things. Lastly in Objection 15, the opponents have mistaken that conditioned things are empty because their inherent existence is emptied by Bhāviveka’s logical reasoning. Bhāviveka refutes all these erroneous notions of other-emptiness and non-emptiness, and demonstrates that things are originally empty of a nature in themselves.

B.1 The view that an illusion is not empty of an inherent existence, but empty of the nature of a real thing is erroneous

The opponents object as follows:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271a9-a16)

[Objection 11:] There are other opponents, whose eyes of wisdom are blinded and confused by their arrogance about their intelligence and by the attachment to their preferred doctrine. They are not able to examine the difference in the merits and demerits between the jewel of skilful explanation and the dirt of their own doctrines. They falsely show the fault in the example we stated by saying, “the power of mantras and herbs are added onto the flower, fruit, brick and other things to make various appearances of elephant, horse, rabbit, etc. manifest.”³²⁷ [1] Our doctrine does not admit that they [i.e. the illusory appearances of elephant, etc.] are empty of an inherent existence. [Your inference] thus lacks a positive example, as [the property] to be inferred [i.e. empty] does not exist [in illusions]. [2] If you respond that ‘like the illusory appearances of elephant, horse, etc., which do not have the natures of other real elephants, horses, etc. and are designated as empty; eyes, etc. are the same [as these illusory appearances], and are established as empty because they do not have the natures of other things,’ then your thesis is fallacious because it [merely] establishes what has already been established.”³²⁸

³²⁷ Poussin, p. 88, note 2 points out that the example of mantra and illusory elephant here is used in the Yogācāras’ definition of the three natures, for example in Vasubandhu’s *Trisvabhāvanirdeśa*, verses 27-30 in Anacker 2005, p. 294. The Yogācāra doctrine of the three natures will be treated by Bhāviveka in relation to Objection 14.

³²⁸ KR: 復有餘師以聰明慢，貪自宗愛，昧亂慧目，不能觀察善說珍寶、自論鄙穢得失差別，妄顯所立譬喻過言：「咒術、藥力加被華、果、塊塼等物，令其種種象、馬、兔等色相顯現。我宗不許彼自性空，同喻便闕，所立無故。若言『如幻象、馬等相，無有他實象、馬等性，說名為空，眼等亦爾，無他性故，立為空』者，便有宗過，立已成故。」

In [1], Bhāviveka's opponents state that illusory appearances, i.e. illusions, are not empty. Bhāviveka thought that "illusions" (his example) were commonly recognised to be "arisen from conditions" and "empty" to be the common ground for his inference. As the emptiness of illusions is disputed, they can no longer exemplify the positive concomitance between "arisen from conditions" and "empty" to his opponents. As these opponents probably also dispute the emptiness of all other conditioned things, they thus claim that Bhāviveka cannot provide any positive example to prove his thesis.

In [2], the opponents' discussion of the fallacy of establishing what has already been established has revealed they admit that conditioned things are empty under the circumstances where they are empty of the nature of other things. While they accept the illusory appearances as empty because they are empty of the nature of the real things they appear as, these very real things, which the arising of illusory appearances depend on, are not empty. This also applies to other conditioned things that are ultimately real. Thus, things are considered as empty not because they are empty of their inherent existence but because they lack the natures of other real things. Eyes, etc. are therefore similar to the illusory appearances of elephant, etc. in the sense that they are empty of the nature of other real things. If Bhāviveka intended to prove the same notion of emptiness, then he would be merely establishing what has already been established by his opponents.

This objection shows that conditioned things can, to the opponents, be either empty of the nature of other things or not empty of an inherent existence. The difference between illusory appearances and real things has become unclear. On the one hand, the opponents seem to admit that the illusory appearances are less real than the real things, because the former do not possess the nature of the latter. On the other hand, they admit that both illusory appearances and real things have an inherent existence. Aiming at these points, Bhāviveka responds as follows:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271a16-a26)

[Response:] Their objection is unfounded. [1] The appearances of elephant, horse, etc. produced from numerous conditions, which are the power of mantras and herbs added

onto the flower, fruit, brick and other things, are empty of the inherent existence of an elephant, [horse,] etc. As they are stated as the examples, [the thesis] to be established by them is established.

[2] If you object again that “although the elephant, horse, etc. that are produced by magic do not have the natures of the other real elephants, horses, etc., it cannot be said that because they are empty of the nature of those [real things] therefore they are also empty of this nature [of being illusory]”; is it not whenever those [illusory things] forms manifest, then there is the inherent existence of the very things manifested, just like the flower, fruit and other things that are admitted by you?³²⁹ If so, then the elephant, horse, etc. that are produced by magic should in fact have the nature of the very elephants, horses, etc. [they appear as]; yet they do not. Therefore, one should know that everything produced by magic, including elephant, horse, etc., is empty of an inherent existence. For this reason, there is in fact such an example [i.e. illusion] as given [by us], and the thesis to be established by it is established. And because eyes and other conditioned things are established as empty in terms of the emptiness of a nature in themselves, neither do we commit the fault of establishing what has already been established.³³⁰

³²⁹ Hsu 2013, pp. 201-202 and Hatani 1976, p. 111 take this question as part of the possible response from the opponents. Hsu 2013 translates it as “Don’t [you see] that if something appears as a certain figure, the nature of this certain figure must exist. The example will be the flowers and fruit that you accept” (“豈非如彼相狀顯現，即有如是諸物自性。如汝所許華果等物”). This translation agrees with the translation in Poussin 1933, p. 89 and summary in Sastri 1949, p. 13, and considers it as Bhāviveka’s response; see discussion in Commentary.

³³⁰ KR: 彼難不然。咒術、藥力加被華、果、塊磚等物，眾緣所生象、馬等相，象等性空，說為喻故，所立義成。

若汝復謂「幻術所作象、馬等事，雖無他實象、馬等性，然不可說彼性空故，此性亦空」，豈非如彼相狀顯現，即有如是諸物自性，如汝所許華、果等物？若爾即應幻術所作象、馬等事，實有如是象、馬等性，然實無有。故知一切幻術所作象、馬等事，自性皆空。是故實有如所說喻，所立義成。亦無成立已成過失，就自性空成立眼等有為空故。

The notion of emptiness which Bhāviveka holds is that conditioned things are originally empty of an inherent existence in themselves. They are not only empty of the nature of other things, as in the case of a jar, which is empty when it is empty of water. Regarding [1], Bhāviveka has denied that his positive example is illegitimate. The opponents' notion of the emptiness of the nature of a real thing in illusory appearances is compatible with his notion of the emptiness of an inherent existence in these appearances.

Emptiness to Bhāviveka is the lack of an inherent existence and of the nature of a false appearance, an illusion. When there is no more mantra, herb, flower or fruit, then the illusion will cease to exist. And people will understand that the illusion merely appeared as real but is in fact not. The same applies to the flower and fruit, which are the conditions for the arising and ceasing of the illusion; they may falsely appear as ultimate existents, though they lack unchanging, permanent existence. If there were no soil, water or sunshine, they would not exist at all. By the same token, the conditions for the arising and ceasing of soil, etc. are also conditioned by other conditions. They also lack inherent existence, and only falsely appear as ultimate existents. With further analysis, it can be understood that all conditioned things are the same – i.e. lacking an inherent existence. They are of the nature of a false appearance, and thus empty.

The claim that some conditioned things are more real than others is untenable. This is not because these things all have an inherent existence. It is rather because they all lack an inherent existence. In the opponents' words, they all lack the nature of a real thing, which is real because of its possession of an inherent nature or an ultimate existence. Thus, conditioned things are not different from an illusion. The opponents indeed admit that illusory appearances are empty of the nature of the real things in their objection. This is therefore compatible with Bhāviveka's understanding of emptiness. Hence, it can be concluded that whatever has "arisen from conditions" is "empty" of an inherent existence. This positive concomitance is exemplified by the positive example, "illusions". "Illusions" is an appropriate example because it can establish what it is expected to establish.

With his response to [1], Bhāviveka has expected the opponents will counter-argue that even though illusory appearances are empty of the nature of real things, they are not empty of the nature of themselves. Regarding [2], Bhāviveka points out that this standpoint, which holds all conditioned things have an inherent existence while the real things are more real than the illusory appearances, will only lead the opponents to an absurd consequence that they cannot accept. What makes an illusory appearance different from a real thing, for example, is that the latter has got a definite form, even perhaps a tangible body. For this reason, the real things, such as the flowers, fruit, etc. in the beginning of the objection, are taken as ultimately real, i.e. as having an inherent existence. In contrast, illusory appearances that lack such a definite form or tangible body remain as illusory, even though they appear like that the real things. Now the opponents claim that illusory appearances, e.g. an illusory elephant, like the real elephant, also have an inherent existence. They are then obliged to explain why an illusory elephant, which does not have a definite form, also has an inherent existence, like the ultimately real elephant.

Before we see the defence from other opponents in Objection 12, Bhāviveka suggests that there are two possible responses which the opponents can take. The first is to admit the illusory elephant as real, and having the same inherent existence as the real elephant does. In Bhāviveka's words, the illusory elephant then has the nature of the very elephant it appears to be. This amounts to admitting that the illusory elephant also has an ultimate existence like the real elephant, and is therefore a real elephant. Second, the opponents may give up their position and admit that illusory appearances are without an inherent existence. As the consequence in the first alternative is absurd and is not acceptable to the opponents, the opponents have to take the second alternative. From this, Bhāviveka has demonstrated that illusory appearances are also empty of an inherent existence. Therefore, his positive example, "illusions", is legitimate. It exemplifies the positive concomitance of the properties "arisen from conditions" and "empty of an inherent existence", and is able to establish the thesis it is expected to establish. And as Bhāviveka does not hold the notion of other-emptiness, his inference for the ultimate emptiness of an inherent existence of all conditioned things does not establish what has already been established between his opponents and him.

B.2 The view that an illusion is not empty of a substantial existence, but empty in contrast with a real thing is erroneous

In defence of the view that illusory appearances also have an inherent existence, the opponents in this objection claim that illusions are empty only when compared with the real things. Their objection is as follows:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271a27-271b1)

[Objection 12:] Again, there are some other opponents, who have a different kind of wisdom to emptiness.³³¹ They [make] another [objection] to point out the fault in our example, “although the illusory men are not real men therefore they are designated as empty, they are not empty of an inherent existence because there is the substantial existence of their appearances as falsely manifested men.”³³² Based on this reason, the meaning of the thesis [i.e. the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things] is unestablished, like what has already been established in the previous [objection], because the example is not established.”³³³

These opponents claim that an illusory man is empty because it is not a real man. Although it is arisen from conditions, its manifestation as a false appearance does have a substantial existence, i.e. it is not empty of an inherent existence in the ultimate sense. For this reason, the property to be inferred (“empty of an inherent existence”) in Bhāviveka’s inference is not present in all illusions, including his positive example. Therefore, the positive concomitance between the properties

³³¹ Poussin 1933, p. 89 seems to understand the opponents, “who has a different kind of wisdom to emptiness” in the present translation as “bien habiles” (“*vidagdha*”), as a variant of “異空” of the Chinese term “異空慧” in the text (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271a27). Hsu 2013, p. 203 gives the translation: some others who possess the knowledge different from *śūnyatā*. The present translation rather understands the term to mean people with a different understanding of emptiness. This is because Bhāviveka has been attempting to refute other notions of emptiness since Objection 11. This understanding is similar to the one in Sastri 1949, p. 13.

³³² The source of this passage has not yet been identified. It is possibly from a Yogācāra source – in the doctrine of the three natures, conditioned things that have arisen from causes and conditions, as real things (*vastu*), are distinguished from the illusory things, as false concepts. Illusory things, while possessing the imagined nature (*parikalpita-svabhāva*, lit. the inherent nature of being imagined), are said to be empty in the sense of being essentially non-existent. See also discussion under Objection 14.

³³³ KR: 復有諸餘異空慧者，別顯喻過：「雖諸幻士非實士，故說名為空，然彼幻士自性不空，有虛妄現土相體故。由此道理，如先所立，句義不成，喻不成故。」

“arisen from conditions” and “empty” which was supposed to be exemplified by the positive example, “illusions”, is unestablished. This example has failed to establish the property to be inferred “empty” in the thesis, and has become illegitimate.

It should be noted that Bhāviveka admits conditioned things as existent inherently in the conventional sense. The objection would not present a problem for his inference if the opponents only supported illusions for having an inherent existence in the conventional sense. However, the above objection claims that illusions are not empty ultimately as they have a substantial existence. To this, Bhāviveka responds:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271b1-b5)

[Response:] Now we should ask them, “is the substantial existence of their appearances as falsely manifested men not arisen from conditions?” They give this answer, “It arises from conditions.” If so, why are [these illusory men] still designated as false? It is because [although they] are manifested as such, they do not exist as such. Is it not the same that eyes, etc. are also arisen from conditions, and do not exist [in the way which] they are manifested? As the positive examples are established, so is the emptiness of inherent existence [that is to be inferred in the thesis]. You should be convinced.³³⁴

Bhāviveka’s response to this objection is simple. Supposing there really is a substantial existence in the illusory men, does this substantial existence also possess the property that infers, “arisen from conditions”, like eyes and other conditioned things?

The illusory men arise with the presence of the conditions, and falsely appear as ultimate existents. They cease with the absence of the conditions, and then people understand their false nature. This shows that, without the conditions of arising, the

³³⁴ KR: 今應詰彼：「此虛妄現幻士相體從緣生不？」彼作是答：「此從緣生。」若爾，何故復名虛妄？以如所顯現，不如是有故。豈非眼等亦從緣生，如所顯現不如是有？同喻成故，性空義成。汝應信受。

illusory men would not arise and be considered as having a substantial existence. Hence, this “substantial existence” of the illusory men is also dependent on conditions. It appears to be an unchanging, permanent inherent existence of the illusory things, but it ceases when the illusory things cease. Therefore, this “substantial existence” in fact does not qualify as such ultimately. It is also false in the ultimate sense. If the opponents accept such a “substantial existence” as impermanent, then their standpoint would be consistent with what Bhāviveka admits regarding the false conventional truth: i.e. that conditioned things are mistaken to have an inherent existence. For this reason, the opponents’ claim that illusory men have a substantial existence in the ultimate sense is untenable.

While the substantial existence of illusory men is refuted, illusions are demonstrated as only having a conventional existence. They are both “arisen from conditions” and “empty” in the ultimate sense. Eyes and other conditioned things, which are arisen from conditions, are then inferred to also be empty in the same sense. Therefore, the opponents should be convinced that taking “illusions” as a positive example is not illegitimate.

Still, the opponents defend their understanding of emptiness and counter-argue that illusory men are empty only when they are contrasted with real men:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271b5-b9)

[Objection 12 cont.:] They respond by saying, “we should not be convinced, as illusionary men are not like real men. With careful examination, these [illusionary men] are [considered] false in contrast to³³⁵ those real men, and therefore they are designated as empty. It is not like you who establish separate eyes, etc. apart from the aforesaid eyes and other conditioned things.³³⁶ With careful examination, [one would say that] this

³³⁵ “In contrast to”, in the sense of contra-distinction (*anyonya*), is to translate “待” in the text (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271b6).

³³⁶ Hsu 2013, p. 203 translates this sentence as “In your case, you did not establish other eyes, etc. separated from the conditioned things of eyes” (“非汝等立離前所說眼等有為，別有眼等”) (see CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271b8). This appears to be mistranslated to my understanding; see Commentary.

[thing] is designated in contrast to that [thing]; it is convincing that eyes, etc. are [designated as] empty [in this way].”³³⁷

In their counter-argument, the opponents restate their standpoint that the emptiness of the illusory men must be designated in relation to the real men. That is to say, there must be some real men so that one can know that the illusory men are illusory. This implies that being “empty” is relative to being “not empty”, and therefore it is not the case that all conditioned things are empty ultimately as stated in Bhāviveka’s thesis. There are at least some conditioned things that are not empty ultimately for the emptiness of other things to be designated.

The opponents also criticise Bhāviveka’s treatment of the emptiness of illusory things. They accuse him of establishing separate eyes, etc. apart from those real eyes and conditioned things mentioned in Objection 11. However, the reason for this criticism is not clear. It is possible the opponents consider that Bhāviveka has independently established that the empty eyes and other conditioned things as lack of a nature in themselves, but not in relation to other real eyes and conditioned things; that is to say, these conditioned things are empty even without contrasting with their real counterparts. If this is the case, then these opponents have indeed misunderstood Bhāviveka’s standpoint. He does not designate conditioned things, such as eyes, etc. as illusory or empty relative to the non-empty real eyes, etc. He does not wish to establish some conditioned things as empty, or even with “empty” as their inherent nature, while leaving other not empty conditioned things untackled. As already discussed in Objection 9, he aims to establish the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things. The ultimate reality of emptiness is also to be refuted. In his response, Bhāviveka therefore clarifies that he does not commit himself to this view:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271b9-b19)

[Response:] Although there are no separately-established eyes, etc. apart from the eyes and other [conditioned things] that are discussed here, there are “the emptiness of inherent existence” and “arisen from conditions” [so that] the property to be

³³⁷ KR: 彼作是言：「不應信受，以諸幻土非如實土。堪審觀察，待彼實土此虛妄故，說名為空。非汝等立離前所說眼等有為，別有眼等。堪審觀察，待彼說此，眼等性空，可令信受。」

inferred and the property that infers are both established.

Therefore, this example alone is sufficient to establish [the second characteristic of a reason] which it exemplifies.³³⁸

Bhāviveka holds that all things (including illusions, the so-called real conditioned things and even emptiness) are originally empty of an inherent existence in themselves; he will neither separately establish their ultimate reality nor their emptiness. Yet, conditioned things do have a conventional reality. Therefore, they are taken up as the subject in his inference, which possesses the property “arisen from conditions”. “Illusions” are also taken up as the positive example, which possesses both the property that infers, i.e. “arisen from conditions”, and the property to be inferred, i.e. “empty of an inherent existence ultimately”. As “illusions” have exemplified the positive concomitance of these two properties, based on this example it is sufficient to infer the ultimate emptiness of the conventionally real conditioned things. Hence, “illusions” is a legitimate example.

Bhāviveka further points out that the opponents have fallaciously distinguished the property that infers and the property to be inferred in the example from those in the subject, by differentiating the particularities of these properties:

Now as you differentiate [the properties of] the example from [those of] the subject, you have thereby committed the fallacy of differentiating properties which are of the same kind (*vikalpasamajāti*).³³⁹ To show the limited wisdom of such opponents; for example the Vaiśeṣikas say, “sound is impermanent, because it has the nature of being produced, like a jar.” One should not object by saying, “jars, etc. are produced by lumps of clay, a wheel, etc. They can be burnt,

³³⁸ KR: 雖無離此所說眼等別有眼等，然有如是「性空」、「緣生」，所立、能立二法成就。但由此喻，足能證成所喻義故。

³³⁹ Poussin 1933, p. 90, note 1 suggests to understand “分別法、喻別” (“differentiating the property of the subject and of the example”) in the Chinese text (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271b11) as “分別喻法別” (“differentiating the particularities of the property of the example [from that of the subject]”) because the definition of *vikalpasamajāti* in PS is “to state the particularities of the positive [example]” and in *Nyāyakośa* is “the example certainly possesses the property which is inferred, [but the opposite party makes it ambiguous by] stating different peculiarities.” This translation follows Poussin’s understanding.

they can be seen, and they can be broken with a stick. Therefore, they are impermanent. However, these do not apply to sound, [therefore sound] should not be impermanent.” As [the Vaiśeṣikas’ opponents] here have also differentiated [the properties of] the example from [those of] the subject, they have committed the fallacy of differentiating properties which are of the same kind. Hence, you should be convinced that eyes, etc. are empty of an inherent existence because [the property to be inferred] “empty of an inherent existence” [in the thesis] is not apart from [the property that infers] “arisen from conditions” in the reason.

And [as the view regarding] “whenever the forms [of the things] manifest, they then have an inherent existence” has already been refuted in previous [objection], so should [the eyes and other conditioned things discussed] here. Therefore, what you have said cannot resolve the faults of your own doctrines.³⁴⁰

Bhāviveka gives an example of the Vaiśeṣikas’ opponents to illustrate this fallacy. The Vaiśeṣikas hold that sound is impermanent, because they are produced, like a jar. However, their opponents claim that the jar is produced by lumps of clay, etc. and it can be destroyed by a stick, etc. Although it is reasonable that the jar is impermanent, the same does not apply to sound. Sound is not produced by lumps of clay, etc. and neither can it be destroyed by a stick, etc. Therefore – argue the opponents – sound cannot be impermanent. In fact, being produced by lumps of clay is only one of the many ways of being produced; it is a particular way of production. The class of “produced” includes “produced by lumps of clay” as well as “produced by the throat” and many others. Similarly, being destroyed by a stick is only one of the many indications of a thing being impermanent. The class of “impermanent” includes other

³⁴⁰ KR: 汝今分別法、喻別故，便成分別相似過類。顯敵論者自慧輕微，如勝論者說：「聲無常，所作性故，譬如瓶等。」不應難言：「瓶等泥團、輪等所成，可燒、可見、棒所擊破，可是無常。聲既不爾，應非無常。」此亦分別法、喻別故，故成分別相似過類。故應信受眼等性空，「性空」不離「緣生」因故。

又如「相現即有自性」先已破故，此亦應爾。故汝等言不能解雪自宗過難。

ways of destruction. As long as sound is produced by one of the many possible causes, then it is produced; and as long as sound is destructible, then it is impermanent. If the property “being produced by lumps of clay” can infer the impermanence of a jar, then the impermanence of sound is also inferable by “being produced by the throat.” It is fallacious to take the impermanence to be inferred by the production by the throat as different from the impermanence which is inferred by the production by lumps of clay.

Bhāviveka’s opponents have also committed the fallacy of differentiating properties which are of the same kind, firstly, by distinguishing the property that infers in the example from that in the subject. In Objection 11, the opponents mentioned that the arising of illusions is different from that of real things. An illusory elephant is manifested under the condition when the power of mantras and herbs are added onto the flower, etc., while the real elephant is arisen from other real conditioned things, such as the elephant mother, etc. Although the ways of arising of the illusory elephant and the real elephant are different, they both are arisen from conditions. This is because the class of “arisen from conditions” includes both “arising from the power of mantras, etc.” and “arising from other conventionally real conditioned things”.

Second, the opponents have differentiated the property to be inferred in the example from that in the subject. In Objections 11 and 12, the opponents consider both illusions and real things as having an inherent existence. Illusions are considered as illusory and empty because they lack the nature of a real thing, while the real things are empty only because they lack the nature of other real things. While it is not disputed that one thing lacks the nature of other things, whether or not all these conventionally real things lack an ultimately real inherent existence is still in question, and is therefore under examination by Bhāviveka’s inference.

As both the property that infers (“arisen from conditions”) and the property to be inferred (“empty of an inherent existence”) occur in “illusions”, this example has exemplified the positive concomitance between these two properties, and is therefore legitimate. The opponents might wish to take up their argument in the beginning of Objection 12 (i.e. whatever manifests, although being a false appearance, should

have an inherent existence ultimately) again to support the possession of an inherent existence by the conventionally real eyes, etc. However, this objection has already been refuted in relation to illusions. As these conventionally real things are also arisen from conditions, they are therefore inferred to be “empty of an inherent existence” based on the said positive concomitance. The opponents have failed to resolve the problem generated by their understanding of emptiness.

B.3 The view that everything is not empty of the existence of everything is erroneous

Bhāviveka presents the Sāṃkhyas in this objection as having a more radical view than the opponents in Objections 11 and 12. They hold that all things, including illusions, are not empty, in the sense that they are not empty of the existence of all things in themselves. Their objection is as follows:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271b20-b23)

[Objection 13:] Some Sāṃkhyas make the following objection,

“we hold that things of transformation (*pariṇama*) such as *mahat*,³⁴¹ etc. are in the nature of being manifested (*vyakta*).

[Therefore,] the reason ‘[they] arise from conditions’ has committed the fallacy of being unestablished. As everything has the existence of everything, [just] as the organs

³⁴¹ *Mahat* refers to the intellect (*buddhi*), which is one of the twenty-five realities (*tattva*) in Sāṃkhya doctrine. The twenty-five truths include *puruṣa*, *prakṛti*, the intellect, the ego (*ahaṃkāra*), the mind (*manas*), the five subtle elements (*tan-mātra*), the five sense organs (*buddhi-indriya*), the five action organs (*karma-indriya*) and the five gross elements (*mahā-bhūta*). (SS in CBETA, T54, no. 2137, 1245c3-c6).

Puruṣa and *prakṛti* co-exist and are both unproduced. *Puruṣa* is the pure consciousness (*cetanā*), which only has the nature of consciousness. It is the knower and pervades in every living being. (SS in CBETA, T54, no. 2137, 1249c5, c12) *Prakṛti* is the primordial matter, which is only of a material nature. It encompasses all existents, except *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* itself, and therefore is their cause, i.e. the *pradhāna*, meaning the first cause. (SS in CBETA, T54, no. 2137, 1245c11-c12) The intellect is responsible for apprehension (*adhyavasāya*). (SK 23; SS in CBETA, T54, no. 2137, 1250c18-c19) On the one hand, it is also called *mahat* (lit. the Great One) and is pervasive because from it things in the universe transform. On the other hand, it is also called understanding (*saṃvitti*), knowledge (*matī*) and wisdom (*prajñā*) because of its ability to cognise. (SS in CBETA, T54, no. 2137, 1250c2-c4) The ego is the self-awareness (*abhimāna*) and self-appropriation. (SS in CBETA, T54, no. 2137, 1251b13-b15) The five subtle elements are matter (*rūpa*), sound (*śabda*), smell (*gandha*), taste (*rasa*) and touch (*sparsa*). The five sense organs include eyes (*cakṣus*), ears (*śrotra*), nose (*ghrāṇa*), tongue (*rasana*) and skin (*tvac*). The five action organs are mouth (*vāc*), hands (*pāṇi*), feet (*pāda*), genitalia (*upastha*) and the anus (*pāyu*). The mind, which is both a sense organ and an action organ, is the organ that is responsible for discrimination (*saṃkalpaka*). (SS in CBETA, T54, no. 2137, 1252a2-a4) The five gross elements are earth (*prthivī*), water (*ap*), fire (*tejas*), wind (*vāyu*) and space (*ākāśa*). See also MHK/TJ 6.1.

(*indriya*)³⁴² pervade everywhere,³⁴³ there is also this existence [of these organs] in those illusionary men.³⁴⁴ [If you wish to] establish that these things are empty in nature, then there will be no positive example.”³⁴⁵

This objection is based on Sāṃkhya’s doctrines of transformation (*pariṇamavāda*) and the pre-existence of effect in cause (*satkāryavāda*) in relation to the permanent existence of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, which are the first two of the twenty-five realities in Sāṃkhya. *Puruṣa* is purely consciousness, while *prakṛti* is purely material. They are the all-pervading substances from which all things in the universe transform or manifest. *Mahat* and the organs mentioned in the objection are parts of the twenty-five realities transformed from *prakṛti*. From these realities, the rest of things in the universe, including the illusory men, manifest.

According to the Sāṃkhya doctrine of transformation, all other things in the universe are manifested from *prakṛti* with the help of *puruṣa*, due to the latter’s desire to see the three constituents of the former.³⁴⁶ *Prakṛti* is identified with its three constituents (*triguṇa*), namely *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, meaning goodness, passion and darkness. *Sattva* is of the nature of pleasure (*sukha*). *Rajas* is of the nature of suffering (*duḥkha*). *Tamas* is of the nature of confusion (*moha*).³⁴⁷ The three constituents are

³⁴² In Hsu 2013, p. 205, “organs” here are understood as “*prakṛti*” and translated as “substance”. This is unlikely because the character “諸” in the Chinese text (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271b22) indicates that the noun “根” that follows should be plural. *Prakṛti* is always singular in Sāṃkhya.

³⁴³ Poussin 1933, p. 91 renders “*tout āyatana*” for “一切處” (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271b22). It is not sure whether or not Poussin understands *āyatana* as the twelve object spheres, i.e. the six sense faculties and their respective objects, in the Buddhist sense. The Buddhist concept of *āyatana* in the sense of the twelve object spheres would rather refers to the five subtle elements (*tanmātra*) and the five sense organs (*buddhi-indriya*) in Sāṃkhya. The two sets of concepts are not equivalent. In Sāṃkhya, subtle elements are not objects of sense perception, while the organs also include the five action organs (*karma-indriya*). Therefore, this translation renders “一切處” in terms of its literal meaning as “all (一切) places (處)”, i.e. everywhere, instead of “object spheres” in the Buddhist sense.

³⁴⁴ To my knowledge, the argument for the organs being also existent in the illusory men, as presented by the Sāṃkhyas here, is not found in Bhaviveka’s PP or MHK, or in other works discussing Sāṃkhya’s doctrine of transformation or manifestation.

³⁴⁵ KR: 有數論師作如是難：「我立大等諸轉變聚是所顯性，『緣生故』因有不成過。一切皆有一切體故，諸根遍在一切處故，彼幻士中亦有此體。立此性空，無同法喻。」

³⁴⁶ SK 21; see also SS in CBETA, T54, no. 2137, 1250b5-b6. As *puruṣa* only has the nature of consciousness and *prakṛti* only has a material nature, their cooperation to create the universe is compared to a lame person (*puruṣa*), who knows the way but cannot walk, and a blind person (*prakṛti*), who can walk but does not know the way; the blind puts the lame on his shoulder and the two eventually arrive at where they want to go, i.e. creating the universe. (SS in CBETA, T54, no. 2137, 1250b14-b20)

³⁴⁷ SS in CBETA, T54, no. 2137, 1247c15-c19.

co-existent and interactive. Before the influence of *puruṣa*, there was the equipoise (*sāmyāvasthā*) between the manifestation of *sattva*, the activity of *rajas* and the restraint of *tamas*, and therefore *prakṛti* did not transform.³⁴⁸ However, with the influence of *puruṣa*, the efficacy of one constituent has overpowered the others', then *prakṛti* starts to transform. Through the constant tension and ever-changing balance of the three constituents, *prakṛti* transforms into different things.³⁴⁹ First it transforms into *mahat*. From *mahat*, there appears the ego, then the subtle elements, the eleven organs, the five gross elements, and eventually all other things in the universe are made up by the five gross elements.³⁵⁰ Sāṃkhya holds that all things in the universe, except *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* itself, are transformed from *prakṛti*, which is identified with the three constituents. *Prakṛti* is therefore compared to water which can transform into rain, steam *inter alia* in different circumstances, but the transformed things in nature are still water.³⁵¹ While all things have the three constituents, of different weights, in their composition, their existence is considered ultimately real.

The Sāṃkhya doctrine of the pre-existence of effect in cause is shown in their proof for the ultimate existence of *prakṛti*, which is the first cause of the universe. Even if some sandalwood is broken into pieces, the pieces are still in nature sandalwood. Likewise, although manifested things are not *prakṛti*, they are of the same nature as *prakṛti*. This is because both the *prakṛti* and the manifested things have the three constituents.³⁵² As the three constituents are in fact *prakṛti*, the manifested things are

³⁴⁸ Sinha 1952, p.15; see also SK13, SS in CBETA, T54, no. 2137, 1248a24-a25 and the TJ following MHK 6.25.

³⁴⁹ SK 16.

³⁵⁰ HE noted a different sequence of transformation which is recorded in the TJ following MHK 6.1 - there is the transformation of *prakṛti* into *mahat*, then the ego and the subtle elements; only after the subtle elements are transformed, they either transform into the eleven organs or the five gross elements. (HE 2011, p. 40, 258)

³⁵¹ SS in CBETA, T54, no. 2137, 1249a7-a8, 1249a22-a23; see also SS in CBETA, T54, no. 2137, 1247b23-b24.

³⁵² This is the second of the five reasons for the ultimate existence of *prakṛti* in SS. The same argument is found in KR: 調諸顯事有性為因，有種類故。諸有種類一切皆見有性為因，如檀片等。顯事既有種類故，有性為因。(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 275b18-b20) The five reasons are: (1) from the fact that different kinds of manifested things exist with a certain quantity, one can know that there must be a cause from which these things are produced. Otherwise, things would not exist with a particular quantity and would not exist at all. Like the potter produces certain amount of pots from the lumps of clay, one therefore knows that there must be a cause, which is *prakṛti*, for the things in the universe; (2) from the fact that even if some sandalwood is broken in pieces, the pieces are still sandalwood, one therefore knows that although manifested things are not *prakṛti*, they are of the same nature as *prakṛti*; they all have the three constituents; (3) as a potter only has the efficacy to produce a pot but not a cloth, the production of the pot is dependent on the specific efficacy which is

considered pre-existent in *prakṛti*, while *prakṛti* goes on existing in the manifested things even after it has transformed into them. This doctrine is understood by the Sāṃkhyas in relation to the causation of manifested things as “change”, like milk changes into yoghurt.³⁵³ It is not like a mother giving birth to a child, in which the mother and the child are independent and different entities. In the case of milk changing to yoghurt, the milk, as the cause, changes into the yoghurt, as the effect, while it goes on existing, although in the form of yoghurt. Hence, in this kind of causality, the cause is different from the effect due to their different compositions and our perception, but they are not independent and therefore not completely different from each other because of the continuation of the cause’s existence in the effect. In this way, the constant relationship between a particular cause and its particular effects is guaranteed. That is to say, a particular cause is considered as only changing into effects that are related and similar to it. Otherwise, it would be able to change into anything in the universe. Due to the constant change into yoghurt from milk, there is the pre-existence of yoghurt in milk.

In their objection, the Sāṃkhyas claim that since all manifested things, including *mahat*, are transformed from *prakṛti*, they pre-exist in *prakṛti* and are as permanent and all-pervading as *prakṛti*. Thus, the appearance of any manifested things should only be due to manifestation instead of production by the conditions. Hence, they do not recognise Bhāviveka’s reason, “because they arise from conditions”, in the sense that conditioned things are produced. The first characteristic of a reason, i.e. the pervasion of “conditioned things” by “arisen from conditions”, is violated. As this reason is not recognised by all parties in debate, it has committed the fallacy of being unestablished.

in turn dependent on the potter; from this one knows that the efficacy to produce the manifested things in the universe is dependent on *prakṛti*; (4) there is a cause which is different from its effect, just like the lump of clay, as cause, cannot hold water, but its effect, the pot can. Hence, one knows that there must a cause, i.e. *prakṛti*, which is different from its effects, i.e. the manifested things; (5) as all things before manifestation are without difference, there must be something which is different from them that produces them. From this one knows that the gross elements, the eleven organs, the subtle elements, the ego and the intellect are not different from each other before they are transformed from *prakṛti* and hence, without *prakṛti* there would not appear any things, which are different from each other, in the universe. (SK15; SS in CBETA, T54, no. 2137, 1248c4-1249a3) Similar reasons can be found in MHK/TJ 6.25-6.26; see also discussion in HE 2011, p. 41-43.

³⁵³ SS in CBETA, T54, n. 2137, 1249a13-a17.

Neither do the Sāṃkhyas recognise Bhāviveka's thesis, "all conditioned things are empty", in the sense that these things do not exist in the ultimate sense. The Sāṃkhyas give the reason "everything has the existence of everything" to support their objection. Based on this reason, all the organs should exist in all places, and therefore these organs should also exist in the illusory men, granted that illusory men are also manifested things. Hence, the property "empty" to be inferred for the subject (i.e. conditioned things) is in fact contradictory to the implication of this subject (*dharmi-viśeṣa*), i.e. being "permanent" or "all-pervading".

Under the Sāṃkhya doctrine, the manifested things thus neither possess the property that infers ("arisen from conditions") nor the property to be inferred ("empty of inherent existence"). If they were to be established as empty of inherent existence in the ultimate sense by Bhāviveka, then Bhāviveka would be unable to give any positive example that possesses both properties to establish his inference.

But what do the Sāṃkhyas mean by "everything has the existence of everything"? This standpoint is rare in Sāṃkhya literature. In YB, Sāṃkhya's doctrine of the pre-existence of effect in cause is understood as a doctrine of manifestation of effect by conditions.³⁵⁴ The Sāṃkhyas hold that all things in nature are existent. As they have already existed entirely, they need not be produced again. Therefore, their appearance is only due to the manifestation instead of the production by conditions.³⁵⁵ The efficacy of a cause is only to manifest an effect. Following this

³⁵⁴ YB: 從緣顯了論者，謂如有一若沙門若婆羅門，起如是見，立如是論：「一切諸法，性本是有，從眾緣顯，不從緣生。」謂即因中有果論者··作如是計。問：「何因緣故？因中有果論者，見諸因中先有果性，從緣顯耶？」答：「由教及理故··彼如是思：『果先是有，復從因生，不應道理。然非不用功。為成於果，彼復何緣而作功用？豈非唯為顯了果耶？』彼作如是妄分別，已立顯了論。」 (CBETA, T30, no. 1579, 304a12-a22); see also Yang 1995, p. 218-219.

³⁵⁵ Obstruction is one of the eight circumstances where existent things cannot be perceived: when (1) they are too far away (*atidūrāt*); (2) they are too close (*sāmīpyāt*); (3) the organs are deficient (*indriya-ghātāt*); (4) the mind is distracted from the object (*mano 'navasthānāt*); (5) they are too small (*sankṣmyāt*); (6) they are obstructed by other things (*vyava-dhānāt*); (7) they are overpowered by other things (*abhibhavāt*); (8) they are mixed with similar things (*samāna-abhihārāt*). (SK 7; SS in CBETA, T54, no. 2137, 1246b10-b17)

Under the doctrine of manifestation by conditions, the cause can at the same time be the cause to manifest the effect and be the obstruction to the manifestation of this effect. The cause thus has a contradictory nature, i.e. being manifesting and obstructive to its effect. Indeed, right after Asaṅga's introduction of the doctrine of manifestation by conditions in YB, the consequence of this doctrine is criticised. Asaṅga asks whether there is the obstruction to the manifestation of the effect in relation to whether or not the cause as the obstruction is existent. If the cause as the obstruction does not exist while there is the obstruction to the manifestation of the effect, then it is not reasonable that

logic, the effect which is the perception of the yoghurt should have already existed in *mahat* and also be permanent. *Mahat*, the ego, the mind, the eyes, the yoghurt are only to manifest the perception of the yoghurt. Hence, the perception of the yoghurt should pre-exist alongside all other perceptual cognitions and manifested things in *mahat*. This understanding would mean that all manifested things, as effects of *prakṛti*, have pre-existed in *prakṛti* entirely and as ultimately real and permanent as *prakṛti*. Further, as *prakṛti* is all-pervading and has the efficacy to transform into any manifested thing, all manifested things, as particular states of *prakṛti*,³⁵⁶ can also

there is the obstruction to the manifestation of the effect. Neither is it reasonable if the cause as the obstruction exists at the same time while there is the obstruction to the manifestation of the effect because this cause, which is also an effect, should also be obstructed. Like the darkness can conceal the water in the pot, it can also conceal the pot. However, if the cause, which is an effect, is also obstructed by the cause as the obstruction, then the cause that manifests the effect should also be obstructed. In this case, it is not reasonable to say that there is the pre-existence of effect in the cause that manifests this effect because the cause cannot be manifested at all. Therefore, if there is the obstruction to the manifestation of the effect, then it would become absurd for the cause to both obstructs and manifests its effect, regardless of whether the cause is existent or not. Hence, the notion of obstruction is refuted.

After this, Asaṅga further examines the nature of obstruction: whether the nature of existence, i.e. the pre-existence of effect in cause, or the nature of the effect itself is the obstruction to the manifestation of the effect. It is not reasonable that the pre-existence of the effect in the cause is the obstruction to the manifestation of the effect because this pre-existence is permanent and the effect would never be manifested. The cause, which is also an effect, should not be manifested either. Neither is it reasonable that the nature of the effect itself is the obstruction to the manifestation of the effect, otherwise the same thing would be the cause, which has an obstructive nature, and the effect at the same time. Then, the sprout would at the same time be the seed, and the fruit would at the same time be the stem, etc. It is not reasonable also because the effect would at the same time be manifested and not manifested. Therefore, the effect, regardless of whether it is pre-existent or manifested, is not the obstruction to the manifestation of itself. To conclude, no reasonable explanation to obstruction can be obtained regardless of whether it is considered in relation to the cause or to the effect. Hence, Sāṃkhya's notion of causation in terms of obstruction and manifestation is refuted.

See YB: 應審問彼：「汝何所欲？為無障緣而有障礙？為有障缘耶？若無障缘者，無障礙缘而有障礙，不應道理。若有障缘者，屬果之因，何故不障？同是有故，不應道理。譬如黑闇障盆中水，亦能障盆。若言障缘亦障因者，亦應顯因俱被障故，而言但顯因中先有果性，不顯因者，不應道理。」復應問彼：「為有性是障缘？為果性耶？若有性是障缘者，是即有性常不顯了，不應道理。因亦是有，何不為障？若言果性是障缘者，是則一法亦因亦果，如芽是種子、果是莖等。因是即一法亦顯、不顯，不應道理。」(CBETA, T30, no. 1579, 304a22-b5); see also Mikogami 1969, p. 443-444.

Bhāviveka's response in the following discussion of the absurdity of "everything has the existence of everything" in terms of manifestation may be compared with the second option of the first argument by Asaṅga. While both of them show the absurd consequence that neither the cause nor the effect could be manifested, instead of considering the problem based on the contradictory nature of the cause, Bhāviveka considers it in terms of the effect to show the problem when everything can be manifested from everything. See Commentary.

³⁵⁶ This commentary generally understands all manifested things as different states of *prakṛti*, the substance that transforms into or manifests itself through different states. Watanabe points out that as recorded in Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, the Sāṃkhyas explain the process of manifestation in terms of *dharma* and *dharmīn*, property and substance. While as recorded in Dharmakīrti's works, they understand the manifested things as "states" (*avasthā*) so that the disappearance of one state does not affect the continuous existence of *prakṛti*. Watanabe seems to consider the second understanding a better explanation of the impermanence of things. (Watanabe 2011, pp. 559-560) It is not clear whether or not the Sāṃkhyas understand manifestation as "states" in

transform into anything else, being some other states of *prakṛti*. Hence, milk does not only possess the existence of yoghurt, but also the existence of a cow and a pot. By its own disappearance, milk can let the yoghurt, the cow or the pot manifest. In this case, manifested things, being permanent and pre-existent effects, should all manifest at the same time in all places and all times (see [2] below). Consequently, the universe should be static.³⁵⁷

The ultimate unreality of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* as unconditioned things will be dealt with in relation to the second inference in the proof of emptiness,³⁵⁸ which is not included in this Commentary. In his response, Bhāviveka attempts to establish the ultimate emptiness of the manifested things in three parts: [1] these things are

Bhāviveka's time. While Bhāviveka is not going to criticise the Sāṃkhya doctrine of manifestation the same way as Vasubandhu and Dharmakīrti do in Watanabe 2011, to give a more favourable reading of this doctrine, this commentary follows Dharmakīrti in taking manifested things as states of *prakṛti*.

³⁵⁷ However, it will be problematic for the Sāṃkhyas to hold this extreme form of the pre-existence of effect in cause. This is because "everything has the existence of everything" in this sense would mean the effect also has the existence of its cause and things unrelated in the causal chain. It will lead to arbitrariness in causation, which is not acceptable to the Sāṃkhyas. Thus, the Sāṃkhya doctrine of the pre-existence of effect in cause may have been misrepresented in YB or even in KR.

There is an alternative interpretation of "everything has the existence of everything": while all manifested things are in nature *prakṛti* and particular states of *prakṛti*, it can also mean that these manifested things all consist of the three constituents, which are identified with *prakṛti*. In this way, every manifested thing is pervaded by it and they all pervade each other in a weak sense. Then, manifested things, as effects of *prakṛti*, are not required to pre-exist in *prakṛti* in entirety, or be as ultimately real and permanent as *prakṛti*. As effects, they are only required to pre-exist in their causes to the extent that there is some guaranteed continuity between the causes and the effects. They are transformed from their causes so that they are conditioned by the limited efficacy or peculiar composition of the causes. Thus, one state of *prakṛti*, as cause, has a composition similar to the next, as effect. Hence, in their objection the Sāṃkhyas mean nothing more than "all places, including the organs and illusory men, which are all transformed from and pervaded by *prakṛti*, consist of the three constituents" by "everything has the existence of everything". In this sense, they have the existence of each other.

The ultimate emptiness of manifested things discussed above is provable to Bhāviveka, as now "being manifested" means to be conditioned by and similar to the cause, which is also true of other conditioned things. The ultimate emptiness of things in Bhāviveka's system of the two truths does not refute the common knowledge which is recognised by the world. In terms of the false conventional truth, it is acceptable for the Sāṃkhyas to claim that the manifested things are in nature *prakṛti* (or the three constituents), provided that these things are not taken as ultimate existents. If they also agreed with the reason that manifested things are produced by conditions, then Bhāviveka's inference is established.

Sāṃkhya holds that manifested things, as certain states, appear due to the transformation of the cause, which is ultimately the permanent and all-pervading substance, *prakṛti*. This shows that the real conflict between the Sāṃkhyas and Bhāviveka lies in whether there is such a permanent and all-pervading *prakṛti* that transforms into the manifested things. Bhāviveka did not discuss this reading of the doctrine of the pre-existence of effect in cause in KR perhaps because of his intention to discuss the first characteristic of a reason in the first inference in his proof of emptiness. It may also be because manifested things in this sense are not so much in conflict with the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things to become an object of refutation in the discussion here. If he can refute the existence of *prakṛti*, then the Sāṃkhyas will lose the reason for their doctrine of transformation, which is established hand-in-hand with the pre-existence of effect in cause.

³⁵⁸ See KR in CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 275b1-b15, b16-c9.

conditioned by the conditions from which they manifest; [2] the standpoint regarding everything having the existence of everything will lead to an absurd consequence that only one thing is perceivable; and [3] Sāṃkhyas' view that the real men do not manifest where the illusory men manifest is compatible to the latter's ultimate emptiness of inherent existence. Bhāviveka starts his response as follows:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271b23-c3)

[Response:] [1] Let us examine [our reason “because conditioned things arise from conditions”] in terms of the cognitions of matter. We would say that the cognitions of matter are not manifested by conditions because they change according to those other conditions. For example, jars, pots, etc., be they large or small, come into existence according to numerous different conditions such as lumps of clay, wheels, sticks, the preferences in the potter's mind, etc. Thus, different cognitions of matter [that arise from] numerous conditions such as eyes, etc. change according to those various [different conditions]; because according to whether the eyes are clear or unclear, the cognitions are then sharp or dull; because according to the different objects of cognition such as the colour blue, etc., there appear different cognitions such as the blue-like cognition, etc. [The Sāṃkhyas may hold that] “things presently seen in the world are manifested things, which do not change according to differences in those conditions, like the round bracelets and various other things that are manifested by bright lamps, herbs, gems, the sun, etc.” But it is not true of the cognitions of matter. The same [conclusion can be reached] regarding eyes, etc. if one examines the cognitions of matter. This meaning is established as true and is commonly recognised by [people in] the world. Therefore, the reason which is given [by us] does not commit the fallacy of being unestablished.³⁵⁹

³⁵⁹ KR: 此中且依色覺觀察。謂諸色覺非緣所顯，隨彼別緣有轉異故。如隨泥團、輪、杖、陶師心欲樂等差別眾緣，有瓶、盆等，或大或小。如是眼等眾緣差別色覺，隨彼種種轉異；隨

Supposing manifested things pre-exist entirely in their causes – their causes’ only efficacy being to manifest them – these things will be manifested in exactly the way they exist in their causes. This means that their causes would not make any difference to their effects. These manifested things are therefore considered as having an unconditioned existence. Thus, round bracelets and various other things that are manifested by bright lamps, etc. are perceived by the Sāṃkhyas as not changing regardless of the change in conditions. In [1], Bhāviveka attempts to clarify that these manifested things, as effects, are indeed conditioned by the conditions from which they manifest. Their pre-existence in causes and permanent existence are not justified by the seemingly unchanging perception of them.

Although the existence of manifested things, as effects, is established by perception, their being perceived as unchanging does not exclude the possibility that they have gone through a causal process before they are perceived. In reality, particular effects can only be manifested by particular causes. For example, there might be a pot, some yoghurt, a cloth and all other things pre-existing in the lump of clay, according to the Sāṃkhya doctrine. If there is a potter working on the lump of clay, then only a pot can manifest as the effect. If there is a weaver working on some thread, then a cloth will manifest as the effect instead. The appearances of the pot resulting from each production by the potter also differ. If the potter prefers to make a larger pot with blue decorations, then he will require additional tools and materials compared with the previous time when he made a small, plain pot. Although causes under the Sāṃkhya doctrine cannot make any difference in the effects they are going to manifest, this at least has shown that they can determine which effect to manifest. Hence, Bhāviveka claims that effects change according to conditions, in the sense that different effects will result, with different conditions as their causes. This should be agreed by the Sāṃkhyas because they support the pre-existence of yoghurt in milk with the reason that only milk can turn into yoghurt.

眼明、昧，覺利、鈍故；隨青等色境界差別，覺似青等顯現異故。「世間現見是所顯物，不隨彼緣差別轉變，猶如明燈、藥、珠、日等所顯種種環釧等物。」色覺不爾。如觀色覺，眼等亦然。此義成實世間共了，故所說因無不成過。

The same can also be said regarding the cognitions of matter – i.e. perceptions of the manifested things – and the visual organs. With reference to the Sāṃkhya doctrines discussed above, eyes and perception have already existed entirely in *mahat*. They are the same before and after they are manifested. However, people in the world commonly agree that whether the perception is sharp or dull is determined by the conditions of the eyes, e.g. whether the eyes are clear or unclear. The blue pot-like object in perception is determined by the actual object, i.e. the blue pot, which the eyes have made contact with. This is also true of the perceptions of round bracelets, etc. They are also effects and their manifestations are conditioned by the conditions of one's eyes, the bright lamp, etc. and the actual objects perceived. This shows that the content of perception changes whenever the conditions involved in the perceptual process change. A particular perception can only be manifested by particular conditions. Thus, these particular conditions are the fundamental factors that contribute to the manifestation of a particular perception.

Hence, the effect which is going to manifest is not determined by what is pre-existent in the cause but by the conditions that are present in the causal process. These conditions have conditioned the manifestation of the effects so that no arbitrary effects can manifest. As these manifested things are conditioned by the conditions from which they manifest, they do not have an unconditional existence. Manifestation in this sense is not incompatible with Bhāviveka's notion of being "arisen from conditions". Bhāviveka indeed takes it as one kind of arising from conditions.³⁶⁰ In this way, the Sāṃkhyas cannot regard his reason "because they arise from conditions" as illegitimate based on their doctrine of manifestation. As shown, the change in conditions alone is sufficient for different effects to manifest. It can further be concluded that the pre-existence of any effect entirely in any cause is redundant.

If the Sāṃkhyas deny that the manifestation of things is conditioned, then the pre-existence of the manifested things will be all-pervading and permanent. In [2], Bhāviveka goes on to show the absurd consequence if "everything has the existence of everything", in the sense that all manifested things, as effects, inhere in all manifested things in all places and all times:

³⁶⁰ See Section 1.3.2 in Part I for the definition of "arisen from conditions".

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271c4-c14)

[2] And as you have said that “everything has the existence of everything,” etc., is it [2a] in terms of the things manifested? or [2b] in terms of their latent efficacy?³⁶¹

[2a] If you maintain “everything has the existence of everything” in terms of the things manifested; like there is a manifested jar in the place where the jar [which is smaller in size] is located, in places where a pot, etc. [which are bigger in size] are located, this manifested jar should also pervade because [the pot, etc.] are pervaded by the existence [of everything]. In this way, [the existence of] one jar should then pervade in everywhere within infinite *yojanas*.³⁶² While in places where the jar, etc. are located, there should also be the manifested pot, etc. It is not because the manifested jar is concealed³⁶³ that the manifested pot, etc. are also concealed; it is because of [other things which have a] larger size. Large things are in turn concealed by [other things which are] even larger in size. [As] the manifested jar, etc. are concealed by the manifested pot, etc., they [i.e. the former, the smaller things] are not obtainable in all places and at all times. Therefore, it is not reasonable for your doctrine [to hold] that “everything has the existence of everything” based on those manifested things.³⁶⁴

³⁶¹ Hsu 2013, p. 207 gives the translation of “non-manifested matters”, instead of “latent efficacy” as in the present translation, for the Chinese term “隱用” in the text (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271c4). Sastri 1949, p. 55 renders the Sanskrit **tirohita-kṛtyā* for the term, which he translates as “unmanifesting” in *ibid.*, p. 15. Poussin 1933, p. 92 renders the term as “l'énergie secrète”, although he is also unsure about it. As the meaning of the term cannot be determined, a literal translation of this term, i.e. “latent efficacy”, is given here.

³⁶² *Yojana* is a measurement of distance. (MW, p. 958, 1)

³⁶³ Hsu 2013, p. 207 translates the Chinese term “隱映” (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271c8) as “reflected” instead of “concealed” here. The present Commentary understands Bhāviveka’s argument as being based on the problem of concealment in the doctrine of manifestation; see discussion below.

³⁶⁴ KR: 又汝所言「一切皆有一切體」等，為據顯事？為據隱用？

若據顯事執「一切有一切體」者，如於瓶處有瓶顯事，於盆等處亦應遍有此瓶顯事，遍有體故，如是一瓶即應遍滿無量百千踰膳那處。於瓶等處亦應具有盆等顯事。非瓶顯事被

“Everything has the existence of everything” can be understood [2a] in terms of the manifestation of things. All manifested things, as effects, can be manifested by all manifested things, as causes, in any place and at any time. It can also be understood [2b] in terms of the latent efficacy of things (see below). All unmanifested things, as effects, inhere in all manifested things, as causes. These unmanifested things can manifest in any place and at any time. In Bhāviveka’s response, the doctrine of the pre-existence of effect in cause is refuted in terms of [2a], while he neither refutes nor accepts [2b].

Regarding [2a], all manifested things, as possible effects, are permanent, pre-existent entirely and pervading in their causes, which are also manifested things. The causes, which were previous pre-existent effects now being manifested, have the pre-existence of all possible effects to be manifested in the future. Hence, in the locus where a manifested thing exists, there is also the existence of all other manifested things. According to SK, obstruction, i.e. being concealed by something else, is one of the circumstances where certain existent manifested things cannot be perceived.³⁶⁵ Causes in this context are therefore considered obstructions to the manifestation or the perception of the effects and have to disappear to let them manifest. However, due to obstruction, Bhāviveka points out that nothing, including the causes themselves, can be manifested in the present locus, except one thing.

Suppose that there is one manifested thing existent and all other possible manifested things pre-existent in the present locus. While a small object, say, a jar, is manifested here, this locus also has the pre-existence of bigger objects, say, a pot and all other objects. While the jar is manifesting here, in all other loci it remains pre-existent, unmanifested and unseen. The same applies to the pot and indeed all other objects. In terms of [2a], everything can be manifested in any place and at any time, even though the thing that is presently manifested is unrelated to the previous thing manifested in the same locus. While the manifestation of effect has become arbitrary, what determines which effect manifests? To Bhāviveka, the size of the object is the

隱映故，盆等顯事亦被隱映，形量大故。形量大者，應為轉大形量隱映。瓶等顯事盆等顯事所隱映故，一切處時應不可得。是故汝宗據其顯事「一切皆有一切體」者，不應道理。

³⁶⁵ See footnote 355 in Part II.

only factor. Imagine that we can put all possible effects on a single locus, say, a paper. We can only see the biggest object we have put on that particular spot on the paper. All the smaller objects are concealed by this biggest object. The same happens to all the possible effects to be manifested on a particular locus. As the perception of the smaller thing, the jar, is obstructed by a bigger object, the pot, the jar can never be seen and be manifested. The perception of the pot, however, is obstructed by yet another bigger object, say, a tree. The pot cannot be manifested either. As a forest is bigger than a tree, neither can the tree be manifested. While we can always imagine the existence of a bigger thing, the chain of obstruction to manifestation can continue forever. As all manifested things have a permanent and all-pervading existence, the biggest thing on earth should hence manifest in all places and in all times. As a result, nothing in our experience, e.g. the jar, the pot, can manifest, except the biggest thing on earth. This is against our experience and is not acceptable to the Sāṃkhyas as they hold that there is the manifestation of different things in the universe. This results in an absurd consequence; therefore the Sāṃkhyas have to give up their doctrine understood in terms of manifestation in this sense.

[2b] If you maintain “everything has the existence of everything” in terms of [manifested things’] latent efficacy, this [which is] maintained [by you] should be examined extensively before one can correctly know whether it is real or not. [We are] afraid that the speech would become too tedious, [so] we will not examine it at length.³⁶⁶

Regarding [2b], all unmanifested things, as effects, inhere in all manifested things, as causes, and can manifest in all places and in all times. Bhāviveka neither refutes nor accepts this understanding. The reason is not clear because he only says that this understanding should be examined at length to determine whether or not it is true, and the present response to the Sāṃkhyas’ objection is getting tedious.

However, Bhāviveka is against the notion that everything has the existence of everything. This is due to the reason that all things have a conditioned existence. They cannot produce all things or be produced by everything. Fundamentally, it is

³⁶⁶ KR: 若據隱用執「一切有一切體」者，如是所執要廣觀察，方可正知是實非實，恐文煩過不廣觀察。

not the manifested things but *prakṛti* which the Sāṃkhyas claim is inhered in by all possible unmanifested things or has the latent efficacy to manifest everything. *Prakṛti* is considered an unconditioned thing, which is to be discussed in relation to the second inference in the proof of emptiness, and therefore out of the scope of this Commentary. This is perhaps the reason why Bhāviveka did not discuss [2b] in this context.

In terms of [2a], Bhāviveka has already refuted the Sāṃkhyas' notion that "everything has the existence of everything". The view that all things can manifest anywhere and at any time is found to be absurd. An effect must be conditioned by its cause. Taking the previously existent manifested thing as cause, and the subsequently manifested thing as effect, the latter cannot be completely different from the former. As the natures of illusory men and real men are mutually exclusive, if the cause will manifest an illusory man, then it will not manifest a real man. That is to say, illusory men and real men cannot be manifested in the same location in space and time. Therefore in [3], Bhāviveka points out that the Sāṃkhyas should also agree that the real men do not manifest where the illusory men manifest:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271c14-c16)

[3] Your doctrine also admits that where the illusionary men manifest is empty of the manifestation of the real men.

[Therefore,] the example established by us did not commit the fallacy of being unestablished. For this reason, the property "empty of an inherent existence" which is to be inferred is established. You Sāṃkhyas have committed [yourselves] to a wrong basis.³⁶⁷

In other words, illusory men lack the existence of real men in themselves. While all manifested things have already been shown to have a conditioned existence, this is thus compatible to Bhāviveka's ultimate emptiness of an inherent existence in conditioned things. His positive example, "illusions", is now agreed by the Sāṃkhyas, as being "manifested by conditions" is included in "arisen from

³⁶⁷ KR: 汝宗亦許幻士顯處，實士顯空，我所立喻無不成過，是故所立性空義成。汝數論師非處投寄。

conditions”, and “lacking the existence of the real things” has already been demonstrated as compatible with “empty of an inherent existence” in the discussion of Objection 11. It possesses both the property that infers and the property to be inferred. And through the positive concomitance of the two properties it exemplifies, it is able to prove the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things. Therefore, it is not unestablished. The Sāṃkhyas’ criticism is unfounded because their doctrines, on which their criticism is based on, are problematic to start with.

After refuting the notions of “everything has the existence of everything” and unconditioned existence in the Sāṃkhya doctrines of manifestation and the pre-existence of effect in cause, Bhāviveka proceeds to refute an inference that may be supported by the Sāṃkhyas:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271c17-c21)

Neither is it the case that “the organs pervade everywhere, because they have a cause, like the place on which these organs depend”. Thus, many kinds of reasons such as “because they can be the causes to produce the cognitions of pleasure, suffering and confusion” and others should also be explained at length. From the refutation of “the organs pervading everywhere”, therefore [one should know that] there is no existence of the organs in the illusionary men. [Also,] it is not the case that there is no positive example for the property to be inferred “empty”. For this reason, you have made false discriminations. [You must be] misled by evil spirits to conceptualise in this way.³⁶⁸

The Sāṃkhyas’ inference is this:

Thesis: The organs pervade everywhere,
Reason: because they have a cause; because they can cause the cognitions of
 pleasure, suffering and confusion,

³⁶⁸ KR: 亦非「諸根遍一切處，有所因故，如根依處」。如是「能為樂、苦、癡覺生因故」等多種證因，亦應廣說。由破「諸根遍一切處」故，幻土中無諸根體，非所立「空」無同法喻。是故汝成虛妄分別，魍魎所魅作如是計。

Positive Example: like the place on which these organs depend.

With the reasons that all organs, as manifested things, have a cause and can cause the cognitions of pleasure, etc., the Sāṃkhyas' wish to prove that these organs pervade everywhere, in the sense of manifesting or pre-existing entirely in all places and at all times. This is exemplified by the place on which these organs depend, i.e. *mahat*, which has a cause, can cause the cognitions of pleasure, etc. and pervades everywhere. However, the notion of “everything has the existence of everything” has already been shown to be absurd. To say that things have a cause means that their existence is conditioned. They pass their conditions onto the effects they produce. As both causes and effects manifested have a conditioned existence, they cannot pervade all places. By the same logic, the inference constructed here to prove the all-pervasion of the organs, which is supported by the reasons just discussed, should be refuted. These organs do not have a permanent or unconditioned existence.

From this, the Sāṃkhyas' claim that “the organs pervade everywhere, there is also this existence of these organs in those illusionary men” at the beginning of their objection should also be refuted. This is because such permanent or unconditioned organs do not exist in illusory men. Illusions that are manifested by conditions are empty ultimately, in the sense that they lack an ultimate existence and the existence of other real things. Thus, Bhāviveka concludes that his positive example, “illusions”, is not unestablished. It can prove the ultimate emptiness of other manifested things.

B.4 The view that emptiness is the non-existence of the imagined nature in the existent dependent nature is erroneous

In this objection, Bhāviveka presents the Yogācāras³⁶⁹ as having a different understanding of emptiness, based on their doctrine of the three natures (*tri-svabhāva*),³⁷⁰ which is introduced below:

³⁶⁹ In the TJ of MHK 5.1, Bhāviveka refers to the Yogācāras as “Asaṅga, Vasubandhu and others”. (Eckel 2008, pp. 214-215) Although in MHK 5.2 and following verses Bhāviveka refers to *Madhyāntavibhāga* to define the Yogācāra position – for example MHK 5.2 quoting *Madhyāntavibhāga* 1.13ab to define emptiness as “the absence of duality and the existence of this absence” (Eckel 2008, pp. 215-216, note 4) – KR discusses a similar notion of emptiness with a quotation of the Buddha's teaching from YB.

³⁷⁰ As introductions of Yogācāra and its doctrine of the three natures have already been provided in works, such as Tola and Dragonetti 2004, Siderits 2007, pp. 146-179, Williams 2009, pp. 84-102, Thakchöe 2015, etc., I will not go into details below. Only texts that are directly related to the present

Yogācāra holds that the objects of cognition do not exist part from our consciousness (*viññāna*). From the store-consciousness (*ālaya-viññāna*), the subject-object duality of cognition arises. By false conceptualisation (*abhūta-parikalpa*), the subjective aspect mistakes that itself has a permanent Self, and holds onto the objective aspect as if the latter has an independent external existence apart from consciousness. The notions of a permanent Self and the independent existence of things are false concepts imposed on the dependently-arisen subjective and objective aspects of consciousness. These false concepts are, however, the objects of cognition of our mind, to be eliminated for one to realise emptiness.

The doctrine of the three natures is about the different states of the consciousness. The Yogācāras take consciousness (*viññāna*), which arises from causes and conditions, as the ultimate reality. It is said to have a dependent nature (*paratantra-svabhāva*), affirming the reality of its dependent arising. When false concepts are present in the consciousness, it is said to be in the defiled state of dependent nature, i.e. the imagined nature (*parikalpita-svabhāva*). When they are eliminated, the consciousness returns to its original non-dual, non-conceptual and ineffable state. It is said to have a perfected nature (*pariniṣpanna-svabhāva*), i.e. the purified state of dependent nature. Emptiness is therefore thought to be realised with the absence of the imagined nature in the purified state of dependent nature. In this doctrine, the dependent nature is explained to be the basis for both false conceptualization and perfection.

It cannot be ascertained whether Bhāviveka is dealing with the whole Yogācāra school,³⁷¹ or a particular Yogācāra scholar in his discussion, as no name is specified. While Dharmapāla and Sthiramati are contemporaries of Bhāviveka, they both agree on the ultimate reality of consciousness and the perfected nature, and also that the subject-object duality does not exist in the purified dependent nature. However, they disagree on whether there is the objective aspect of the consciousness in the

objection (which is from mainly YB) will be discussed. For the analyses of other Yogācāra texts, see also Anacker 2005, Tola and Dragonetti 2004 and Wood 1994.

³⁷¹ Eckel points out that Bhāviveka may have taken the word “Yogācāra” from the title of *Yogācāra-bhūmi* to name this particular group of Mahāyāna opponents. Thus by “Yogācāra”, Bhāviveka is first referring to the text YB, then to the teaching derived from this text and the scholars of this teaching. (Eckel 2008, pp. 64-65)

dependent nature, resulting in different views as to how perfected nature is achieved. When the consciousness is in the dependent nature, Dharmapāla holds that there are both subjective and objective aspects, while Sthiramati holds that there is only the subjective aspect because objects of cognition pertain to the imagined nature. Thus, to Dharmapāla, to attain the perfected nature means to get rid of the false concepts imposed on the dependently-arisen things. While the non-discriminating wisdom takes emptiness as its object, it is devoid of duality in the perfected nature. To Sthiramati, to attain the perfected nature means to get rid of the object so that the consciousness has nothing to cognise apart from itself. As there is no object, the consciousness ceases to be the subject. In this way, it is devoid of duality in the perfected nature. Dharmapāla considers the dependent and the perfected natures individually real, while Sthiramati considers the dependent nature empty and the three natures actually one, i.e. the perfected nature.³⁷² From the Yogācāras' objection portrayed by Bhāviveka below, however, it can be observed that their notion of the three natures is more in line with Dharmapāla's understanding.

In comparison, both the Yogācāras (as portrayed in this objection) and Bhāviveka deny absolute non-existents even conventionally and agree that conditioned things are free from false concepts when they are empty. However, the Yogācāras hold that the dependently-arisen things, the consciousness, must exist as the basis for the arising of all other phenomena; the reality of the perfected nature and the dependent nature corresponds to the reality of the existence of such a basis and the dependent origination of these phenomena. By contrast, according to Bhāviveka's system of the two truths, these realities are understood as ultimate realities, being both true and exist in the ultimate sense. Bhāviveka rejects such realist views of dependent origination; on his conception, things arise inter-dependently without a basis, i.e. without the consciousness, dependent origination or their natures being taken as ultimately real. From the discussion below, based on Bhāviveka's presentation, their standpoints differ in that: (1) the Yogācāras take both the dependently-arisen things (which are not empty of the dependent nature) and the dependent nature to be ultimately real. Bhāviveka, in contrast, admits their reality in the conventional sense,

³⁷² See Chen's Preface in Ueda 2002 and Ueda 1980. Nagao, however, objects this view and holds that Dharmapāla and Sthiramati explain the same notion of emptiness. For the discussion of the Nagao-Ueda dispute and Dharmapāla's and Sthiramati's notions of emptiness, see Chen's Preface in Ueda 2002 and Kitano 2008; see also Nagao 1968 and various articles in Nagao 1992; Ueda's articles such as Ueda 1971, 1972, 1973, 1980.

while considering them empty in the ultimate sense. (2) The Yogācāras take the imagined nature to be equivalent to Bhāviveka's notions of inherent nature, ultimate existents and absolute non-existents, considering it unreal even conventionally. Bhāviveka admits the inherent nature or the ultimate existence of things – thus, part of the imagined nature – conventionally, and only denies them in terms of the ultimate truth.

As Bhāviveka has different ontological commitments from the Yogācāras, in his presentation of the Yogācāra doctrine, both in the objection and his response, he always interprets it according to his notions of the two truths and emptiness. From this, he questions the Yogācāras' claims about the reality of the dependently-arisen things and the dependent nature. In Bhāviveka's view, they could be either real ultimately or real conventionally. He considers both options problematic in the debating context. His criticisms will certainly yield counter-arguments from the Yogācāras. However, an actual Yogācāra interlocutor is missing. Counter-arguments are therefore not available. Below I offer a charitable reading of Bhāviveka's arguments. Further exploration of the Yogācāra counter-arguments³⁷³ is outside the scope of this commentary.

Bhāviveka presents the Yogācāras' objection as follows:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271c22-272a10)

[Objection 14:] The Yogācāras³⁷⁴ say, “in terms of ‘the ultimate truth’, you establish that ‘conditioned things are empty, because they arise from conditions’; if this means that ‘conditioned things, which arise from numerous conditions, are not existent spontaneously (*svayaṃbhāva*) [and that] they are established as empty in terms of “the naturelessness of

³⁷³ See, for example, Dharmapāla's criticism of Madhyamaka in Chapter 8 of *Dacheng Guang Bai Lun Shilun* (大乘廣百論釋論) in Keenan 1997.

³⁷⁴ “The Yogācāras” translates the term “相應論師” in the Chinese text (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271c22). “Yoga” means “joining” or “union” which corresponds to the Chinese characters “相應”; “acāra” means “practice” which corresponds to “論”. Hence, “Yogācāra” means the practice of the union of mind and body, i.e. “相應論”. The “people who practice” corresponds to “師”. The Yogācāras who practice the union of mind and body, or those who belong to the school of this practice, are therefore “相應論師”.

arising” (*utpatti-niḥsvabhāvatā*),³⁷⁵ then it does state and establish the Yogācāras’ doctrine and conforms to the right reasoning.

“It is also said, ‘[this] is empty of that, because that does not exist; [this] is empty, because this does exist.’³⁷⁶ This emptiness is explained by the teacher of deities and men [i.e. the Buddha] according to reality.³⁷⁷ This teaching means that the inherent nature of ‘the imagined’ is essentially non-existent in ‘the dependently-arisen’ because [‘the dependently-arisen’] is not of the nature of that [i.e. ‘the imagined’]. For it is neither the case that there is the nature of that which is expressed (*abhidheya*) with regard to that which expresses (*abhidhāna*) nor that there is the nature of that which expresses with regard to that which is expressed.³⁷⁸ Therefore, ‘the imagined nature’ is essentially non-existent in the existent ‘dependent nature’. ‘[This] is empty of that’ means the inherent nature of ‘that’, [i.e. the ‘imagined nature’]

³⁷⁵ A similar definition of the naturelessness of arising is found in the MHK 5.72ab: *utpattiniḥsvabhāvatvaṃ sadbhūtājāto yadi* |. (Eckel 2008, p. 426) See also YB: 云何「生無自性性」？謂一切行眾緣所生，緣力故有，非自然有，是故說名「生無自性性」。(CBETA, T30, no. 1579, 702b21-b23); and similar passages in Chapter 5 of SNS in CBETA, T16, no. 676, 694a18-a20; Chapter 7 of XYSJL in CBETA, T31, no. 1602, 557b19-b20. Poussin 1933, p. 93 suggests the Sanskrit equivalent “*svayaṃbhāva*” for “自然有”.

³⁷⁶ This quotation and the following discussion of emptiness by the Yogācāras in the same paragraph are based on the *Tattvārtha* Section of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* in YB: *yena hi śūnyam tadasadbhāvāt yac ca śūnyam tatsadbhāvāc chūnyatā yujyeta* || *sarvābhāvāc ca kutra kiṃ kena śūnyam bhaviṣyati* || *na ca tena tasyaiva śūnyatā yujyate* || *tasmād evaṃ durgrhītā śūnyatā bhavati* || *kathaṃ ca punaḥ sugrhitā śūnyatā bhavati* || *yataś ca yad yatra na bhavati tat tena śūnyam iti samanupaśyati* | *yat punar atrāvaśiṣṭaṃ bhavati tat sad ihāstīti yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti* || *iyam ucyate śūnyatāvakrāntir yathābhūtā aviparītā*. (Takahashi 2005, p. 101) See also CBETA, T30, no. 1579, 488c25-489a2: 由彼故空，彼實是無；於此而空，此實是有。由此道理可說為空。若說一切都無所有，何處、何者、何故名空？亦不應言由此、於此即說為空，是故名為惡取空者。云何復名善取空者？謂由於此，彼無所有，即由彼故，正觀為空。復由於此，餘實是有，即由餘故，如實知有。如是名為悟入空性如實無倒。； Yao 2014, p. 328.

³⁷⁷ See MN, III, 104, *Cūḷasuññata Sutta: iti yaṃ hi kho tattha na hoti, tena taṃ suññaṃ samanupassati, yaṃ pana tattha avasiṭṭhaṃ hoti, taṃ santaṃ idaṃ atthūti pajānāti*. (quoted in Yao 2014, p. 329; see also Nagao 1992, pp. 209-210) This passage is translated in Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi 1995, p.966ff as “Thus he regards it as void of what is not there, but as to what remains there he understands that which is present thus: ‘This is present.’”

³⁷⁸ The source of the correspondence of that which expresses and that which is expressed is perhaps YB: 此二相應相者，謂所詮、能詮更互相應，即是遍計所執自性執所依止。(CBETA, T30, no. 1579, 751b2-b3); see also XYSJL in CBETA, T31, no. 1602, 559b20-b27. Poussin 1933, p. 94 suggests the Sanskrit equivalents “*abhidheya*” and “*abhidhāna*” for “所詮” and “能詮”.

of] the falsely conceptualised things, is non-existent. ‘[This] is empty’ means the inherent nature of ‘this’, [i.e. the ‘dependent nature’ of] the real things (*vastu*) that exist through dependent arising, is existent. If ‘this’ [i.e. the real things that exist through dependent arising] is not existent, then this is nihilism. Depending on what is emptiness said? and what is said to be empty?³⁷⁹ The real things that exist through dependent arising are thus designated as [having] ‘the dependent nature’. Based on ‘this’ [i.e. ‘the real things that exist through dependent arising’], the process of the designation of the inherent nature of, and the difference between matter, sensation (*vedanā*), conception (*saṃjñā*), etc. is possible. If ‘this’ is non-existent, so are the things designated (*prajñāpti-dharma*). This view then becomes a nihilistic (*nāstika*) view. One should neither speak to nor stay with [people who adopt this view. This is because they] make not only themselves but also the others fall into bad rebirths.³⁸⁰ Thus, establishing ‘the imagined

³⁷⁹ It should be noted that the third question on “why”, “with what” or “what is it empty of” is missing comparing with the text “*kutra kiṃ kena śūnyam bhaviṣyati*” in the Tattvārtha Section of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (Takahashi 2005, p.101); See also CBETA, T30, no. 1579, 488c27: 何處、何者、何故名空？。

³⁸⁰ The passage “Based on ‘this’ [‘the reality of dependent arising’], the process of the designation of...make not only themselves but also the others fall into bad rebirths” in the present translation is also based on the Tattvārtha Section of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*: *evam eva sati rūpādīnāṃ dharmānāṃ vastumātre sa rūpādīdharmaprajñāptivādopacāro yujyate nāsati nirvastukaḥ prajñāptivādopacārah || tatra prajñapter vastu nāstīti niradhiṣṭhānā prajñāptir api nāsti ||* (Takahashi 2005, pp. 98-99) and also: *ato ya ekatyā durvijñeyān sūtrāntān mahāyānapratīṣṭhāṃ gambhīrāṃ śūnyatāpratīṣṭhāṃ ābhīprāyikārthanirūpitāṃ śrutvā yathābhūtaṃ bhāṣitasyārtham avijñāyāyoniśo vikalpayitvāyogavihitena tarkamātrakeṇaivaṃdrṣṭayo bhavanti evaṃvādināḥ prajñāptimātram eva sarvaṃ etac ca tattvaṃ yaś caivaṃ paśyati sa samyak paśyati teṣāṃ prajñāptiyadhiṣṭhānasya vastumātrasyābhāvāt saiva prajñāptiḥ sarvena sarvaṃ na bhavati || kutaḥ punaḥ prajñāptimātraṃ tattvaṃ bhaviṣyati || tad anena paryāyeṇa tais tattvaṃ api prajñāptir api tadubhayam apoditaṃ bhavati || prajñāptitattvāpavādhāc ca pradhāno nāstiko veditavyaḥ || sa eva nāstikaḥ sann akathyo bhavaty asaṃvāśyo bhavati vijñānāṃ sabrahmacāriṇāṃ || sa ātmānam api vipādayati | lokam api yo 'sya drṣṭyanumatam āpadyate. (ibid., pp. 99-100) See also CBETA, T30, no. 1579, 488b24-27: 如是要有色等諸法實有唯事，方可得有色等諸法假說所表，非無唯事而有等假說所表。若唯有假無有實事，既無依處，假亦無有。是則名為壞諸法者。and CBETA, T30, no. 1579, 488b29-c10: 如有一類聞說難解大乘相應空性、相應未極顯了密意趣義甚深經典，不能如實解所說義，起不如理虛妄分別，由不巧便所引尋思，起如是見立如是論：「一切唯假是為真實。若作是觀名為正觀。」彼於虛假所依處所實有唯事，撥為非有，是則一切虛假皆無，何當得有一切唯假是為真實？由此道理，彼於真實及以虛假二種俱謗都無所有。由謗真實及虛假故，當知是名最極無者。如是無者，一切有智同梵行者不應共語、不應共住。如是無者能自敗壞，亦壞世間隨彼見者。； see also MHK 5.82 and 5.83ab in Eckel 2008, p. 281.*

nature' as empty and 'the dependent nature' as existent does agree with right reasoning.

“If it [i.e. the inference ‘in terms of the ultimate truth, conditioned things are empty, because they arise from conditions’] means ‘[conditioned things] are established as empty because “the dependent nature” is also non-existent,’ then you have fallen into the abyss of fault as said above, and have also succeeded in committing the fault of slandering the sacred teachings of the Blessed One.”³⁸¹

The basic doctrine of Buddhism states that things arise dependently on causes and conditions. In this sense, they do not exist spontaneously. Therefore, things and their arising do not have an inherent existence, and are empty. Thus in the middle way, they should neither be taken as ultimately existent nor as absolutely non-existent. Based on this, Bhāviveka presents the Yogācāras as regarding the dependently-arisen things as the real things (*vastu*). In Bhāviveka's presentation, this is because the Yogācāras hold that these things have arisen from conditions and their existence cannot be denied. Due to one's false conceptualisation, the Yogācāras (as Bhāviveka presents them) hold that the real things are reified to become the duality of that which expresses and that which is expressed – i.e. the permanent Self and its independent object – by means of designation through speech. Designations that are originally non-existent, as inherent natures and differences, are imposed onto these real things to be the five aggregates, i.e. the physical and mental factors that constitute the universe, and thus all things in conventional knowledge.

³⁸¹ KR: 相應論師有作是說：「汝就『真性』立『有為空，緣生故』者，若此義言『諸有為法從眾緣生，非自然有，就『生無性』立彼為空』，是則述成相應師義，符會正理。」

「又如是說：『由彼故空，彼實是無。依此故空，此實是有。』如是空性是天人師如實所說。此教意言『遍計所執』『依他起』上自性本無，非彼性故。以非如能詮有所詮性，亦非如所詮有能詮性，故『依他起自性』有上『遍計所執自性』本無。『由彼故空』，即妄計事，彼自性無；『依此故空』，即緣生事，此自性有。此若無者，則為斷滅，於何事上說誰為空？此緣生事，即說名為『依他起性』。依此得有色、受、想等自性、差別假立性轉。此若無者，假法亦無，便成無見。不應與言，不應共住。自墮惡趣，亦令他墮。如是成立『遍計所執自性』為空及『依他起自性』為有，契當正理。」

「若此義言『依他起性』亦無所有，故立為空』，汝便墮落如上所說過失深坑，亦復成就誹謗世尊聖教過失。」

Based on the Buddha's teaching on emptiness from YB (which states that "this is empty of that, because that does not exist; this is empty, because this does exist,") the Yogācāras in Bhāviveka's presentation explain that emptiness is achieved when the thing present ("this") is empty of other non-existent things ("that"). Because the dependent nature of the real things is not of the imagined nature of the designations, what is existent is the dependent nature and what is essentially non-existent is the imagined nature. The real thing and the dependent nature (being the inherent nature of the real things) must be real ultimately to be the basis for the existence and emptiness of the designations and the imagined nature.

The dependent nature is also understood in relation to the naturelessness of arising; they are two sides of the same coin. While things that exist through dependent origination do not exist spontaneously or independently, they do not arise with a permanent existence or an unchanging nature, and hence there is the naturelessness of arising in regard to these dependently-arisen things.³⁸²

Thus in Bhāviveka's presentation, the Yogācāras claim that: if Bhāviveka is attempting to prove that the dependently-arisen things are empty due to the naturelessness of arising or the dependent nature, then he is merely establishing what they have already established. But knowing Bhāviveka indeed denies the ultimate reality of these natures and holds that things are empty because they do not have any such natures, the Yogācāras point out that if the dependent nature were unreal or non-existent, then the dependent origination of the conditioned things (which are the real things in their understanding) would be denied. This means that things would not arise at all and become non-existent even conventionally. Designations and conventional knowledge would also become impossible. There would be no

³⁸² There are also the naturelessness of characteristics (*lakṣaṇa-niḥsvabhāvatā*) and the naturelessness of the ultimate truth (*paramārtha-niḥsvabhāvatā*) in the doctrine of three non-natures (*tri-vidhā niḥsvabhāvatā*). The former is understood in relation to the imagined nature, which refers to the designation of false concepts, i.e. characteristics, onto the dependently-arisen real things by speech and thought. As the ultimate reality of the characteristics of the subjective and objective aspects arisen from the store-consciousness (as that which expresses and that which is expressed) are falsely conceptualised and originally non-existent, so there is the naturelessness of characteristics in regard to these falsely conceptualised things. The latter is understood in relation to the perfected nature, which refers to the suchness (*tathatā*), i.e. the nature (*dharmatā*) of the real things that is ineffable when they are free from the imposition of false concepts. As nothing exists with a nature in the ultimate truth, there is the naturelessness of the ultimate truth. See also discussions on the three non-natures and their relation to the three natures in the TJ of MHK 5.5 in Eckel 2008, p. 223; see also Vol. 73 of YB in CBETA, T30, no. 1579, 702b17ff.; Chapter 5 of SNS in CBETA, T16, no. 676, 694a2ff.; Chapter 7 of XYSJL in CBETA, T31, no. 1602, 557b19-b23; and also Nagao 1992, pp. 181-187.

causation as there would be neither cause nor effect. As there would nor be karmic fruit (*phala*) from skilful or unskilful actions (*karma*), there would be no spiritual attainment for enlightenment or liberation.³⁸³ The denial of the ultimate reality of the dependent nature is therefore the same as nihilism. Nothing could be empty of anything else or be emptied, and emptiness would become inconceivable. Bhāviveka would have contradicted his own doctrine, i.e. the middle way, and the Buddha's teaching on emptiness discussed above. On this basis, the Yogācāras criticise Bhāviveka of having an erroneous view of emptiness.

To this, Bhāviveka replies:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272a11-a14)

[Response:] We even gladly seek for skilful explanation with other vehicles which set out to pursue [enlightenment] and with the heretics, without greed and envy; we debate extensively [with them], not to mention the followers of the same One Vehicle³⁸⁴ who are going towards the same destination as we are.³⁸⁵ As the opportunity presents itself, together we shall briefly discern this matter in this discussion. As this matter has already been analysed extensively like in **Tattvāmṛtāvatāra*,³⁸⁶ it will not be explained [at length] again,

³⁸³ Cf. MMK 24.1-24.6.

³⁸⁴ There are three vehicles (*triyāna*). The Vehicle of the Hearers (*śrāvaka-yāna*) is followed by the *arhats*. The Vehicle of the Privately-enlightened Buddhas (*pratyeka-buddha-yāna*) is concerned with the Buddhas who practise and attain enlightenment by themselves and do not teach to the others. The One Vehicle (*eka-yāna*) refers to the Vehicle of the Bodhisattvas (*bodhisattva-yāna*), which is generally known as Mahā-yāna. It is considered the most excellent among the three by practitioners of Mahāyāna; for details, see the entry of “一乘” in DDB. The followers of the One Vehicle mentioned here refer to the Yogācāras.

³⁸⁵ Poussin 1933, p. 95 seems to understand this sentence as said by the Yogācāras. However, this translation considers it as Bhāviveka's response, explaining why he is going to discuss with the Yogācāras although a long discussion has already been done in **Tattvāmṛtāvatāra*; see also Zangyao, p.9 and Hatani 1976, p. 114.

³⁸⁶ There is another occasion in KR where Bhāviveka's earlier work **Tattvāmṛtāvatāra* (人真甘露) is mentioned. In the discussion of unconditioned things after Yogācāra's notion of the ultimate reality of suchness has been refuted, Bhāviveka comments that this subject has already been treated in **Tattvāmṛtāvatāra*. (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 275a12)

**Tattvāmṛtāvatāra* is recognised to include at least the first three chapters of MHK. Eckel comments that Bhāviveka in KR refers his discussion on Yogācāra to these three chapters. His discussion is also a preview to the Chapter 5 of MHK on the reality of Yogācāra. (Eckel 2008, p. 23) Ejima and Saito point out that **Tattvāmṛtāvatāra* refers to Chapters 1 to 5 of MHK (Ejima 1987, p. 201-214, Saito 2005, p. 67-173); see also Iida 1980, p. 52ff; Ejima 1980, 15-16. Zangyao, p. 9 notes that **Tattvāmṛtāvatāra* refers to the Chapter 5 of MHK.

as people who are afraid of long speech will not be delighted.³⁸⁷

YB is one of the foundational texts that define the identity of the Yogācāras. The teaching of emptiness in the Yogācāras' objection, which is a direct quotation from the *Cūḷasuññata Sutta*, did not attract much attention to Madhyamaka, but had a great influence on the formation of Yogācāra's notion of other-emptiness,³⁸⁸ i.e. the emptiness of the imagined nature in the dependent nature. Although Bhāviveka has already discussed the problems of Yogācāra doctrine in his earlier work, **Tattvāmṛtāvatāra*, it may be reasonable to assume that he intentionally includes the discussion of YB in order to clarify the meaning of dependent origination and emptiness, as an important step to establish the self-emptiness of all conditioned things.

As Bhāviveka considers the lack of an inherent existence or nature in the dependently-arisen things the fundamental reason for their emptiness, he attempts to refute both the ultimate existence of the dependent nature and the absolute non-existence of the imagined nature. There are four parts to Bhāviveka's response: [1] if things do not arise with an ultimate existence, then they should not possess the naturelessness of arising or the dependent nature; [2] the Buddha's teaching on emptiness from YB has been misinterpreted by the Yogācāras; [3] the ultimate reality of the dependent nature as an ineffable real nature is untenable, regardless of whether it is established independently or in terms of reasoning; [4] the defilements of all sentient beings will not be eliminated with the non-existence of the imagined nature. Hence, the Yogācāras' doctrine regarding the emptiness of the imagined nature in the dependent nature of things, as he has presented above, is superfluous.³⁸⁹

Regarding [1], Bhāviveka denies that his inference has committed the fallacy of establishing what has already been established by the Yogācāras. This is because he does not agree with those who take the naturelessness of arising or the dependent

³⁸⁷ KR: 此中尚與發趣餘乘及諸外道欣求善說，離慳嫉者，廣興諍論，何況同趣一乘諸師？論時至故，少共決擇此事。廣如《入真甘露》已具分別，故不重辯，怖廣文者不欣樂故。

³⁸⁸ See “‘What remains’ in *śūnyatā*: a Yogācāra interpretation of emptiness” in Nagao 1992, pp. 51-60.

³⁸⁹ The discussions of the dependent nature and the imagined nature have also been taken up in MHK/TJ 5.55-5.84. (Eckel 2008, pp. 261-283) See also Bhāviveka's refutation of the three natures in the Chapter 5 of MHK summarised in Thakchöe 2015.

nature to be ultimately real, while claiming that the dependently-arisen things, which are taken to be possessing the two, do not arise with an ultimate existence. On his interpretation, this should contradict the Yogācāras' own doctrine of emptiness. His demonstrates this as follows:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272a15-a26)

[1] You say that “conditioned things that arise from numerous conditions are not existent spontaneously [and that] they are explained as empty in terms of ‘the naturelessness of arising’.”

What does this mean? [1a] If it means “the eyes and other conditioned things that are permanent and indestructible do not arise from causes in ‘the dependently-arisen’ [things]; as [such] eyes and other inherent existents are absolutely non-existent, they are designated as empty,” then it is establishing what has already been established. This is because this is commonly admitted by our own kind [i.e. the Buddhists], the Sāṃkhyas, the Vaiśeṣikas and all other doctrines.

However, [if] it [means to] say that “eyes, etc. are not empty as they are produced, [but] because they are empty in their own nature,”³⁹⁰ [then] you should say that “they are ‘non-arisen’ and ‘without an inherent existence’ [and] therefore empty.” You should not say that “they are explained as empty in terms of ‘the naturelessness of arising’.” If, when they [eyes, etc.] arise, so does their inherent existence in terms of the ultimate truth, [then] why are they explained as “arising without an inherent existence” [i.e. “the naturelessness of arising”]? If [their inherent existence] in fact does not arise, then there is no such a substantial existence. So you should not say that there

³⁹⁰ Sastri 1949, p. 16 understands this sentence as Bhāviveka's quoting of the Yogācāras' response. But this Commentary understands it as Bhāviveka's interpretation of the meaning of their notion of the naturelessness of arising. Hsu 2013, p. 213 gives a different translation: However, eyes, etc. are not caused to be empty instead they are empty in their own nature; cf. the similar translation in Poussin 1933, p. 96.

exists “the reality of consciousness-only (*viññapti-mātratā*)”.³⁹¹

Otherwise, you would commit the fallacy of contradicting your own doctrine.³⁹²

Bhāviveka starts by questioning what the Yogācāras actually mean when they claim that things that have arisen dependently – such as eyes, etc., which have the dependent nature and do not exist spontaneously – are empty due to the naturelessness of arising. On his interpretation, there are two possible meanings: [1a] some permanent eyes do not arise and are therefore absolutely non-existent in the dependently-arisen eyes and hence, the dependently-arisen eyes are empty of the former; [1b] these dependently-arisen eyes are empty because their nature of being existent spontaneously is empty and non-existent (see below). However, both meanings are problematic.

Regarding [1a], Bhāviveka points out that the Yogācāras have committed the fallacy of establishing what has already been established. This is because other Buddhists and the heretics, such as the Sāṃkhyas and the Vaiśeṣikas, do not dispute it. Buddhists in general, including Bhāviveka himself, hold that conditioned things, e.g. eyes, are impermanent, and lack an ultimate existence or a permanent and unchanging nature. Therefore, they can accept the Yogācāras’ claim that some permanent and indestructible existence is not present in these things. This is also compatible with the Sāṃkhyas’ doctrine of manifestation. As already discussed under Objection 13, it is unacceptable to the Sāṃkhyas that two things can manifest at the same time in the same locus. Hence, if the dependently-arisen eyes are

³⁹¹ See verse 25 of Vasubandhu’s *Triṃśikā-viññapti-kārikā* (Anacker 2005, p. 423) and Xuanzang’s translation on CBETA, T31, no. 1586, 61a27. To the Yogācāras, the real nature of things, or the suchness of the real things in their understanding, is consciousness-only. It is emptiness understood as the non-existence of the imagined nature in the dependent nature, i.e. the perfected nature, or as the non-existence of false concepts in the real things, which have arisen from consciousness. Without the imagined nature or the false concepts, consciousness in the perfected nature is non-dual and ineffable. The Yogācāras take it as their ultimate reality.

³⁹² KR: 言「有為法從眾緣生，非自然有，就『生無性』說彼為空」，此有何義？若此義言「眼等有為『依他起』上不從因生，常、無滅壞。眼等自性畢竟無故，說名為空」，便立已成，同類、數論、勝論等宗皆共許故。

然說「眼等非所作空，自性空故」，應言「『無生』、『無性』故空」，不應說言「就『生無性』說彼為空」。若彼起時，就勝義諦有自性生，云何說為「生無自性」？若實無生，此體無故，不應說有「唯識實性」，若爾則有違自宗過。

Poussin 1933, p. 96 understands “無生” and “無性” as a single term “absence de nature proper du fait de non-production” (*anutpatti-niḥsvabhāvatā*), i.e. “無生無性”. As the term “*anutpatti-niḥsvabhāvatā*” is rare, my translation did not follow his understanding.

manifesting, then the permanent eyes will not be able to manifest. As for the Vaiśeṣikas, since Bhāviveka did not offer any discussion of their doctrine before the present objection, it is unclear why he would think that they agree with the Yogācāras' claim. The Vaiśeṣikas hold that no produced things are empty. This is because they are inhered in by universals, which are non-produced and unchanging, so that things are qualified as what they are.³⁹³ These universals are considered ultimate existents to Bhāviveka. While the produced things are existent, i.e. not empty, to the Vaiśeṣikas, the Vaiśeṣikas may consider things to be empty (in the sense of non-existent) if they are not inhered in by such universals. Since both the Buddhists and the heretics agree on this meaning of the Yogācāras' claim, there is no need to propose it again in the debate involving these parties.

As explained above, the naturelessness of arising (i.e. not arising with a spontaneous existence or an ultimate existence) refers to the dependent nature (i.e. arising dependently on conditions) of things. Hence, on Bhāviveka's interpretation, the Yogācāras' claim understood in terms of [1a] may actually mean that these things are empty in their own nature, and are therefore not produced in the ultimate sense. Based on this meaning, Bhāviveka then considers that it is inappropriate to explain the emptiness of conditioned things in terms of the naturelessness of arising. The emptiness of these things is not that they are not produced with the inherence of an ultimate existence. It is rather that they do not have an inherent existence to start with. As they arise inter-dependently, taking each other as conditions, they cannot have a permanent or indestructible existence; they do not arise or be produced to exist ultimately. For this reason, conditioned things are considered as empty (i.e., in the Yogācāras' understanding, as not arisen to be inhered in by some permanent or indestructible existence). Therefore, instead of taking conditioned things as empty due to their arising in a natureless way, they should be considered empty as they do not arise independently and are without an inherent existence in the ultimate sense.

Further, in Bhāviveka's presentation, the Yogācāras have created a dilemma for themselves if they take either the naturelessness of arising or the dependent nature as ultimately real. The dependent nature refers to the inherent nature of the real things being dependently-arisen, while the naturelessness of arising refers to things arisen

³⁹³ See details in Potter 1977, pp. 133-140.

without an ultimate existence or nature. Although the two notions are employed to explain the emptiness of conditioned things, how can a conditioned thing be inhered in by them, both of which are ultimately real, and be empty at the same time? Possessing them and being empty of them are mutually exclusive. Hence, Bhāviveka points out that, on the one hand, if an inherent nature, as an ultimate reality, of the dependently-arisen things could arise together with these things, then the Yogācāras' explanation of dependently-arisen things in terms of the naturelessness of arising would be unreasonable. On the other hand, if these things do not arise with an inherent nature at all, then neither is it reasonable for the Yogācāras to take the naturelessness of arising or the dependent nature as ultimately real.

The Yogācāras regard consciousness as the ultimate reality because it is the only dependently-arisen thing that remains existent after all false concepts are emptied. It possesses the perfected nature, i.e. the purified dependent nature emptied of the imagined nature, or the naturelessness of arising. Based on the discussion here, Bhāviveka claims that this “reality of consciousness-only” is untenable.³⁹⁴ This is because consciousness, as a dependently-arisen thing, cannot be empty of an ultimate existence while at the same time possessing the purified dependent nature, which nature is indeed not different from any other ultimate existence. In this way, the Yogācāras, as portrayed by Bhāviveka, have contradicted their own doctrine, which holds that all conditioned things are essentially not inhered in by any ultimate existence.

Bhāviveka goes on to evaluate meaning [1b], which indicates that conditioned things are empty because their nature of being existent spontaneously is empty and non-existent:

[1b] If [it means that] “the dependently-arisen” [things] are designated as empty because their nature of spontaneous arising [i.e. of being existent spontaneously] is empty and non-existent, then you are still establishing what has already been established. Since you admit “the dependent [nature]”,

³⁹⁴ See also MHK/TJ 5.17-5.54 to see Bhāviveka's arguments against the Yogācāras' notion that no object exists outside consciousness, in Eckel 2008, pp. 232-261.

things that arise from conditions should in fact be not empty.
Therefore, they should not be designated as empty. [As] this is
not the way we understand it, why do [you say that] we state
and establish the Yogācāras' doctrine?³⁹⁵

In terms of [1b], the Yogācāras have again committed the fallacy of establishing what has already been established (in Bhāviveka's understanding), for Bhāviveka also agrees that conditioned things which cannot arise independently are empty of the nature of spontaneous arising (although he holds that their lack of an inherent existence is the more fundamental reason for their emptiness).

From this, Bhāviveka points out that as long as the Yogācāras in his portrayal admit the ultimate reality of the dependent nature, they should not take the dependently-arisen things that possess this nature to be empty, and designate these things as such. If the Yogācāras really adhere to their doctrine of the emptiness of conditioned things, then they should discard their notions of dependent nature and the naturelessness of arising altogether. Since Bhāviveka has a different understanding of emptiness than the Yogācāras, he concludes this argument by denying that he is stating or establishing the Yogācāras' doctrine.

After demonstrating the conflict between the ultimate reality of the dependent nature or the naturelessness arising and emptiness in Yogācāra, Bhāviveka further argues that the Buddha's teaching from YB is misinterpreted by the Yogācāras. In his response [2], the correct understanding of this teaching is clarified to be that the ultimate existence of conditioned things is refuted to avoid the extreme of eternalism, and their conventional existence affirmed to avoid the extreme of nihilism:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272a26-b15)

[2] Again, according to what is said, "[this] is empty of that, because that does not exist; [this] is empty, because this does exist," etc.; all [things] that are commonly recognised by the world as real, like eyes, etc. that are produced by the efficacy

³⁹⁵ KR: 若「依他起」自然生性空無有故，說之為空，是則還有立已成過。既許「依他」，眾緣而生實不空故，應不名空。我則不爾。云何述成相應師義？

of causes and conditions, are those which are cognised by the fools' intellect. Conventionally, it appears as if there is the manifestation of their inherent existence; [but when we] investigate [the nature of these things] by means of the intellect of the ultimate truth, [these things,] just like the illusory men, do not have any reality at all. For this reason, it is said that "[this] is empty of that, because that does not exist" for the sake of avoiding the fault of falling into the extreme of eternalism.

In order to get rid of the fault of falling into the extreme of eternalism, we say "that" is "non-existent"; also in order to get rid of the fault of falling into the extreme of nihilism, we say "this" is "existent": eyes, etc., which are produced by the efficacy of causes and conditions, are included in the conventional truth, [and] there is their inherent existence, unlike a sky-flower which is non-existent absolutely. But in terms of the ultimate truth, they are established as empty. For this reason, it is said that "[this] is empty, because this does exist." This emptiness is explained by the teacher of deities and men according to reality. If you explain "the dependent nature" as existent based on this meaning [of emptiness as understood by us], then [your explanation] is a skilful explanation [of the Buddha's teaching].³⁹⁶

According to Bhāviveka, the Buddha actually refers "that" to the existence of the conditioned things in terms of the ultimate truth in his teaching, and "this" to the existence of these things in terms of the conventional truth. Hence, the correct understanding of this teaching is: the conventional existence of conditioned things is

³⁹⁶ KR: 又如所說「由彼故空，彼實是無。依此故空，此實有」等，若因緣力所生眼等一切世間共許實有是諸愚夫覺慧所行。世俗似有自性顯現，以勝義諦覺慧尋求，猶如幻士，都無實性，是故說言「由彼故空，彼實是無」，為欲遮墮常邊過故。

如為棄捨墮常邊過，說彼為「無」；亦為棄捨墮斷邊過，說此為「有」。謂因緣力所生眼等世俗諦攝，自性是有，不同空華全無有物，但就真性立之為空，是故說言「依此故空，此實是有」。如是空性是天人師如實所說。若就此義說「依他起自性」是有，則為善說。

empty of their ultimate existence because their ultimate existence does not exist; their conventional existence is empty because it does exist. Or simply as: conditioned things are empty of an inherent existence, because their inherent existence does not exist in the ultimate sense; conditioned things are empty because they do exist in the conventional sense.

In order to avoid the extreme of eternalism, the ultimate existence of conditioned things is refuted. Also to avoid the extreme of nihilism, their conventional existence is affirmed. Bhāviveka explains that it is only through ordinary people's intellect that conditioned things are commonly recognised to have an inherent existence. If these things are examined in terms of the ultimate truth, then their existence is like an illusory man; he was believed to be real, but is now revealed to be unreal. Thus, conditioned things should not be granted ultimate existence ("that"). However, conditioned things are indeed produced by causes and conditions. They are not absolutely non-existent, unlike a sky-flower which does not arise. Thus, their conventional existence ("this") should be granted.

While the Buddha's teaching on emptiness in YB is quoted from the *Cūḷasuññata Sutta*, it would contribute to the present discussion by noting the circumstance where this teaching is delivered. When every time a meditative object is realised to be empty, the Buddha says, "thus he regards it as void of what is not there, but as to what remains there he understands that which is present thus: 'This is present'." After the perceptions of village and people up to the defilements from sensual desire, life and ignorance have all been realised as empty, the things that remain present are the six sense faculties that are dependent on the Buddha's body and conditioned by his present life. Nonetheless, the sense faculties, the Buddha's body and his present life are conditioned and impermanent.³⁹⁷ The subject matter of the *Cūḷasuññata Sutta* is the method of meditation that takes emptiness as its object, so that things that have become empty during the process are realised as not existent ultimately. But this method does not therefore affirm the remaining sense faculties, etc. as ultimately real, as they can remain present in a conventional sense.³⁹⁸ If the Yogācāras, on Bhāviveka's interpretation, have indeed developed the notion of

³⁹⁷ See Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi 1995, pp. 969-970.

³⁹⁸ See further discussion in Anālayo 2012, pp. 347-349.

other-emptiness and the reality of consciousness-only from this passage, then they may have misunderstood its meaning as they have reified the existence of consciousness and its dependent nature. In view of this, Bhāviveka considers that their teaching on the ultimate reality of the dependent nature is not a skilful explanation of the teaching of the Buddha. Unless they can understand the dependent nature according to the meaning just explained by him and only take it as a conventional reality, they would be the ones who hold a wrong view of emptiness instead of him.

Then, Bhāviveka refutes the Yogācāras' accusation that he has committed the fault of nihilism in relation to the conventional existence of the dependent nature:

As we also accept this kind of inherent nature, as this conforms to the two kinds of accumulation, [namely] merit and knowledge, that are included in the conventional speech in the world,³⁹⁹ and as those on which the conventional designations depend are existent, so are the things designated.⁴⁰⁰ But then you say, “if ‘this’ [i.e. ‘the real things that exist through dependent arising’] is non-existent, so are the things designated. This view then becomes a nihilistic view. One should neither speak to [nor stay with people who adopt this view].” These faults [which you attribute to us] are all unestablished.

Again, if you establish that “‘the dependent nature’ is conventional therefore it is existent”, then you are establishing what has already been established. If you establish that “this ‘[dependent] nature’ is existent in terms of the ultimate truth”, there will be no positive example. As those who attach to

³⁹⁹ See footnotes 118 and 127.

⁴⁰⁰ In his translation, Poussin only takes the second reason in the present translation, i.e. “conformation to the two kinds of accumulation” and the third reason, i.e. “the existence of those on which the conventional designations depend” as the reasons for “the existence of the things designated”. He understands the first reason, i.e. “the conventional existence of inherent nature”, in relation to the dependent nature as a good speech, if such a nature is existent based on the meaning of emptiness explained by Bhāviveka. (Poussin 1933, p. 97)

“ultimate existence” (lit. the notion that things definitely have an inherent existence) have already been refuted, those who attach to “absolute non-existence” (lit. the notion that things definitely lack an inherent existence) should also be refuted. For this reason, one should neither reject (*apavadati*), add to (*adhikaṃkaroti*) nor subtract (*nyūnīkaroti*)⁴⁰¹ the discussed “dependent nature”.⁴⁰²

The Yogācāras, in Bhāviveka’s presentation, have accused Bhāviveka of being a nihilist in their objection. This is because they think that he has denied the dependent nature, and thus the existence of, the real things that exist through dependent arising. As a result, the designations of their inherent natures and differences, which are necessary for everyday life, would lose their basis and become impossible. From this, they determine that Bhāviveka has denied the existence of everything. But the discussion above shows that Bhāviveka in fact does not deny dependent origination. Neither does he deny the existence of designated things as conditioned things, as they are admitted as having an inherent existence in the conventional sense. While a practitioner is required to accumulate merit and knowledge early on her path to liberation, she has to achieve this with conventional practices and speech that would be otherwise impossible without the designation of conventional existents. As conventional existence is not denied, the designations of things, conventional speech and practices are not denied either. These accumulations are therefore possible. As both conditioned things and their designations are existent according to Bhāviveka’s understanding of emptiness, and as spiritual practice in general is also possible with this understanding, from his standpoint, it is unreasonable for the Yogācāras to accuse him of holding nihilistic views.

⁴⁰¹ Poussin 1933, p. 98 suggests the Sanskrit equivalents “*apavadati*”, “*adhikaṃkaroti*”, “*nyūnīkaroti*” for “謗言”, “增益”, “損減” (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272b15). “Reject” translates the Chinese term “謗言”, following the translation in *ibid.* and note 2. Hsu, p. 216 understands it as “accuse” (hence rendering the translation: you should not accuse us of increasing or decreasing other-dependence.)

⁴⁰² KR: 如是自性我亦許故，隨順世間言說所攝福德、智慧二資糧故，世俗假立所依有故，假法亦有。然復說言「此若無者，假法亦無，便成無見。不應與語...」，如是等過皆不成就。又若建立「『依他起性』世俗故有」，便立已成。若立「此性勝義諦有」，無同法喻。如已遮遣執「定有性」，亦當遮遣執「定無性」，是故不應謗言、增益、損減所說「依他起性」。

With the above discussion, the Yogācāras in Bhāviveka's presentation can no longer establish the reality of the dependent nature in the debate because it is problematic both conventionally and ultimately. In MHK/TJ 5.71, Bhāviveka has already pointed out that if the Yogācāras respond that the dependent nature is existent because it is conventional, i.e. it is a conventional existent, then they are merely establishing what has already been established by him. This is because he also accepts the inherent existence of things in the conventional sense, and he does take the dependent nature as conventional. In contrast, if the Yogācāras insist on the ultimate reality of the dependent nature, then they would be unable to provide any positive example to support this. This is because, as already discussed in relation to [1], if they hold that all things are empty of a permanent and indestructible existence, then these things should also be empty of the dependent nature, which is ultimately real and not different from such ultimate existence in his understanding. A thing which is empty and at the same time inhered in by an ultimate existence, i.e. not empty, is absurd. The real nature of consciousness is refuted for the same reason. Hence, he thinks that it is unreasonable to take consciousness as the positive example.

Thus, Bhāviveka concludes that the dependent nature regarding the existence of conditioned things should be understood in terms of the middle way as neither ultimately existent nor absolutely non-existent. Things that have arisen dependently from causes and conditions should not be taken as either (i.) having an inherent nature ultimately or (ii.) not having one even conventionally. This sense of the middle way should also be applied to the notion of dependent nature itself, meaning that it should only be taken as a conventional reality. For this reason, Bhāviveka comments that it is equally erroneous to reject the dependent nature as absolutely non-existent, to add to it to become ultimately existent, or to subtract it to become merely an imaginary existence.

In [3], the dependent nature in its purified state (i.e. when it is free from the dualistic concepts), which is added to or reified to become an ineffable true nature, will be refuted. In [4], the dependent nature in its defiled state (i.e. with the presence of these concepts), which is subtracted to become the imagined nature, will also be refuted. In [3a], Bhāviveka refutes the Yogācāras' claim, as portrayed by him, that the purified state of the dependent nature, as an ineffable real nature, is established

outside reasoning, because such a nature would be not different from the ineffable realities in the heretics' doctrines. Then, in [3b] he points out that the ultimate reality of the dependent nature, according to his interpretation, will make illusions not different from the real things, thus making the designations of things impossible. This cancels the difference between the perfected, dependent and imagined natures of things. Regarding [3a], Bhāviveka says:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272b16-b28)

[3a] If you say that “our thesis establishes that there is an ineffable reality of illusions, etc. Because there is no positive example, this is not something that can be proved. As the reasoning for this ineffable reality cannot be established, therefore we do not commit any fault,”⁴⁰³ if so, who can refute the ineffable realities such as the Self,⁴⁰⁴ etc., to which the heretics attach themselves? They also claim that “there are realities such as the Self, etc., because [these realities] are not cognised by intellect (*buddhi*) or by speech.”⁴⁰⁵

Bhāviveka has previously demonstrated that the Yogācāras cannot provide a positive example to support the ultimate existence of the dependent nature due to the absurdity of conditioned things, which do not arise with an ultimate existence, being inhered in by such an ultimately existent nature. To this, he anticipates the Yogācāras to counter-argue that the purified state of this dependent nature (i.e. the perfected nature of consciousness), which is free from false conceptualisations, is the ineffable reality of the dependently-arisen things such as illusions, etc. As this reality is non-conceptual to start with, he anticipates the Yogācāras to counter-argue that it

⁴⁰³ Cf. MHK/TJ 5.104, where the Yogācāras argue for a reality of things which cannot be known by logical reasoning. This is followed by Bhāviveka's response in MHK/TJ 5.107ff. While admitting that the reality of things is not an object knowable by logical reasoning, he emphasises the importance of logical reasoning, i.e. to eliminate false views. As this reality is indeed not an object to be known, therefore the reality (i.e. the object “suchness”) that the Yogācāras argue for is not the true reality of things either. (Eckel 2008, pp. 295-298)

⁴⁰⁴ “Self, etc.” translates the Chinese term “我等” (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272b18), which is understood as “us” or “our” in Hsu 2003, p. 216.

⁴⁰⁵ KR: 若言「我宗立有幻等離言實性，同喻無故，非能立者，離言實性道理不成，故無有過」；若爾，外道所執離言實性我等，誰能遮破？彼亦說「有實性我等，非慧、非言之所行故」。

is not to be established by logical reasoning. Therefore, it is not fallacious if it does not have a positive example in order to be proved.

However, the proposal that dependently-arisen things exist ultimately in some ineffable way is untenable because, in Bhāviveka's understanding, it amounts to admitting the ultimate reality of consciousness. For Yogācāra regards the subjective aspect of consciousness as ultimately real when the consciousness is in the perfected nature; to Bhāviveka, this ineffable reality is therefore not different from the ineffable and non-conceptual realities such as the Self, etc. in the heretics' doctrines. Buddhism generally sets out to refute such ultimate realities through its doctrine of no-Self. If the Yogācāras' ineffable perfected nature of consciousness were accepted, then there would be a double-standard regarding the ultimate existence of the Self, and the Yogācāras would no longer be in the position to refute the heretics. In view of this, the Yogācāras may justify themselves by clarifying that this ineffable real nature is different from the Self because the latter is the subjective aspect of the consciousness that is reified by false conceptualisation. However, they are still not in the position to refute the equally ineffable realities of the heretics by reasoning, for they cannot justify why their ineffable reality is established while other ineffable realities are not. The justifications and refutations involved here, although outside the scope of discussion, exactly require the use of logical reasoning, which the Yogācāras deny.

In [3b], Bhāviveka further points out the problems that arise if the dependent nature is established as an ultimate reality:

[3b] If all things produced by the efficacy of numerous conditions, which are in a "dependent nature", had an inherent nature in terms of the ultimate truth, then the illusory men should also have the inherent existence of the real men. Neither is it reasonable [for these things] to have the natures of other things, as the nature of a donkey should not exist in a cow. [These natures] also include the dualities of the natures of production and non-production, ultimate existence and absolute non-existence, and possession of an inherent nature

and non-possession of an inherent nature. This which is established [by the Yogācāras] is either without a positive example or establishes what have already been established. Having these two faults, it is therefore not reasonable.⁴⁰⁶

Bhāviveka admits that the dependently-arisen things have a dependent nature in the conventional sense. Here, on his interpretation, he argues that if these things also possess such a nature in the ultimate sense in the form of an ineffable reality, then the illusory men would have the same nature as the real men. Conventionally, illusory men are distinguished from the real men based on the common conception that they lack the reality of the latter. To Bhāviveka, the real men, who have arisen from conditions, may be compared with the real things that have the dependent nature in the Yogācāras' understanding. However, illusions also arise from conditions. In this way, on Bhāviveka's interpretation, the illusory men should also be taken as real and as possessing the dependent nature, like the real men. While they both are real and have the dependent nature in the ultimate sense, they would no longer be distinguishable from each other. While the Yogācāras could instead regard the real men and the illusory men as equally unreal; either way, their treatment of the ultimate reality of the dependent nature would contradict conventional knowledge.

Also because the dependently-arisen things are inhered in by this ineffable reality, based on Bhāviveka's interpretation, the designations of these things have become impossible. The Yogācāras hold that false concepts do not originally pertain to the dependently-arisen things, i.e. that the imagined nature is essentially non-existent in the existent dependent nature. But due to the defiled state of the dependent nature, the dependently-arisen things in their doctrine are also allowed to be imposed upon with false concepts and acquire an imagined nature. However, when a thing is inhered in by a nature in the ultimate sense, it should possess this nature in all places and at all times, and will not possess any other nature. Otherwise, this nature would either be not real in the ultimate sense or not the inherent nature of the thing. Thus, as the dependently-arisen things have already inhered in by such an ineffable reality

⁴⁰⁶ KR: 若眾緣力所生一切「依他起性」就勝義諦有自性者，幻土應有實土自性。若有他性，亦不應理，牛上不應有驢性故。作、非作性、實有、實無、有性、無性二俱攝受。如此所立，無同法喻，或立已成。二過所染，故不應理。

in the ultimate sense, they cannot be inhered by another nature, being the unreal imagined nature in the present context. This is because real and unreal are mutually exclusive. In Bhāviveka's word, donkey-ness does not inhere in a cow, which is already inhered in by cowness.

In addition, the Yogācāras hold that this ultimate reality is ineffable. If things have such a reality in the ultimate sense, then based on Bhāviveka's interpretation again, they cannot at the same time be inhered by a contradictory effable nature, which is indeed of an imagined nature. Therefore, having an ineffable reality, that which was designated as an illusory man can no longer be designated as such. As a result of everything being real and ineffable, speech and thought cannot function to discriminate. Eventually, designations of concepts, such as being produced or non-produced, ultimately existent or absolutely non-existent and having an inherent nature or not having one, are denied altogether. The differences between things having a perfected nature, a dependent nature and an imagined nature have also been denied. If nothing has an imagined nature and everything has the perfected nature – i.e. the ineffable reality that is the purified state of the dependent nature – then it is no longer necessary to have the three natures; the dependent nature and imagined nature can be cancelled. On Bhāviveka's interpretation, thus, the legitimacy of the Yogācāra doctrine, which builds upon the notions of dependent origination, of the absolute non-existence of the imagined nature in the ultimately existent dependent nature and of emptiness, is also harmed.

Such a nature is untenable, further, because in Bhāviveka's understanding it cannot be supported by any positive example. If any similar instance possessed such an ineffable reality, it would be non-conceptual and ineffable, and therefore fail to be an example.

The Yogācāras in Bhāviveka's portrayal claim that the designation of things is possible only if there is the dependent nature because this nature guarantees the existence of the dependently-arisen real things that are the bases for designation to take place. Such a nature must be ultimately real for this reason. However, Bhāviveka has shown that it is exactly *because* of the ultimate reality of this nature that the designations of things have become impossible. This consequence suggests

that the Yogācāras in Bhāviveka's presentation should discard the notion of the ultimate reality of the dependent nature and admit its conventional reality. But if they do so, they still have committed the fallacy of establishing what has already been established because Bhāviveka does admit the conventional reality of the dependent nature.

This problem of the ultimate reality of the dependent nature, according to Bhāviveka, is shown more precisely through the fallacious thesis of the Yogācāras, which invalidates their inference:

Again, if conditioned things, which are arisen from conditions, are accepted as having a [dependent] nature in terms of the ultimate truth – with the reason “because they are produced” that proves them as empty of a nature and refutes such a nature as existent – this thesis [that you have stated] therefore has the fallacy of invalidating the inference.⁴⁰⁷ Things arisen from conditions are commonly recognised by all as having a nature conventionally. If there are some who attach to [the notion of] these things having a nature in terms of the ultimate truth, then their thesis should be refuted by this reasoning. Also, they [i.e. the Yogācāras] should not hold this doctrine [either], as the twofold discriminations, [such as the dualities of ultimate existence and absolute non-existence, etc., that are established] in terms of the ultimate truth do not conform to [their] reasoning.⁴⁰⁸

⁴⁰⁷ Poussin 1933, p. 99 and HE 2012, p. 14 indicate that this is the fallacy committed when the property to be inferred in relation to the subject in the thesis is contradicted by another inference (*anumāna-viruddha*). NP gives the example of the thesis “jars are permanent” to illustrate this (CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 11b28; Section 3.1 [2] in Tachikawa 1971, pp. 122, 141), because it is contradicted by an established inference which can prove the impermanence of jars. However, the Yogācāras may not have committed this fallacy here. Their thesis is faulty not because it is contradicted by another inference, but because it is contradicted by their own reason. Cf. MHK/TJ 5.71, where their reason is said to be contradictory. (Eckel 2008, p. 274 and note 89)

⁴⁰⁸ KR: 又從緣生諸有為法就勝義諦若許有性，「所作故」因證彼性空、遣彼性有，故所立宗違比量過。諸從緣生皆共了知世俗有性。若有定執勝義諦有，應以此理遮破彼宗。又彼不應攝受此論，就勝義諦二種分別，不應理故。

In Bhāviveka's presentation, the Yogācāras' argument can be structured as an inference:

Thesis: In terms of the ultimate truth, conditioned things possess the dependent nature,
Reason: because they are produced.

The fallacy of invalidating the inference is committed because the property, “possessing the dependent nature in the ultimate sense”, to be inferred in relation to the conditioned things can be contradicted by an inference by Bhāviveka which infers the opposite of this property, with the same property that infers, i.e. “being produced”. Referring to previous discussions, in Bhāviveka's portrayal the Yogācāras also hold that produced things lack an ultimate existence. For this reason, conditioned things, which are produced, should not possess the dependent nature, as an ultimate reality, in the ultimate sense. Hence, their reason is establishing the contrary of what it is meant to establish in the thesis. Besides, Bhāviveka thinks that the Yogācāras' cannot provide a positive example in their inference. As they deny all dualities in the ultimate sense, ultimately, there is no similar instance that possesses any properties (including “being produced” and “possessing the dependent nature in the ultimate sense”). The thesis “conditioned things possess the dependent nature in the conventional sense” would also be fallacious for establishing what has already been established. Thus, proposing the reality of the dependent nature is untenable both ultimately and conventionally in the debate.

Indeed, on Bhāviveka's interpretation, the ultimate reality of the dependent nature or the ineffable reality of conditioned things already involves the notion of ultimate existence, and the imagined nature involves the notion of absolute non-existence. The Yogācāras, in Bhāviveka's understanding, have never thoroughly eliminated the dualities, i.e. the imagined nature of the things they have claimed to eliminate to achieve the perfected nature. If they are consistent with their doctrine, in Bhāviveka's opinion, they should also give up the notions of the three natures (which are understood in relation of ultimate existence and absolute non-existence).

Lastly in [4], Bhāviveka goes on to point out the problems of establishing the imagined nature as non-existent:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272c1-c10)

[4] Again, referring to what you have said, [i.e.] “it is neither the case that there is the nature of that which is expressed with regard to that which expresses nor that there is the nature of that which expresses with regard to that which is expressed,” [your] opponents [i.e. us] have no doubt about it, therefore we refute it by pointing out⁴⁰⁹ that you have committed the fallacy of establishing what has already been established. And as you have also said, “therefore the ‘imagined nature’ is essentially non-existent in the existent ‘dependent nature’”; this is also beyond doubt to the other doctrines therefore we refute it by stating that you have committed the fallacy of establishing what has already been established.

If you say that “by attaching to the ‘imagined nature’, i.e. to that which expresses and that which is expressed, there is the efficacy to generate defilements, therefore [the ‘imagined nature’] should be negated”; this is not true either. This is because animals, etc., which do not know the correspondence of that which expresses and that which is expressed, without following the reasoning [that you have explained] also attach to their object spheres and generate defilements.⁴¹⁰

[Although] the teaching on the emptiness of “the imagined nature” possesses various capacities and joys, and also various profound sacred words, it only benefits a few, but not all. Therefore, we do not only establish it as empty. We also put

⁴⁰⁹ Poussin 1933, p. 99 renders “négation” (*pratiṣedha-vacana*) for the Chinese term “遮止言” in the text (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272c1). This translation instead understands it in a general sense as “refute by pointing out”.

⁴¹⁰ Cf. MHK/TJ 5.57, where Bhāviveka argues for the existence of external objects as the source of defilement for animals. This is because animals do not use words to designate things but they still have objects and defilements (Eckel 2008, p. 263); see also Hoornaert 2001b, pp. 40-41, note 10.

an end to this topic which has been discussed only due to the present opportunity (*prasaṅga*); we should discuss the main topic.⁴¹¹

First, Bhāviveka holds that the Yogācāras' claim regarding the non-existence of the imagined nature (i.e. the nature of the correspondence of that which is expressed and that which expresses), has committed the fallacy of establishing what has already been established. This is because Bhāviveka also holds that concepts due to false conceptualisation – such as the dualities of that which is expressed and that which expresses, object and subject, etc. – do not apply in the ultimate truth. Referring to the discussion in [2], he also accepts that conventional existents take the dependent nature as their inherent nature. In the ultimate sense, these things are indeed empty of an ultimate existence (i.e. the imagined nature in the Yogācāras' understanding in his portrayal).

Second, the negation of the imagined nature does not therefore eliminate the defilements of all sentient beings. To the above, the Yogācāras, on Bhāviveka's interpretation, may reply that the negation of imagined nature, which they refer to as the duality of that which expresses and that which is expressed in language, is to eliminate defilements. But Bhāviveka considers this theory of the imagined nature as not being able to fundamentally address the issue of the arising of defilements. To him, it cannot explain the generation of defilements in animals. Although animals cannot refer to things by words and therefore do not have the duality of that which expresses and that which is expressed in language, they still generate defilements because they attach to external objects. Negating this theoretical imagined nature would not help to eliminate their defilements. As the generation of their defilements is not related to the existence or non-existence of such a nature, there must be a more fundamental cause. It may be assumed that this fundamental cause of the defilements of all sentient beings, human and non-human, is that they hold onto the dependently-

⁴¹¹ KR: 又如所說「非如能詮有所詮性，非如所詮有能詮性」，諸敵論者於此無疑，故遮止言「立已成過」。又如所說「故『依他起』自性有上，『遍計所執』自性本無」，此亦他論於是無疑，故遮止言「立已成過」。

若言「由執能詮、所詮『遍計所執自性』，有力生諸煩惱，故須遮止」，此亦不然，諸禽獸等不了能詮、所詮相應，亦於境界不如理執，生煩惱故。

具有種種堪能、意樂，亦有種種微妙聖言，「遍計所執自性」空教唯益少分，不遍一切。故我不獨立之為空，且止傍論，應辯正論。

arisen things and take them as ultimately real. Therefore, the thorough way to eliminate their defilements would be to assist them to understand that objects in their perception do not have an ultimate existence in themselves because these objects arise dependently on conditions. However, there is still the question as to how this can be conveyed to sentient beings other than humans. Thus, Bhāviveka's theory is not better than the Yogācāras' in the sense that it also cannot apply to animals to eliminate their defilements, although it could explain the fundamental cause for the arising of those defilements.

From the above, Bhāviveka concludes his discussion by stating that the Yogācāra doctrine of other-emptiness as portrayed by him – i.e. that conditioned things are empty when they are empty of the imagined nature while possessing the dependent nature – is not applicable universally. It can benefit those human beings whose defilements are partly generated due to the reification of the subject-object duality in relation to language, and who can understand this doctrine. However, as shown in the above, it cannot benefit other sentient beings, whose defilements are not related to language. While this doctrine finds support in the Buddha's teaching in YB, Bhāviveka holds that the Yogācāras' understanding is problematic because it contradicts the notion of emptiness they intended to explicate, thus resulting in the fallacies in their argument. These make their dependent nature and imagined nature at best conventionally real, but not ultimately. As all things, including these natures, are empty ultimately, only the realisation of this can eliminate all defilements.⁴¹² As Bhāviveka considers his discussion sufficient to refute this doctrine, he ends his discussion here.

⁴¹² This discussion may also be related to the topic of whether or not the Buddha's teaching should be taken literally. The Yogācāras, as presented by Bhāviveka, can be considered as understanding the Buddha's teaching in YB or the *Cūḷasuṇṇata Sutta* in a more literal way. In relation to meditative practices, they take what remains as not empty and ultimately real, and eventually develop this notion into the doctrines of the three natures and of consciousness-only. Bhāviveka can be considered as engaging in a more interpretive approach to understand it, while he explains it in terms of the two-truths. Hence, this teaching may be regarded as having explicit and fully explicated meaning (*nītārtha*) to the Yogācāras, but implicit meaning that requires further explication (*neyārtha*) to Bhāviveka.

From this, there may be an alternative reading of Bhāviveka's comment that the Yogācāra doctrine of other-emptiness cannot benefit all: although this doctrine is sophisticated and effective to a certain extent, as it is not the final interpretation of the Buddha's teaching, it can only facilitate limited attainment for practitioners throughout their spiritual progress, and cannot lead them to achieve the ultimate liberation. To Bhāviveka, the things that remain of the Yogācāra doctrine – i.e. in his understanding, the real things and the consciousness, the dependent and perfected natures, and emptiness – should also be empty of ultimate reality. And the ultimate liberation is achieved by the refutation of the inherent existence or nature of all things.

B.5 The view that the inherent existence of conditioned things is emptied by the reasonings that refute it is erroneous

After refuting various notions of non-emptiness and other-emptiness in relation to previous objections, Bhāviveka claims that he has already established the ultimate emptiness of the inherent existence of all conditioned things such as eyes, etc. by the reasonings discussed. However, some other opponents might still not understand that conditioned things are originally without an inherent existence. They might think that these things are empty only because their inherent existence is refuted by Bhāviveka's reasonings. To them, however, the inherent existence of any particular thing can only be refuted by another thing that has an inherent existence, i.e. by another thing that is ultimately real.⁴¹³ Thus, to these opponents, Bhāviveka's reasonings must be ultimately real, as must his claim that he has established the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things through those reasonings. These opponents therefore contend that both Bhāviveka's claim and that to which it refers (i.e. his reasonings) involve mistakes, regardless of whether either is ultimately real or not:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272c11-c14)

[Objection 15:] Thus, the reasonings discussed above are already sufficient to establish that eyes are empty of an inherent existence. Yet, there are some other opponents who make the following objection, “if this claim ‘[the reasonings discussed above] can refute the inherent existence [of all conditioned things]’ is really existent, [then] you refute the thesis you yourself have established, and your reason has become indeterminate. If this claim is not really existent, then it is without an inherent existence, [and therefore] not qualified to be that which refutes.”⁴¹⁴

⁴¹³ It should be noted that the notions of truth and existence are not distinguished in Indian philosophy; see discussion concerning *satya* under Section 1.1 in Part I.

⁴¹⁴ KR: 如是如前所說道理，已具成立眼自性空。復有餘師作如是難：「此『能遮破有自性』言若是實有，失所立宗，因成不定。若非實有，即無自性，不成能破。」

If the claim (“Bhāviveka’s reasonings can refute the inherent existence of all conditioned things”) itself were ultimately real, then Bhāviveka would have committed the fallacy of refuting his own thesis. Bhāviveka’s thesis states that all conditioned things are empty of an inherent existence, or false, in the ultimate sense. Now this claim is a conditioned thing. If Bhāviveka admitted that it is ultimately real, then it would not be false in the ultimate sense, and there would be at least one thing which is conditioned but not empty. Thus, his standpoint would have contradicted and refuted his own thesis. Further, if Bhāviveka accepted the ultimate reality of the claim, then his reason “because conditioned things arise from conditions” would be able to infer both the ultimate emptiness and ultimate reality of conditioned things; it would become indeterminate.⁴¹⁵

However, if this claim were not ultimately real, then it would not have an inherent existence, and what is referred to by it – i.e. Bhāviveka’s reasonings can refute the inherent existence of all conditioned things – would not be ultimately real either. As Bhāviveka’s claim is denied of its ultimate reality, his reasonings cannot refute the inherent existence of conditioned things and cease to be that which refutes.

Bhāviveka responds by denying that this claim represents his standpoint as it is made based on the opponents’ misunderstanding. In Objection 4 he has already refuted the view that conditioned things, which are empty of an inherent existence in the ultimate sense, have no causal efficacy even conventionally. Here, he is not denying the efficacy of this claim or his reasonings (i.e. the referent of this claim) in refuting inherent existence on the conventional level. As he holds that all conditioned things are empty of a nature in themselves in terms of the ultimate truth, these things are considered devoid of inherent existence to start with. Thus, it is not as if Bhāviveka’s refutation or anything other than the things themselves destroys their inherent existence; ultimately, inherent existence never arises. Hence, what Bhāviveka is denying here is the ultimate reality of this claim or his reasonings, and also their efficacy in refuting things’ inherent existence on the ultimate level. For this reason, on the same level, he denies the claim about his reasonings as that which refutes and about inherent existence as that which is refuted. Neither does he admit the fallacies

⁴¹⁵ Cf. VV 1-2.

from taking this claim as either ultimately real or not ultimately real, as attributed to him by the opponents. He responds as follows:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272c14-c28)

[Response:] This is not true either. Just as the Blessed One has said, “Brahmin, you should know that for all sayings regarding reality and unreality that have been said, I would say that they are neither true nor false.”⁴¹⁶ From this sacred teaching and the reasonings that have been said and should be said, neither reality nor unreality can be established in terms of the ultimate truth. For this reason, I did not commit the fallacies that the opponents accused me of committing.⁴¹⁷

Bhāvivēka firstly clarifies that there is neither reality nor unreality in terms of the ultimate truth, and therefore the opponents’ understanding of the claim, his reasonings and the inherent existence of things is erroneous. This is in accordance with the Buddha’s teaching, which explains that for whatever he says, be it about reality or unreality, it is neither true nor false in the ultimate sense. He taught about realities such as the Self to inspire people to virtuous deeds in order to attain better rebirths. He also taught about unrealities such as no-Self to inspire people to abandon their attachments. There are other examples – such as his teachings on death and rebirth, nirvana, etc. – but these are all skilful means (*upāya*). In terms of the ultimate truth, when all conceptual proliferations have ceased, the realities and unrealities, which were once taught or known by speech and thought through conceptualisation, have become undistinguishable and are no longer known as they were. As the nature of things has become ineffable, neither inherent nature nor any other nature is established. Hence, the Buddha, who has reached enlightenment, does not take things to be real or unreal, and neither does he take his teachings to be either true or false in the ultimate sense.⁴¹⁸ The problem with the opponents’ argument is

⁴¹⁶ The Buddha’s saying that his teachings are neither true nor false is found in *The Diamond Sutra* (*Vajracchedikā*), in 14g, where it is said in relation to the things (*dharma*s) known and demonstrated by the Tathāgata, and in 17c, where it is explained that the Tathāgata does not achieve enlightenment through anything (*dharma*) (Conze 2002, p. 157-158, 161); see also Poussin 1933, p. 100, note 3.

⁴¹⁷ KR: 此亦不然。如世尊說：「梵志，當知一切所說實、非實言，我皆說為非實、非妄。」由此聖教及諸已說、當說道理，就勝義諦實與不實皆不建立，是故無有如所說過。

⁴¹⁸ See also MMK 18.6-18.8.

that they are still conceiving and therefore discriminating the nature of things in terms of ultimate reality or unreality. However, reality and unreality are only some forms of inherent nature to be eliminated on one's path to enlightenment. For this reason, the opponents hold an erroneous understanding of the nature of things.

Analysing the opponents' argument, it seems that the way out of the dilemma is to give up postulating the ultimate reality or unreality of the claim, and of Bhāviveka's reasonings and the inherent existence of things which this claim is about. The discussion above shows that this is indeed Bhāviveka's recommendation:

And it is just as what you mean, because the negatum (*niṣedhya*) of the reasonings discussed above [i.e. the inherent existence of all conditioned things] does not exist, neither does the negation (*niṣedha*) [i.e. the reasonings discussed above];⁴¹⁹ it is not the case that the negation does not exist, then the negatum would [really] exist. It is rather that because the negatum in its nature does not exist, neither does the negation. The negation can only explicate that the negatum originally does not have an inherent existence, [but] it cannot destroy the inherent existence of the negatum. Like it is said, “the Bodhisattva cannot empty all things by emptiness, but all things themselves are originally empty in nature,”⁴²⁰ etc. And like when that which illuminates illuminates that which is illuminated, one should not say, “as the illuminated things such as jars, clothes, etc. do not exist, neither does that which illuminates.”⁴²¹ Neither should one say, “the inherent

⁴¹⁹ See a similar comment by Nāgārjuna in Section LXXIII in *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* and commentary in Tola and Dragonetti 1995, pp. 94-95, 155-156. Poussin 1933, p. 100 suggests the Sanskrit equivalents “*niṣedhya*” and “*niṣedha*” for “所遮” and “能遮” (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272c18).

⁴²⁰ Staël-Holstein 1926, p. 94; see also Poussin 1933, p. 100, note 6.

⁴²¹ This quotation seems to refer to the fire analogy, in which the fire's ability to illuminate itself and others is refuted. It does not illuminate itself because wherever there is light there is no darkness; it never illuminates itself because its distinctive characteristic is light. It does not illuminate other things because light and darkness are mutually exclusive; it cannot contact darkness in order to illuminate it. The ability of fire to illuminate things is compared with the instruments of knowledge's ability to know things, i.e. a subject's ability to act on its object. Since the fire's ability is refuted, the ability of these instruments to know should also be refuted; see VV 34-39, MMK 7.8-7.11.

existence of that which is illuminated was originally non-existent but now existent.”⁴²²

Bhāviveka explains that the inherent existence of all conditioned things, i.e. the negatum, which is to be refuted by his reasonings, i.e. the negation, would not therefore remain existent if the negation did not exist. The understanding “without the negation to negate the negatum, then the negatum would exist” is still based on the inherent existence of things. While both the opponents and Bhāviveka agree that this would lead to fallacies in the inference, Bhāviveka rather considers that there neither is the negatum nor the negation. This means that as there is no inherent existence, i.e. the negatum, in all conditioned things in the ultimate sense, the negation, as a conditioned thing, also lacks an inherent existence and is unestablished in the same sense. Thus, ultimately, there is nothing that negates and nothing to be negated. Although the negation does not exist ultimately, as already discussed in Objection 4, it still has the efficacy to refute the inherent existence of things on a conventional level. As the negation is only real conventionally, it cannot destroy the inherent existence, i.e. the negatum, like one tangible thing destroying another. It can only point out that the negatum is originally empty of an inherent existence.⁴²³ For the same reason, Bhāviveka has quoted the Buddha’s teaching that all things are empty in themselves, instead of being emptied by the Bodhisattva by means of emptiness. This is because the Bodhisattva, her teachings on emptiness and emptiness itself are originally empty of an inherent existence. The same is true of Bhāviveka’s reasonings for the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things.

With this understanding, Bhāviveka further clarifies that in the ultimate sense, it is also erroneous to say that the object does not exist therefore the subject does not exist either, as in the case of that which illuminates being non-existent due to the non-existence of that which is illuminated. It is true that explanations of subject-object duality or interdependence are often given to establish the emptiness of

⁴²² KR: 又如汝意，所說道理所遮無故，能遮亦無，非能遮無，所遮便有。但由所遮本性無故，能遮亦無。能遮唯能辯了所遮本無自性，非能破壞所遮自性。如說「菩薩不能以空，空一切法，然一切法本性自空」，乃至廣說。又如能照照所照時，不應說言「瓶、衣等物所照無故，能照亦無」，亦不應言「所照物性本無今有」。

⁴²³ See a similar response by Nāgārjuna in VV 23, 24, 27 and also discussions in VV 11-12, 61-64.

things,⁴²⁴ but Bhāviveka considers even these conventional designations. As things do not have an inherent existence to start with, no subject or object is established in the ultimate sense, and nothing can be established as interdependent. Neither is it right to say that the inherent existence of that which is illuminated was originally non-existent but now has become existent. Buddhists generally agree that something absolutely non-existent cannot become existent. An originally non-existent inherent existence cannot be created, like the voice of the son of a barren woman cannot be produced. Since no inherent existence arises together when a thing arises, this thing is empty of inherent existence originally.

Nevertheless, Bhāviveka does not deny the conventional reality of the claim concerned:

Also the negation, the negatum, that which proves (*sādhana*), that which refutes (*dūṣaṇa*),⁴²⁵ that which is perverted (*viparīta*) and that which is unperverted established by us are all conventional existents. If you refute that which is to be proved or that which proves, then you contradict your own thesis. [You may support this inference:] this claim, [i.e.] “[the reasonings discussed above] can refute [the inherent existence of all conditioned things]” should not be that which proves, because its nature is not real, like the voice emitted by the son of a barren woman. Since you accept that there is such an inference, [which is] that which proves, so should we, because it is conventionally existent.⁴²⁶

⁴²⁴ For example, in various occasions in Madhyamaka literature, both subject and object are considered empty in the ultimate sense because one cannot exist without the other, e.g. MMK 3.6, 18.4. In Yogācāra, the perfected nature, i.e. emptiness, is defined as the non-existence of subject-object duality (see Objection 14). See also the teaching on dependent origination, which explains that when this arises, that arises; when this ceases, that ceases. Each limb in the chain of dependent origination arises and ceases consequently and interdependently. (SN 12.61 in Bhikkhu Bodhi 2005, pp. 595-596) This notion of interdependence is considered conventional in MMK 1.10.

⁴²⁵ See Section 1 in Tachikawa 1971, pp. 120, 140; CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 11a28.

⁴²⁶ KR: 又我所立能遮、所遮、能立、能破、有倒、無倒皆世俗有。若汝遮破所立、能立，即違自宗。「此『能遮』言應非能立，性非實故，如石女兒所發音聲。」汝既許有能立比量，我亦應爾，世俗有故。

He clarifies that the terms he employs in his discussion to establish the emptiness of things – such as the negation, the negatum, that which proves, that which refutes, that which is perverted and that which is unperturbed – are all designations that have an inherent existence conventionally. Although they do not exist ultimately, their existence on the conventional level should not be denied. If the opponents think that denying the ultimate existence of these things amounts to denying these terms even conventionally, then they will have to take that which is to be proved and that which proves, which are admitted as existent conventionally by Bhāviveka, as non-existent absolutely. They would therefore have contradicted their own thesis. This is shown in their objection regarding the ultimate unreality of the claim, which is presented in the following inference:

Thesis: The claim, which states that Bhāviveka's reasonings can refute the inherent existence of all conditioned things, is not that which proves [the ultimate emptiness of these things],

Reason: because its nature is not real, [i.e. it is not ultimately real,]

Positive Example: like the voice emitted by the son of a barren woman.

Based on the reason that the claim, which concerns Bhāviveka's reasonings, is not real ultimately, the opponents wish to establish that it cannot prove the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things. Following their logic, whatever is not real ultimately is not able to prove anything; it is devoid of efficacy even conventionally, like the voice emitted by the son of a barren woman. Although they wish to press Bhāviveka to admit the ultimate reality of the claim concerned, Bhāviveka has already denied it above. It is not a problem for him to admit that the claim is not real in the ultimate sense and not able to prove the emptiness of conditioned things in the same sense, because this is meant to be achieved only conventionally. The positive example, "the voice emitted by the son of a barren woman", which is absolutely non-existent, has become illegitimate. This is because Bhāviveka considers that the property that infers, i.e. "being not ultimately real", means "existent only conventionally", instead of "non-existent even conventionally", as in the case of this positive example. To him, things that are "existent only conventionally" are indeed causally efficacious.

More importantly, the opponents' thesis (i.e. that a claim being not real ultimately cannot prove anything) will be refuted if these opponents apply their logic to their own inference. Granted that their inference is established, as it is also unreal (i.e. "non-existent even conventionally"), it would be unable to prove anything. The thesis would be refuting itself at the same time when it is established, thus failing to establish that a claim being not real ultimately cannot prove anything, which it was meant to establish. Therefore, if these opponents support their inference and hold that it can prove the thesis, i.e. that there are that which proves and that which is to be proved, then they have to admit that their inference is not absolutely unreal, although it lacks an inherent existence. As Bhāviveka accepts that things are not real ultimately, and he has also demonstrated that they are causally efficacious conventionally, the reasonable choice for these opponents to solve the problem in their inference is to admit that it is real only conventionally.

C. Conclusion

At this point, Bhāviveka has refuted all the objections that he regards as in various ways supporting the non-emptiness of conditioned things in the ultimate sense. He proposes to end the dispute here:

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272c28-273a5)

Like what has already been said before, we would rather stop the long dispute, as it will be difficult for those, who are agitated about the meaning of extensive discussion, to accept and remember.

Thus the inference discussed above is free from objections. Therefore, the reasoning of the stated thesis, "in terms of the ultimate truth, the eye faculty is empty of an inherent existence," is established. Further, the stated reason, "because it arises from conditions," only gives a typical reason; in order to negate the inherent existence of the discussed eyes, etc., there are other reasons such as "because they are destructible", "because they change according to conditions", "because they can be produced" and "because sometimes they can produce

false or correct knowledge”. Based on these reasons, as appropriate, one should correctly refute that which is counteracted by these reasons.⁴²⁷

While considering his thesis, “in terms of the ultimate truth, all conditioned things, including the eye faculty, are empty of an inherent existence” proved, Bhāviveka adds that the reason he has given in his inference, “because they arise from conditions”, is only a typical reason to support the proof of this thesis. There are other reasons, such as “because it is destructible” that, for example, can be applied to prove the impermanence of a jar, which was mistakenly considered as permanent by ordinary people; “because it changes according to conditions” to prove the dependent existence of the sun, which they mistakenly considered as unchanging; “because it can be produced” to prove the limited nature of sound, which they mistakenly considered as all-pervading; and “because sometimes it can produce false or correct knowledge” to prove the non-absolute nature of the means of knowledge, which other doctrines mistakenly considered as necessarily valid. Things that are impermanent, dependently existent, limited in nature or non-absolute are also considered to lack an inherent existence. These reasons are equally applicable in proving the ultimate emptiness of eyes. Hence, Bhāviveka lastly comments that they should be used in appropriate circumstances to refute the objections to which they apply. Therefore, they can also prove the ultimate emptiness of all other conditioned things.

⁴²⁷ KR: 如前已說，但止廣淨，諸有厭怖廣文義者，難受持故。

如是如前所說比量無諸障礙，故所立宗謂「就真性眼處性空」道理成就。又所立因「緣生故」者，略舉名相。為遮所說眼等自性，復有餘因謂「可壞故」、「隨緣別故」、「可生起故」、「有時能起邪、正智故」。由此等因，如其所應，隨所對治，應正遮破。

APPENDIX – THE CHINESE TEXT

A.1 The thesis regarding the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things does not contradict direct perception, common knowledge, or Bhāviveka's own doctrine, nor is it self-contradictory

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269a13-a18)

此中一切不空論者皆設難言：「若立一切有為皆空，便無色等。如緣兔角現量智生理不成就，似色等緣諸現量覺亦應不生。然彼實有各別內證。是故汝宗憎背法性，便有違害現量過失及有違害共知過失。撥無一切牧牛人等同所了知眼等體故。」

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269a18-a29)

諸有智者今當遣除朋黨執毒，住處中慧，應共思議我所立宗為當違害自相續中所生現量？為當違害他相續中所生現量？

若言違害自相續中所生現量，諸現量覺就勝義諦自性皆空，眾緣生故，如睡夢中諸現量覺，非實現量，是故我宗且不違害自相續中所生現量。

若言違害他相續中所生現量，非淨眼者顯彼眾多眼瞽眩者所見不實髮、蠅、月等，是虛妄現，違害現量，應正道理，是故我宗亦不違害他相續中所生現量。

若總相說如愚夫等一切世俗所生現量，今此不遮，世俗有故，無容違害。

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269b1-b11)

言有違害共知過失，此亦不然。若言違害自論共知，不應道理，自論許故。設違自論，是違自宗，非是違害共知過失。

若言違害他論共知，亦不應理，一切論興皆為破遣他共知故。

若言違害牧牛人等共所了知，亦不應理。諸佛弟子立一切行皆剎那滅，諸法無我，亦無有情。諸勝論者：「實異色等有異實等。」諸數論者：「覺體非思，

已滅、未生皆是實有。」如是等類廣顯自宗，所有道理皆應說名違害共知，然不應許。以於此中就勝義諦觀察諸法，非關牧牛人等共知。

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269b12)

又立宗中以勝義諦簡別所立，故定無容如說違害，由此亦無違自宗過。

A.2 Although conditioned things are empty of an inherent existence ultimately, it is not fallacious for them to be taken up as the subject of an inference

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269b13-b14)

有餘復言：「性空論者，就勝義諦眼等處空，便有有法不成宗過，亦有所依不成因過。」

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269b15-b17)

此不應理。牧牛人等共所了知極成眼等總為宗故，即說彼法以為因故，此似有法不成宗過，亦似所依不成因過。

A.3 The property that infers, i.e. “arisen from conditions” does not contradict the property to be inferred, i.e. “empty”

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269b18-269b21)

有諸不善正理論者作是難言：「若『就真性，眼等皆空，眾緣生故』，眼等既『空』，云何『緣生』？若『緣生』者，云何『體空』？如是宗、因更相違故，便成與宗相違過失。」

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269b21-b27)

此若矯舉立宗過失，方便顯因無同法喻或不成過，如說「聲是常，一切無常故」，此方便顯非「一切」故，不明了因，有不成過，以「聲」攝在「一切」中故。亦無同喻，如何是「常」，而非「一切」？此不應理。「緣生故」因及「如幻」喻皆共知，故因、喻並成，是故汝難終不能令智者意悅。

A.3.1 It cannot be established logically that whatever is causally efficacious has inherent existence

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269b27-269c1)

有性論者復作是言：「汝應信受眼根有性，有所作故。諸無性者，非有所作，如石女兒。眼有所作，謂生眼識。如所說因，有勢用故，眼定有性。」

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269c1-c7)

此若就彼，非學所成。牧牛等慧所知自性，依世俗說。成立眼等有為有性，便立已成。若就勝義，無同法喻。唯遮異品，所愛義成，不應道理。如計音聲，常住論者說「聲是常，所聞性故。瓶等無常，非所聞性。聲既所聞，是故性常。」又依世間共知同喻，「有所作故」成相違因，能立「眼等」皆是世俗言說所攝，自性有故。

A.3.2 The inference can be established even it is a conditioned thing and empty due to the reflexivity of its thesis

A.3.2.1 The inference is not deficient, although the reason and the example are also conditioned things and included in the subject

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269c8-269c9)

餘復難言：「『有為空』者，若因若喻皆攝在中。種類同故，闕比量過。」

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269c9-c15)

今此頌中總說量果。於觀察時及立量時，眼等一一別立為宗，故無此過。總立一切有為為宗，亦無此過。「緣生故」因二宗皆許，非不成故。若說「眼空，其性空故」，此所說因可有是過。亦非無喻，幻等有故。若立所說喻中幻等以為宗者，便有重立已成過故。

A.3.2.2 The reason is not illegitimate, although it is included in the subject and proved to be empty, should the thesis be established

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269c15-c16)

有少智者作是難言：「若立『一切有為性空』，因有為故，其性亦空，是則此因有不成過。」

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269c17-c26)

此似不成非真不成。如佛弟子立「一切行皆無有我，由有因故」。有難「此因諸行中攝，亦無我故，有不成過」。又數論者立「諸顯事以苦、樂、癡為其自性，與思別故」。有難「此因顯事中攝，亦以樂等為其性故，有不成過」。又勝論者立「聲無常，所作性故」。有難「此因用聲為體，亦無常故，有不成過」。如是等類諸敵論者雖廣勤求立論者過，如所說理畢竟無能破壞他論。若有此理，何處、誰能建立比量壞我所樂、所說道理？

A.3.2.3 It is fallacious to take the reason, which is empty of a self-nature, to be absolutely non-existent

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269c27-c28)

復有難言：「『緣生故』因終不能立所應立義，以性空故，如石女兒所發音聲。」

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269c29-270a12)

此因於自有不成過。若說他宗所許為因，亦不應理。以就他宗說『性空故』，其義未了。若『非有』義，是因義者，此因不成，非『非有』故。若是『虛妄顯現有』⁴²⁸義，是因義者，『石女兒聲』畢竟無故，此喻則無能立之法。又由化聲有不定過，彼能成辦無量有情利樂事故。

⁴²⁸ For this second meaning of “空” (“empty”), instead of “虛妄顯現有” (“existing [in form of] a false appearance”) in CBETA (T30, no. 1578, 270a2), in Poussin 1933, p.81 and in Hatani 1976, p. 106, it is rendered differently in the Zangyao, p. 5 as “虛空顯現有” meaning “space that appears as existent”.

The voice emitted by the son of a barren woman is non-existent absolutely. The present context intends to convey that it cannot be a positive example because of its absolute non-existence. Therefore, what “empty” actually means here should not be “absolutely non-existent”, otherwise the voice emitted by the son of a barren woman would be able to be a positive example. To Bhāviveka, space is an unconditioned thing that does not arise from conditions and is to be proved to be unreal ultimately. It is considered the same as the voice emitted by the son of a barren woman. Hence, it is unlikely that “empty” means “space that appears as existent” in this context. While a “false appearance” is arisen from conditions, the term “existing [in form of] a false appearance” is consistent with Bhāviveka’s understanding of the middle way. This term also appears in Yogācāra literature

又非他宗獨所⁴²⁹許因能立所立，一不成故，猶如他宗所不成因；相違比量所損害故、有太過失所隨逐故。如立「慧等非心相應，行蘊攝故，如名身等」、立「虛空等皆非是常，德所依故，猶如地等」、立「我非思，非顯事故，猶如最勝」。如是等類壞一切宗，過失隨逐。故定應信二宗共許，方名為因。由此道理，如所說過，無容得有。

A.3.2.4 The thesis regarding the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things is reflexive but not fallacious

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270a13-a17)

有餘不善正理論者為顯宗過，復作是言：「若自性空，所立、能立皆不成就，如石女兒所發音聲。能立攝在有為中，故同彼所立，其性亦空。以俱空故，所立、能立並不成就。彼遣所立、能立法體，即是遣於有法自相，顯立宗過。」

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270 a18-a20)

彼因自他互不成故，不決定故，喻有過故，如次前說，亦不應理。雖設異端，終不能掩自宗過失。

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270a20-a28)

有餘復設別異方便掩自宗過，作如是言：「所說『真性有為空』者，此立宗言其義未了。若『就真性，一切有為皆無有實』是立宗義，此所說言亦復攝在有為中，故同諸有為，亦應無實。若所說言非無實者，有為亦應皆非無實。此言破自所立義故，名違自言立宗過失，如立一切言說皆妄。若『就真性，一切有為都無所有』是立宗義，即謗一切皆無所有。如是所立，便墮邪見。」

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270a28-b3)

relating to designations and the imagined nature. As the rendering of the term “虛空顯現有” is rare, this translation follows Poussin’s understanding as “虛妄顯現有”.

⁴²⁹ The character “所” is rendered as “不” (“not”) on CBETA (T30, no. 1578, 270a5). It is edited back to “所” (which is a variant from the earlier editions of the Chinese canon; see note 1 under [269c27] on CBETA) in this translation with reference to Poussin 1933, p. 81, Zangyao, p. 5 and Hatani 1976, p. 107. Otherwise, the subject (i.e. “他宗獨不許因”) of the inference would be the same as the positive example (i.e. “他宗所不成因”) as they refer to the same thing in this context.

此中如說：「我定依於我，誰言他是依？智者我善調，故得昇天樂。」彼就世俗說心為我，就勝義諦立為非我，無違自言立宗過失。此亦如是。此是就世俗性說有眼等，就勝義諦立彼皆空，故無過失。

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270b3-b25)

復如有說：「一切生法，皆歸於死。」牟尼所言，定無虛妄，自身既生，亦應歸死，不相離故。彼所立宗雖能證自亦歸於死，是所許故，無違自言立宗過失。此亦如是。說就真性有為皆空，眾緣生故，所立宗言既眾緣生，亦應性空，不相離故。此立宗言雖能證自言說性空，是所許故，無有自破所立義失。

如梵志言：「世尊，一切我皆不忍。」佛言：「梵志，忍此事不？」此中梵志固忍此事，而言『一切我皆不忍』，彼言違自所許事故，可有違害自所言過。非一切處皆有此失。

世尊餘處說：「一切行皆無有我。」又餘處說：「諸行無常，有生滅法。」若不爾者，既說諸行無我、無常，佛亦應有如所說過，然無彼失。如遮諸行我性、常性，此立宗言亦許同彼無我、常故。此亦如是。說「有為空」，所立宗言亦許性空。此則順成自所許義。是故汝說「此言破自所立義故」，此因不成。

又如數論立諸顯事樂等為性，雖有難言：「顯事若以樂等為性，所立宗言亦應用彼樂等為性。所立宗言若非彼性，顯事亦應非彼為性。」然所立宗無如是過。如立有為無常、無我，亦無如彼所說宗失。此亦如是，無所說過，意所許故。

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270b25-b27)

又彼論者不救所立，而返難言：「若『就真性有為無實』，所說『有為無實』之言，亦應無實。」

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270b27-c1)

此難不能免自宗過。妄說他宗同彼有失，如世癡賊既被推徵不能自雪，而立道理誣譎他言：「汝亦是賊。」此非審察所出言詞。

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c1-c5)

又彼所言：「若『就真性，一切有為都無所有』是立宗義，即謗一切皆無所有，如是所立墮邪見」者，此中宗義，如前廣說，謂『空』、『無性』虛妄顯現門之差別，非一切種皆謗為無。故汝不應作如是難。

A.3.2.5 Establishing conditioned things as empty of self-nature is not a nihilistic view

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c6-c8)

復有餘師懷聰叡慢，作是難言：「若諸有為就勝義諦猶如幻等，空無自性，即是非有。執非有故，便為無見。」

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c8-c23)

彼欲覆障自宗過難，矯設謗言。寧俱有過，勿空論者所立量成，謗勝義諦過失大故。此「非有」言，是遮詮義。汝執此言表彰為勝，我說此言遮止為勝。此「非有」言唯遮「有性」，功能斯盡，無有勢力更詮餘義。如世間說「非白絹」言，不可即執此言詮「黑」，與能說者作立宗過。「非白絹」言唯遮「白絹」，功能斯盡，更無餘力詮表「黑絹」、「赤絹」、「黃絹」。

今此論中，就勝義諦於有為境避常見邊，且遮「有性」。如是餘處，避斷見邊，遮於「無性」。雙避二邊，遮「有、無性」。為避所餘妄執過失，乃至一切心之所行，悉皆遮止。所行若滅，心正隨滅。

又於餘處說：「阿難陀，若執有性，即墮常邊。若執無性，即墮斷邊。」如是餘處說：「迦葉波，有是一邊，無是第二。」

由如是等阿笈摩故，及當所說諸道理故，我所立宗無觸如冀無見過失。

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c25-c27)

有不忍見自宗道理過難所集，為欲隱映，復作是言：「性空論者雖常欣求無分別慧，而恒分別一切有為、無為空性，即是成立遍計所執虛妄分別，失自樂宗。」

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c27)

如是亦遮，故無此過。

A.4 The general quality, instead the particularities, of the subject should be taken up as the property that infers

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c28-c29)

有餘復言：「所說空因，若就世俗，或就勝義，於自、於他，因義不成。」

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c29-271a9)

二宗共許，不顯差別。總相法門明正理者許為因故，汝所立難，似不成過，非真不成。如勝論者立「聲無常，所作性故。」聲常論者說彼過言：「分別因義，咽喉等作，或杖等作，如是分別，因義不成。」如數論者立「能聞等五有情根非所造色，是根性故，猶如意根。」眼等五根造色論者說彼過言：「根性故因，若大造性，或樂等性，於自、於他，如是分別，因義不成。」彼二種說，似不成過，非真不成，故不應理。此亦如是。

B. Conditioned things themselves are originally empty of a self-nature

B.1 The view that an illusion is not empty of a self-nature, but empty of the nature of a real thing is erroneous

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271a9-a16)

復有餘師以聰明慢，貪自宗愛，眯亂慧目，不能觀察善說珍寶、自論鄙穢得失差別，妄顯所立譬喻過言：「咒術、藥力加被華、果、塊塼等物，令其種種象、馬、兔等色相顯現。我宗不許彼自性空，同喻便闕，所立無故。若言『如幻象、馬等相，無有他實象、馬等性，說名為空，眼等亦爾，無他性故，立為空』者，便有宗過，立已成故。」

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271a16-a26)

彼難不然。咒術、藥力加被華、果、塊塼等物，眾緣所生象、馬等相，象等性空，說為喻故，所立義成。

若汝復謂「幻術所作象、馬等事，雖無他實象、馬等性，然不可說彼性空故，此性亦空」，豈非如彼相狀顯現，即有如是諸物自性，如汝所許華、果等物？若爾即應幻術所作象、馬等事，實有如是象、馬等性，然實無有。故知一切幻術所作象、馬等事，自性皆空。是故實有如所說喻，所立義成。亦無成立已成過失，就自性空成立眼等有為空故。

B.2 The view that an illusion is not empty of a substantial existence, but empty in contrast with a real thing is erroneous

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271a27-271b1)

復有諸餘異空慧者，別顯喻過：「雖諸幻土非實土，故說名為空，然彼幻土自性不空，有虛妄現土相體故。由此道理，如先所立，句義不成，喻不成故。」

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271b1-b5)

今應詰彼：「此虛妄現幻土相體從緣生不？」彼作是答：「此從緣生。」若爾，何故復名虛妄？以如所顯現，不如有故。豈非眼等亦從緣生，如所顯現不如有？同喻成故，性空義成。汝應信受。

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271b5-b9)

彼作是言：「不應信受，以諸幻土非如實土。堪審觀察，待彼實土此虛妄故，說名為空。非汝等立離前所說眼等有為，別有眼等。堪審觀察，待彼說此，眼等性空，可令信受。」

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271b9-b19)

雖無離此所說眼等別有眼等，然有如是「性空」、「緣生」，所立、能立二法成就。但由此喻，足能證成所喻義故。

汝今分別法、喻別故，便成分別相似過類。顯敵論者自慧輕微，如勝論者說：「聲無常，所作性故，譬如瓶等。」不應難言：「瓶等泥團、輪等所成，可燒、可見、棒所擊破，可是無常。聲既不爾，應非無常。」此亦分別法、喻別故，故成分別相似過類。故應信受眼等性空，「性空」不離「緣生」因故。

又如「相現即有自性」先已破故，此亦應爾。故汝等言不能解雪自宗過難。

B.3 The view that everything is not empty of the existence of everything is erroneous

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271b20-b23)

有數論師作如是難：「我立大等諸轉變聚是所顯性，『緣生故』因有不成過。一切皆有一切體故，諸根遍在一切處故，彼幻土中亦有此體。立此性空，無同法喻。」

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271b23-c3)

此中且依色覺觀察。謂諸色覺非緣所顯，隨彼別緣有轉異故。如隨泥團、輪、杖、陶師心欲樂等差別眾緣，有瓶、盆等，或大或小。如是眼等眾緣差別色覺，隨彼種種轉異⁴³⁰；隨眼明、昧，覺利、鈍故；隨青等色境界差別，覺似青等顯現異故。「世間現見是所顯物，不隨彼緣差別轉變，猶如明燈、藥、珠、日等所顯種種環釧等物。」色覺不爾。如觀色覺，眼等亦然。此義成實世間共了，故所說因無不成過。

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271c4-c14)

⁴³⁰ The characters “隨彼” (“according to those”) on CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271b27 are rendered as “彼隨” (“they are according to”) in Zangyao, p. 8. With this understanding, the text would be changed from “如是眼等眾緣差別色覺，隨彼種種轉異” (“Thus, different cognitions of matter [that arise from] numerous conditions such as eyes, etc. change according to those various [different conditions]”) to “如是眼等眾緣差別色覺，彼隨種種轉異” (“Thus, [regarding] the cognitions of matter of different numerous conditions such as eyes, etc.; they change according to those various changes in conditions”); hence resulting in the difference in the referent of “彼” as “those various [different conditions]” in the former and as “they” which are “the cognitions of matter” in the latter. Since there is no difference in the overall meaning in either case, i.e. the cognitions of matter change according to the differences or changes in conditions, this translation follows the former.

又汝所言「一切皆有一切體」等，為據顯事？為據隱用？

若據顯事執「一切有一切體」者，如於瓶處有瓶顯事，於盆等處亦應遍有此瓶顯事，遍有體故，如是一瓶即應遍滿無量百千踰膳那處。於瓶等處亦應具有盆等顯事。非瓶顯事被隱映故，盆等顯事亦被隱映，形量大故。形量大者，應為轉大形量隱映。瓶等顯事盆等顯事所隱映故，一切處時應不可得。是故汝宗據其顯事「一切皆有一切體」者，不應道理。

若據隱用執「一切有一切體」者，如是所執要廣觀察，方可正知是實非實，恐文煩過不廣觀察。

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271c14-c16)

汝宗亦許幻土顯處，實土顯空，我所立喻無不成過，是故所立性空義成。汝數論師非處投寄。

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271c17-c21)

亦非「諸根遍一切處，有所因故，如根依處」。如是「能為樂、苦、癡覺生因故」等多種證因，亦應廣說。由破「諸根遍一切處」故，幻土中無諸根體，非所立「空」無同法喻。是故汝成虛妄分別，魍魎所魅作如是計。

B.4 The view that emptiness is the non-existence of the imagined nature in the existent dependent nature is erroneous

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271c22-272a10)

相應論師有作是說：「汝就『真性』立『有為空，緣生故』者，若此義言『諸有為法從眾緣生，非自然有，就『生無性』立彼為空』，是則述成相應師義，符會正理。」

「又如是說：『由彼故空，彼實是無。依此故空，此實是有。』如是空性是天人師如實所說。此教意言『遍計所執』『依他起』上自性本無，非彼性故。以非如能詮有所詮性，亦非如所詮有能詮性，故『依他起自性』有上『遍計所執

自性』本無。『由彼故空』，即妄計事，彼自性無；『依此故空』，即緣生事，此自性有。此若無者，則為斷滅，於何事上說誰為空？此緣生事，即說名為『依他起性』。依此得有色、受、想等自性、差別假立性轉。此若無者，假法亦無，便成無見。不應與言，不應共住。自墮惡趣，亦令他墮。如是成立『遍計所執自性』為空及『依他起自性』為有，契當正理。」

「若此義言『依他起性』亦無所有，故立為空』，汝便墮落如上所說過失深坑，亦復成就誹謗世尊聖教過失。」

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272a11-a14)

此中尚與發趣餘乘及諸外道欣求善說，離慳嫉者，廣興諍論，何況同趣一乘諸師？論時至故，少共決擇此事。廣如《入真甘露》已具分別，故不重辯，怖廣文者不欣樂故。

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272a15-a26)

言「有為法從眾緣生，非自然有，就『生無性』說彼為空」，此有何義？若此義言「眼等有為『依他起』上不從因生，常、無滅壞。眼等自性畢竟無故，說名為空」，便立已成，同類、數論、勝論等宗皆共許故。

然說「眼等非所作空⁴³¹，自性空故」，應言「『無生』、『無性』故空」，不應說言「就『生無性』說彼為空」。若彼起時，就勝義諦有自性生，云何說為「生無自性」？若實無生，此體無故，不應說有「唯識實性」，若爾則有違自宗過。

若「依他起」自然生性空無有故，說之為空，是則還有立已成過。既許「依他」，眾緣而生實不空故，應不名空。我則不爾。云何述⁴³²成相應師義？

⁴³¹ The characters “所作空” are rendered as “所作宗” on CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272a19. They are edited back to “所作空” (which is a variant from the earlier editions of the Chinese canon; see note 1 under [271c22] on CBETA) according to Zangyao, p. 9, and with reference to Hatani 1976, p. 115 and Poussin 1933, p. 96.

⁴³² Zangyao, p. 9 renders the character “述” (which is a variant from the earlier editions of the Chinese canon; see note 2 under [271c22]), instead of “迷” on CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272a26. The sentence “云何述成相應師義” then means “why do [you say that] we state and establish the

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272a26-b15)

又如所說「由彼故空，彼實是無。依此故空，此實有」等，若因緣力所生眼等一切世間共許實有是諸愚夫覺慧所行。世俗似有自性顯現，以勝義諦覺慧尋求，猶如幻士，都無實性，是故說言「由彼故空，彼實是無」，為欲遮墮常邊過故。

如為棄捨墮常邊過，說彼為「無」；亦為棄捨墮斷邊過，說此為「有」。謂因緣力所生眼等世俗諦攝，自性是有，不同空華全無有物，但就真性立之為空，是故說言「依此故空，此實是有」。如是空性是天人師如實所說。若就此義說「依他起自性」是有，則為善說。

如是自性我亦許故，隨順世間言說所攝福德、智慧二資糧故，世俗假立所依有故，假法亦有。然復說言「此若無者，假法亦無，便成無見。不應與語...」，如是等過皆不成就。

又若建立「『依他起性』世俗故有」，便立已成。若立「此性勝義諦有」，無同法喻。如已遮遣執「定有性」，亦當遮遣執「定無性」，是故不應謗言、增益、損減所說「依他起性」。

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272b16-b28)

若言「我宗立有幻等離言實性，同喻無故，非能立者，離言實性道理不成，故無有過」；若爾，外道所執離言實性我等，誰能遮破？彼亦說「有實性我等，非慧、非言之所行故」。

若眾緣力所生一切「依他起性」就勝義諦有自性者，幻士應有實士自性。若有他性，亦不應理，牛上不應有驢性故。作、非作性、實有、實無、有性、無性二俱攝受。如此所立，無同法喻，或立已成。二過所染，故不應理。

Yogācāras' doctrine?" as in my translation. This resembles a similar phrase “是則述成相應師義” in the first paragraph of the Yogācāras' objection. As the term “迷成” on CBETA is rare and the meaning it renders “why do [you say that] we have mistakenly established the Yogācāras' doctrine?” can be confusing, this translation follows Zangyao and has edited “迷” to “述”.

又從緣生諸有為法就勝義諦若許有性，「所作故」因證彼性空、遣彼性有，故所立宗違比量過。諸從緣生皆共了知世俗有性。若有定執勝義諦有，應以此理遮破彼宗。又彼不應攝受此論，就勝義諦二種分別，不應理故。

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272c1-c10)

又如所說「非如能詮有所詮性，非如所詮有能詮性」，諸敵論者於此無疑，故遮止言「立已成過」。又如所說「故『依他起』自性有上，『遍計所執』自性本無」，此亦他論於是無疑，故遮止言「立已成過」。

若言「由執能詮、所詮『遍計所執自性』，有力生諸煩惱，故須遮止」，此亦不然，諸禽獸等不了能詮、所詮相應，亦於境界不如理執，生煩惱故。

具有種種堪能、意樂，亦有種種微妙聖言，「遍計所執自性」空教唯益少分，不遍一切。故我不獨立之為空，且止傍論，應辯正論。

B.5 The view that the self-natures of conditioned things are emptied by the reasonings that refute them is erroneous

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272c11-c14)

如是如前所說道理，已具成立眼自性空。復有餘師作如是難：「此『能遮破有自性』言若是實有，失所立宗，因成不定。若非實有，即無自性，不成能破。」

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272c14-c28)

此亦不然。如世尊說：「梵志，當知一切所說實、非實言，我皆說為非實、非妄。」由此聖教及諸已說、當說道理，就勝義諦實與不實皆不建立，是故無有如所說過。

又如汝意，所說道理所遮無故，能遮亦無，非能遮無，所遮便有。但由所遮本性無故，能遮亦無。能遮唯能辯了所遮本無自性，非能破壞所遮自性。如說「菩薩不能以空，空一切法，然一切法本性自空」，乃至廣說。又如能照照所

照時，不應說言「瓶、衣等物所照無故，能照亦無」，亦不應言「所照物性本無今有」。

又我所立能遮、所遮、能立、能破、有倒、無倒皆世俗有。若汝遮破所立、能立，即違自宗。「此『能遮』言應非能立，性非實故，如石女兒所發音聲。」汝既許有能立比量，我亦應爾，世俗有故。

C. Conclusion

(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272c28-273a5)

如前已說，但止廣諍，諸有厭怖廣文義者，難受持故。

如是如前所說比量無諸障難，故所立宗謂「就真性眼處性空」道理成就。又所立因「緣生故」者，略舉名相。為遮所說眼等自性，復有餘因謂「可壞故」、「隨緣別故」、「可生起故」、「有時能起邪、正智故」。由此等因，如其所應，隨所對治，應正遮破。

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